REGULATING SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

One of the biggest challenges currently facing the developing world is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Arms control and disarmament have been part of the diplomatic agenda since the middle of the 19th century and were two of the most important issues facing the world's major powers during the 1960s and 1970s. When the Cold War ended, different instruments had been developed to negotiate the control over nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional weapons. However, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons poses new challenges to the international system. While control over legitimate use is laudable, the major problem relates to the illicit proliferation external to the state system. To address this challenge, international and national law faces the challenge of regime creation, and of the implementation and enforcement of international and national standards. Possible approaches to regime creation are discussed in this essay and recent examples are provided of how these were applied in practice to the issue of small arms and light weapons by the OAS, ECOWAS, SADC, the OAU and in East Africa.     

BANNING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) underpins the international regime to control biological weapons. The strength of the treaty however relies on national implementation. The first step for many states party to the Convention is drafting appropriate national laws and regulations. So far, 32 countries in Africa are signatory to the BTWC. More recently, in 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1540, which requires all UN Member States to put in place legislation to prevent the illicit trafficking of material that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. The need for such wide-ranging legislation is recognised African countries but its creation and implementation pose specific challenges.     

Arms Control,Proliferation and Terrorism: The Bush Administration's Post-September 11 Security Strategy

The current Bush Administration considers ‘outlaw regimes’ and their terrorist clients acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the gravest danger to international security. Thus, arms control, proliferation and terrorism are inextricably linked. The administration also believes that arms control and non-proliferation, as traditionally practiced, do not provide effective tools for preventing WMD spread. As evidenced in Iraq, Washington subscribes to an interventionist policy of rolling back WMD programs it considers threatening. This article examines the logic that underpins US arms control and proliferation thinking and considers the implications of US policy for relations with other states deemed to be proliferation risks.     

MICRO-DISARMAMENT IN WEST AFRICA

This article explores the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the West African sub-region and efforts by the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to deal with the problem through the ECOWAS Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa. The paper analyses the degree of compliance with the Moratorium by four ECOWAS member states, namely, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Mali.     

INTEGRATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES TO ENABLE SIGNIFICANT STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS

In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that could make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.     

The disconnect between arms control and DDR in peace processes

The article discusses the disconnect between arms control and disarmament practices vis-à-vis peacebuilding practices. It critically analyzes Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) practices focusing on their absence of dialogue with international arms control and disarmament (ACD) practices. It proposes that a conversation between experts involved in these distinct practices could promote a political discussion on the place of weapons held by state and non-state actors in times of peace. The argument is illustrated through an analysis of the treatment of rules on weapons in the Colombian peace process (2012–present) with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The article concludes that the disconnect between the arms control and disarmament and the peacebuilding associations, as seen in the context of DDR practices, reinstates the rule on the monopoly of violence by the state, preventing a broader discussion of the role of weapons and violence in the building of political communities.     

ON THE USE OF TERROR WEAPONS VERSUS MODERN WEAPON SYSTEMS IN AN ARMS RACE BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Some of the most active arms races are taking place between developed and less developed countries. The inability of less developed countries to compete financially, as well as technologically, with developed countries may be forcing the former to acquire terror weapons (TWP). The Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s and the events of 9/11 proved that the use of TWP is no longer a mere threat; there are several organizations and countries that will not hesitate to use them. This study develops a model of resource allocation in an arms race between a developed country that is characterized by state‐of‐the‐art technology and high GDP, and a less developed country whose technological capability and GDP are much lower. The model is used to predict the optimal mix of weapons of the two countries that are engaged in the arms race. Applying the model to the arms race between Israel and Syria demonstrates its use.     

The financing factor in military trade

Available sources value transfers of weapons irrespective of whether they are paid for and how. Data from the U.S. indicates that the shares of arms given for free or on credit are high. If other arms exporters, all military aid and all credits used for military purposes are considered, which is done here on the basis of rough estimates and an opportunity cost model, the true cash costs of weapons in the year of the actual transfer are small. On the other hand, the financial burden of earlier arms imports via debt service has grown over time. It most probably exceeded the true cash cost of imports of arms in the late 1980s. Large differences between arms transfer data and the actual true costs of arms transfers means that analysis of the economic effects of arms imports without considering these financial aspects makes little sense.     

Small world,big guns: globalization,interstate security networks and conventional weapons imports

With the burgeoning influence of emerging markets in Asia, a tectonic shift is taking place in the global security landscape. Asian states are concomitantly arming as their economic clout grows. In light of these developments, security analysts would benefit from a formal means of placing these arms acquisitions in a structural context. Are arms acquisitions on par with the expectations of Asian states, given their structural dispositions, or are recent acquisitions beyond anticipated levels? By using a dynamic panel regression of 187 states from 1950 to 2011, this research predicts arms import volume using the degree of interstate arms linkages, the size of a state's military, and its level of economic development. The technique offers analysts a formal means of distinguishing orthodox behavior in importing conventional weapons from extraneous security motivations. The article concludes by generating near-term forecasts of Asian arms imports and discussing the implications of the technique.     

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Nonproliferation policies to prevent biological and chemical weapons use are important, but insufficient, particularly in view of the rise of global terrorism. Given the history of developing and using these weapons, it is crucial that governments properly prepare for biological and chemical threats, whether naturally occurring or man-made, such as by developing and managing effective healthcare infrastructure to mitigate widespread illness and injuries resulting from pandemics or terrorist attacks. Although the Middle East is one of the most sensitive and complex areas in the world—especially regarding regional arms control efforts and prevention—coordinating preparedness strategies among states in the region may be possible. Cooperatively addressing biological and chemical threats could lead to constructive progress towards the otherwise elusive goal of establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East.     

VERIFIABILITY,RELIABILITY, AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.S. Senate in October 1999 could have been avoided, and the consequences of that vote still loom in the minds of supporters of the treaty. President Barack Obama has embraced the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and a key element of the Obama administration's arms control agenda is delivering on U.S. CTBT ratification. In order to secure the two-thirds majority in the Senate necessary to ratify the treaty, senators that remain skeptical of nuclear disarmament must also be convinced that the entry into force of the CTBT is in the national security interest of the United States. This article provides an analysis of the issues surrounding U.S. CTBT ratification divided into three segments—verifiability of the treaty, reliability of the U.S. stockpile, and the treaty's impact on U.S. national security—and concludes that CTBT ratification serves the security objectives of the United States. The CTBT constitutes an integral component of the multilateral nonproliferation architecture designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and it constrains the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, thereby hindering efforts by states of concern to develop advanced nuclear weapons.     

ARMS CONTROL CONTINUUMS

In July 2001, member states will gather in New York for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Arms in All its Aspects. It represents part of the effort to establish controls on small arms and light weapons. This article argues that it is possible that nuclear and conventional arms control represent two ends of a continuum, with common goals and a common set of mechanisms and processes at work. A decade after the end of the Cold War, it is not surprising that the international community is working on mechanisms to deal with conventional arms. The existence of a continuum and connections between conventional and nuclear arms control is less evident. The two arms control communities appear to function in isolation of each other. The return to the debate on small arms and light weapons echoes post-World War I and II periods. The fact that small arms control is back on the agenda within the context of the UN may signify recognition that any kind of arms control serves the same purpose—preventing and mitigating the effects and duration of, and bringing an end to conflict.     

THE MIDDLE EAST WMD-FREE ZONE CONFERENCE

This article reviews the origins and evolution of the Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) concept and the proposal for a 2012 conference on the subject, and explores new challenges and opportunities for regional arms control in the current regional environment. It suggests that new models may be necessary to revitalize regional arms control efforts. The establishment of a broad regional security forum could include, but should not be limited to, curtailing weapons of mass destruction through the zone approach. Even if the 2012 conference fails to materialize, or is limited to a one-time event, the proposal for such a conference has provided an important opportunity to rethink future options for a regional arms control and security process.     

Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.     

Minimum deterrence and missile defenses: what's new,what's true,what's arguable

Minimum deterrence is a compromise, or halfway house, between nuclear abolition or nearly zero and assured destruction, the dominant paradigm for strategic nuclear arms control during and after the cold war. Minimum deterrence as applied to the current relationship between the United States and Russia would require downsizing the numbers of operationally deployed long-range nuclear weapons to 1000, or fewer, on each side. More drastic bilateral Russian–American reductions would require the cooperation of other nuclear weapons states in making proportional reductions in their own arsenals. In addition, US plans for European-based and global missile defenses cause considerable angst in Russia and threaten to derail the Obama “reset” in Russian–American relations, despite the uncertainties about current and plausible future performances of missile defense technologies.     

ARMING THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT

On 7 July 1999, the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed the Lomé Peace Agreement to end the civil war. A central component of this agreement called for the RUF to disarm. A year later, the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, was in custody and the future of the peace accord in grave doubt. Far from disarming, all parties have been rearming at an alarming rate, in contravention of a 1997 UN arms embargo and despite a regional moratorium on the production, procurement and sale of small arms and light weapons. The political and security situation remains extremely fragile. This article explores the ease with which small arms and light weapons can be obtained, and questions the efficacy of existing armament and disarmament policies. Given the availability of arms, the weakness of the current government, the relative strength of the RUF, and the fluidity of alliances among the country's armed groups, the likelihood of continued conflict in Sierra Leone is great.     

Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.     

舰空导弹武器抗干扰与反隐身技术研究

电子战在现代战争中的地位和作用日益提高,已从战争辅助保障手段发展成为战争中不可缺少的重要作战武器;电子战是现代战争的序幕与先导,并贯穿于战争的全过程,进而决定战争进程和结局.在分析舰空导弹武器面临的典型干扰目标威胁环境基础上,分析了目前舰空导弹武器存在的主要问题,提出了舰空导弹武器系统发展方向的建议.     

A Sign of Victory?: ‘Scottish Swords’ and Other Weapons in the Possession of the ‘Auld Innemie’

Many late medieval documents, notably inventories of arms and armour, of Englishmen contain references to ‘Scottish swords’ and other weapons. What did the compilers of these documents mean when they described a weapon as ‘Scottish’? How did such weapons come to be in the possession of these men? This article will attempt to explain this phenomenon drawing on primary documentary sources and surviving material culture from Glasgow Museums’ collections and others, as well as artworks from the period.     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016