从震网病毒分析“网络物理战”作用机理

震网病毒被认为是史上第一种"网络物理战"武器,文章介绍了两个版本震网病毒的作用机理,分析了网络物理战的作战思想,提出了层次化的网络空间、过程中的网络漏洞和网络物理威慑等新概念,并总结了其对网络战研究的启示。     

Cyber War Will Not Take Place

A large collection of captured documents from the very highest levels of the Iraqi government offers a chance to gain insight into why Saddam Hussein was unwilling and unable to alter his strategy on the eve of the 2003 war that toppled his regime. This paper explores some of the perceptions and misperceptions that Saddam Hussein took away from the 1991 Gulf War and shows how they affected his decisionmaking on the eve of the war in 2003. It concludes with some thoughts on the policy implications of these findings.     

IS STUXNET PHYSICAL? DOES IT MATTER?

Cyber-weapons are software and software, at least intuitively, is non-physical. Several authors have noted that this potentially renders problematic the application of normative frameworks like UN Charter Article 2(4) to cyber-weapons. If Article 2(4) only proscribes the use of physical force, and if cyber-weapons are non-physical, then cyber-weapons fall outside the purview of Article 2(4). This article explores the physicality of software, examining Stuxnet in particular. First, I show that with a few relatively uncontroversial metaphysical claims we can secure the conclusion that Stuxnet is physical. In particular, there exist instances of Stuxnet that are both located in space and causally efficacious, and this is very strong evidence for their being physical. Second, I argue that the question of physicality is actually irrelevant for the moral evaluation of an attack like Stuxnet because of its undeniably physical effects. Finally, I argue that some features of Stuxnet should make us optimistic about the prospects for discrimination and proportionality in cyberwarfare.     

SHADOW WARS

The Secret War with Iran: The 30-Year Clandestine Struggle Against the World's Most Dangerous Terrorist Power, by Ronen Bergman. Free Press, 2008. 432 pages, $28

Fallout: The True Story of the CIA's Secret War on Nuclear Trafficking, by Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz. Free Press, 2011. 304 pages, $26.

The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year War with Iran, by David Crist. Penguin Press, 2012. 638 pages, $36.

Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War, by Yaakov Katz and Yoaz Hendel. Potomac Books Inc., 2012. 254 pages, $30.

Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel's Secret Wars, by Dan Raviv. Levant, 2012. 356 pages, $17.

Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, by David E. Sanger. Crown Publishers, 2012. 476 pages, $28.     

Cyber-weapons in nuclear counter-proliferation

ABSTRACT

Under what conditions are cyber-weapons effective in nuclear counter-proliferation? With continued interest in nuclear proliferation professed by Iran, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia, a discussion of the effectiveness of counter-proliferation measures remains relevant. Cyber-attacks as military option in a state-on-state conflict still requires additional corroborating evidence to make conclusions about its long-term effectiveness. This work analyses the general applicability of cyber-weapons and their usefulness in nuclear counter-proliferation. Through a comparative case study of Operation Orchard, Stuxnet, and recent “Left-of-Launch” operations against North Korea, the essay finds that cyber-operations are not particularly effective against nuclear programmes that are in the later stages of their development. They can disrupt and delay a nuclear programme temporarily, if the attack remains clandestine, but cannot halt nuclear proliferation all together. However, effectiveness increases if they are used in combination with conventional weapons. The article addresses a topic of interest to national-level decision-makers: whether cyber-operations can and should play a role in nuclear counter-proliferation.