Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks

The inspection game is a two-player noncooperative game that models a situation where an inspector verifies whether the inspectee complies with the rules (on the assumption that the inspectee has the tendency to violate at least one of the rules). The usual approach in the analysis of this game seeks to find an optimal strategic inspection scheme for each of the two players yielding favorable payoffs. Recently, there have been some developments in the study of such games that use a mathematical structure known as reaction network involving a set of molecular species and the existing reactions among these species. In this paper, we use a reaction network to analyze the inspection game giving an alternative way of modeling the social situation. The molecular species play the role of the players' decision moves and their resulting gain or loss, while the reactions are the encounters of the decisions of the players which, as expected, yield payoffs. We reexamine the dynamics of the inspection game through the lens of reaction network theory and consider various situations that call for more detailed analyses such as equal or unequal reaction rates and inspection leadership. Conditions concerning reaction rates, initial population of decision species, benefits, and costs are determined in order to identify strategies that yield better payoffs both for the inspector and inspectee. These results illustrate practical insights rooted from the formulated simple game models.     

Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds

This article discusses a two‐player noncooperative nonzero‐sum inspection game. There are multiple sites that are subject to potential inspection by the first player (an inspector). The second player (potentially a violator) has to choose a vector of violation probabilities over the sites, so that the sum of these probabilities do not exceed one. An efficient method is introduced to compute all Nash equilibria parametrically in the amount of resource that is available to the inspector. Sensitivity analysis reveals nonmonotonicity of the equilibrium utility of the inspector, considered as a function of the amount of resource that is available to it; a phenomenon which is a variant of the well‐known Braess paradox. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016     

Exact analysis of (R,s, S) inventory control systems with lost sales and zero lead time

We study an (R, s, S) inventory control policy with stochastic demand, lost sales, zero lead‐time and a target service level to be satisfied. The system is modeled as a discrete time Markov chain for which we present a novel approach to derive exact closed‐form solutions for the limiting distribution of the on‐hand inventory level at the end of a review period, given the reorder level (s) and order‐up‐to level (S). We then establish a relationship between the limiting distributions for adjacent values of the reorder point that is used in an efficient recursive algorithm to determine the optimal parameter values of the (R, s, S) replenishment policy. The algorithm is easy to implement and entails less effort than solving the steady‐state equations for the corresponding Markov model. Point‐of‐use hospital inventory systems share the essential characteristics of the inventory system we model, and a case study using real data from such a system shows that with our approach, optimal policies with significant savings in inventory management effort are easily obtained for a large family of items.     

Non‐zero‐sum nonlinear network path interdiction with an application to inspection in terror networks

A simultaneous non‐zero‐sum game is modeled to extend the classical network interdiction problem. In this model, an interdictor (e.g., an enforcement agent) decides how much of an inspection resource to spend along each arc in the network to capture a smuggler. The smuggler (randomly) selects a commodity to smuggle—a source and destination pair of nodes, and also a corresponding path for traveling between the given pair of nodes. This model is motivated by a terrorist organization that can mobilize its human, financial, or weapon resources to carry out an attack at one of several potential target destinations. The probability of evading each of the network arcs nonlinearly decreases in the amount of resource that the interdictor spends on its inspection. We show that under reasonable assumptions with respect to the evasion probability functions, (approximate) Nash equilibria of this game can be determined in polynomial time; depending on whether the evasion functions are exponential or general logarithmically‐convex functions, exact Nash equilibria or approximate Nash equilibria, respectively, are computed. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 139–153, 2017     

The economic effects of inspector error on attribute sampling plans

In this paper the effects of inspector error on a cost-based quality control system are investigated. The system examined is of a single sampling plan design involving several cost components. Both type I and type II inspector errors are considered. The model employs a process distribution, thus assuming that a stochastic process of some kind governs the quality of incoming lots. Optimal plan design is investigated under both error-free and error-prone inspection procedures and some comparisons are made.     

Using container inspection history to improve interdiction logistics for illicit nuclear materials

Strengthening the United States' ability to prevent adversaries from smuggling nuclear materials into the country is a vital and ongoing issue. The prospect of additional countries, such as Iran, obtaining the know‐how and equipment to produce these special nuclear materials in the near future underscores the need for efficient and effective inspection policies at ports and border crossings. In addition, the reduction of defense and homeland security budgets in recent years has made it increasingly important to accomplish the interdiction mission with fewer funds. Addressing these complications, in this article, we present a novel two‐port interdiction model. We propose using prior inspection data as a low‐cost way of increasing overall interdiction performance. We provide insights into two primary questions: first, how should a decision maker at a domestic port use detection data from the foreign port to improve the overall detection capability? Second, what are potential limitations to the usefulness of prior inspection data—is it possible that using prior data actually harms decision making at the domestic port? We find that a boundary curve policy (BCP) that takes into account both foreign and domestic inspection data can provide a significant improvement in detection probability. This BCP also proves to be surprisingly robust, even if adversaries are able to infiltrate shipments during transit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 433‐448, 2013     

Allocation of resources of modular sizes with an application to Internet Protocol (IP) address allocation

We consider a resource allocation problem, where resources of different capacities must satisfy multiple demands. The demand sizes and the resource capacities are limited to sizes that are power‐of‐two integers (i.e., 1, 2, 4, 8, …). The cost of the resources exhibit economies‐of‐scale savings, i.e., the cost per capacity unit is smaller for resources with larger capacity. The problem is to select the minimum‐cost set of resources that satisfies the demands, while each of the demands must be assigned to a single resource and the number of selected resources does not exceed a specified upper bound. We present algorithms that take advantage of the special structure of the problem and provide optimal solutions in a negligible computing effort. This problem is important for the allocation of blocks of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, referred to as subnets. In typical IP networks, subnets are allocated at a large number of nodes. An effective allocation attempts to balance the volume of excess addresses that are not used versus fragmentation of addresses at nodes to too many subnets with a discontinuous range of addresses. Due to the efficiency of the algorithms, they can readily be used as valuable modules in IP address management systems. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

A good simple percentile estimator of the weibull shape parameter for use when all three parameters are unknown

In this paper we consider a simple three-order-statistic asymptotically unbiased estimator of the Weibull shape parameter c for the case in which all three parameters are unknown. Optimal quantiles that minimize the asymptotic variance of this estimator, c? are determined and shown to depend only on the true (unknown) shape parameter value c and in a rather insensitive way. Monte Carlo studies further verified that, in practice where the true shape parameter c is unknown, using always c? with the optimal quantities that correspond to c = 2.0 produces estimates, c?, remarkably close to the theoretical optimal. A second stage estimation procedure, namely recalculating c? based on the optimal quantiles corresponding to c?, was not worth the additional effort. Benchmark simulation comparisons were also made with the best percentile estimator of Zanakis [20] and with a new estimator of Wyckoff, Bain and Engelhardt [18], one that appears to be the best of proposed closed-form estimators but uses all sample observations. The proposed estimator, c?, should be of interest to practitioners having limited resources and to researchers as a starting point for more accurate iterative estimation procedures. Its form is independent of all three Weibull parameters and, for not too large sample sizes, it requires the first, last and only one other (early) ordered observation. Practical guidelines are provided for choosing the best anticipated estimator of shape for a three-parameter Weibull distribution under different circumstances.     

Some probability functions in reliability and their applications

There has been much research on the general failure model recently. In the general failure model, when the unit fails at its age t, Type I failure (minor failure) occurs with probability 1 ? p(t) and Type II failure (catastrophic failure) occurs with probability p(t). In the previous research, some specific shapes (constant, non‐decreasing, or bathtub‐shape) on the probability function p(t) are assumed. In this article, general results on some probability functions are obtained and applied to study the shapes of p(t). The results are also applied to determining the optimal inspection and allocation policies in maintenance problems. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

The one‐warehouse multiretailer problem with an order‐up‐to level inventory policy

We consider a two‐level system in which a warehouse manages the inventories of multiple retailers. Each retailer employs an order‐up‐to level inventory policy over T periods and faces an external demand which is dynamic and known. A retailer's inventory should be raised to its maximum limit when replenished. The problem is to jointly decide on replenishment times and quantities of warehouse and retailers so as to minimize the total costs in the system. Unlike the case in the single level lot‐sizing problem, we cannot assume that the initial inventory will be zero without loss of generality. We propose a strong mixed integer program formulation for the problem with zero and nonzero initial inventories at the warehouse. The strong formulation for the zero initial inventory case has only T binary variables and represents the convex hull of the feasible region of the problem when there is only one retailer. Computational results with a state‐of‐the art solver reveal that our formulations are very effective in solving large‐size instances to optimality. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Maximizing the ratio of two convex functions over a convex set

The purpose of this article is to present an algorithm for globally maximizing the ratio of two convex functions f and g over a convex set X. To our knowledge, this is the first algorithm to be proposed for globally solving this problem. The algorithm uses a branch and bound search to guarantee that a global optimal solution is found. While it does not require the functions f and g to be differentiable, it does require that subgradients of g can be calculated efficiently. The main computational effort of the algorithm involves solving a sequence of subproblems that can be solved by convex programming methods. When X is polyhedral, these subproblems can be solved by linear programming procedures. Because of these properties, the algorithm offers a potentially attractive means for globally maximizing ratios of convex functions over convex sets. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Repression Substitution: Shifting Human Rights Violations in Response to UN Naming and Shaming

Does the United Nations naming and shaming of specific violations of human rights decrease government repression? In this article, we argue that international shaming of specific human rights violations can weaken the target government, bringing new challenges and making the government cessation of repression less feasible. When international naming and shaming campaigns target specific repressive tactics, they increase the costs of some – but not all – means of repression. Using original data on naming and shaming by the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), we show that the shaming of one physical integrity violation is jointly associated with decreases in that violation and increases in other violations of human rights.     

The incentive effect of acceptance sampling plans in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This article studies a firm that procures a product from a supplier. The quality of each product unit is measured by a continuous variable that follows a normal distribution and is correlated within a batch. The firm conducts an inspection and pays the supplier only if the product batch passes the inspection. The inspection not only serves the purpose of preventing a bad batch from reaching customers but also offers the supplier an incentive to improve product quality. The firm determines the acceptance sampling plan, and the supplier determines the quality effort level in either a simultaneous game or a Stackelberg leadership game, in which both parties share inspection cost and recall loss caused by low product quality. In the simultaneous game, we identify the Nash equilibrium form, provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and find parameter settings under which the decentralized and centralized supply chains achieve the same outcome. By numerical experiments, we show that the firm's acceptance sampling plan and the supplier's quality effort level are sensitive to both the recall loss sharing ratio and the game format (i.e., the precommitment assumption of the inspection policy). © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Terrorism,Radicalisation and Moral Panics: Media and Academic Analysis and Reporting of 2016 and 2017 ‘Terrorism’

Radicalism or radicalisation has become a serious political and academic theme in recent years and any incident involving Muslims now almost automatically acquires the cachet, as events in 2016 and 2017 have shown. However, despite vast sums and resources expended on the subject no one can define what they mean by ‘it’. This should make us pause and question what precisely it is that causes so much alarm and is it worth the resources, time and effort employed to respond to it?     

Minimax resource allocation problems with ordering constraints

Resource allocation problems consider the allocation of limited resources among numerous competing activities. We address an allocation problem with multiple knapsack resource constraints. The activities are grouped into disjoint sets. Ordering constraints are imposed on the activities within each set, so that the level of one activity cannot exceed the level of another activity in the same set. The objective function is of the minimax type and each performance function is a nonlinear, strictly decreasing and continuous function of a single variable. Applications for such resource allocation problems are found, for example, in high-tech industries confronted with large-scale and complex production planning problems. We present two algorithms to solve the allocation problem with ordering constraints. The first one uses characterization of the optimal decision variables to apply a search method. The second algorithm solves a sequence of problems, each in the format of the original problem without ordering constraints. Whereas the computational effort of the first algorithm depends on the desired degree of accuracy even for linear performance functions, the effort of the latter algorithm is polynomial for certain classes of performance functions. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Technical note: Reexamination of all‐or‐none inspection policies in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This note studies the optimal inspection policies in a supply chain in which a manufacturer purchases components from a supplier but has no direct control of component quality. The manufacturer uses an inspection policy and a damage cost sharing contract to encourage the supplier to improve the component quality. We find that all‐or‐none inspection policies are optimal for the manufacturer if the supplier's share of the damage cost is larger than a threshold; otherwise, the manufacturer should inspect a fraction of a batch. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Multiperiod resource allocation with a smoothing objective

We consider a multiperiod resource allocation problem, where a single resource is allocated over a finite planning horizon of T periods. Resource allocated to one period can be used to satisfy demand of that period or of future periods, but backordering of demand is not allowed. The objective is to allocate the resource as smoothly as possible throughout the planning horizon. We present two models: the first assumes that the allocation decision variables are continuous, whereas the second considers only integer allocations. Applications for such models are found, for example, in subassembly production planning for complex products in a multistage production environment. Efficient algorithms are presented to find optimal allocations for these models at an effort of O(T²). Among all optimal policies for each model, these algorithms find the one that carries the least excess resources throughout the planning horizon. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

An economic two-stage screening procedure with a prescribed outgoing quality in logistic and normal models

An economic two-stage screening procedure based on a dichotomous performance variable T and a continuous screening variable X is proposed. X is measured first to decide whether an item should be accepted, rejected, or additional observations should be taken. If no terminal decision is reached, T is then observed to classify the undecided items. Two models are considered; (i) the logistic model, where P(T = 1|X = x) is assumed to be a logistic function of x, and (ii) the normal model, where X given T is assumed to be normally distributed. A simple economic model based on inspection and misclassification costs is constructed. Optimal cutoff values on the screening variable are obtained by minimizing the expected cost subject to the constraint that the average outgoing quality attains a pre-specified level. Solutions are provided for both known-parameter and unknown-parameter cases. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

A probabilistic analysis of a fixed partition policy for the inventory‐routing problem

We consider the Inventory‐Routing Problem (IRP) where n geographically dispersed retailers must be supplied by a central facility. The retailers experience demand for the product at a deterministic rate, and incur holding costs for keeping inventory. Distribution is performed by a fleet of capacitated vehicles. The objective is to minimize the average transportation and inventory costs per unit time over the infinite horizon. We focus on the set of Fixed Partition Policies (FPP). In an FPP, the retailers are partitioned into disjoint and collectively exhaustive sets. Each set of retailers is served independently of the others and at its optimal replenishment rate. Previous research has measured the effectiveness of an FPP solution relative to a lower bound over all policies. We propose an additional measure that is relative to the optimal FPP. In this paper we construct a polynomial‐time partitioning scheme that is shown to yield an FPP whose cost is asymptotically within 1.5% + ? of the cost of an optimal FPP, for arbitrary ? > 0. In addition, in some cases, our polynomial‐time scheme yields an FPP whose cost is asymptotically within 1.5% + ? of the minimal policy's cost (over all feasible policies). © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004