主要国家航天力量建设节点

航天力量是各主要军事强国重点投入建设的新型作战力量。本文以航天产业军民两用的天然技术属性作为切入点,从各主要军事强国商业、民用航天的规划建设中研判分析航天力量短期、中期、长期的建设节点,对航天力量走向战场需要突破的瓶颈进行思考,就航天力量建设问题提出思考。     

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

As the potential for the involvement of corporations in the manufacture of nuclear weapons has increased, particularly through dual-use technology, global regulation has failed to keep pace. Where regulation of private corporations does exist, in the form of treaties, UN resolutions, or more informal arrangements, the obligations fall only on states. This state of affairs is a result of international law's traditional deference to state sovereignty; yet, it has led to significant shortcomings in the global regulatory regime, where states are unwilling or unable to meet their obligations. While radical departures from the traditional model of international law might remove the regulatory gaps caused by noncompliant states, such changes are unrealistic in the current political climate. More realistic changes must be focused on, offering greater recognition of the role of private corporations in nuclear proliferation and increasing state compliance with existing regulation.     

The “yellow rain” controversy: Lessons for arms control compliance

Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam recently announced that they are launching nuclear energy programs, and Malaysia and the Philippines soon may follow suit. As a result, by 2020, at least three states in Southeast Asia could possess latent nuclear capabilities—the option to pursue military applications of dual-use nuclear technology. Analysis of the nuclear programs, domestic proliferation pressures, and the external threat environment in Southeast Asia leads the authors to conclude that the nuclear intentions of states in that region are entirely peaceful and the probability of future nuclear breakout there is low. However, this finding does not justify complacency. In the long term, the benign outlook for regional security may change, and in the near term weak regulatory regimes present serious challenges to nuclear safety and create opportunities that non-state actors may exploit. To minimize these risks, the authors recommend creating a “proliferation firewall” around the region, which would combine strong global support for Southeast Asian nuclear energy programs with innovative regional multilateral nuclear arrangements.     

Iran's nuclear programme: civil and/or military goals?

The ultimate goal of Iran's nuclear programme remains uncertain. While the nuclear reactor of Bushehr has finally been connected to the power grid, the nuclear fuel enrichment activities and their location cause concern to the international community. Thirty years of nuclear investments demonstrate a negative cost–benefit analysis: technical constraints and economic and infrastructural requirements constitute a burden on the implementation of a nuclear programme. This article analyses the economic, legal, technical and political aspects of the Iranian programme in order to uncover its civil and/or military finality.     

STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS IN TAIWAN

Because it is a producer and supplier of high-tech dual-use goods as well as a major transit point for WMD-related and military items, Taiwan represents an important case study of national export control systems. Taiwan is not an official member of the major multilateral export control regimes, yet it remains committed to nonproliferation goals. The article explores the strategic trade controls of Taiwan within the context of its nonproliferation policies and commitments. The author discusses the strong and weak aspects of Taiwan's strategic trade controls by looking in detail at key components of the country's export-import control system: legal basis, licensing system, enforcement and compliance mechanism, government-industry outreach, and adherence to nonproliferation treaties and multilateral export control regimes.     

Making Us Disarmament Commitments Credible

President Barack Obama's 2009 commitment to pursue a world without nuclear weapons struck some as incredible given political resistance to arms control treaties and unilateral reductions. This viewpoint describes steps that can demonstrate a commitment to nuclear disarmament that do not rely on warhead dismantlement. These steps include the collation and release of nuclear data; the renovation and construction of facilities to new transparency standards; and the selective modification of conventional weapon systems. The steps may make a disarmament agreement more likely by assuaging the difficulty the United States will have committing to a verification scheme, given its capacity to circumvent such a scheme. A more credible disarmament pledge could also secure substantial fiscal and diplomatic gains.