The International Criminal Court and the Deterrence of Human Rights Atrocities

Research on human rights treaties has mostly reached depressingly similar conclusions – that such treaties and their resulting institutions have little or no impact on human rights. The International Criminal Court, however, possesses significant power to investigate and prosecute violations of international law that equip it with potentially more influence than previous human rights regimes. I suggest, however, that the impact of the ICC on human rights is conditioned by signatory governments’ commitment to good governance and acceptance of the role of the ICC in addressing violations of international law. I develop a two-stage model of ICC ratification and human rights abuse that shows that while many states have ratified the ICC Treaty, not all are committed to stopping the crimes under its jurisdiction. Rather, state commitment to human rights depends first on its commitment to the rule of law within its own borders. Second, commitment to human rights depends on states’ willingness to grant the ICC the powers necessary to carry out its mission. Through a number of statistical tests, I find strong support for these hypotheses on states’ human rights and propensity for violence.     

FROM RIGHTS TO RESPONSIBILITIES

This article aims to explore possible avenues that the international community can use in order to justify forcible intervention in sovereign states in cases where gross and systematic violations of the human rights of the he population take place, but where the legal authority for such intervention is not forthcoming from the Uni ted Nations Security Council. Two possible justifications are identified: the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which despite being controversial, enjoys a measure of acceptance due to the practice of states in this regard, and the notion of an international responsibility to protect vulnerable populations and individuals. The latter option, despite a vague and uncertain legal basis, offers several advantages: it focuses on the suffering of human beings and not on the rights of states, it enumerates clear and definable thresholds for intervention by the international community and acknowledges that intervention is only one step in the process of achieving peace, to be preceded by preventive action and followed by post-conflict reconstruction. It is submit ted that elements of the notion of an international “responsibility to protect” are to be found in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and especially the Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. Furthermore, the principles underlying this notion, as developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty may serve as guidelines in decisions by the Assembly to authorise interventions in AU members.     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.     

国际海洋法与维护国家海洋权益

海洋权益是指沿海国对属于自己的管辖海域享有国际海洋法所赋予的特定主权权利。《联合国海洋法公约》奠定了现代国际海洋法制度的基础，为各国维护正当的海洋权益提供了基本法律依据，但也有不完善甚至严重缺陷之处。认真研究其利弊，以切实维护国家海洋权益和公正合理的国际海洋法律秩序。     

The case for demilitarising Lesotho

ABSTRACT

The Kingdom of Lesotho spends around five per cent of its annual budget – some 700 million Maloti ($US52.6 million) in 2017 – on the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF). Lesotho’s geographical position means that the LDF has no meaningful role regarding its primary function of defending the country from external aggression and it hardly engages in its secondary functions. In addition, the LDF has a long history of interference with democratic processes and engaging in human rights abuse. The financial resources currently allocated to the LDF could do far more for security, widely defined, if they were allocated to a number of other government expenditure categories.     

联合国维和行动立法问题研究

从立法主体和立法形式的角度探讨联合国维持和平行动的立法问题。尽管联合国大会并不是维和行动适格的立法机构，但是维和行动的国际法依据是国家和国际组织在实践中长期形成的惯例。其立法主体资格实质上是一个共享问题，因此，由联合国组织立法应当是最为适宜的。就立法形式而言，采用由联合国主持缔结维和条约的形式最具有可行性，也最为合理。     

PARLIAMENT AND DEFENCE OVERSIGHT

Abstract

A tremendous amount of important work has been done recently on operationalising the protection of civilians as a military task. The bulk of the discussion has focused on how militaries should respond to direct attacks on civilians. This is an important issue, but thinking about civilian protection should also include a serious examination of the ways in which the approach of military organisations to the problem of ‘spoiler’ groups can affect the level and dynamics of attacks on civilians – importantly, where armed groups are interested in violent control of civilian populations, attempts to ‘dislodge’ them from areas of control may substantially increase the level of violence against civilians (beyond the dangers to be expected from being near areas where active fighting is taking place). In 2009, the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) supported the Congolese military in operations to dismantle the Hutu-dominated FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) militia group, at massive human cost. Critics have primarily focused on MONUC's failure to protect civilians from direct attack, consonant with the general discourse on tactics for civilian protection. These criticisms are valid, but in this paper I argue that two crucial additional considerations should be kept in mind: the way that military operations can affect violence against civilians, and the way that moralising the approach to armed groups, even those which have committed serious abuses, can limit military and political options – potentially in ways that increase civilian risk in the name of protecting them.     

The Harmful and Residual Effects on Civilians by Bombing Dual-purpose Facilities

This article addresses what we owe to the civilians of a state with which we are militarily engaged. The old notion of noncombatant immunity needs to be rethought within the context of both human rights and into the postwar phase. No doubt, civilians will be killed in war. However, much more can be done during and after the fighting to protect civilians’ basic human rights from the ills of war. I argue for making belligerents accountable ex post by requiring them to repair destroyed dual-purpose facilities that are essential for securing basic human rights of the civilian populace. I argue also that a belligerent’s targeting decisions should be reviewed ex post by an impartial commission.     

Conflict management in the Central African Republic: making genocide prevention work

This commentary analyses the international response to the crisis that struck the Central African Republic (CAR) in early December 2013. It examines three intertwined dimensions defining the courses of action available to policymakers dealing with pre-genocidal crises: the politics and institutional manoeuvring shaping the United Nations (UN) Security Council's decision to authorise an enforcement mission without deploying ‘blue helmets’ on the ground; the operational complexities involved in launching rapid reaction forces; and the interdependent logics between peacebuilding and atrocity prevention. The author argues that there are three ways for the UN Secretariat to ensure a more effective response to CAR-type situations: generating political will to respond swiftly to deteriorating crises leading to widespread abuses of human rights by advancing the concept of Responsibility to Protect as a core component of states' national interests; developing strategic frameworks for the deployment of multi-plural missions equipped to avert the actual or potential threat of atrocities; and developing joint early warning and scenario planning between peacebuilding and atrocity prevention agencies.     

U.S. Troops and Foreign Economic Growth

By way of an evolutionary game model we show that mediation in international conflicts might be harmful to the conflicting parties. In fact, under anarchy both parties can be better off than under an international regime if mediation reduces the parties’ reactive capacities (i.e. their abilites to respond to an aggression). This result is applied to issues currently discussed in the literature on international relations such as the role of the United Nations as a mediator of international conflicts.     

Unmasking silence and impunity: the Zimbabwe Peace Project’s e-activism in a polarised political dispensation

This study is an exploration of the use of technology-mediated interventions by the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) in checkmating the country’s insidious culture of political violence and impunity. It disentangles the ZPP’s strategies and the composite reactions they triggered from state functionaries and the aligned security apparatus. The ZPP exploited and deployed an Internet-circulated monthly newsletter, bulk short message service (SMS) alerts, smartphones, radio and Facebook to shine a spotlight on injustice. It is argued that the ZPP’s whistle-blowing strategies used against human rights violators were not necessarily intended to secure immediate perpetrator conviction; rather, they were a partial but exigent attempt at using perpetrator exposure to reveal extralegal activities and checkmate the country’s culture of impunity. The ZPP’s cybernetic naming and shaming strategies embarrassed some offenders, as evidenced by the intelligence operatives and the police’s constant harassment and arrests of ZPP-affiliated activists. The state-controlled media compounded this pressure by casting aspersions on the ZPP’s bona fides, labelling it a foreign-funded organisation that was attempting to destabilise the country. Finally, this study is informed by a broad evidentiary base that includes ZPP reports on its e-archive, oral interviews, policy documents and newspaper accounts.     

Efficient distributions of arms‐control inspection effort

A rule that constrains decision‐makers is enforced by an inspector who is supplied with a fixed level of inspection resources—inspection personnel, equipment, or time. How should the inspector distribute its inspection resources over several independent inspectees? What minimum level of resources is required to deter all violations? Optimal enforcement problems occur in many contexts; the motivating application for this study is the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Using game‐theoretic models, the resource level adequate for deterrence is characterized in a two‐inspectee problem with inspections that are imperfect in the sense that violations can be missed. Detection functions, or probabilities of detecting a violation, are assumed to be increasing in inspection resources, permitting optimal allocations over inspectees to be described both in general and in special cases. When detection functions are convex, inspection effort should be concentrated on one inspectee chosen at random, but when they are concave it should be spread deterministicly over the inspectees. Our analysis provides guidance for the design of arms‐control verification operations, and implies that a priori constraints on the distribution of inspection effort can result in significant inefficiencies. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Justice empowered or justice hampered: The International Criminal Court in Darfur

It came as a surprise to many international observers when, on 31 March 2005, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1593, which referred the situation in Darfur to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Some celebrated this event as initiating a new era in which international criminal justice would prevail, but they might have done well to consider the objections immediately raised by the representatives of the Sudanese government, which was not a party to the ICC, a point that created a series of impediments to the implementation of the resolution. For all that the ICC has been charged with investigating crimes against humanity in Darfur, its investigators are being prevented from seeking the evidence on the ground essential to any successful prosecution. The Sudanese government has so far maintained its obstructive position, arguing that it is capable of handling such cases within its own sovereign jurisdiction. The imperative of excluding the ICC from Darfur has contributed to Khartoum's objections to the deployment of a UN force to replace the African Union mission there. In sum: the challenges faced by the ICC in Darfur demonstrate that international criminal justice does not operate in a political vacuum.     

试论联合国维和行动的法律性质

联合国维持和平行动的法律性质在国际法学界一直存在争议。在维和行动与其他国际军事或准军事行动的辨析中我们可以看到维和行动自身所独具的法律特征。维和行动的法律依据尽管未有定论,但依据其实践与发展的现实状况,我们可以将它的法律性质概括为:联合国属准军事行动性质,国际法约定的默示授权性质,维护国家间独立平等的工具性质等。     

A plan for military intervention in Darfur

This article contains a plan on how the African Union/United Nations hybrid force authorised by the UN Security Council in July 2007 could realistically and effectively use military power to save civilian lives in Darfur. It is envisaged that the international force, given its limited size, would mainly focus on protecting and policing refugee and internally displaced persons camps, rather than trying to stop all violence in the region. This intervention is unlikely to provoke a violent military reaction from the Sudanese government. In fact, a careful analysis of the conflict suggests that Khartoum has been engaged in a scorched-earth counterinsurgency rather than in an attempt to exterminate Darfur's ‘black’ population as an end in itself, and thus would stand to benefit from interveners' efforts to keep the camps demilitarised.     

PEACEKEEPERS AS PERPETRATORS OF ABUSE

I am afraid there is clear evidence that acts of gross misconduct have taken place. This is a shameful thing for the United Nations to have to say, and I am absolutely outraged by it.

—Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General

Despite promulgating a comprehensive set of guidelines to deter UN personnel from committing acts of sexual misconduct, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse have become widespread within United Nations peacekeeping missions. The policy of zero-tolerance for peacekeeper misconduct has not been matched by strong disciplinary measures, and crimes are often ignored and rarely punished: absentee fathers, rapists and murderers simply disappear back in their home countries. In countries where women and children rarely have the same economic resources, political rights and authority or control over their environment—or their bodies—they easily become prey for those in perceived positions of power and authority. By failing to hold those responsible to account, the UN may in fact be fuelling even greater discrimination and violence against women and children. In order to ensure those who are mandated to protect to do not become perpetrators of abuse, the UN must take a stronger stand against those who commit acts of sexual misconduct, and must ensure that victims see that their abuser is brought to justice and that reparation is offered. A recent report submitted by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse makes a comprehensive set of recommendations to prevent, detect, and respond to these allegations. The aim of this essay is to highlight some of the main points of the Special Envoy's report, and to examine the practical challenges the UN and troop/police contributing countries will face when attempting to implement these recommendations.     

反商业贿赂立法的国际经验及其启示

旨在以世界的眼光观察中国的问题,借鉴国际经验,解决中国问题。不仅介绍了美国、德国和日本的反商业贿赂立法,而且对《联合国反腐败公约》——联合国向世界推荐的反腐败指南的相关规定做了详细介绍。在此基础上,提出了一些可资我国借鉴的立法经验。     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016     

A Good Ally - Norway and International Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 2001-2014

The article examines the findings of the Commission of Inquiry established by the Norwegian government in 2014 to evaluate all aspects of Norway’s civilian and military contribution to the international operation in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Concerned with the wider implications of the Commission’s findings, it focuses on two issues in particular: (1) Norway’s relations with the US, a close and long-standing strategic ally whose resources, capabilities and dominance of decision-making dwarfed that of all other coalition partners in Afghanistan; and (2) Norway’s record in the province of Faryab, where, from 2005 to 2012, a Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team was charged with bringing security, good governance and development to the province. How Norway prioritised and managed relations with the US highlights and helps to problematise the challenges – political, practical and moral – facing small and medium-sized powers operating in a coalition alongside the US. Norwegian efforts in Faryab are revealing of the dilemmas and contradictions that plagued and, ultimately, fatally undermined the international intervention as a whole. As such, Norway’s experience provides a microcosm through which the inherent limitations of the attempt to transfer the structures of modern statehood and Western democracy to Afghanistan can be better understood.