WHO IS THE ENEMY?

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and who benefits when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by engaging in actions against the common enemy. We determine the leadership structure under which each group is better off, as well as the circumstance that the common enemy prefers. We are able to state simple and general conditions for each group and the common enemy to benefit.     

Uranium yellowcake trafficking incidents in Africa

The perpetuation of an otherwise astute fissile material safeguards model by the current non-proliferation regime raises a number of concerns, not least the efficacy of the approach in reducing clandestine weapon developments and the nuclear terrorism threat. Mindful of potential shifts in illicit nuclear material and weapon acquisition, following an excessive focus on fissile material safeguards and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology, this article uses proliferation trend and scenario analysis in a bid to identify potential proliferation threats and non-proliferation opportunities. The results of the article's assessment of reported incidents (1992–2013) involving theft, unauthorised possession, and attempts to smuggle or sell highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, low-enriched uranium (LEU), natural uranium and uranium yellowcake reveal a decline in occurrences involving fissile material but an increase in uranium yellowcake incidents, particularly in Africa. Presumptions that yellowcake may have provided the newest threat to clandestine weapon developments and nuclear terrorism wane amid concerns over possible biases in reporting, scepticism over an organised and demand-driven nuclear black market, and the difficulties of non-state actors’ development of crude nuclear weapons off the tedious yellowcake conversion-enrichment-fabrication pathway. To secure Africa's uranium yellowcake from potential proliferators, the article proposes concerted domestic, regional and multilateral non-proliferation efforts.     

Modelling the demand for national security expenditure: a note

In the past, national security for the majority of countries was almost exclusively associated with an external military threat emanating from a rival state(s). This was reflected in the standard models for the demand for military expenditure. The emergence of new security challenges such as terrorism, transnational crime networks, failed and rogue states, has profoundly affected the international security environment and the concept of national security. This note develops a model for the demand for national security expenditure adopting a broader, more inclusive definition of national security and includes concomitant budgetary outlets to meet the new security challenges.     

THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

The July 2005 terrorist attacks in London demonstrated the resilience of Western society in the face of low-level conventional terrorism. But the psychological damage from the London bombings would likely pale next to the severe, unpredictable, long-lasting effects of a radiological attack. One unique hazard of radiation exposure beyond the obvious physiological effects is that it is colorless, odorless, and tasteless, making it difficult for ordinary citizens to evaluate, quantify, and rationally understand the dangers confronting them. Radiological weapons stand out among the tools available to terrorists for their capacity to inflict far-reaching psychological damage to civilian populaces well beyond the immediate victims. A possible solution to mitigate the psychological consequences is to build a “resilience culture,” an interlocking set of beliefs, attitudes, approaches, and behaviors that help people fare better in any disaster or extraordinary circumstance. The “all-hazards approach,” which emphasizes the identifiable similarities among the “disaster triad”—that is, natural, accidentally man-made, and intentionally man-made disasters—extends to acts of terrorism and could help demystify the fears associated with radiological terrorist weapons.     

From the Editors

Israel's policy of military reprisals has never seemed to follow any consistent pattern of tit‐for‐tat. On the one hand, not every violent incident was answered with a counterattack. On the other hand, when Israel responded, frequently it employed an excessive amount of force, which was disproportional to the Arab provocation. This behavior has not been the consequence of a premeditated and rational strategy. Instead, it appears to have been the result of a political dispute between alternative approaches regarding the use of military force. The following research analyzes the development of this controversy and how these differences of opinion were resolved.     

Terrorism,crime and public spending: Panel VAR evidence from europe

Within a panel VAR framework and utilizing generalized impulse response and forecast error variance decomposition analysis, we explore the dynamic effects of terrorism and crime on public order and safety spending across European countries during the period 1994–2006. Our findings show that a ‘shock’ in terrorism and/or in crime, significantly increases the subsequent trajectory of public order and safety spending. As a by-product, we find that public spending is ineffective in reducing observed crime or terrorism.     

The Dark Side of Extended Deterrence: Thinking through the State Sponsorship of Terrorism

States employ extended deterrence to shield third parties from aggression. The concept is traditionally applied to interstate relations, collective security arrangements, and strategic considerations. The protective relationship that exists between a state sponsor of terrorism and its non-state militant proxy is rarely considered. This article will introduce and explore the sponsor–proxy relationship in the context of extended deterrence, and relate it to Iran’s support and sponsorship of political violence, militancy, and terrorism in Europe. The article reviews the rationale states have for sponsoring terrorism, and illustrates the promises and pitfalls associated with extending deterrence to non-state militants.     

On the Determinants of Terrorism Risk Concern in Europe

We investigate whether differences in terrorism risk are mirrored on terrorism risk perception across European countries for the period 2003–2007. We find that the average propensity for terrorism risk concern is affected by actual risk levels. Country and individual heterogeneity contribute substantially to the variation of observed risk perception. Singles and individuals with white collar jobs are less likely to mention terrorism as one of the most pressing issues their country faces, while political positioning towards the right makes it more likely to be concerned about terrorism. As far as competing risks are concerned, we find that the likelihood terrorism is mentioned, decreases with spending on pensions as a percentage of GDP being higher. Finally, based on the Bayesian framework, we also examined the formation of terrorism risk perceptions, and decompose the observed country-level time series of terrorism activity into a long- and a short-run component. We concluded that the observed risk perception variation is only explained by the long-term trend of terrorism activity countries face.     

DEFENSIVE COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Unlike most of the literature, this paper includes domestic political considerations in which two countries must decide defensive countermeasures against a common terrorist threat. A delegation problem arises as voters strategically choose a policymaker whose preferences differ from their own. As a consequence, countries limit the presumed oversupply of defensive countermeasures. Thus, the inclusion of domestic politics gives a new perspective on counterterrorism. The timing of elections is also shown to make a difference.