Beyond the Double Game: Lessons from Pakistan’s Approach to Islamist Militancy

States commonly take one of three approaches to militant groups on their soil: collaboration; benign neglect; or belligerence. All three approaches are present in Pakistan, where some groups also move back and forth among these categories. I employ the term “coopetition” to capture this fluidity. The dynamic nature of militancy in Pakistan makes the country an excellent laboratory for exploring a state’s assessment of the utility an Islamist militant group offers, and the threat it poses relative to other threats informs the state’s treatment of that group. In this article, I put forward a typology that situates Islamist militants in Pakistan in one of the above four categories. I also illustrate how a group’s identity, objectives, and alliances inform assessments of its utility and threat relative to other threats. In addition to enhancing our understanding of militant–state dynamics, this taxonomy builds on and helps to unify earlier typologies of Pakistani militancy.     

On the brink: The resurgence of militant Islam in Central Asia

Since Operation Enduring Freedom, Central Asian militants, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, have fled to Pakistan from their previous strongholds in Afghanistan. However, many militants have begun returning to Central Asia. Thus questions are raised as to what extent militancy has the potential to thrive with the pending North Atlantic Treaty Organization withdrawal from Afghanistan set for 2014? Is militancy a legitimate security threat to Central Asia? What strategies might militants implement? Thus, this article examines the current state of militancy, analyzes militant trends, introduces Afghanistan and Pakistan into the Central Asian equation, and determines the militants' capability and overall strategy. The article concludes that militant Islam, regardless of its current numbers, remains a viable threat to regional security, Afghanistan will be an essential factor for the future of Central Asian militancy, and the form this re-emergence will take becomes apparent.     

When the green gets greener: political Islam's newly-found environmentalism

Although the environmental movement was established in the West, there is currently an Islamist variant that has received less attention. The Quran and the Hadiths provide guidance for the faithful on the relationship between Allah, humanity and nature. The article will examine and compare the environmental agendas of six Islamist groups: Hizb'allah, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-e-Islami, and al Qaeda. While they all share similar concerns, Islamists have developed globalized, glocalized, or localized ‘scales’ of engagement, depending on the targeted audience. Finally, the article will examine the security implications of Islamist environmentalism, including the possibility of an alliance between Islamists and militant environmentalists.     

The Dark Side of Extended Deterrence: Thinking through the State Sponsorship of Terrorism

States employ extended deterrence to shield third parties from aggression. The concept is traditionally applied to interstate relations, collective security arrangements, and strategic considerations. The protective relationship that exists between a state sponsor of terrorism and its non-state militant proxy is rarely considered. This article will introduce and explore the sponsor–proxy relationship in the context of extended deterrence, and relate it to Iran’s support and sponsorship of political violence, militancy, and terrorism in Europe. The article reviews the rationale states have for sponsoring terrorism, and illustrates the promises and pitfalls associated with extending deterrence to non-state militants.     

Ireland's Ho Chi Minh trail? The Republic of Ireland's role in the Provisional IRA's bombing campaign, 1970–1976

A common criticism levelled at successive governments of the Republic of Ireland during the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ was their alleged inactivity in the face of a ferocious Provisional IRA campaign. Such criticisms were based in large part on the perception of the southern state as a supply base for militant republicanism. The Republic was undoubtedly a formidable logistics hinterland for such militants. However, criticisms of the reactions of authorities in the south are unfair. This article considers the explosives capabilities of the IRA during the first six years of their campaign. It does so with reference to their attempts to obtain commercial explosives as well as measures employed by them to obtain homemade explosives. The article also considers countermeasures employed by the southern government and reveals the extent to which they sought to shut down IRA capabilities in the south. It is argued that, ultimately, the IRA's campaign in this regard could only be contained and never unilaterally halted.     

India’s Taliban Dilemma: To Contain or to Engage?

India’s Afghanistan policy in the 1990s is termed a zero-sum game of influence with Pakistan. New Delhi’s aversion to the pro-Pakistan Taliban regime is considered a marker of this rivalry. This paper revisits India’s approach towards Afghanistan and examines if New Delhi was necessarily averse to engaging with pro-Pakistan political factions during 1990s. Based on fresh primary interviews with former Indian policymakers, media archives, and official reports, the paper shows that India engaged with and accommodated pro-Pakistan factions after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 until 1996. The Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul in September 1996 challenged India’s engage-with-all approach. Nonetheless, the decision to sever ties with the Taliban and to bolster anti-Taliban factions was highly debated in New Delhi. Many in India saw the Taliban as a militant Islamist force sponsored by Pakistan. For others, however, it was an ethno-nationalist movement representing Pashtun interests, and not necessarily under Islamabad’s control.     

Factional politics in the Iran–Iraq war

This article examines the domestic causes of the Iran–Iraq War. It delves into secret discussions among Iranian political and military elites during the conflict, their analyses of their own performance on the battlefield, and their revealing public disputes and blame game decades later. It contends that an underexplored and yet critical driving force behind Iran’s prosecution of the war was factional politics. Along with state-level geo-strategic, regime-level security and individual-level ideological concerns, factional factors must also be examined to understand Tehran's war-time decisions. Iran’s factional rivalries began between the Islamists and the nationalists; and between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the army at war’s outbreak, and eventually penetrated into the heart of the Islamist camp between the militant clerics and the IRGC.     

Violence,Legitimacy, and Control: The Microdynamics of Support Relationships between Militant Groups and their Social Environment

When police moved against a mosque known to be a stronghold of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) in a neighbourhood in northeastern Cairo in summer 1988, they quickly became involved in street battles in which they were confronted not only by members of the militant Islamist group but also by many ordinary residents, including teenagers and elderly women throwing stones from balconies. It was obvious that the group had built a considerable base of support in the area: ‘They were very good young people’, one resident explained. The Islamists ‘used to have very active social work around their mosque. […] They collected donations for needy families and intervened in family disputes;’ and people, as he recounted, ‘admired their bravery to voice something the government does not want’ (Interview with residents of Ayn Shams, Cairo, March 2005). Yet, the resistance proved short-lived. When the neighbourhood was put under a curfew after the riots, people gradually withdrew from the group and many young followers shaved and changed their white galabiyya for a pair of trousers.     

Drone usage by militant groups: exploring variation in adoption

Judging by recent media reporting and pronouncements by senior US military and security officials, the use of drones by militant groups is both reshaping conflict between armed non-state actors and state parties and now presents a grave and direct threat to nations in the West and elsewhere. But does this threat warrant the attention it is currently receiving? To answer this question, this article surveys how various militant groups have used drones both tactically on the battlefield and for wider strategic purposes. Closely examining how drones have been employed and by whom provides a basis for understanding variation in adoption. The article shows how drone usage or non-usage is highly contingent on the setting of the conflict, the aims of different groups, and the capacity of groups to adopt the technology. Though advances in drone technology could make the use-case more appealing for militant groups, drones will be subject to the same back-and-forth, techno-tactical adaptation dynamic between adversaries that have accompanied prior military innovations.     

Countering global insurgency

This article suggests that the War on Terrorism is actually a campaign against a globalized Islamist 1 1 In this article, the term ‘Islamist’ describes the extremist, radical form of political Islam practiced by some militant groups, as distinct from ‘Islamic’, which describes the religion of Islam, or ‘Muslim’, which describes those who follow the Islamic religion. In this article the term is used to refer primarily to Al Qaeda, its allies and affiliates. View all notes insurgency. Therefore, counterinsurgency approaches are more relevant to the present conflict than traditional terrorism theory. Indeed, a counterinsurgency approach would generate subtly, but substantially different, policy choices in prosecuting the war against Al Qaeda. Based on this analysis, the article proposes a strategy of ‘disaggregation’ that seeks to dismantle, or break, the links in the global jihad.2 2 This article uses the short form of the Islamic term jihad to mean ‘lesser jihad’ (armed struggle against unbelievers), rather than ‘greater jihad’ (jihad fi sabilillah), i.e. moral struggle for the righteousness of God. View all notes Like containment in the Cold War, disaggregation would provide a unifying strategic conception for the war – a conception that has been somewhat lacking to date.     

Underselling Islamist extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa

Islamist extremism as an ideology has seemingly spread in influence in the past few years. The violent Islamist threat may have a singular religious dogma, but that does not mean that it will interact in the same fashion within the various cultures it infests. The Sub-Saharan region is one general context where Islamist extremism is both vividly active and misunderstood. Africa's reaction to: Arabization; the adjustment to post-colonial rule; the perception of secular government institutions; the extent of cultural and religious pluralism; and the local character of Muslim leadership and institutions are all very different from that of the Middle East. Scores of terrorism analysts and even Arab populations only too familiar with the Middle East context superimpose Middle East threats over the Sub-Saharan African cultural landscape. Instead of generalizing the Islamist threats, it might be better to ask why it is that violent Islamist groups have traditionally been challenged to expand their influence in Muslim Sub-Saharan Africa. The underestimated Islamist is using ignorance to its advantage, recruiting through channels unnoticed by its Arab counterparts while creatively catering its message by region.     

Explaining the impact of militancy on Iran–Pakistan relations

ABSTRACT

Sectarian militants have for years launched attacks from Pakistan across the border to Iran. Finding sanctuary in a neighbouring country can make the difference between success and failure for militants. Conventional wisdom holds that a lasting transnational militancy challenge would typically create serious interstate conflict. Militancy has triggered armed encounters between Iran and Pakistan. This article argues that despite some tension militancy has resulted in deeper cooperation in the ambivalent dyad. Both states’ overarching security concerns, having exhausted other options, the believed involvement of third-party states, and economic potential, have moderately alleviated negative pressure caused by militancy.     

Causal analysis of radical Islamism in northern Nigeria's Fourth Republic

This article attempts an agential explanation of the raison d'être for Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal Jihad, also known as Boko Haram (meaning Western education is forbidden), an Islamist sect that came to public consciousness in 2009 after the extra-judicial killing of its leader. Conceptualising Nigeria as a weak state, the article identifies the failed prebendal relationship between politicians in northern Nigeria and members of Boko Haram, and the extra-judicial killing on 30 July 2009 of Mohammed Yusuf, as agential causations of the current wave of radical Islamism. The article argues for the need to transcend the orthodox interpretation of the current wave of Islamist terrorism being demonstrated by the Nigerian state to a more nuanced approach that pays attention to the essentialist, psychological, political and economic perspectives of Islamist terrorism at the structural and individual levels.     

Insurgency and Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Pakistan has an uneven history of dealing with insurgencies and extremism. This article identifies the various campaigns and policies employed to defeat militants and deal with violent extremism. It describes the major anti-state groups and how Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders, relying on the related strategies of selectivity, gradualism and containment, have allowed militancy and terrorism to thrive. This article finds that while the elites and the public may have belatedly come to appreciate the existential internal threats these groups pose to the country, there are strong reasons to doubt the state’s full commitment to its promises to take meaningful action.     

The rise of targeted killing

Targeted killings have become a central tactic in the United States' campaigns against militant and terrorist groups in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Both ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ factors explain the rise of targeted killings. Demand for targeted killings increased as the United States faced new threats from militant groups that could not be effectively countered with conventional military force. Concerns about the political consequences of long-term military involvement overseas and American casualties led political leaders to supply more targeted killings. The conclusion discusses how this tactic may have unintended consequences as other states follow the United States use of targeted killings.     

Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir: actors,agendas and expanding benchmarks

Militant jihad as witnessed in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is centred around the primary objective of finding a separate homeland for the Muslims of the state. Opinion on whether this homeland would be an independent entity or merged into Pakistan remains inconclusive. And yet, this externally sponsored violent extremism, spearheaded by interlinked militant formations with significant local participation, has remained deeply religious, highlighting the alleged machinations of the Hindu Indians, both in the state and in India in general, against the Muslim population. Over the years, the objective of liberating Kashmir from Indian control has been attempted not just through an armed movement that targets the symbols of Indian state sovereignty within J&K, but has invested resources carrying violence into the Indian heartland and also making the movement transnational in character by aligning with global terror formations like the al Qaeda and the Islamic State. This paper is an examination of the shifting agenda as well as the activities of three primary militant formations operating in J&K: the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad and an assessment of the transformation of the Jihad that has bilateral, regional and international security implications.     

Hezbollah: A Proletarian Party with an Islamic Manifesto – A Sociopolitical Analysis of Islamist Populism in Lebanon and the Middle East

This article examines the rising contention between a global foreign policy promoting liberal democracy in the Middle East and Islamist rejectionism. It provides a sociopolitical analysis of the phenomena of radical Islamist politics while focusing on the experience of Hezbollah in Lebanon. It associates the growth of Hezbollah, a political movement seen in various forms in several countries, with social class dynamics that have been antagonised by social inequality, opportunistic leadership, the importation of Western-ordered democracy and by perceived foreign intervention. By examining the root dynamic of Hezbollah in Lebanon, this article argues that poverty has provided the fertile ground for the growth of Islamic populism as a revolutionary movement and has represented a major reason for the rejection of democratisation and political reform. A global foreign policy that seeks to uproot extremism in favour of state-building and the advancement of democracy in the Middle East needs to be reoriented so as to help undermine class inequality and to strengthen government-sponsored public services programmes for the underclass.     

Modern Sikh Warriors: Militants,Soldiers, Citizens

Central to the mainstream Sikh identity is the concept of ethically-justified force, used as a last resort. There is no place for absolute pacifism in this conception of ethical living. Fighters and martyrs occupy an important place in the Khalsa narrative, and Sikhs are constantly reminded of the sacrifices and heroism of their co-religionists of the past. This article explores how the Sikh warrior identity is manifested in the contemporary world. It examines the Sikhs who, in the 1980s and 1990s, were involved on both sides of the Punjab crisis: those militants who fought for a Sikh homeland (“Khalistan”) and those Sikhs in the Indian army who suppressed the insurgency. The article also looks beyond the militants and soldiers to Sikhs employed in modern security-related professions, the broader issue of Sikh symbols relating to the use of force, and violence within the Sikh diaspora. An examination of the Sikhs in various parts of the world reveals additional uses and consequences of ideology, whether in enlistment in the armed forces of the states in which they live, or in the support of the militancy in India, particularly in the 1980s. The conclusion is that the modern Sikh warrior is a nuanced actor behaving in various ways, some overt and some subtle: the warrior is willing to physically fight those perceived to be tyrannous, but most initiatives have shifted to pursuing justice through non-violent means, such as legal struggles for civil rights. Although armed Sikh militancy against the Indian government is in the past, there are strong residual resentments still requiring redress. All of this is of great relevance to understanding the ethics of armed force within modern Sikhism.     

Development of proxy relationships: a case study of the Lebanese Civil War

Proxy warfare is a consistent element in international warfare. However, it is unclear why proxy relationships form in cases where states have multiple options of groups to support. Existing research identifies the presence of transnational constituencies, shared interstate rivalries, and moderate relative strength of militant groups as highly influential on the development of a proxy relationship. This study examines the presence of these variables within the context of the Lebanese Civil War. The results of this demonstrate that each state places greater importance on some variables and ignores others when choosing a proxy. Additionally, this study further demonstrates the presence of new variables that are key to the development of proxy relationships.     

The Ethnic Russian as an Enemy of Islam: Frame Analysis of the Kavkaz Center News Agency (2001–2004)

Abstract

Typically, when analysing contemporary Russian–Chechen conflicts, the relegation of the nationalist struggle to a secondary role by the religious battle waged by the North Caucasus insurgency is pinpointed as one of the fundamental differences between the First and Second War in Chechnya. This article discusses how it was reflected in one of the most important media of the Chechen Islamist insurgency: the Kavkaz Center. To this end, 2859 English language news items posted on the website during 2001–04 were reviewed using media frame analysis.