The RAF staff college and the evolution of British strategic bombing policy, 1922–1929

This article borrows from the work of Clausewitz to posit two general approaches to the pursuit of limitation in war, one being political and the other technical. The political approach seeks to control escalation via consensual arrangements with the adversary, while the technical approach seeks to forestall escalation by peremptorily destroying the enemy's military capability. It is argued that the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) instantiates the second, technical, approach to war limitation. By exploiting advanced technology, the US armed forces hope to limit the costs of war by defeating their adversaries in a rapid, decisive manner. The problems associated with this approach are discussed in relation to the nature of the conflicts that the US is likely to face in the foreseeable future. The article concludes by suggesting that such conflicts will require that more attention be paid to the political sources of limitation in war.     

Winning hearts and minds in the ‘war on terrorism’

Ten days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon US President George W Bush addressed a joint session of Congress. In an emotional speech he declared war on terrorism and vowed that the US would not rest until all of the perpetrators were brought to justice and A1 Qaeda destroyed. In virtually the next breath he hastened to add that the US-led campaign would not be a war on Islam, a promise Muslims might have found more reassuring had the President not sounded so much like a Baptist preacher. Whatever its propaganda value, the speech distorted the reality of the struggle facing the West while tacitly acknowledging an important truth. Since terror is merely a weapon in a larger struggle, there can be no war on terrorism per se. The West faces a counterinsurgency campaign on a global scale. Winning the hearts and minds of disaffected people in lands where terrorism thrives must be central to conducting this campaign.     

巡航导弹--现代战争中的骄子

现代战争中,巡航导弹正扮演着越来越重要的角色.讲述了巡航导弹的技战术特点,分析了其优缺点,着重分析了巡航导弹的发展趋势.     

WHAT ARE THE ODDS?

Nuclear optimists and pessimists disagree on whether the odds of nuclear war are low or high. This viewpoint assesses the odds of nuclear war over the past sixty-six years, exploring three pathways to nuclear war: an international crisis leading directly to nuclear war, an accident or misperception leading to nuclear escalation or nuclear retaliation against an imaginary attack, and a general conventional war leading to nuclear war. The assessment is based on the application of Bayes's theorem and other statistical reasoning and finds that the expected probability of nuclear war during this historical period was greater than 50 percent. This level of risk is unacceptably high. It is therefore urgent that effective measures be taken to substantially reduce the risk of nuclear war.     

PART II: CONTINUING TO QUESTION THE RELIABILITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Responding to Derrin Culp's critique, the author argues that distinguished nuclear theorists may be wrong because groups of experts have been wrong in the past, that city attacks are central to nuclear deterrence theory because killing civilians en masse is what nuclear weapons do best, and that understanding how effective city attacks would be in war is crucial to understanding how well they would work as threats. Moreover, while it is undeniable that nuclear deterrence works some of the time, this simply is not good enough. Because any failure of nuclear deterrence could end in catastrophic nuclear war, nuclear deterrence must be perfect or almost perfect. This is a very difficult standard to reach.     

突袭敌方指挥所兵力需求仿真

甲方以特种部队突袭乙方师(旅)指挥所的行动是未来渡海登岛作战中的重要内容,能大大加快战役进程.战前通过侦察已知对方实力,通过作战模拟的方法确定规定时间内完成任务所需派遣特种部队的规模有决定性意义.采用指数-Lanchester理论模拟作战过程,在考虑气象、士气因素对作战过程影响的基础上,以甲方在消灭乙方50%有生力量后作战结束,通过MATLAB7 0仿真工具得出在一定的作战想定条件下甲方需要投入兵力的综合战斗力指数.     

Next steps in the creation of an accidental nuclear war prevention center

In early 1983, members of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control met to discuss ideas on the establishment of a joint U.S.‐U.S.S.R. center to support cooperative efforts to prevent accidental nuclear war. William Perry (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) began the discussion by outlining several measures he felt could help to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. Calling attention to the earlier proposals of Senators Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, and Henry Jackson, he endorsed the concept of a joint accidental nuclear war prevention center as a mechanism to support efforts of the two superpowers to prevent or reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of nuclear war. Most notable in this regard was his personal experience of an erroneous warning of a large‐scale Soviet missile attack on the U.S., which resulted from a NORAD computer malfunction. Information exchanges and consultation to clarify circumstances surrounding an accident ‐ or the misperceptions that might result from one ‐ could be facilitated by a number of different types of centers that have been suggested. Perry described one possible configuration for such a center, consisting of two stations, jointly staffed and located in Washington and Moscow.

Members of the Stanford Center met again in June 1983 to examine in more detail the issues raised by this idea and similar ones, and possible next steps involved in implementation. This paper reports on research in progress on this subject. In addition to the Perry contribution, much of the conceptual analysis of the missions of a joint center derives from the work of Alexander George on crisis prevention and crisis management.’ Those elements of the research covering the technical and ‘mechanization’ requirements are contributed by Elliott Levinthal and Ted Ralston. Lastly, the suggested negotiating approach derives from the experiences and thinking of Sidney Graybeal, former U.S. Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).     

浅析武警部队“能打胜仗”核心军事能力建设

习主席关于“能打仗、打胜仗”是强军之要的重要思想,是对党的建军治军思想的继承和发展,有着很强的指向性,为在新的历史起点上加快推进国防和军队现代化建设指明了方向。贯彻落实好“能打仗、打胜仗”重要思想,必须按照打仗的标准搞建设抓准备,确保武警部队始终能够召之即来、来之能战、战之必胜。     

GPS在导航战中的作用及其干扰对抗研究

论述导航战的作用和军用范围,进攻导航战的目标和防御导航战的措施以及GPS系统中C/A码的扩展和加密应用,新码的发展和抗干扰能力。并通过应用实例进一步论述对GPS接收机的干扰原理和干扰效果分析以及美、俄两国发展GPS干扰机的技术现状。     

俄罗斯应对导航战举措

卫星导航系统作为重要的战场传感器,已经成为现代战争不可或缺的重要组成部分,围绕卫星导航系统的攻防博弈由此兴起。针对美国首先提出的导航战概念,俄罗斯为进一步提升导航战作战实力,有针对性地采取了应对举措。文章介绍了导航战概念及相关作战案例,具体分析了俄罗斯应对导航战威胁的主要举措,并结合美俄围绕导航战开展的攻防博弈,得出掌握现代战争制导航权的改进方向。     

Doing Away with “Legitimate Authority”

ABSTRACT

I argue in this article that traditional just war theory did allow private, indeed even individual war, and that arguments in support of a legitimate authority criterion, let alone in support of the “priority” of this criterion, fail. I further argue that what motivates the insistence on “legitimate authority” is the assumption that doing away with this criterion will lead to chaos and anarchy. I demonstrate that the reasoning, if any, underlying this assumption is philosophically confused. The fact of the matter is that wars need not necessarily be authorized by some higher authority (such as a king, president, or parliament) in order to be justified, and this moral fact does not need to lead to chaos and anarchy. Accordingly, the criterion of legitimate authority cannot be relied on to delegitimate individual war, private war, guerrilla war, or even terrorism. Finally, I consider some other defenses of authorization and demonstrate that the “authorization” these accounts defend is either not needed for justification or already provided by other just war criteria or, indeed, entirely fictitious.     

Legitimate Authority as a Jus Ad Bellum Condition: Defense of a Procedural Requirement in Just War Theory

ABSTRACT

Today, it is widely held that while authorization may be helpful in assuring that the other jus ad bellum criteria are met, legitimate authority is not itself a condition for just recourse to war. Or, if it is necessary, it is said to be a trivial requirement, as mobilization for war requires some political authorization. Those who would retain the legitimacy requirement have differing views about who the proper authority is. I argue that, reasonably understood, legitimate authorization is necessary for jus ad bellum. Considerations of agency and consent in force combine with the social contract to commit us to deferring to recognized authorities. These obligations are strengthened by the epistemic reliability and pragmatic value conferred by governing institutions and procedures limiting recourse to war. These same rationales imply that the U.N. Security Council should regulate the international use of force. I qualify that if higher authorities fail to act, other subsidiary authorities may then authorize force. However, the move to each subsequent level of authorization must be justified. Understood in this way, the requirement that wars not be fought without legitimate authorization is a non-trivial, necessary procedural jus ad bellum condition.     

Approximations and empirics for stochastic war equations

The article develops a theorem which shows that the Lanchester linear war equations are not in general equal to the Kolmogorov linear war equations. The latter are time‐consuming to solve, and speed is important when a large number of simulations must be run to examine a large parameter space. Run times are provided, where time is a scarce factor in warfare. Four time efficient approximations are presented in the form of ordinary differential equations for the expected sizes and variances of each group, and the covariance, accounting for reinforcement and withdrawal of forces. The approximations are compared with “exact” Monte Carlo simulations and empirics from the WWII Ardennes campaign. The band spanned out by plus versus minus the incremented standard deviations captures some of the scatter in the empirics, but not all. With stochastically varying combat effectiveness coefficients, a substantial part of the scatter in the empirics is contained. The model is used to forecast possible futures. The implications of increasing the combat effectiveness coefficient governing the size of the Allied force, and injecting reinforcement to the German force during the Campaign, are evaluated, with variance assessments. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

How Is a Man to Decide? Unjust Combatants,Duress and McMahan’s Killing in War

Jeff McMahan’s much-discussed work Killing in War is an important part of the revisionist school of just war studies. This paper avoids discussion of McMahan’s use of human rights and examines the practical consequences of his argument about duress on soldiers to fight an unjust war. These arguments are found to be wanting and to be impractical ones that do not fit battlefield realities. The importance of the Law of Armed Conflict and the legal equality of combatants that is part of it is emphasised and accepted as the most practical way of regulating battlefield behaviour and saving lives. It is concluded that attempts to tell soldiers what to do when they may be fighting an unjust war add to their burdens and are misplaced.     

平流层飞艇空间控制作战样式分析*

临近空间是未来作战的制高点之一,在分析了临近空间作战特点的基础上,建立了平流层飞艇编队作战模型,通过研究飞艇的信息对抗能力、防御能力及武器性能,表明激光武器比导弹更适合于平流层飞艇的临近空间作战,干扰通信系统比干扰侦察系统对作战结果的影响更大,采取一定的防御措施也不能对平流层飞艇的损失率产生较大影响.     

The ‘War on Terrorism’: What Does it Mean to Win?

Abstract

The war on al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be endless but every war must end. Winding down the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been difficult, but both were embedded in what was then called the ‘war on terrorism.’ What does ‘success’ in that war mean? With the death of bin Laden and the increase in drone operations, how far is the US from achieving it? Can this war end? The article analyzes the ongoing US response to the 9/11 attacks in historical context, revealing four patterns common to all prolonged wars: means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries are blurred, and the search for a perfect peace replaces reality. It concludes by laying out an effective strategy for ending the war.     

装备修理任务最优分配模型

装备修理是我军一项计划性强、涉及面广和费用颇高的系统工作。本文首先系统分析了装备修理的组织过程。在此基础上,建立了适用于总部、军区等上下各级装备修理任务分配的数学规划模型,并对模型进行了讨论,同时对模型中目标函数的获取提供了一条可行的技术途径。最后,举例说明了该模型的应用。     

基于生命周期理论的军事环境安全策略

探讨了军事环境安全概念,并运用生命周期理论对国家军事环境安全的保障措施和宏观策略进行了初步研讨。军事活动一般可分为计划规划、具体实施和事后评价3个阶段。为了在新形势下更加经济、高效地保障国家军事环境安全,首先要加大军事活动环境影响评价力度、采用对环境破坏小的战法并在军购中推行环境准入制,即尽量从源头上控制重大环境问题出现。考虑到战争的特殊性,需要在战前预先储备必要的生态环境修复技术。     

CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN SIERRA LEONE'S PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS

Following the holding of elections in May 2002, Sierra Leone has embarked on a process of peace-building. While facing multiple challenges, the country's youthful population is one that certainly deserves greater attention. Youths comprise more than 50% of Sierra Leone's population and in the face of scarce economic opportunities in a country devastated by war; they are a segment of the population that must be incorporated into the post-conflict reconstruction processes currently underway. This article is based on field trips by both authors to Sierra Leone in 2002.     

Cyber War Will Take Place!

The question of whether or not cyber war amounts to war per se is difficult to determine given strategic theory's uncertain grasp of the concepts of force, violence and lethality. These three concepts, along with their relationships with one another, are explored in order to demonstrate that cyber attacks can in fact be construed as acts of war.