Continuous accumulation games on discrete locations

In an accumulation game, a HIDER attempts to accumulate a certain number of objects or a certain quantity of material before a certain time, and a SEEKER attempts to prevent this. In a continuous accumulation game the HIDER can pile material either at locations $1, 2, …, n, or over a region in space. The HIDER will win (payoff 1) it if accumulates N units of material before a given time, and the goal of the SEEKER will win (payoff 0) otherwise. We assume the HIDER can place continuous material such as fuel at discrete locations i = 1, 2, …, n, and the game is played in discrete time. At each time k > 0 the HIDER acquires h units of material and can distribute it among all of the locations. At the same time, k, the SEEKER can search a certain number s < n of the locations, and will confiscate (or destroy) all material found. After explicitly describing what we mean by a continuous accumulation game on discrete locations, we prove a theorem that gives a condition under which the HIDER can always win by using a uniform distribution at each stage of the game. When this condition does not hold, special cases and examples show that the resulting game becomes complicated even when played only for a single stage. We reduce the single stage game to an optimization problem, and also obtain some partial results on its solution. We also consider accumulation games where the locations are arranged in either a circle or in a line segment and the SEEKER must search a series of adjacent locations. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 60–77, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1048     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000     

More on the search for an infiltrator

We have asymptotically solved a discrete search game on an array of n ordered cells with two players: infiltrator (hider) and searcher, when the probability of survival approaches 1. The infiltrator wishes to reach the last cell in finite time, and the searcher has to defend that cell. When the players occupy the same cell, the searcher captures the infiltrator with probability 1 ? z. The payoff to the hider is the probability that the hider reaches the last cell without getting captured. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 1–14, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1047     

Capacity games for partially complementary products under multivariate random demands

In this study, we consider n firms, each of which produces and sells a different product. The n firms face a common demand stream which requests all their products as a complete set. In addition to the common demand stream, each firm also faces a dedicated demand stream which requires only its own product. The common and dedicated demands are uncertain and follow a general, joint, continuous distribution. Before the demands are realized, each firm needs to determine its capacity or production quantity to maximize its own expected profit. We formulate the problem as a noncooperative game. The sales price per unit for the common demand could be higher or lower than the unit price for the dedicated demand, which affects the firm's inventory rationing policy. Hence, the outcome of the game varies. All of the prices are first assumed to be exogenous. We characterize Nash equilibrium(s) of the game. At the end of the article, we also provide some results for the endogenous pricing. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 59: 146–159, 2012     

Special Air Service Books to Choose From

Barry Davies, Joining the SAS: How to Get In and What It's Like.Miami: Lewis International Inc., 1998. Pp.214, photos, index. $22.95. ISBN 0–966771–4–2.

Peter McAleese and John Avery, McAleese's Fighting Manual: The Definitive Soldier's Handbook.London: Orion, 1998. Pp.179, illus. £18.95. ISBN 0–75280–063–9.

Steve Crawford et al.The SAS Encyclopedia: The Definitive Guide to the World's Crack Regiment.Miami: Lewis International Inc., 1998. Pp.288, photos, maps, index. $29.95. ISBN 0–9666771–0–2.

Barry Davies et al.The Complete Encyclopedia of the SAS.London: Virgin Publishing Ltd, 1998. Pp.288, photos, maps, no index. $39.95. ISBN 1–85227–707–6.     

Discrete search allocation game with false contacts

This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

New results on a Ruckle problem in discrete games of ambush

This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game in which player I chooses in integer interval [1, N] two integer intervals consisting of p and q points where p + q < N, and player II chooses an integer point in [1, N]. The payoff to player I equals 1 if the point chosen by player II is at least in one of the intervals chosen by player II and 0 otherwise. This paper complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, Lee, Garnaev, and Zoroa, Zoroa and Fernández‐Sáez. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 98–106, 2001     

Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game‐theoretic model

Consider a distributed system where many gatekeepers share a single server. Customers arrive at each gatekeeper according to independent Poisson processes with different rates. Upon arrival of a new customer, the gatekeeper has to decide whether to admit the customer by sending it to the server, or to block it. Blocking costs nothing. The gatekeeper receives a reward after a customer completes the service, and incurs a cost if an admitted customer finds a busy server and therefore has to leave the system. Assuming an exponential service distribution, we formulate the problem as an n‐person non‐zero‐sum game in which each gatekeeper is interested in maximizing its own long‐run average reward. The key result is that each gatekeeper's optimal policy is that of a threshold type regardless what other gatekeepers do. We then derive Nash equilibria and discuss interesting insights. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 702–718, 2003.     

Characterization of the nucleolus for a class of n-person games

An inductive procedure is given for finding the nucleolus of an n-person game in which all coalitions with less than n-1 players are totally defeated. It is shown that, for such a game, one of three things may occur: (a) all players receive the same amount; (b) each player receives his quota, plus a certain constant (which may be positive, nerative, or zero); (c) the weakest player receives one half his quota, and the other players divide the remaining profit according to the nucleolus of a similar (n-1)-person game. It is also shown that the nucleolus of such a game yields directly the nucleolus of each derived game. An example is worked out in detail.     

Minimal LST representations of MAP(n)s: Moment fittings and queueing approximations

A Markovian arrival process of order n, MAP(n), is typically described by two n × n transition rate matrices in terms of rate parameters. While it is straightforward and intuitive, the Markovian representation is redundant since the minimal number of parameters is n² for non‐redundant MAP(n). It is well known that the redundancy complicates exact moment fittings. In this article, we present a minimal and unique Laplace‐Stieltjes transform (LST) representations for MAP(n)s. Even though the LST coefficients vector itself is not a minimal representation, we show that the joint LST of stationary intervals can be represented with the minimum number of parameters. We also propose another minimal representation for MAP(3)s based on coefficients of the characteristic polynomial equations of the two transition rate matrices. An exact moment fitting procedure is presented for MAP(3)s based on two proposed minimal representations. We also discuss how MAP(3)/G/1 departure process can be approximated as a MAP(3). A simple tandem queueing network example is presented to show that the MAP(3) performs better than the MAP(2) in queueing approximations especially under moderate traffic intensities. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 549–561, 2016     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016     

Bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects under the rationing game

When an unreliable supplier serves multiple retailers, the retailers may compete with each other by inflating their order quantities in order to obtain their desired allocation from the supplier, a behavior known as the rationing game. We introduce capacity information sharing and a capacity reservation mechanism in the rationing game and show that a Nash equilibrium always exists. Moreover, we provide conditions guaranteeing the existence of the reverse bullwhip effect upstream, a consequence of the disruption caused by the supplier. In contrast, we also provide conditions under which the bullwhip effect does not exist. In addition, we show that a smaller unit reservation payment leads to more bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects, while a large unit underage cost results in a more severe bullwhip effect. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 203–216, 2017     

A computation procedure for the exact solution of location-allocation problems with rectangular distances

A method is presented to locate and allocate p new facilities in relation to n existing facilities. Each of the n existing facilities has a requirement flow which must be supplied by the new facilities. Rectangular distances are assumed to exist between all facilities. The algorithm proceeds in two stages. In the first stage a set of all possible optimal new facility locations is determined by a set reduction algorithm. The resultant problem is shown to be equivalent to finding the p-median of a weighted connected graph. In the second stage the optimal locations and allocations are obtained by using a technique for solving the p-median problem.     

Approximations for heavily loaded G/GI/n + GI queues

Motivated by applications to service systems, we develop simple engineering approximation formulas for the steady‐state performance of heavily loaded G/GI/n+GI multiserver queues, which can have non‐Poisson and nonrenewal arrivals and non‐exponential service‐time and patience‐time distributions. The formulas are based on recently established Gaussian many‐server heavy‐traffic limits in the efficiency‐driven (ED) regime, where the traffic intensity is fixed at ρ > 1, but the approximations also apply to systems in the quality‐and‐ED regime, where ρ > 1 but ρ is close to 1. Good performance across a wide range of parameters is obtained by making heuristic refinements, the main one being truncation of the queue length and waiting time approximations to nonnegative values. Simulation experiments show that the proposed approximations are effective for large‐scale queuing systems for a significant range of the traffic intensity ρ and the abandonment rate θ, roughly for ρ > 1.02 and θ > 2.0. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 187–217, 2016     

Solving quadratic assignment problems with rectangular distances and integer programming

The problem considered involves the assignment of n facilities to n specified locations. Each facility has a given nonnegative flow from each of the other facilities. The objective is to minimize the sum of transportation costs. Assume these n locations are given as points on a two-dimensional plane and transportation costs are proportional to weighted rectangular distances. Then the problem is formulated as a binary mixed integer program. The number of integer variables (all binary) involved equals the number of facilities squared. Without increasing the number of integer variables, the formulation is extended to include “site costs” Computational results of the formulation are presented.     

Efficient multinomial selection in simulation

Consider a simulation experiment consisting of v independent vector replications across k systems, where in any given replication one system is selected as the best performer (i.e., it wins). Each system has an unknown constant probability of winning in any replication and the numbers of wins for the individual systems follow a multinomial distribution. The classical multinomial selection procedure of Bechhofer, Elmaghraby, and Morse (Procedure BEM) prescribes a minimum number of replications, denoted as v*, so that the probability of correctly selecting the true best system (PCS) meets or exceeds a prespecified probability. Assuming that larger is better, Procedure BEM selects as best the system having the largest value of the performance measure in more replications than any other system. We use these same v* replications across k systems to form (v*)^k pseudoreplications that contain one observation from each system, and develop Procedure AVC (All Vector Comparisons) to achieve a higher PCS than with Procedure BEM. For specific small-sample cases and via a large-sample approximation we show that the PCS with Procedure AVC exceeds the PCS with Procedure BEM. We also show that with Procedure AVC we achieve a given PCS with a smaller v than the v* required with Procedure BEM. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 459–482, 1998     

Approximation schemes for single‐machine scheduling with a fixed maintenance activity to minimize the total amount of late work

We consider the problem of scheduling n independent and simultaneously available jobs without preemption on a single machine, where the machine has a fixed maintenance activity. The objective is to find the optimal job sequence to minimize the total amount of late work, where the late work of a job is the amount of processing of the job that is performed after its due date. We first discuss the approximability of the problem. We then develop two pseudo‐polynomial dynamic programming algorithms and a fully polynomial‐time approximation scheme for the problem. Finally, we conduct extensive numerical studies to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 172–183, 2016     

Rectilinear m-Center problem

In this article we consider the unweighted m-center problem with rectilinear distance. We preent an O(n^m–2 log n) algorithm for the m-center problem where m ≥ 4.     

Solving partially observable agent‐intruder games with an application to border security problems

In this paper, we introduce partially observable agent‐intruder games (POAIGs). These games model dynamic search games on graphs between security forces (an agent) and an intruder given possible (border) entry points and high value assets that require protection. The agent faces situations with dynamically changing, partially observable information about the state of the intruder and vice versa. The agent may place sensors at selected locations, while the intruder may recruit partners to observe the agent's movement. We formulate the problem as a two‐person zero‐sum game, and develop efficient algorithms to compute each player's optimal strategy. The solution to the game will help the agent choose sensor locations and design patrol routes that can handle imperfect information. First, we prove the existence of ?‐optimal strategies for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we introduce a Bayesian approximation algorithm to identify these ?‐optimal strategies using belief functions that incorporate the imperfect information that becomes available during the game. For the solutions of large POAIGs with a finite time horizon, we use a solution method common to extensive form games, namely, the sequence form representation. To illustrate the POAIGs, we present several examples and numerical results.