Misapplying lessons learned? Analysing the utility of British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland, 1971–76

This article examines the British Army's deployment in support of the civil power in Northern Ireland. It argues that the core guiding principles of the British approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) – employing the minimum use of force, firm and timely action, and unity of control in civil–military relations – were misapplied by the Army in its haste to combat Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorism between 1971 and 1976. Moreover, it suggests that the Army's COIN strategy was unsuccessful in the 1970s because commanders adhered too closely to the customs, doctrine, and drill applied under very different circumstances in Aden between 1963 and 1967, generally regarded as a failure in Britain's post-war internal security operations. The article concludes with a discussion of the British government's decision to scale back the Army's role in favour of giving the Royal Ulster Constabulary primacy in counter-terrorist operations, a decision which led ultimately to success in combating IRA violence.     

Poverty,Pipeline Vandalisation/Explosion and Human Security: Integrating Disaster Management into Poverty Reduction in Nigeria

This paper interrogates the common official refrain to attribute vandalisation-induced pipeline explosion to poverty in the country. It argues that although poverty has explanatory relevance in terms of the ubiquity of oil pipeline explosion, such attribution conceals more than it reveals: it clearly shows that the poor are the direct and hardest hit in oil pipeline explosion in Nigeria, but conceals the fact that rich vandalisation barons are behind these threats to human security; it conceals the contradiction between the material circumstances of the victims and the sophisticated technology deployed in such nefarious acts. While it reveals the disempowerment of the poor to negotiate their survival outside the lure of fuel scooping, it conceals the power of the barons to easily negotiate their freedom from conviction. Also, it conceals the seeming contradiction of perceptions of security between the government officials and the poor citizens. The paper therefore argues that it is this prevalent situation that not only accounts for the frequency of pipeline vandalisation, but provides reasons that government fails to pay compensation to victims of explosion or to evolve proactive disaster response strategies. Thus, it advocates the integration of a disaster management framework into government's overall effort of poverty reduction in the country.     

U.S. policy on preventive war and preemption

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, the United States government has spent tens of billions of dollars to improve the nation's ability to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack, but the emphasis on immediate first response has left many long-term environmental, political, and technological challenges unaddressed. Although a dirty bomb attack is unlikely to yield the same amount of physical devastation and death as caused by Katrina or a nuclear weapon, the social, psychological, and economic impact would be enormous. At present, however, the United States lacks the technology necessary to decontaminate a large, densely populated urban area under time, political, and economic constraints. This article reviews past cleanup experiences and current decontamination capabilities to consider the long-term implications of a dirty bomb, identifies weaknesses in America's existing response capabilities, notes possible areas of political friction, and considers the implications of the failure to adequately prepare. Having the appropriate decontamination techniques established and long-term plans in place before an incident occurs will significantly improve the government's ability to protect public and environmental security, establish a viable decontamination strategy, allow residents to return to their homes, and get the local economy back on its feet.     

Insurgency in Afghanistan: implications for Pakistan's internal and external security

In the aftermath of 9/11, the USA embarked on a massive global hunt for terrorists and launched its “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan. Its failure to control insurgency in Afghanistan spilled over into Pakistan, with disastrous consequences. The resurgence of the Taliban with more formidable tactics and maneuvering skills has become more troublesome for both Afghanistan and Pakistan and for the USA and its allied forces. The fierce comeback of the insurgents has challenged the political and territorial integrity of Pakistan, one that it cannot tolerate. This article analyzes the current situation and its implications for Pakistan's security. Moreover, it looks into the internal and external security complexities that Pakistan faces and the possible implications of the US exit strategy for Pakistan's security. It concludes that the security situation in Pakistan is continuously deteriorating and no part of her territory is immune from terrorists' attacks. To be successful, Pakistan must pursue a broad-based strategy that encompasses military, political, social, economic and informational domains aimed at accomplishing four major objectives: (1) elimination of foreign terrorists and their facilitators; (2) strengthening of the political and administrative institutions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); (3) establishing a safe and secure environment conducive for sustained development and the realization of real socio-economic progress and (4) integrating the FATA into the national mainstream. In the long term, a strategy based on the concept of “Enlightened Moderation” is the right solution, not only to the internal problems of Pakistan but also for the Muslim world and the international community.     

THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE

When Botswana arrived at independence in 1966, it had no army, depending instead on a police force with deep roots in the colonial era. The country waited another eleven years before creating a military and within a quarter of a century had seen it develop into a capable, well-educated and self-disciplined force that was attracting some of the nation's most talented young people. It had also become the government's institution of choice for addressing the country's most pressing security dilemmas, whether environmental catastrophe or serious crime, and had performed sterling service in regional peace operations. To its members and external observers, it emphasised its professionalism and service, enjoying a high level of respect in the nation as a whole. Given the generally poor reputation of armies in Africa, this qualifies as a notable achievement.     

ACQUIRING FOREIGN NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has laid out an ambitious plan to become the first Arab country to possess a civilian nuclear energy program. Central to that effort has been the Emirati government's ability to obtain foreign nuclear assistance. This article traces the UAE's strategies for overcoming the obstacles that stood in the way of nuclear suppliers providing assistance. It examines the approach taken by the UAE to assuage the safety and security concerns of nuclear suppliers, how the UAE leveraged its alliances with France and the United States to obtain their cooperation, and its strategies for engaging domestic interest groups in supplier states. The generalizable elements of the UAE's strategies are discussed and used to provide insight into the prospects for other Middle Eastern states' bids to obtain similar assistance. The article concludes with a discussion of the potentially transformative aspects of the strategies employed by the UAE in shaping other countries' pursuit of nuclear energy in the region.     

Winning the ‘War on Terror’? Roy Mason's Contribution to Counter-Terrorism in Northern Ireland

Roy Mason's tenure as Northern Ireland Secretary marked a watershed, yet it has provoked little analysis. Contrary to his popular image, security policy under Mason remained within the limits that had determined the formulation of British counter-terrorism ever since 1972. It was precisely because of this strategic environment that Mason's contribution was little more than a change in rhetoric, the implications of which were contradictory. Likewise, his key political idea of promoting ‘constitutional security’ negated its stated purpose by furthering instability, and – in the longer term – by making Dublin's permanent inclusion in the government of the province a political imperative.     

Home Defence and the Sandys Defence White Paper, 1957

Long understood as the key document in Britain's Cold War history, the Duncan Sandys Defence White Paper of 1957 nevertheless has a largely forgotten context: home defence. This article argues that understanding this context allows important new conclusions to be drawn concerning the drafting, presentation and the reception of the document and the deterrent strategy it expounded. It argues that the Paper failed to establish a new doctrine for civil defence which reconciled the policy with the wider deterrent strategy. In doing this, the Paper presented a muddled policy to the public: one which failed to justify the reductions in civil defence provision but which stressed the destructive power of thermonuclear weapons. This had the effect of encouraging the critics of the government's nuclear strategy to flag up the absence of adequate civil defence measures and highlight the ‘admission’ that there was no defence against the hydrogen bomb.     

PROTECTING CULTURAL MONUMENTS AGAINST TERRORISM

Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy to discourage terrorist attacks on iconic monuments is for a government to show a firm commitment to swift reconstruction. Using a simple game‐theoretic model, we demonstrate how a credible claim to rebuild any destroyed cultural monument discourages terrorist attacks by altering the terrorists' expectations and by increasing the government's reputation costs if they fail to rebuild.     

Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries

This paper models transnational terrorism as a three‐way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state's opponents against the government's external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilises deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep‐seated sense of humiliation. The model highlights the importance of intrinsic motivation. A rise in the external power's preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government's military efficiency against the rebels, who are also terrorists against the government's sponsor, raises overall levels of violence.     

ISIS-K: deadly nuisance or strategic threat?

ABSTRACT

In 2014, an affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria emerged in Afghanistan. Wilayat Khorasan, or ISIS-K, intends to secure Afghanistan to legitimize the Islamic State’s caliphate across the ‘Khorasan Province’ including portions of Central Asia, China, Iran, the Indian Subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. While the group’s intent is clear, its capability confounds analysts. The authors argue that Wilayat Khorasan is likely the Islamic State’s most viable and lethal regional affiliate based on an expansionist military strategy. This is designed to enable the group’s encirclement of Jalalabad City in Nangarhar Province and is foundational to its expanded operational reach, regionalization, and lethality. Since 2016, the US-led Coalition’s counter-terrorism strategy has disrupted ISIS-K’s critical requirements and prevented external attacks. Yet, raids and strikes alone will not defeat ISIS-K. They must be calibrated against an institution-building approach that legitimizes Afghanistan’s government and redresses grievances that ISIS-K exploits to resolve.     

North Korea,deterrence, and engagement

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) justifies its nuclear weapon arsenal with the concept of deterrence. It means that it will try to miniaturize and modernize its warheads and missiles. This leads to a first-use doctrine of nuclear weapons. Obama's policy of engagement does not offer a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue as yet. In the context of its policy of critical engagement with the DPRK, the European Union has three key interests: regional peace and stability, denuclearization, and human rights. The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) could be a precedent. The CSCE process was based on three “baskets”: security, economics, and humanitarian. The multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership is a step in this regard. This article looks at three theoretical approaches: realism, liberal institutionalism, and liberal internationalism. It concludes that a political strategy to create a stable North Korean peninsula has to go beyond nuclear deterrence that is based on the realist notion of balance of power.     

SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

In the ten years since the establishment of South Africa's first inclusive democratic government, an ambitious, extensive and systematic process of reform has been carried out in the governance of security. The process is widely regarded as having been successful and a model for other processes of ‘security sector reform’ in the context of transitions from authoritarian forms of governance to democratic ones.

That this been achieved with hardly a shot fired in anger is a remarkable achievement and a credit to visionary political leadership as well as organisational capacity, in other words to effective security governance.

At the same time, progress has been uneven and sometimes fragmentary, policy intentions and commitments have not always been translated into practice, the end results have not been to everyone's liking, and transformation has engendered its own pathologies. Thus several challenges remain in improving security governance.

This article provides a broad overview of the roles played by the various actors in the governance of the security sector, including the executive, parliament and civil society. It examines the main policy frameworks and touches on organisational transformation, because it is impossible to deal with governance in isolation from these issues. Policy processes and the frameworks they give rise to—in particular—are critical for effective governance. This article deals with the defence, safety and security and intelligence fields. A comprehensive overview would need to include the governance of criminal justice and foreign policy. The article does not seek to make an overall evaluation of governance, but to identify achievements, shortfalls and challenges.     

THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

ABSTRACT

Since the 1990s, the group of stakeholders working to combat biological weapons (BW) proliferation has broadened to include new actors who have not traditionally focused on security issues, including organizations from the public health sector, researchers in the life sciences, and the biosafety community. This has had significant benefits for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the arms control establishment more broadly. However, the BWC's agenda has become increasingly dominated by issues of international health and global health security. By focusing solely on response strategies, the United States and other interested parties risk losing sight of other important elements of a counter-BW strategy, including deterrence and prevention. Focusing on public health-related issues to the exclusion of more traditional security matters puts the nonproliferation regime at risk, because it limits the amount of time that stakeholders have available to grapple with the critical questions facing the BWC and the biological weapons nonproliferation establishment—questions that must be answered if the regime is to survive.     

Credibility over Courage: NATO's Mis-Intervention in Kosovo

NATO officials have cited various reasons for conducting their air campaign in Kosovo. Though not emphasised as much, the concern that NATO's credibility was at stake stood out as the most paramount on the basis of logical comparison. In fact, NATO intervened in Kosovo primarily to maintain its credibility as the Trans- Atlantic's only multilateral security mechanism because its continued existence depended on it. While NATO's search for its new role in the post-Cold War strategic environment has been fraught with several problems, the inclination towards collective security and crisis management has placed it in a position of proactive military obligation. Predictably, NATO's venture in the Balkans this time around has had various implications on its future prospects as an organisation.     

Country Survey XIII: Japan's security posture and defense industry prospects

Defense budgets in Japan have been complicated compromises from numerous inputs ‐ including threat perceptions, domestic industrial/technological base development, support for the bilateral security treaty with the United States and internal bureaucratic politics ‐ but with the fall of the former Soviet Union, the clearest justification for higher spending disappeared. Double‐digit defense spending increases that were common in the 1980s have been replaced by annual increases lower than present inflation rates, resulting in negative real growth in the country's defense budget. Domestic economic problems and consistent government pressures for smaller budgets have further slowed annual growth in total spending and have contributed to lower procurement budgets. As a result, the domestic Japanese defense industry is facing far more constrained conditions from the growth years of a decade before.

Government policymakers are examining Japan's regional security environment as well as its alliance with the United States to determine the appropriate course for the country to take in the coming years. The formal security treaty with the United States is likely to remain a major element of government positions, but other aspects of the country's overall security posture are open to debate. Perceptions of a reduced threat environment are fueling additional pressures for defense budget cuts.

The domestic defense industry seeks means to assure its survival in domestic defense markets in this constrained environment. Expansion into overseas markets to offset declining domestic markets is an option that currently is constrained by policy restrictions on arms exports. Industry is advocating re‐examination of those policies and unlike earlier years, government appears willing to respond positively but cautiously to this lobbying.     

India's Pursuit Of Ballistic Missile Defense

This article analyzes India's efforts to deploy a Ballistic Missile Program (BMD). The article has three objectives. First, it argues that scientific-bureaucratic factors and India's incapacity to deter Pakistan's use of terrorist proxies have driven its quest for BMD. Second, the article also evaluates the current state of India's two-tiered missile defense shield. In spite of various claims on the part of India's defense science establishment, the paper estimates that India still lacks a deployable BMD system and is still far from developing an effective strategy of deterrence-through-denial. Third, the article analyzes the implications of the development of India's BMD system for nuclear stability in South Asia. The article shows how India's BMD capacities, however limited, have indirectly exacerbated the security concerns of India's regional rival, Pakistan.     

Shielding the ‘Hot Gates’: Submarine Warfare and Japanese Naval Strategy in the Cold War and Beyond (1976–2006)

The build-up of Japan's military apparatus in the 1990s and 2000s has been often regarded by security analysts as indicative of a departure from the country's Cold War strategic posture. Japan appears to be engaged in a process of militarisation that is eroding the foundations of its ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ policy. In the case of the archipelago's naval strategy, such assessments overlook the longstanding significance of a core feature of its defence policy, namely the surveillance of maritime crossroads delivering the wealth of the country. The paper reassesses the evolution of the Japanese strategy since the Cold War by examining the development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force's submarine force, one of the key components of the defensive shield for these crossroads. The paper argues that with the changes in the security environment of the 1990s, Japan already fielded a mature force with state-of-the-art submarines, and that the rise of a new naval competitor aiming at controlling key strategic points along Japan's sea lanes reconfirmed the critical importance of submarine operations to Japanese national security.     

Lesotho’s 2015 elections in the context of an ongoing security vacuum

After inconclusive elections in 2012, Lesotho had a coalition government for the first time, made up of three political parties that had a narrow majority in parliament. The new government, however, faced several challenges, some of which were of its own making. The agreement among the three parties was to literally divide the government into three parts, leading to a continuous stalemate in its operation; the most serious consequence was the prorogation of parliament and the resultant attempted coup. The flight of the prime minister to South Africa and his return under a Southern African Development Community (SADC) security detail provided a short-term solution to Lesotho's security crisis. Under Cyril Ramaphosa's mediation, the prorogued parliament was conditionally opened and the election date set for 28 February 2015. However, the security dilemma – whereby the prime minister, who is also minister of defence, has no control over the military – remains. When elections are held, there does not seem to be a guarantee that they will be held in peace; moreover, there are now fears that the losers will not accept the results of the elections because of the security vacuum in Lesotho. This article argues that peace can only be salvaged by enhanced SADC security before, during and after the elections. It argues that the SADC mission should remain beyond the elections to oversee the constitutional changes that are necessary for ensuring long-term stability. On their own, Lesotho politicians are unlikely to be able to work together in order to move the country forward.     

Poland's national potential and its international position within the European Union – research remarks

This article examines Poland's national potential and its international position within the European Union (EU) with respect to security issues. It presents research results based on a comparison of Poland's national potential as it relates to other EU countries, which is useful when evaluating Poland's power within the EU. The article also evaluates Poland's crisis potential, i.e. it identifies those factors that may potentially be treated as threats to national and regional security. Finally, it enables the identification of challenges to Poland's security in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The research is conducted according to a multidimensional comparative analysis, which is perceived by the author as the best available to measure a country's power despite its weaknesses.