Fencing the bear? Explaining US foreign policy towards Russian interventions

Despite the burgeoning literature on Russia’s renewed power politics, little attention has been paid to the fact that US reactions towards Russia’s military interventions were all but coherent. The USA has chosen weak measures in Georgia in 2008 (shaming) compared to its assertive response in Ukraine in 2014 (sanctions, hard deterrence). This article assesses the explanatory power of neorealist, liberal and constructivist theories for the variation in US reactions towards Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Our argument is that the constructivist perspective explains the cases best as it highlights the power and communality of normative assessments. The Ukraine crisis was perceived by the USA as a violation of core international norms, especially the non-use of force and the principle of territorial integrity. Relevant international norm carriers shared this assessment of the conflict. In contrast, the perception of the Georgian war centred on the issue of democracy promotion. While democracy is an important aim of US foreign policy, it does not summon the same normative importance as general principles of international law. Furthermore, the perception of the Georgian war remained contested among Western allies, which decreased the communality of the normative assessment.     

Israeli foreign policy and the arms race in the Middle East 1950–1960

Previous accounts of the arms race in the Middle East during the 1950s have focused on the imbalance that resulted from the ‘Czech deal’ of September 1955. While that transfer of weaponry by the Soviet Union to Egypt constituted both a historical turning point and sharp acceleration of the arms race, it was only one of several changes in the regional strategic balance of that decade. This article makes extensive use of archival material in order to identify five phases of the arms race of the 1950s and analyze the manner in which Israeli policy‐makers dealt with the exigencies of procurement during each phase. Except for a brief period following the arms deals with France in 1956 that marked the beginning of the fifth phase examined below, the Israelis never abandoned the attempt to obtain arms from the United States. Israel's success in maintaining a high degree of independence in foreign policy throughout this period was the result of arms purchases from Britain and France that marked each phase of the arms race examined here. Yet, the Israelis considered arms from both of these Western powers to be temporary substitutes for the arms relationship with the USA that came about during the 1960s.     

Keeping an eye on South Asian skies: America’s pivotal deterrence in nuclearized India–Pakistan crises

Since declaring their nuclear weapons capabilities in 1998, India and Pakistan have engaged in three major crises that each threatened to escalate into war. In each crisis, the USA engaged in active diplomacy to dissuade the South Asian rivals from taking escalatory actions. Previous literature on the crises has described the American role, but has not theorized third-party involvement in a nuclearized regional rivalry. We apply Timothy Crawford’s pivotal deterrence theory to the nuclearized India–Pakistan conflict, and extend the original theory to cover the novel condition of a non-superpower nuclear dyad, in the context of a single-superpower international system. We find that America’s pivotal deterrence generally enhanced stability in the India–Pakistan crises, and unlike in pre-nuclear South Asia, other great powers supported American diplomacy. However, we suggest that future regional crises between nuclear rivals, in South Asia or elsewhere, may present greater challenges for pivotal deterrence.     

EU Global Strategy in a changing world: Brussels’ approach to the emerging powers

The world is entering a period of power transition, at the outcome of which some new form of global order (or disorder) is likely to emerge. Critical to this process is the interaction between the established powers, the USA and the European Union (EU), and the emerging powers, particularly China, Brazil, India and Russia. Many analysts have classified the EU as a declining power, a perception that has been enhanced with the triple crises of sovereignty that have rocked the Union since the mid-2000s (money, borders and defence). In this context, the publication of the EU Global Strategy was an opportunity for the EU to state clearly the nature of its ongoing and future relations with the rest of the world. This article argues that, in reality, Europe as a bloc (as opposed to its member states severally) has very limited purchase with the other major powers, and an ambivalent or ill-defined grasp of how to engage with them. They, for their part, have difficulty in knowing how to understand the EU as an actor and prefer to deal bilaterally with its key member states.     

Putin and Russia in retro and forward: the nuclear dimension

Deterioration in security relations as between NATO and Russia reached boiling point in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. As a result, some voices in the West look forward to the departure of Vladimir Putin from power, and others to the possible disintegration of Russia as a unitary state. However, both the departure of Putin and the collapse of Russia have a nuclear dimension. Putin has issued pointed reminders of Russia’s status as a nuclear great power, and Russian military doctrine allows for nuclear first use in the event of a conventional war with extremely high stakes. Beyond Putin, a breakup of Russia would leave political chaos in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and elsewhere, inviting ambiguous command and control over formerly Russian nuclear forces.     

THE CREATION OF THE ICC

The implications for African states of the recently created International Criminal Court should be carefully considered. There are far-reaching limitations placed on the ICC's jurisdictional scheme, both temporally as well as by the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction in the form of territoriality and nationality. The Court's powers may also be constrained out of deference to the grant of an internationally acceptable amnesty, and national courts may be constrained to recognise immunities from prosecution for high-ranking officials. These limitations need to be properly understood so that the ICC can be effectively utilised by African States to declare and act upon their commitment to the principle of individual criminal liability for those responsible for the most serious crimes.     

NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the Baltic States

According to the NATO’s collective defence strategy and the principle of deterrence, “no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened”. In this sense, credible deterrence acts as a guarantee for peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, recent events in Ukraine and Georgia have revealed the potential weaknesses of the current deterrence models. Without any overt fear of retaliation, we have seen Russia’s aggressive steps towards its neighbours, which were planned and executed with great sophistication, initiative, agility and decisiveness. Although contrary to Ukraine and Georgia which are not the members of the Alliance, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are granted security guarantees in the NATO framework, the Baltic countries clearly constitute Russia’s point of contact with NATO and are, therefore, also subject to the interests of Russia to test mutual capabilities and commitment, and to send strategic messages to the Alliance. In this context, the article aims to assess how credible is the deterrence posture provided by NATO in avoiding potential aggression on the part of Russia against the Baltic countries.     

Great-power Responsibility,Side-effect Harms and American Drone Strikes in Pakistan

In International Relations (IR), the actions of great powers are usually assessed through their direct effects. Great powers are generally considered to be responsible for the consequences of their actions if they intentionally caused them. Although there is discussion on “double-effects” and “side-effect harms” in the realms of philosophy and political sociology, these largely remain absent from the field of IR. This article bridges that gap by clarifying a set of yardsticks through which side-effect harms of great powers’ actions can be evaluated, including “capacity”, “historical precedent”, “voluntarism” and “unintentional causality”. These yardsticks are deduced through the Theory of Special Responsibilities, which combines elements of Constructivism and the English School. The theoretical framework presented is then applied to the case of American drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. A number of terrorists in FATA have relocated elsewhere within Pakistan to escape these strikes, subsequently harming individuals in new locations. The article asks: who bears responsibility for the harm brought to civilians by these dislocated terrorists? Analysis from the perspective of the theoretical framework, constructed and applied here, suggests that even if the US may claim not to have directly intended such an outcome, it still shares some responsibility for the harm to innocent civilians.     

Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

In an effort to better understand the benefits and limitations of an authoritarian approach to counter-insurgency, this article examines the relationship between regime type and military effectiveness in the often neglected case of Soviet counter-insurgency operations in Western Ukraine. This study finds that the advantages authoritarian governments enjoy in designing, planning and implementing counter-insurgency campaigns – related to a lack of restraints and constraints – can all too easily become reversed through the excesses they permit.     

美国空间攻防对抗概念体系下的空间武器平台

首先指出空间武器平台在未来空间攻防对抗中占有极其重要的位置;然后对美国的研究现状及趋势进行了系统的总结,重点分析了3种子平台的性能参数和作战方式,这3种子平台包括:空间机动飞行器(SMV)、模块插入级(M IS)和通用航空飞行器(CAV);最后给出了美国空间攻防对抗概念体系下的空间武器平台的构成。     

The legality of unmanned aerial vehicles outside the combat zone: a case study of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan

The drone is the latest tool to promote interests of a nation-state. It is clear that USA as well as other major powers anticipate that robotics will play a key role in future warfare. Today, more than 70 countries have already acquired drone technology and many others are desperate to join the ranks. This urge for drone technology will ultimately lead to a “boundless and borderless war without end.” In the case of Pakistan, the US drone campaign has raised some important issues regarding how their use could, or should, be regulated in the future. This article analyses the legal issues raised by the US's use of drone technology in non-combat zones, such as Pakistan. It is argued that a reckless disrespect of Pakistan's sovereignty has had adverse implications and consequences for the legitimacy of the Pakistani government. Drone strikes have prompted instinctive opposition among the Pakistani population, hurt their feelings and estranged them from the government. This in turn has added to Pakistan's instability and stimulated a ground-swell of animosity toward the USA.     

Forging the Anglo‐American global defence partnership: Harold Wilson,Lyndon Johnson and the Washington summit,December 1964

This article investigates the initial phase of the relationship between the Harold Wilson government and the Lyndon Johnson administration. Despite the generally held view that relations between these two countries were neither warm or close or that Wilson was more anxious to establish a close partnership with the United States than Johnson was with Britain, the article will show that this view is rather superficial. On the contrary, it was the Johnson administration which lacked confidence in dealing with the Wilson government for several reasons. The British leadership fought its corner very well, and used Britain's ability to play a world role as a means of influencing the USA. Indeed, no other single Western ally was equal to the USA, and thus a close relationship with the USA did not necessarily mean that the other country had to have equal power and strength to the USA.     

THE US NAVY AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

In the last decade, the nature of peacekeeping in Africa has changed somewhat, especially the manner in which peacekeeping missions are comprised, funded and driven. What one can observe is that there has been new thinking in the field of peacekeeping where this initiative is driven by states with particular interest in a particular issue(s). This thinking has led, to a certain extent, to the United Nations (UN) de-monopolising peacekeeping and ceding its ‘responsibility to protect’ to either lead states or regional organisations to deal with crises in respective backyards. In the first instance, ‘lead states’ have been empowered (financially and militarily) by peacekeeping powers to attend to crises in their respective regions to drive peacekeeping efforts. In the second instance, while financial and military support is not paramount, regional powers have had the blessing of the UN to deal with regional issues and crises in various parts of their respective regions. This situation evidently signifies the shifting nature of peacekeeping on the African continent. On assessing this scenario, the question that emerges in one's mind is where does this leave the UN? Does this mean that the UN and multilateralism is being sidelined in favour of unilateralism? Or does the UN still matter? What is the future of peacekeeping in Africa? These questions and the challenges posed by both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ approach to peacekeeping will be analysed in this article.     

地缘缺陷是制约大国崛起的重要因素：以印度为例

历史上，地缘因素对大国崛起起过重要的作用。地缘优势有利于大国的崛起，而地缘缺陷则制约着大国的崛起，导致其崛起失败或难以崛起。印度是正在崛起的新兴大国。然而，印度所处的地缘环境存在明显缺陷，这是制约印度崛起的重要因素。印度只有对自身的地缘缺陷进行合理改造，扬长避短，才能顺利实现崛起目标。     

Coercive diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian strategy in Eastern Ukraine

What were Russia’s objectives in Eastern Ukraine, and why was it seemingly unable to achieve a successful or decisive outcome? In contrast to Russia’s seizure of Crimea, the uprising in Eastern Ukraine was marked by disorganization and chaos. Using proxy and surrogate actors, along with military exercises and the injection of Russian troops, Russia sought to institutionalize a political entity inside Ukraine to influence its domestic politics. In this article, I analyze the mechanisms by which Russia attempted to implement, and later salvage, its strategy. The article contributes to clearer theoretical and practical understanding of limited force in coercive diplomacy, signaling, and a more rigorous treatment of the role and uses of proxy actors.     

侵害企业家常见犯罪及其防范

近年来,刑事犯罪居高不下,侵害企业家的犯罪持续上升,企业家被侵害的常见犯罪尤以绑架、敲诈勒索最为突出。企业家要思想上高度重视,搞好自身防范;做好企业内部的安全防范;教育好自己的子女,以防成为被侵害目标;加大技防投入;宽以待人,为自身安全创造一个良好的环境;慎于交友;保持良好的生活方式。     

East versus West in the defeat of Nazi Germany

One of the most commonly expressed opinions about victory in the Second World War is that the Soviet Union was mostly responsible for beating Nazi Germany. Supposedly the great land war fought between these two powers in the East was the decisive front in Europe. The West's contribution to German defeat, on the other hand, is often seen as somewhat marginal. The Anglo‐American strategic bombing campaign in 1943 paid few dividends and it was not until after the Normandy landings in June 1944 that the West really began to divert a large amount of German resources.

The purpose of this article is to challenge some of these basic notions. Through analysing what Germany produced, where it was sent and how it was destroyed, the West's contribution to defeating Germany moves from an ancillary position to a dominant one. Taking German war production as a whole, from 1943 onwards the West was responsible for tying down and destroying a significantly larger share than the Soviet Union.     

Collective security and strategic instability in the digital domain

Cyberspace experiences worrying trends that could have a negative impact on the international strategic landscape. The lack or erosion of norms and risky practices and behaviors could lead to greater uncertainty and thus greater instability. Set against a context of renewed competition between great powers, these developments are also tied to the strategic structure of cyberspace. This forum is devoted to discussing factors leading to stability or and instability.     

Troubled triangle: Russia,Ukraine and the United States

A potentially productive triangular arrangement among Russia, Ukraine, and the United States emerged in 1994 from efforts to constrain nuclear weapons diffusion. By 2001, this promising initiative was nearly moribund, owing to the inability or unwillingness of the parties to fulfill the commitments of subsequent agreements. The domestic and external causes of this failure are many and clear. Yet the advantages to each of reengaging in a trilateral relationship are also plain. This means fulfilling their unfinished agenda by learning from past mistakes, adopting realistic premises and goals, and pursuing ‘bottom up’ as well as ‘top down’ strategies.     

Europe,Russia and the Ukraine crisis: the dynamics of coercion

This article analyses European strategy towards Russia during the Ukraine crisis between February 2014 and December 2015, conceptualising it as a coercive diplomatic strategy and analysing the relationship between its ends, ways and means. European strategy sought to reverse Russian intervention. However, this overarching aim was flanked by two ‘constraining’ aims of avoiding an escalation of the conflict and a breakdown of relations with Russia. The strategy shifted between these aims, which proved to be irreconcilable: while the EU partly succeeded in containing the conflict, it failed to reverse Russian intervention and relations between the EU and Russia deteriorated sharply.