Special Air Service Books to Choose From

Barry Davies, Joining the SAS: How to Get In and What It's Like.Miami: Lewis International Inc., 1998. Pp.214, photos, index. $22.95. ISBN 0–966771–4–2.

Peter McAleese and John Avery, McAleese's Fighting Manual: The Definitive Soldier's Handbook.London: Orion, 1998. Pp.179, illus. £18.95. ISBN 0–75280–063–9.

Steve Crawford et al.The SAS Encyclopedia: The Definitive Guide to the World's Crack Regiment.Miami: Lewis International Inc., 1998. Pp.288, photos, maps, index. $29.95. ISBN 0–9666771–0–2.

Barry Davies et al.The Complete Encyclopedia of the SAS.London: Virgin Publishing Ltd, 1998. Pp.288, photos, maps, no index. $39.95. ISBN 1–85227–707–6.     

Choosing arrival process models for service systems: Tests of a nonhomogeneous Poisson process

Service systems such as call centers and hospital emergency rooms typically have strongly time‐varying arrival rates. Thus, a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) is a natural model for the arrival process in a queueing model for performance analysis. Nevertheless, it is important to perform statistical tests with service system data to confirm that an NHPP is actually appropriate, as emphasized by Brown et al. [8]. They suggested a specific statistical test based on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) statistic after exploiting the conditional‐uniform (CU) property to transform the NHPP into a sequence of i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed on [0,1] and then performing a logarithmic transformation of the data. We investigate why it is important to perform the final data transformation and consider what form it should take. We conduct extensive simulation experiments to study the power of these alternative statistical tests. We conclude that the general approach of Brown et al. [8] is excellent, but that an alternative data transformation proposed by Lewis [22], drawing upon Durbin [10], produces a test of an NHPP test with consistently greater power. We also conclude that the KS test after the CU transformation, without any additional data transformation, tends to be best to test against alternative hypotheses that primarily differ from an NHPP only through stochastic and time dependence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 66–90, 2014     

The solution to an open problem for a caching game

In a caching game introduced by Alpern et al. (Alpern et al., Lecture notes in computer science (2010) 220–233) a Hider who can dig to a total fixed depth normalized to 1 buries a fixed number of objects among n discrete locations. A Searcher who can dig to a total depth of h searches the locations with the aim of finding all of the hidden objects. If he does so, he wins, otherwise the Hider wins. This zero‐sum game is complicated to analyze even for small values of its parameters, and for the case of 2 hidden objects has been completely solved only when the game is played in up to 3 locations. For some values of h the solution of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations is known, but the solution in the remaining cases was an open question recently highlighted by Fokkink et al. (Fokkink et al., Search theory: A game theoretic perspective (2014) 85–104). Here we solve the remaining cases of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations. We also give some more general results for the game, in particular using a geometrical argument to show that when there are 2 objects hidden in n locations and n→∞, the value of the game is asymptotically equal to h/n for h≥n/2. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 23–31, 2016     

A note on signature‐based expressions for the entropy of mixed r‐out‐of‐ n systems

We provide an expression for the Shannon entropy of mixed r‐out‐of‐ n systems when the lifetimes of the components are independent and identically distributed. The expression gives the system's entropy in terms of the system signature, the distribution and density functions of the lifetime model, and the information measures of the beta distribution. Bounds for the system's entropy are obtained by direct applications of the concavity of the entropy and the information inequality.Copyright © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 202–206, 2014     

Non‐zero‐sum nonlinear network path interdiction with an application to inspection in terror networks

A simultaneous non‐zero‐sum game is modeled to extend the classical network interdiction problem. In this model, an interdictor (e.g., an enforcement agent) decides how much of an inspection resource to spend along each arc in the network to capture a smuggler. The smuggler (randomly) selects a commodity to smuggle—a source and destination pair of nodes, and also a corresponding path for traveling between the given pair of nodes. This model is motivated by a terrorist organization that can mobilize its human, financial, or weapon resources to carry out an attack at one of several potential target destinations. The probability of evading each of the network arcs nonlinearly decreases in the amount of resource that the interdictor spends on its inspection. We show that under reasonable assumptions with respect to the evasion probability functions, (approximate) Nash equilibria of this game can be determined in polynomial time; depending on whether the evasion functions are exponential or general logarithmically‐convex functions, exact Nash equilibria or approximate Nash equilibria, respectively, are computed. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 139–153, 2017     

Technical note – operational statistics: Properties and the risk‐averse case

Consider a repeated newsvendor problem for managing the inventory of perishable products. When the parameter of the demand distribution is unknown, it has been shown that the traditional separated estimation and optimization (SEO) approach could lead to suboptimality. To address this issue, an integrated approach called operational statistics (OS) was developed by Chu et al., Oper Res Lett 36 (2008) 110–116. In this note, we first study the properties of this approach and compare its performance with that of the traditional SEO approach. It is shown that OS is consistent and superior to SEO. The benefit of using OS is larger when the demand variability is higher. We then generalize OS to the risk‐averse case under the conditional value‐at‐risk (CVaR) criterion. To model risk from both demand sampling and future demand uncertainty, we introduce a new criterion, called the total CVaR, and find the optimal OS under this new criterion. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 206–214, 2015     

To catch an intruder: Part A—uncluttered scenario

We analyze an interdiction scenario where an interceptor attempts to catch an intruder as the intruder moves through the area of interest. A motivating example is the detection and interdiction of drug smuggling vessels in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. We study two models in this article. The first considers a nonstrategic target that moves through the area without taking evasive action to avoid the interdictor. We determine the optimal location the interceptor should position itself to best respond when a target arrives. The second model analyzes the strategic interaction between the interceptor and intruder using a Blotto approach. The intruder chooses a route to travel on and the interceptor chooses a route to patrol. We model the interaction as a two‐player game with a bilinear payoff function. We compute the optimal strategy for both players and examine several extensions. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 64: 29–40, 2017     

Supply licensing when the manufacturer strategically commits to invest in R&D

This article proposes a strategic reason for a proprietary component supplier to license her technology to a competitor or a manufacturer: her anticipation of the manufacturer's strategic commitment to invest in research and development (R&D). We address this phenomenon with a game theoretic model. Our results show that the manufacturer's full commitment to invest in R&D enables the supplier to license, sell a larger quantity through the supply chain, and charge lower prices. These results are robust to the type of demand uncertainty faced by the manufacturer within the class of increasing generalized failure rate distributions. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 341–350, 2014     

Solving partially observable agent‐intruder games with an application to border security problems

In this paper, we introduce partially observable agent‐intruder games (POAIGs). These games model dynamic search games on graphs between security forces (an agent) and an intruder given possible (border) entry points and high value assets that require protection. The agent faces situations with dynamically changing, partially observable information about the state of the intruder and vice versa. The agent may place sensors at selected locations, while the intruder may recruit partners to observe the agent's movement. We formulate the problem as a two‐person zero‐sum game, and develop efficient algorithms to compute each player's optimal strategy. The solution to the game will help the agent choose sensor locations and design patrol routes that can handle imperfect information. First, we prove the existence of ?‐optimal strategies for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we introduce a Bayesian approximation algorithm to identify these ?‐optimal strategies using belief functions that incorporate the imperfect information that becomes available during the game. For the solutions of large POAIGs with a finite time horizon, we use a solution method common to extensive form games, namely, the sequence form representation. To illustrate the POAIGs, we present several examples and numerical results.     

Volume discount decisions: Wealth maximization or EOQ approach?

A recent paper finds that when volume discounts are available, in some cases, reliance on the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model can induce purchasers to make wealth reducing decisions, and the Present Value (PV) approach should be preferred. While this finding is theoretically correct, the magnitudes of wealth reductions suggested by the paper's numerical examples seem to be questionable. Furthermore, the paper also finds that, in some other cases, a purchaser using the EOQ approach realizes a net increase in current wealth compared to a purchaser using the PV approach. Logic suggests that such a finding cannot be correct, since by its very definition, it is the PV approach that seeks to maximize the current wealth. We offer an alternative frame of comparison and a modified model to show that, under the paper's assumptions, the EOQ approach can never realize a net increase in current wealth compared to the current wealth generated by the PV approach. On the other hand, we also show that when typical values of the relevant parameters prevail, the additional costs imposed by the EOQ approach are not significant. Finally, we suggest that insofar as the PV approach requires greater administrative costs to implement, it may even be counterproductive to the goal of wealth maximization. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 377–389, 1998     

Strategic obfuscation of production capacities

Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014     

Strategic outsourcing under technology spillovers

We study a supply chain in which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM) compete in the finished goods market. The OEM can decide whether to outsource the intermediate good, a critical component for producing the finished good, from the CM or make in‐house production. Technology transition improves the CM's production efficiency, and it can take two different forms: a direct technology transfer from the OEM to the CM or technology spillovers through outsourcing from the OEM to the CM. We document the possibility of strategic outsourcing, that is, the CM supplies the intermediate good to the OEM when she is less efficient than the OEM's in‐house production. We find that technology spillovers can strengthen the incentive for strategic outsourcing. Furthermore, compared with direct technology transfers, outsourcing coupled with technology spillovers may generate more technology transition. Outsourcing is a particularly appropriate channel for implicit collusion when the OEM is not very efficient with the production of the intermediate good. Our results suggest that ex post competition on the finished goods can create room for ex ante collaboration and provide some implications on the OEM's outsourcing strategies when facing a competitive CM.© 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 501–514, 2014     

Impact of reseller's and sales agent's forecasting accuracy in a multilayer supply chain

We consider a three‐layer supply chain with a manufacturer, a reseller, and a sales agent. The demand is stochastically determined by the random market condition and the sales agent's private effort level. Although the manufacturer is uninformed about the market condition, the reseller and the sales agent conduct demand forecasting and generate private demand signals. Under this framework with two levels of adverse selection intertwined with moral hazard, we study the impact of the reseller's and the sales agent's forecasting accuracy on the profitability of each member. We show that the manufacturer's profitability is convex on the reseller's forecasting accuracy. From the manufacturer's perspective, typically improving the reseller's accuracy is detrimental when the accuracy is low but is beneficial when it is high. We identify the concrete interrelation among the manufacturer‐optimal reseller's accuracy, the volatility of the market condition, and the sales agent's accuracy. Finally, the manufacturer's interest may be aligned with the reseller's when only the reseller can choose her accuracy; this alignment is never possible when both downstream players have the discretion to choose their accuracy. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 207–222, 2014     

Impact of tax reduction policies on consumer purchase of new automobiles: An analytical investigation with real data‐based experiments

We investigate and compare the impact of the tax reduction policies implemented in the United States and China to stimulate consumer purchase of new automobiles and improve manufacturers' profits. The U.S. policy provides each qualifying consumer with a federal income tax deduction on state and local sales and excise taxes paid on the purchase price (up to a cutoff level), whereas the Chinese policy reduces the vehicle sales tax rate for consumers. We observe that these policy designs are consistent with the tax management system and the economic environment in the respective country. We analytically determine the effects of the two tax reduction policies on the automobile sales and the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits. Numerical examples are then used to provide insights on the importance of certain factors that influence the effects of the two policies. Finally, a numerical experiment with sensitivity analysis based on real data is conducted to compare the merits and characteristics of the two policies under comparable conditions. We find that the U.S. policy is better than the Chinese policy in stimulating the sales of high‐end automobiles, whereas the Chinese policy is better than the U.S. policy in improving the sales of low‐end automobiles. The U.S. policy is slightly more effective in increasing the profitability of the automobile supply chain; but, in general, the Chinese policy is more cost effective. The methodology developed herein can be used to evaluate other tax reduction policies such as those related to the purchase of energy‐saving vehicles and to serve as a decision model to guide the choice of alternative tax reduction policies. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 61: 577–598, 2014     

Return policy: Hassle‐free or your money‐back guarantee?

This article compares the profitability of two pervasively adopted return policies—money‐back guarantee and hassle‐free policies. In our model, a seller sells to consumers with heterogeneous valuations and hassle costs. Products are subject to quality risk, and product misfit can only be observed post‐purchase. While the hassle‐free policy is cost advantageous from the seller's viewpoint, a money‐back guarantee allows the seller to fine‐tune the consumer hassle on returning the product. Thus, when the two return policies lead to the same consumer behaviors, the hassle‐free policy dominates. Conversely, a money‐back guarantee can be more profitable even if on average, high‐valuation consumers experience a lower hassle cost than the low‐valuation ones. The optimal hassle cost can be higher when product quality gets improved; thus, it is not necessarily a perfect proxy or signal of the seller's quality. We further allow the seller to adopt a mixture of these policies, and identify the concrete operating regimes within which these return policies are optimal among more flexible policies. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 403–417, 2014     

The loss‐averse newsvendor problem with supply options

In this article, we consider a loss‐averse newsvendor with stochastic demand. The newsvendor might procure options when demand is unknown, and decide how many options to execute only after demand is revealed. If the newsvendor reserves too many options, he would incur high reservation costs. Yet reserving too few could result in lost sales. So the newsvendor faces a trade‐off between reservation costs and losing sales. When there are multiple options available, the newsvendor has to consider how many units of each to reserve by studying the trade‐off between flexibility and costs. We show how the newsvendor's loss aversion behavior affects his ordering decision, and propose an efficient algorithm to compute his optimal solution in the general case with n options. We also present examples showing how the newsvendor's ordering strategy changes as loss aversion rises. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:46–59, 2015     

Multidirectional scheduling scheme in resource‐constrained project schedulingproblem

In 2000, Klein showed that bidirectional scheduling schemes (bidss) outperform single‐directional scheduling schemes (e.g., forward or backward schemes). In 2010, Yoosefzadeh, et al. [J Math Model Algor 9 (2010), 357–373] showed that depending on the nature of the problems and also the type of priority rules used, schedules produced by a so‐called tridirectional scheduling scheme (trdss) yields shorter makespans when compared to forward, backward, and even bidss. Since the justification technique is applied in many of the state‐of‐the‐art algorithms nowadays, we show that the tuned version of the trdss outperforms the double justification technique. Moreover, we investigate the circumstances under which the trdss is more probable to generate schedules with shorter makespans. To this end, we introduce a new measure of resource requirements and their distributions, namely total amount of overflows. Our analytical as well as empirical investigations show that when the new measure is increased, it is more probable to obtain schedules with shorter makespans using the trdss. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 44–55, 2014     

The burglar problem with multiple options

We consider the burglar problem in which a burglar can either retire or choose among different types of burglaries, with each type having its own success probability and reward distribution. Some general structural results are established and, in the case of exponentially distributed reward distributions, a solution technique is presented. The burglar problem's relationship to a stochastic knapsack problem with a random exponentially distributed knapsack capacity is shown. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 359–364, 2014     

Dynamic inventory control with limited capital and short‐term financing

For most firms, especially the small‐ and medium‐sized ones, the operational decisions are affected by their internal capital and ability to obtain external capital. However, the majority of the literature on dynamic inventory control ignores the firm's financial status and financing issues. An important question that arises is: what are the optimal inventory and financing policies for firms with limited internal capital and limited access to external capital? In this article, we study a dynamic inventory control problem where a capital‐constrained firm periodically purchases a product from a supplier and sells it to a market with random demands. In each period, the firm can use its own capital and/or borrow a short‐term loan to purchase the product, with the interest rate being nondecreasing in the loan size. The objective is to maximize the firm's expected terminal wealth at the end of the planning horizon. We show that the optimal inventory policy in each period is an equity‐level‐dependent base‐stock policy, where the equity level is the sum of the firm's capital level and the value of its on‐hand inventory evaluated at the purchasing cost; and the structure of the optimal policy can be characterized by four intervals of the equity level. Our results shed light on the dynamic inventory control for firms with limited capital and short‐term financing capabilities.Copyright © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 184–201, 2014     

Optimal pricing and scheduling control of product shipping

In this article, we seek to understand how a capacity‐constrained seller optimally prices and schedules product shipping to customers who are heterogeneous on willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to wait (WTW). The capacity‐constrained seller does not observe each customer's WTP and WTW and knows only the aggregate distributions of WTP and WTW. The seller's problem is modeled as an M/M/N_s queueing model with multiclass customers and multidimensional information screening. We contribute to the literature by providing an optimal and efficient algorithm. Furthermore, we numerically find that customers with a larger waiting cost enjoys a higher scheduling priority, but customers with higher valuation do not necessarily get a higher scheduling priority. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 215–227, 2015