EFFECTS OF MILITARY SPENDING ON THE PROFITABILITY OF SPANISH DEFENCE CONTRACTORS

The traditional view of the defence industry obtaining large profits from contracts with the Ministry of Defence relies on several assumptions. Among these are the use of such arrangements as an instrument of industrial policy, the strong market power enjoyed by prime contractors, and the inefficiency encouraged by the sector. The findings show that defence contracts have a positive effect on profits, as well as the prizes for innovation and the market power enjoyed by some defence subsectors.     

军队工程招标激励模型研究

运用激励理论研究了军队工程招标采购过程中军方与承包商之间的关系,建立了军队工程招标激励模型。在不完全信息和竞争性招标中,投标人的行为是追求最大的效用,军方则需要建立一种机制诱使投标人按真实成本信息报价,以达到预期支付最小的目的。这种招标博弈的结果是军方与投标人之间达成贝叶斯纳什均衡(Bayesian Nash equilib- rium),即军方利用激励合同诱使投标人报出其真实成本,而投标人为达到中标目的则必须采取讲真话的占优策略,最终在双方均可接受的条件下达成协议。在此基础上,结合实际研究提出了改进的综合评标模型。     

Private military contractors’ financial experiences and incentives

ABSTRACT

This article analyses findings from an original survey of 187 private military contractors on their incentives for working in the industry. Perceptions of contractors as “greedy, ruthless, and unscrupulous mercenaries” shape both public and military opinions of outsourcing and may impact U.S. military effectiveness, civil–military relations, and contractor identity. We find that contractors are motivated by a range of factors and that their financial experiences are not clearly more positive than that of state military troops. We recommend broad education of military and defense officials and the public in the U.S. and other relevant nations, regarding the true incentives of modern-day, Western contractors, in an effort to dispel misperceptions, increase effective utilisation of contractors, and beneficially shape PMC-military coordination. DoD may consider integrating such training into its current efforts to improve outsourcing, including its Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course, pre-deployment fora, and curricula of advanced military studies schools.     

Supply contracts in manufacturer‐retailer interactions with manufacturer‐quality and retailer effort‐induced demand

We consider a decentralized distribution channel where demand depends on the manufacturer‐chosen quality of the product and the selling effort chosen by the retailer. The cost of selling effort is private information for the retailer. We consider three different types of supply contracts in this article: price‐only contract where the manufacturer sets a wholesale price; fixed‐fee contract where manufacturer sells at marginal cost but charges a fixed (transfer) fee; and, general franchise contract where manufacturer sets a wholesale price and charges a fixed fee as well. The fixed‐fee and general franchise contracts are referred to as two‐part tariff contracts. For each contract type, we study different contract forms including individual, menu, and pooling contracts. In the analysis of the different types and forms of contracts, we show that the price only contract is dominated by the general franchise menu contract. However, the manufacturer may prefer to offer the fixed‐fee individual contract as compared to the general franchise contract when the retailer's reservation utility and degree of information asymmetry in costs are high. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

The financial performance of aircraft manufacturers during world war II: the vicissitudes of war

Controversy has long surrounded the role and profitability of US defense contractors. From a financial perspective the question becomes whether defense contractors earn greater profits and investor returns than other companies during military conflicts. We explore this question by examining the accounting profitability and investor returns of US aircraft manufacturers before, during, and after World War II and compare them to a sample of non-defense firms. We also examine the reactions of aircraft stock prices to important political and military events of the time. We find that (1) aircraft stocks exhibited positive abnormal returns around events associated with defense buildups and outbreaks of hostile action and negative returns around events signaling an end to hostilities, (2) the company’s accounting returns improved during the war but these higher accounting returns did not translate into higher stock returns for the shareholders, and (3) investors could have earned higher stock returns had they switched out of aircraft stocks after Pearl Harbor and reinvested the proceeds in the overall market.     

A note on the financial condition of defense contractors

In recent years, there have been several changes in the weapon‐system acquisition market which have the potential to negatively impact the financial condition of defense contractors. This study evaluates the financial health of defense firms vis‐a‐vis nondefense firms using a fiscal distress identification model developed by E.I. Altman. We conclude that the financial condition of defense firms has deteriorated but the deterioration is the same as experienced by nondefense firms.     

装备采购线性合同优化研究

高额装备费支出使对招投标合同优化问题备受国防经济学界关注,对装备采办过程中招投标线性合同的优化进行了研究。采用招投标模型与委托-代理模型分析相结合的方法,先从道德风险与风险分担2个方面分析装备采购合同的优化问题,然后引入竞争效应,分析风险分担的问题。即使在双方为风险中性不需要风险分担时,DoD仍然需要在最初的投标竞争与中标后承包商降低成本行为之间进行权衡。一般的投标中,应使最终支付基于实际成本和投标值2个因素,并考虑最终支付基于道德风险损失。研究的基本结论是:固定价格合同应尽可能少地使用;若存在2个以上的投标人,成本加价合同也应禁止使用;在使用激励合同时,应慎重选择合同系数,提出了计算优化线性激励合同系数的方法。     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Chalk vs Guns: Some economic consequences of an announced French scenario 1

This paper explores whether defense contractors' manufacturing technology advantages over purely commercial firms might be associated with differences in their workforce and organizational practices. It uses unique original data collected specifically to test workforce and organizational complementarities in implementation of advanced manufacturing technology in small manufacturers. Findings are that defense contractors: (1) have higher and deeper rates of advanced manufacturing technology use; (2) have greater perceived success in achieving manufacturing goals; (3) are more likely practitioners across a diverse spectrum of advanced workforce and organizational practices. Then, (4) econometrically, the defense contractors' higher reported levels of achievement in implementing advanced manufacturing technologies are positively associated with those organizational and workforce practice differences.     

美军装备采办合同管理及其标准化

在我军武器装备建设逐渐"以计划为主要管理方式和手段"向"以合同为主要管理方式和手段"转变的背景下,装备采购合同管理的研究日趋深入。而装备采购合同"行政合同"的性质及合同标的物复杂性的特点,进一步凸显了标准化在保证装备采购合同规范性、降低不确定性、减少交易成本和提高工作效率中的重要作用。文章在对美军装备采办合同管理标准化特点与经验详细分析和提炼的基础上,对比我军装备采购合同管理体制及标准化现状,有针对性的提出了装备采购合同管理标准化建议,梳理了标准化重点,并为日后时机成熟时制定适用于装备采购合同管理的相关标准或指南,奠定了一定的研究基础。     

A bayesian approach to evaluating military investments in product improvement and testing

Two issues of frequent importance in new product development are product improvement and reliability testing. A question often faced by the developer is: Should the product be distributed in its present state, or should it be improved further and/or tested before distribution? A more useful statement of the question might be: What levels of investment in further improvement and testing are economically permissible? Products for which this question is relevant may vary widely in type and intended use. This paper presents a model for determining these levels for one such product—an equipment modification procedure. The model presented makes use of present value analysis to compare cost streams and of Bayesian statistics to relate the costs to various outcomes under conditions of uncertainty. The model is applied to an actual military problem and a method is described for examining the sensitivity of the results to changes in the prior probabilities and discount rate.     

PUBLIC SAFETY AND THE MORAL DILEMMA IN THE DEFENSE AGAINST TERROR

The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is, however, ineffective and pre‐emptive defense is required when a population of intended victims confronts supreme‐value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since pre‐emption may impose collective punishment, while in the absence of pre‐emption the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population's response with the public‐safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.     

A parallel machine replacement model

This paper considers a finite horizon parallel machine replacement problem where a fixed number of machines is in operation at all times. The operating cost for a machine goes up as the machine gets older. An older machine may have to be replaced by a new one when its operating cost becomes too high. There is a fixed order cost associated with the purchase of new machines. Machine purchase prices and salvage values may depend on the period in which they were purchased. The objective is to find a replacement plan that minimizes the total discounted cost over the problem horizon. We believe that the costs in our model are more commonly observed in practice than those previously used in the literature. The paper develops properties of optimal solutions and an efficient forward‐time algorithm to find an optimal replacement plan. A dominance property is developed that further limits the options to be considered, and a simple forecast horizon result is also presented. Future research possibilities are mentioned. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 275–287, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (http://www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10012     

A cost–benefit analysis of terrorist attacks

A cost–benefit analysis of terrorist attacks is developed and placed within a systematic theoretical structure. For the target or object of the attack, we consider the lost value of human lives, lost economic value, and lost influence value, counted as benefits for the terrorist. The corresponding losses for the terrorist are counted as costs. The terrorist attacks if benefits outweigh costs. Bounded rationality is enabled where the three kinds of benefits and costs can be weighted differently. We account for two ex ante probabilities of successful planning and attack, and enable the terrorist to assign different weights to its multiple stakeholders. We introduce multiple time periods, time discounting, attitudes towards risk, and subcategories for the benefits and costs. The cost–benefit analysis is illustrated with the 11 September 2001 attack, and 53 incidents in the Global Terrorism Database yielding both positive and negative expected utilities. The paper is intended as a tool for scientists and policy-makers, as a way of thinking about costs and benefits of terrorist attacks.     

“Government contracting options: A model and application“∗

This paper models and simulates a government‐contractor principal‐agent weapon system repair model. Insights are derived as to how government repair contracts should be constructed so as to induce optimal contractor behavior. The paper's general conclusion is that the best contracting approach combines a lump‐sum payment that does not vary with the number of units repaired, expensive item cost‐sharing, and a contractor‐provided availability guarantee. Provided there is intercontractor competition, this type of contract performs well even if the government is poorly informed about weapon system break patterns or repair costs.     

The U.S. versus the Soviet incentive models

This paper is concerned with models of the use of performance incentives in the Soviet Union and United States. The principal analytical result is an extension of an analysis of the methods whereby Soviet planners make the decision about production targets a variable under control of the producer, who is the only one possessing a knowledge of the uncertain condition of production. It is shown that this device can be viewed as a classical inventory problem. There is also an examination of the “U.S. incentive program” referring to multi-incentive contracts in which the profits received by the private producers are related to performance, outcome and cost. The analysis describes how this device can be extended to solve the target output selection problem of the Soviet planning system.     

Contracts and coordination: Supply chains with uncertain demand and supply

Considering a supply chain with a supplier subject to yield uncertainty selling to a retailer facing stochastic demand, we find that commonly studied classical coordination contracts fail to coordinate both the supplier's production and the retailer's procurement decisions and achieve efficient performance. First, we study the vendor managed inventory (VMI) partnership. We find that a consignment VMI partnership coupled with a production cost subsidy achieves perfect coordination and a win‐win outcome; it is simple to implement and arbitrarily allocates total channel profit. The production cost subsidy optimally chosen through Nash bargaining analysis depends on the bargaining power of the supplier and the retailer. Further, motivated by the practice that sometimes the retailer and the supplier can arrange a “late order,” we also analyze the behavior of an advance‐purchase discount (APD) contract. We find that an APD with a revenue sharing contract can efficiently coordinate the supply chain as well as achieve flexible profit allocation. Finally, we explore which coordination contract works better for the supplier vs. the retailer. It is interesting to observe that Nash bargaining solutions for the two coordination contracts are equivalent. We further provide recommendations on the applications of these contracts. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 305–319, 2016     

Plunder or Trade?

Plunder and trade are theoretically and historically entwined in complex ways. This paper examines when rational players will choose one or both by employing a model of plunder within an evolutionary game theoretic framework. Evolutionary stable strategy equilibria are derived and the replicator dynamics are examined for simple two-by-two symmetric games. Not only are positive defense allocations necessary for trade, implying that all trade is of a contested nature, but the defense technology must also exhibit sufficient effectiveness relative to the plunder technology. A continuum of possible exchanges is proposed that is based on the effectiveness of enforcing property claims. For high levels of transactions costs, plunder dominates. As transactions costs decline, mutual trade emerges as one possible exchange mechanism. All market exchange entails some cost of enforcement; it is contested. Insufficient enforcement of property claims produces mutual plunder as the dominant exchange mechanism. Some implications are suggested for institutional evolution. C7 K4 N4     

Preserving defense technologies: A strategy for economic conversion†

This paper presents a model for converting legacy defense production facilities into private‐sector economic resources. Specifically, this paper will examine as a case study the first successful conversion of a former U.S. Department of Energy nuclear weapons production installation, including reasons for its success, its costs and benefits, and lessons for public policy. It is envisioned that this model may be useful for mitigating local economic hardship resulting from defense “downsizing” and for privatizing production capacities critical for national defense.     

巡航导弹综合防御系统仿真研究

巡航导弹超低空突防效果好、命中精度高、价格低廉,这些优越的性能使其在近几次局部战争中大显身手,越来越受到世界各国的高度重视,也促使各国纷纷研究巡航导弹及其防御措施.国内对巡航导弹的防御研究多从电子对抗与火力打击两方面分别入手,缺乏对巡航导弹的综合防御系统及其仿真的研究.为了更好地研究巡航导弹的综合防御问题,在分析巡航导弹防御方法的基础上,提出构建对巡航导弹进行软硬对抗的综合防御系统,并建立了基于DIS的综合防御系统仿真框架,介绍了系统的体系结构和模型体系,对进一步深化巡航导弹防御研究具有重要的意义.