《禁止化学武器公约》生效十年履约评述

简要回顾了《禁止化学武器公约》生效10年来化学武器的宣布、销毁、核查等履约进展情况。分析了履行《禁止化学武器公约》需要注意的几个问题,包括公约的普遍性、化学武器威胁的长时间存在,以及科学技术发展对《禁止化学武器公约》的影响等。     

“合法”的新概念化学武器

所谓新概念化学武器,是区别于传统化学毒剂弹药而言的一种武器。这种新化学武器由于其弹药并不对作战人员构成伤害,更不会致人死亡,也不污染环境,因此短期内还不会受国际《禁止化学武器公约》的限制。说它不受《禁止化学武器公约》限制,是指它既不违背1925年日内瓦议定书的内容和精神,也不受1993年1月公开签署的人类历史上第一个全面禁止、彻底销毁大规模杀伤性武器的军控条约《关于禁止发展、生产、储存和使用化学武器及销毁此种武器的公约》的约束。它是一种新型概念武器。这种新概念化学弹内装的不是普通炸药,也不是常说的沙林、芥子气等种种     

遗留化学武器的核查制度

《禁止化学武器公约》(《化武公约》)生效在即,根据公约的宗旨,一切化学武器都必须销毁,包括遗留化学武器在     

1998年化学裁军形势分析

１９９８年化学裁军,以执行《禁止化学武器公约》为中心,取得重大进展。公约组织全面开展覆约活动。１６９个签约国中已有１２１国批准公约,８７国作出宣布。公约组织进行了３４９次核查。美国销毁化学武器近３０００ｔ,俄罗斯销毁化学武器尚处于计划准备阶段。但伊拉克武器核查危机重复,美、英动武,非缔约国中化学武器扩散不断发生,化学裁军仍潜存诸多矛盾。     

《禁止化学武器公约》履约进展

本文简要回顾了《禁止化学武器公约》生效后禁止化学武器组织的主要活动。     

毒剂销毁的化学问题

《禁止化学武器公约》的签署使销毁化学武器的问题日益迫切和重要。本文就销毁化学毒剂的化学反应：氧化（高温、低温）、水解、分解等进行全面系统的讨论。     

化学战的今昔

化学武器的广泛使用始于第一次世界大战。其使用表明,它能影响战斗的胜负并可取得战术效果。早年的国际公众舆论把化学武器看成是所有武器中最令人恐怖的一种,交战各方也都一致认为应在未来禁止使用这种武器。国际社会于1925年6月签署了《日内瓦议定书》,禁止化学及细菌武器的使用。然而,该公约并未能禁止住化学及细菌武器的生产和使用,也没有规定对违约者的制裁措施。有些签     

化学核查技术与化学武器公约

《禁止化学武器公约》(简称《化武公约》),在国际社会和联合国裁军委员会的长期努力下,已于1993年1月在法国巴黎签署。目前已有159个国家在此公约上签字,并有19个国家已批准。虽然《化武公约》的生效和实施是一项艰难的工作,但是此公约在化学武器裁军历史上是独一无二的、全面的、切实可行的公约,在减少全球化学战威胁方面向前迈     

“14号,是中国”

正"这个可是我们研究室的宝贝。"在研究室门口,副主任周世坤指着一块牌子,"国际禁止化学武器公约组织指定实验室"郑重地向我们介绍,"1997年,全世界只有7个,我们就是其中之一,这可是一件很了不起的事。""国际联试",全称为"国际禁止化学武器公约组织官方水平考试",由联合国禁化武组织每年进行一次,旨在对签署禁止化学武器公约的国家鉴定实验室的资格评定。由于这个名字长达18个字,拗口冗长,于是防化研究院分析化学实验室     

《禁止化学武器公约》生效8年回顾

截止2004年12月31日,《禁止化学武器公约》共有167个缔约国,根据公约要求,其中6个缔约国宣布拥有化学武器,136个缔约国建立了国家执行机构,96个缔约国进行了国家立法。禁止化学武器组织对66缔约国的750个设施进行了视察。截止2004年11月30日,已销毁宣布的71373t化学武器中的10351t,已销毁宣布的8671564件弹药／容器中的2145268件。截止2005年1月31日,OPCW对已宣布的化武设施和工业设施共进行了1963次视察。     

防化研究院履约十年回顾

《禁止化学武器公约》生效10周年之际,简要回顾公约生效以来防化研究院参与的履约研究、核查接待、单一小规模设施建设、指定实验室建设、日本遗弃化武处理等各个方面的履约活动,以期总结经验,展望未来。     

WHILE WAITING FOR THE PROTOCOL

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) regime currently suffers from a lack of effective compliance procedures. Because a legally binding compliance protocol to the BWC is not available, other measures are needed to stabilize the regime against the risk of violations of its rules. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the experiences of UN inspection teams show that among the necessary components of effective compliance mechanisms are an intermediary level between bilateral consultations of states parties and involvement of the UN Security Council as well as independent assessment capabilities. This article suggests that the UN Secretary General could assume such an intermediary function and, using the authority contained in Article 99 of the UN Charter, could investigate not only alleged use of biological weapons but also alleged breaches of the BWC. A standing expert unit in the Department for Disarmament Affairs could provide the independent expertise necessary for such investigations. Such a compliance mechanism could provisionally help stabilize the BWC regime until a permanent compliance system can be agreed.     

Reading the Riot Act: Toward a More Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons

ABSTRACT

The recent use of chemicals in warfare in Syria and Iraq illustrates that, despite the important work of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the world has not yet been totally successful in stopping the use of indiscriminate toxic agents in conflicts, either by states or non-state actors. Michael Crowley's excellent and timely new book, Chemical Control, analyzes the use of “riot control agents” (RCAs) and “incapacitating chemical agents” (ICAs), including launch and dispersal systems, by police, paramilitary, and military forces over the last decades and raises the challenging question about where the red line might be drawn between banned and permitted uses of chemicals. He discusses this problem not only in the context of the CWC, which allows use of RCAs for civilian riot control, but also in the context of international law, human rights, and criminal justice, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other disarmament and abolition regimes. He proposes a “holistic, three-stage approach” to addressing this issue “for effective regulation or prohibition of the weapon or weapon-related technology of concern.” As we approach the global abolition of a whole class of weapons of mass destruction in the next decade or even sooner, Chemical Control is helpful in better understanding and solving the dilemma of what's actually banned or permitted under international law, and precluding states undermining the chemical weapons ban.     

Chemical-weapon use in Syria: atrocities,attribution, and accountability

ABSTRACT

International efforts to hold the government of President Bashar al-Assad accountable for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War have entered a new phase. For the first time, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization responsible for implementing the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, has been empowered to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which was formed to conduct the OPCW’s new attribution mission, has announced its intention to investigate and identify the perpetrators of nine chemical attacks in Syria, including the April 7, 2018, attack in Douma. This article reviews recent efforts to attribute chemical attacks in Syria, describes what we know about the nine incidents to be investigated, summarizes what is known about the Syrian government officials, military commanders, and chemical-warfare scientists suspected of being responsible for these attacks, discusses what to expect during the next phase of the attribution process, and offers insights into how the international community can move beyond attribution to accountability. Accountability is necessary to provide justice for victims and to prevent future incidents by demonstrating that perpetrators of chemical attacks will be identified and punished.     

THE AUSTRALIA GROUP

The Australia Group's (AG's) contributions toward stemming global proliferation of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction over the last 20 years are noted, in addition to the group's complementary role in effectively supporting the purpose and objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This report also outlines the organizational and operational means that help accomplish the AG mission and notes the U.S. Congress’ recognition of the role of the AG in countering chemical and biological weapons proliferation. Addressing criticism by some CWC states parties that question the AG's role in nonproliferation, the author also highlights the AG's expanded reach since September 2001 over terrorist activity. Finally,the article identifies a challenge the AG now faces in furthering its objectives and offers a possible solution.     

ALBANIA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS CON

In 2003, the Albanian government declared that in late 2002 it had discovered a heretofore unknown cache of 16 tons of chemical weapons. Tirana requested and received assistance from the West in securing and destroying the materials, a task completed in 2007. Albania has been lauded for its responsible handling of the discovery and for being the first nation to complete the destruction of its chemical weapons under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This article argues that the Albanian government has always knowingly possessed the weapons, keeping them a secret until a post-September 11, 2001 international focus on weapons of mass destruction made it politically worthwhile for Tirana to declare and destroy them. The likelihood that the governments of the West turned a willful blind eye to this chain of events is troubling for the credibility of the CWC and confidence in nonproliferation measures in general. Finally, the author recommends measures to avoid and address similar situations in the future.     

OPTING OUT OF THE IRON TRIANGLE

Between the 1960s and the 1990s, the US chemical industry went from lobbying against the Geneva Protocol and promoting increased funding for chemical warfare to refusing to produce binary chemical weapons and assisting with the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—even though the treaty included provisions that could be costly to industry. What happened in those thirty years to make the US chemical industry reverse its position on chemical weapons? This article argues these changes were largely caused by the chemical industry's desire to reform the negative public image it had acquired due to its involvement in the Agent Orange scandal and other high-profile incidents during the 1970s and 1980s. The chemical industry's assistance with CWC negotiations may be explained after an examination of the US public policy literature, which argues that industry will support apparently costly regulations if doing so helps it repair a damaged public image and ensures greater profits in the long run.     

BANNING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) underpins the international regime to control biological weapons. The strength of the treaty however relies on national implementation. The first step for many states party to the Convention is drafting appropriate national laws and regulations. So far, 32 countries in Africa are signatory to the BTWC. More recently, in 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1540, which requires all UN Member States to put in place legislation to prevent the illicit trafficking of material that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. The need for such wide-ranging legislation is recognised African countries but its creation and implementation pose specific challenges.     

HARNESSING GLOBAL TRADE DATA FOR BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL

Unlike treaties dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention still lacks formal verification measures, 31 years after entering into force. Here we propose a global export-import monitoring system of biological dual-use items as an additional measure for a web of biological arms controls that could complement traditional export controls. We suggest that such a measure may help to guide consultation or verification processes in the biological area.     

论自主武器军控的国际法及政策要点

如何规制自主武器是1980年《常规武器公约》框架下讨论的热点问题,目前这一议题已进入到政府专家组讨论阶段,对自主武器的研发、测试、部署及使用的关键问题,进行了比较深入的讨论。2018年以来,政府专家组会议最后文件已包含了未来谈判的若干指导性原则。本文认为,结合国际军控博弈的背景和各军事大国人工智能技术发展现状考虑,《日内瓦公约:第一附加议定书》第36条下缔约国审查义务、使用自主武器违反国际人道法的责任不得转移规则,以及2013年《武器贸易条约》对自主武器贸易的管制,是三个法律、政策背景极其复杂的问题。以自身军事能力不受到国际军控规则的严重削弱为基础考量,我国应该对此采取审慎的态度,尽力完善法律和政策。