Stranglehold: The Context,Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China

The mounting challenge posed by China's military modernization has highlighted the need for the United States to analyze its ability to execute a naval blockade. A blockade strategy is viable, but it would be limited to a narrow context: the United States would have to be engaged in a protracted conflict over vital interests, and it would need the support of key regional powers. The United States would also need to implement a mix between a close and distant blockade in order to avoid imperiling the conflict's strategic context. If enacted, a blockade could exact a ruinous cost on the Chinese economy and state.     

Reconsidering a Naval Blockade of China: A Response to Mirski

Sean Mirski's assessment of a naval blockade is an important contribution to the debate over how the United States should respond to China's growing military power. Nevertheless, it has three limitations. First, although distant and close-in blockades could be employed in tandem, analyzing them separately helps to explain when they might be used and how they could influence escalation. Second, while conventional countervalue and counterforce options could also be employed together, this would depend on the degree to which they overlapped and the order in which they were implemented. Third, a blockade could lead to unanticipated prewar, intra-war, and postwar challenges.     

COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.     

War and punishment the implication of arms purchases in maritime Southeast Asia

While there is no arms race currently underway in Southeast Asia, there should still be concern for the effects of a regional arms buildup. No state currently possesses, or is seeking to possess, the capabilities necessary to dominate the core territory of its potential adversaries. However, the types of weapons being procured favour punishment based strategies that are highly unstable and war‐prone. Geographic vulnerability to blockade and interdiction make Southeast Asia's security dilemma particularly acute.     

Kenya and Somalia

Much research has been done on patriarchy in numerous contexts in Africa, contributing to an understanding of the phenomenon. Recent developments in Kenya and Somalia, characterised by the adoption of new constitutions against the backdrop of stringent patriarchal practices, prompted the writing of this article. Kenya's journey towards gender equality has not been an easy one, given that prior to 2010 – when its new constitution was adopted – customary law that endorsed the violation of women's rights held precedence. For Somalia, over two decades of civil war had encouraged lawlessness, which acted as a barrier for women's progress. With the two countries' new constitutions now in place, expectations are high that past hindrances will be eradicated. Kenya and Somalia stand a good chance of achieving gender equality if lessons from other countries can be carefully considered to avoid a repeat of their failures. Using secondary and primary data, it is this article's argument that an honest dialogue on women's rights involving all relevant stakeholders needs to be initiated to tackle the deeper structural problem of patriarchy, which poses a huge threat to the gains achieved on paper.     

Currency Warfare and Just War: The Ethics of Targeting Currencies in War

ABSTRACT

Is Currency Warfare defined as, the use of monetary or military force directed against an enemy’s monetary power as part of a military campaign, a just way to fight a war? This article explores the ethics of waging currency warfare against the Just War Tradition’s principles of jus in bello (just conduct in war) and its criteria of discrimination and proportionality. The central argument is that currency warfare is inherently indiscriminate but may be proportionate when policy makers consider the nature of the threat confronted and the targeted currency's level of internationalization, that is, to what degree it is used in foreign transactions or used as a foreign currency reserve. I evaluate this argument against historical cases during the Second World War (1939–1945), the Gulf War (1990–1991), subsequent operations against Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s, and the ongoing campaign against ISIS.     

On the manipulation of transfer prices in a static environment

In a static environment, J. Hirschleifer's marginal cost solution to the transfer pricing problem is commonly accepted as analytically correct. However, actual pricing practice within Western corporations and socialist-planned economies generally deviates from marginal cost pricing. Some form of average cost pricing is more commonly chosen. Recently in this journal, H. Enzer has claimed to show that some form of average cost pricing is indeed the analytically correct solution to the transfer pricing problem when choice of technique and manipulation are allowed. Enzer claims that optimal decisions made by each of two divisions according to their individual self-interests are made compatible with overall firm optimization when the transfer price assigned to the internally-transferred commodity is any form of average cost. We show that the marginal cost solution is correct for Enzer's problem in the absence of manipulation by either division. Indeed, this was all that Hirschleifer claimed. In the process, we uncover a fundamental mathematical error in Enzer's argument. When manipulation of the transfer price by divisions is allowed, we demonstrate the faults with Enzer's average cost solution and conclude Hirschleifer's original statements on manipulation to be correct even in Enzer's environment. A final section briefly indicates the importance to the transfer pricing problem of a growing body of economic literature on incentive structures.     

Beyond 'the Mogadishu Line': Some Australian Lessons for Managing Intra-State Conflicts

The controversial humanitarian intervention in Somalia was a foretaste of a continuing international failure to come to terms with the post-Cold War security environment. For much of the 1990s, the wrong lessons, drawn almost entirely from the unsuccessful US experience in Mogadishu, shackled international thinking about international conflicts like Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Bosnia. Yet if the international communities going to develop a more effective response to the new pattern of intra-state violence, it should learn from the successes as well as the failures of humanitarian intervention in Somalia. In Baidoa, the Australians demonstrated it is possible to develop what might be termed a peace-enhancement strategy in a collapsed state situation. By striking a balance between political reconstruction and a measure willingness to use force to obtain compliance with UN demands the Australians indicated that the dire prophesies of Robert Kaplan's 'The Coming Anarchy' can be averted.     

China's Military Procurement and Its Operational Implications: A Response to Yoram Evron

This article is a response to Evron's argument, offering readers another perspective to assess China's military modernization and war fighting capabilities, using the same framework and methodology. It examines three topics: China's national security and military strategy, the PLA's procurement decision-making process, and China's military support and mobilization system. It concludes that, China's military modernization is to fight and win local wars under the conditions of informatization, but if required the PLA can reliably supply large numbers of sophisticated weapons and spare parts, to wage a complex and prolonged conflict.     

The 1907 Naval War Plans and the second Hague peace conference: A case of propaganda 1

The phenomenon of mutual sea denial had rendered offensive naval actions such as commercial blockade impossible in the narrow seas around Europe. Consequently, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, abandoned commercial blockade for the safer option of interdicting enemy commerce on the high seas where the Royal Navy could control communications. The proposal to extend immunity to all private property at sea at the 1907 Hague Conference threatened this strategy. As part of a wider campaign to convince the British establishment to oppose immunity, Fisher created the 1907 Naval War Plans to directly influence Cabinet decision-making. Fisher's close involvement in the creation of the ‘Plans’ indicates that they are an expression of Fisher's strategic vision. Moreover, Fisher's attempt to influence the Cabinet asks questions of the bureaucratic decision-making process within the British establishment before 1914.     

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Intervention which violates state sovereignty is often justified by its humanitarian goals. In Africa, the debate goes beyond humanitarian objectives and considers intervention when collapsed state authority threatens regional security. Poorly planned interventions can do more harm than good while also weakening the norm of non-intervention in international relations. The brutal and often degrading history of colonization and neo-colonialism still influences African thinking on intervention. Africa's relative geopolitical weakness has compelled it to rely strongly on the international rules. African state's view on intervention should be rethought in the light of failed states, the spill-over of conflicts, threats to the democratic process and an abject failure to act in the face of hummanitarian catastrophe. Military intervention should be an exceptional action of last resort but it will remain an option while states are unwilling or unable to protect their own populations. The objective should be prevention through good governance and the democratic process.     

A generalization of the entropy model for brand purchase behavior

Hemiter's entropy model for brand purchase behavior has been generalized for Renyi's measure of entropy which is a more general concept than Shannon's measure of entropy used by Herniter and which includes Shannon's measure as a limiting case. The generalized model considered here is more flexible than Herniter's model since it can give different marketing statistics for different products and it can give these statistics even when only some of the brands are considered.     

Myth and the small war tradition: Reassessing the discourse of British counter-insurgency

In recent years a number of commentators have posited that the British reputation for conducting small wars has suffered in the wake of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument here contests whether such a tradition can be truly said to have ever existed. A close examination of this supposed tradition reveals it to be a myth. In fact, rarely have the British armed forces claimed a facility for counter-insurgency or small war. Invariably, commentators outside the Army have ascribed the tradition to them. Most notably, commentators in the United States keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning generated the narrative of British COIN expertise. Ultimately, what this myth reveals is that, when deconstructed, it is political will, not an ingrained understanding of fighting insurgencies, that has determined Britain's success, or otherwise, in so-called small wars.     

India's Evolving Nuclear Posture

This article analyzes India's nuclear doctrine, finding it to be critically flawed and inimical to strategic stability in South Asia. In pursuing an ambitious triad of nuclear forces, India is straying from the sensible course it charted after going overtly nuclear in 1998. In doing so, it is exacerbating the triangular nuclear dilemma stemming from India's simultaneous rivalries with China and Pakistan. Strategic instability is compounded by India's pursuit of conventional “proactive strategy options,” which have the potential to lead to uncontrollable nuclear escalation on the subcontinent. New Delhi should reaffirm and redefine its doctrine of minimum credible nuclear deterrence, based on small nuclear forces with sufficient redundancy and diversity to deter a first strike by either China or Pakistan. It should also reinvigorate its nuclear diplomacy and assume a leadership role in the evolving global nuclear weapon regime.     

Security in the Americas: Neither Evolution nor Devolution – Impasse

This article begins with a discussion of sovereignty and goes on to discuss the idea of national security threats with reference to two different levels of analysis. First, the traditional-legal versus a more realistic contemporary level of analysis. Second, the operational, strategic, and political levels of analysis. The traditional concept tends to focus attention on the tactical-operational levels of activity, and the more contemporary notion broadens analysis to more strategic-political concerns. The article concludes with the argument that a broadened concept of threat to national security and sovereignty is meaningful and important. This is particularly important for those governments in the Western Hemisphere – and elsewhere – that do not discern any serious security issues, or proverbial clouds, on their peaceful horizons. Ample evidence indicates that non-traditional security problems can lead nation-states to failing or failed state status. That is to say, as examples, dysfunctional states, criminal states, narco-states, rogue states, and new ‘people's democracies'.     

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) 2012–2019 Strategy Framework has proposed that the CEWARN mechanism expand its conflict typologies and geographic coverage. The argument advanced in this paper is that the proposed CEWARN expansion should be welcomed. Since its establishment in 2003, CEWARN had restricted itself to dealing with cross-border pastoral conflicts among the member states. However, conceptually and legally, CEWARN was not precluded from dealing with other types of conflict. Firstly, in the past, any conflict, other than cross-border pastoral ones, had been considered by the member states as firmly within their national jurisdiction that mechanisms like CEWARN are precluded from handling. Secondly, CEWARN, which has hitherto been dependent on external donations, just does not have the requisite financial resources to expand its coverage. Thirdly, and most importantly, governments often know the imminence of some, if not all, of the conflicts because they cause them. Thus, they are not interested in reacting to them. In the end, the paper concludes that the proposal to expand CEWARN's conflict portfolio and geographic spread may just remain that – a proposal.     

Plague and Paradox: Militias in Iraq

Politicians, political pundits, and others focus a lot of attention on the political militias in Iraq, usually blaming them for their destabilising effect on the country and insisting that they disband. This study examines the impact that the militias in Iraq have on the Iraqi government's ability to consolidate control over its territory by first explaining how militias rose to prominence in Iraq during the power vacuum created by Saddam Hussein's ousting, then analysing the many ways militias adversely impact the security situation. The study then examines the other side of the argument – that is, why militias enjoy so much support in Iraq among their constituencies, and why they may actually be necessary to achieve stability in Iraq in the short term.     

Securitising humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa: A critical review of South Africa's new defence policy

The South African Defence Review 2014 is the country's new defence policy. The Review, which is expected to steer South African defence policymaking for the next few decades, discusses in detail the role of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in peace missions in Africa and proposes the direct involvement of the country's soldiers in both military and civilian tasks, from peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction and development. This paper contains a critical review of the Review with regard to South Africa's envisaged contribution to regional and continental peace and stability. It is argued that humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction should not be securitised and that the SANDF should only be tasked with peacekeeping and the establishment of stability and security in fragile in-conflict and post-conflict settings. The humanitarian work should be left to humanitarian and aid agencies, while reconstruction and development should be left to organisations such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development, continental and international development organisations, and local actors.     

Can Torture Be Justified?

Torture requires careful definition, because of the degree to which its definition often entails its moral condemnation. Torture involves the deliberate infliction of (intense) pain for coercive or punishment reasons. While emphasizing that the act of torture is indeed naturally seen as repulsive and ideally should not take place, I offer a non-utilitarian argument to ethically justify torture in specific kinds of interrogative cases. This argument closely examines the moral isomorphism between cases of immediate and delayed self-defense, showing that in both cases lethal force is justified. I further show that, once one’s life is forfeit, one’s other rights pertaining to the defense of one’s intended victims are likewise forfeit. As such, any form of interrogative torture necessary to procuring relevant information from persons involved in a lethal attack upon innocent persons is ethically justified. However, that an action is strictly ethically justified does not entail that it ought to be generally adopted. Several potent constitutional and sociological concerns are raised and considered.     

Supplier‐buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation

We consider the problem of designing a contract to maximize the supplier's profit in a one‐supplier–one‐buyer relationship for a short‐life‐cycle product. Demand for the finished product is stochastic and price‐sensitive, and only its probability distribution is known when the supply contract is written. When the supplier has complete information on the marginal cost of the buyer, we show that several simple contracts can induce the buyer to choose order quantity that attains the single firm profit maximizing solution, resulting in the maximum possible profit for the supplier. When the marginal cost of the buyer is private information, we show that it is no longer possible to achieve the single firm solution. In this case, the optimal order quantity is always smaller while the optimal sale price of the finished product is higher than the single firm solution. The supplier's profit is lowered while that of the buyer is improved. Moreover, a buyer who has a lower marginal cost will extract more profit from the supplier. Under the optimal contract, the supplier employs a cutoff level policy on the buyer's marginal cost to determine whether the buyer should be induced to sign the contract. We characterize the optimal cutoff level and show how it depends on the parameters of the problem. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 41–64, 2001