Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Transshipment through crossdocks with inventory and time windows

A major challenge in making supply meet demand is to coordinate transshipments across the supply chain to reduce costs and increase service levels in the face of demand fluctuations, short lead times, warehouse limitations, and transportation and inventory costs. In particular, transshipment through crossdocks, where just‐in‐time objectives prevail, requires precise scheduling between suppliers, crossdocks, and customers. In this work, we study the transshipment problem with supplier and customer time windows where flow is constrained by transportation schedules and warehouse capacities. Transportation is provided by fixed or flexible schedules and lot‐sizing is dealt with through multiple shipments. We develop polynomial‐time algorithms or, otherwise, provide the complexity of the problems studied. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

Disruption‐management strategies for short life‐cycle products

Supplier diversification, contingent sourcing, and demand switching (whereby a firm shifts customers to a different product if their preferred product is unavailable), are key building blocks of a disruption‐management strategy for firms that sell multiple products over a single season. In this article, we evaluate 12 possible disruption‐management strategies (combinations of the basic building‐block tactics) in the context of a two‐product newsvendor. We investigate the influence of nine attributes of the firm, its supplier(s), and its products on the firs preference for the various strategies. These attributes include supplier reliability, supplier failure correlation, payment responsibility in the event of a supply failure, product contribution margin, product substitutability, demand uncertainties and correlation, and the decision makes risk aversion. Our results show that contingent sourcing is preferred to supplier diversification as the supply risk (failure probability) increases, but diversification is preferred to contingent sourcing as the demand risk (demand uncertainty) increases. We find that demand switching is not effective at managing supply risk if the products are sourced from the same set of suppliers. Demand switching is effective at managing demand risk and so can be preferred to the other tactics if supply risk is low. Risk aversion makes contingent sourcing preferable over a wider set of supply and demand‐risk combinations. We also find a two‐tactic strategy provides almost the same benefit as a three‐tactic strategy for most reasonable supply and demand‐risk combinations. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Simultaneous production of market‐specific and global products: A two‐stage stochastic program with additional demand after recourse

This paper analyzes the simultaneous production of market‐specific products tailored to the needs of individual regions and a global product that could be sold in many regions. We assume that the global product costs more to manufacture, but allows the decision concerning the allocation of products to regions to be delayed until after the manufacturing process has been completed. We further assume that there is additional demand after the region allocation but prior to delivery, extending the two‐stage stochastic program with recourse to include additional stochastic demand after the recourse. This scenario arises, for example, when there is additional uncertainty during a delivery delay which might occur with transoceanic shipments. We develop conditions for optimality assuming a single build‐allocate‐deliver cycle and stochastic demand during both the build and deliver periods. The optimal policy calls for the simultaneous production of market‐specific and global products, even when the global product is substantially more costly than the market‐specific product. In addition, we develop bounds on the performance of the optimal policy for the multicycle problem. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 438–461, 2003     

A generic model of motor‐carrier fuel optimization

Fuel optimizers are decision models (software products) that are increasingly recognized as effective fuel management tools by U.S. truckload carriers. Using the latest price data of every truck stop, these models calculate the optimal fueling schedule for each route that indicates: (i) which truck stop(s) to use, and (ii) how much fuel to buy at the chosen truck stop(s) to minimize the refueling cost. In the current form, however, these models minimize only the fuel cost, and ignore or underestimate other costs that are affected by the models' decision variables. On the basis of the interviews with carrier managers, truck drivers, and fuel‐optimizer vendors, this article proposes a comprehensive model of motor‐carrier fuel optimization that considers all of the costs that are affected by the model's decision variables. Simulation results imply that the proposed model not only attains lower vehicle operating costs than the commercial fuel optimizers, but also gives solutions that are more desirable from the drivers' viewpoint. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

The cost impact of using simple forecasting techniques in a supply chain

In this paper we consider an inventory model in which the retailer does not know the exact distribution of demand and thus must use some observed demand data to forecast demand. We present an extension of the basic newsvendor model that allows us to quantify the value of the observed demand data and the impact of suboptimal forecasting on the expected costs at the retailer. We demonstrate the approach through an example in which the retailer employs a commonly used forecasting technique, exponential smoothing. The model is also used to quantify the value of information and information sharing for a decoupled supply chain in which both the retailer and the manufacturer must forecast demand. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 388–411, 2003     

Service design at diagnostic service centers

We study a service design problem in diagnostic service centers, call centers that provide medical advice to patients over the phone about what the appropriate course of action is, based on the caller's symptoms. Due to the tension between increased diagnostic accuracy and the increase in waiting times more in‐depth service requires, managers face a difficult decision in determining the optimal service depth to guide the diagnostic process. The specific problem we consider models the situation when the capacity (staffing level) at the center is fixed, and when the callers have both congestion‐ and noncongestion‐related costs relating to their call. We develop a queueing model incorporating these features and find that the optimal service depth can take one of two different structures, depending on factors such as the nurses' skill level and the maximum potential demand. Sensitivity analyses of the two optimal structures show that they are quite different. In some situations, it may (or may not) be optimal for the manager to try to expand the demand at the center, and increasing skill level may (or may not) increase congestion. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

Effects of Nuclear Technology Export Competition on Nuclear Nonproliferation

ABSTRACT

While nuclear suppliers compete in markets, they simultaneously partner in other fields. This produces a delicate relationship between civilian nuclear programs and nuclear weapon proliferation. This study explores how export competition affects suppliers’ conditions of supply related to nuclear nonproliferation. We investigated three export cases (India, North Korea, and South Korea) and identified four effects that competition has on the conditions of supply related to nonproliferation. First, under highly competitive conditions, suppliers might hesitate to enforce the conditions of supply to avoid negotiation conflicts with recipients. Second, suppliers focus on politically and economically attractive recipients while mostly ignoring unattractive ones, perhaps allowing proliferation problems to fester out of view in marginal states. Third, suppliers can build consensus on the conditions of supply to avoid being the only party experiencing negotiation conflicts. Fourth, suppliers can constrain others from relaxing the conditions of supply to maintain economic benefits and nonproliferation norms. The first two effects accelerate proliferation while the last two promote nonproliferation. Although the extent of these effects can vary with changes in nonproliferation norms, they can contribute to our understanding of the relationship between nonproliferation and civilian nuclear programs.     

When to commit in a serial supply chain with forecast updating

Negotiations between an end product manufacturer and a parts supplier often revolve around two main issues: the supplier's price and the length of time the manufacturer is contractually held to its order quantity, commonly termed the “commitment time frame.” Because actual demand is unknown, the specification of the commitment time frame determines how the demand risk is shared among the members of the supply chain. Casual observation indicates that most manufacturers prefer to delay commitments as long as possible while suppliers prefer early commitments. In this paper, we investigate whether these goals are always in the firm's best interest. In particular, we find that the manufacturer may sometimes be better off with a contract that requires an early commitment to its order quantity, before the supplier commits resources and the supplier may sometimes be better off with a delayed commitment. We also find that the preferred commitment time frame depends upon which member of the supply chain has the power to set their exchange price. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

Optimal operating policies in a commodity trading market with the manufacturer's presence

With the help of the Internet and express delivery at relatively low costs, trading markets have become increasingly popular as a venue to sell excess inventory and a source to obtain products at lower prices. In this article, we study the operational decisions in the presence of a trading market in a periodic‐review, finite‐horizon setting. Prices in the trading market change periodically and are determined endogenously by the demand and supply in the market. We characterize the retailers'optimal ordering and trading policies when the original manufacturer and the trading market co‐exist and retailers face fees to participate in the trading market. Comparing with the case with no trading fees, we obtain insights into the impact of trading fees and the fee structure on the retailers and the manufacturer. Further, we find that by continually staying in the market, the manufacturer may use her pricing strategies to counter‐balance the negative impact of the trading market on her profit. Finally, we extend the model to the case when retailers dynamically update their demand distribution based on demand observations in previous periods. A numerical study provides additional insights into the impact of demand updating in a trading market with the manufacturer's competition. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Dynamic pricing and inventory control with learning

Optimal operating policies and corresponding managerial insight are developed for the decision problem of coordinating supply and demand when (i) both supply and demand can be influenced by the decision maker and (ii) learning is pursued. In particular, we determine optimal stocking and pricing policies over time when a given market parameter of the demand process, though fixed, initially is unknown. Because of the initially unknown market parameter, the decision maker begins the problem horizon with a subjective probability distribution associated with demand. Learning occurs as the firm monitors the market's response to its decisions and then updates its characterization of the demand function. Of primary interest is the effect of censored data since a firm's observations often are restricted to sales. We find that the first‐period optimal selling price increases with the length of the problem horizon. However, for a given problem horizon, prices can rise or fall over time, depending on how the scale parameter influences demand. Further results include the characterization of the optimal stocking quantity decision and a computationally viable algorithm. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 303–325, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10013     

The effects of customer rebates and retailer incentives on a manufacturer's profits and sales

In some industries such as automotive, production costs are largely fixed and therefore maximizing revenue is the main objective. Manufacturers use promotions directed to the end customers and/or retailers in their distribution channels to increase sales and market share. We study a game theoretical model to examine the impact of “retailer incentive” and “customer rebate” promotions on the manufacturer's pricing and the retailer's ordering/sales decisions. The main tradeoff is that customer rebates are given to every customer, while the use of retailer incentives is controlled by the retailer. We consider several models with different demand characteristics and information asymmetry between the manufacturer and a price discriminating retailer, and we determine which promotion would benefit the manufacturer under which market conditions. When demand is deterministic, we find that retailer incentives increase the manufacturer's profits (and sales) while customer rebates do not unless they lead to market expansion. When the uncertainty in demand (“market potential”) is high, a customer rebate can be more profitable than the retailer incentive for the manufacturer. With numerical examples, we provide additional insights on the profit gains by the right choice of promotion.© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Optimal outbound dispatch policies: Modeling inventory and cargo capacity

In this paper, we present an optimization model for coordinating inventory and transportation decisions at an outbound distribution warehouse that serves a group of customers located in a given market area. For the practical problems which motivated this paper, the warehouse is operated by a third party logistics provider. However, the models developed here may be applicable in a more general context where outbound distribution is managed by another supply chain member, e.g., a manufacturer. We consider the case where the aggregate demand of the market area is constant and known per period (e.g., per day). Under an immediate delivery policy, an outbound shipment is released each time a demand is realized (e.g., on a daily basis). On the other hand, if these shipments are consolidated over time, then larger (hence more economical) outbound freight quantities can be dispatched. In this case, the physical inventory requirements at the third party warehouse (TPW) are determined by the consolidated freight quantities. Thus, stock replenishment and outbound shipment release policies should be coordinated. By optimizing inventory and freight consolidation decisions simultaneously, we compute the parameters of an integrated inventory/outbound transportation policy. These parameters determine: (i) how often to dispatch a truck so that transportation scale economies are realized and timely delivery requirements are met, and (ii) how often, and in what quantities, the stock should be replenished at the TPW. We prove that the optimal shipment release timing policy is nonstationary, and we present algorithms for computing the policy parameters for both the uncapacitated and finite cargo capacity problems. The model presented in this study is considerably different from the existing inventory/transportation models in the literature. The classical inventory literature assumes that demands should be satisfied as they arrive so that outbound shipment costs are sunk costs, or else these costs are covered by the customer. Hence, the classical literature does not model outbound transportation costs. However, if a freight consolidation policy is in place then the outbound transportation costs can no longer be ignored in optimization. Relying on this observation, this paper models outbound transportation costs, freight consolidation decisions, and cargo capacity constraints explicitly. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 531–556, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10030     

Production/distribution system design with inventory considerations

This study addresses the design of a three‐stage production/distribution system where the first stage includes the set of established retailers and the second and third stages include the sets of potential distribution centers (DCs) and potential capacitated suppliers, respectively. In this problem, in addition to the fixed location/operating costs associated with locating DCs and suppliers, we consider the coordinated inventory replenishment decisions at the located DCs and retailers along with the appropriate inventory costs explicitly. In particular, we account for the replenishment and holding costs at the retailers and selected DCs, and the fixed plus distance‐based transportation costs between the selected plants and their assigned DCs, and between the selected DCs and their respective retailers, explicitly. The resulting formulation is a challenging mixed‐integer nonlinear programming model for which we propose efficient heuristic solution approaches. Our computational results demonstrate the performance of the heuristic approaches as well as the value of integrated decision‐making by verifying that significant cost savings are realizable when the inventory decisions and costs are incorporated in the production distribution system design. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 59: 172–195, 2012     

The impact of demand uncertainty on product line design under endogenous substitution

The existing product line design literature devotes little attention to the effect of demand uncertainty. Due to demand uncertainty, the supply‐demand mismatch is inevitable which leads to different degrees of lost sales depending on the configuration of product lines. In this article, we adopt a stylized two‐segment setup with uncertain market sizes and illustrate the interplay between two effects: risk pooling that mitigates the impact of demand uncertainty and market segmentation that facilitates consumer differentiation. Compared to downward substitution, inducing bidirectional substitution through product line decisions including quality levels and prices can yield greater risk pooling effects. However, we show that the additional benefit from the risk pooling effect cannot compensate for the reduced market segmentation effect. We demonstrate that the presence of demand uncertainty can reduce the benefit of market segmentation and therefore the length of product lines in terms of the difference between products. We also propose three heuristics that separate product line and production decisions; each of these heuristics corresponds to one particular form of demand substitution. Our numerical studies indicate that the best of the three heuristics yields performance that is close to optimality. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 143–157, 2015     

Markets for surplus components with a strategic supplier

We study markets for surplus components, which allow manufacturers with excess component inventory to sell to firms with a shortage. Recent developments in internet commerce have the potential to greatly increase the efficiency of such markets. We develop a one‐period model in which a monopolist supplier sells to a number of independent manufacturers who are uncertain about demand for final goods. After uncertainty is resolved, the manufacturers have the opportunity to trade. Because uncertainty is over demand functions, the model allows us to endogenize both the price of final goods and the price of components in wholesale and surplus markets. We derive conditions on demand uncertainty that determine whether a surplus market will increase or decrease supplier profits. Increased costs of transacting on the surplus market may benefit manufacturers, because of the impact of these costs on the supplier's pricing power. The surplus market can decrease overall efficiency of the supply chain, since the benefit of better allocation of components may be outweighed by an increased double‐marginalization effect. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

Mandated defence offsets: can they ever deliver?

Defence offsets are elements of defence procurement deals additional to the primary content. Offsets are usually expected to yield technological or industrial benefits to the purchasing country (e.g. countertrade, technology transfers, or additional jobs) and military buyers often require suppliers to make offsets available “cost-free.” The authors argued previously that such strategies achieve little of value to buyers that lack market power and are unnecessary otherwise, since purchasers with the market power to extract more value for money from foreign suppliers can do so anyway. This article also focuses on the supply side of offset deals. The USA is the world's largest defence offsets supplier but the US government opposes offsets demands as economically inefficient and trade distorting. Even if offsets are inefficient and trade distorting, they may still benefit a materiel-exporting country such as the USA as they may induce exports and create associated benefits for the offsets provider.     

Free riding in a multi‐channel supply chain

Free riding in a multichannel supply chain occurs when one retail channel engages in the customer service activities necessary to sell a product, while another channel benefits from those activities by making the final sale. Although free riding is, in general, considered to have a negative impact on supply chain performance, certain recent industry practices suggest an opposite view: a manufacturer may purposely induce free riding by setting up a high‐cost, customer service‐oriented direct store to allow consumers to experience the product, anticipating their purchase at a retail store. This article examines how the free riding phenomenon affects a manufacturer's supply chain structure decision when there are fixed plus incremental variable costs for operating the direct store. We consider factors such as the effort required to find and buy the product at a retail store after visiting the direct store, the existence of competing products in the market, and the extent of consumer need to obtain direct‐store service. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

The loss‐averse newsvendor problem with supply options

In this article, we consider a loss‐averse newsvendor with stochastic demand. The newsvendor might procure options when demand is unknown, and decide how many options to execute only after demand is revealed. If the newsvendor reserves too many options, he would incur high reservation costs. Yet reserving too few could result in lost sales. So the newsvendor faces a trade‐off between reservation costs and losing sales. When there are multiple options available, the newsvendor has to consider how many units of each to reserve by studying the trade‐off between flexibility and costs. We show how the newsvendor's loss aversion behavior affects his ordering decision, and propose an efficient algorithm to compute his optimal solution in the general case with n options. We also present examples showing how the newsvendor's ordering strategy changes as loss aversion rises. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:46–59, 2015     

The defence firm of the future

This paper offers the personal view of a senior executive in the Defence Procurement Agency about the future requirements of the defence industry’s principal UK customer. The focus here is on trying to identify the type of corporate behaviour and range of skill sets that the UK Government will need from defence suppliers, both primes and supply chain companies in the future. The concluding message from this ‘Customer View’ is that there is likely to be a continuing market for the company that specializes in delivering defence capability. It will be a company that will be looking for a long‐term relationship, with a specialist knowledge of its various national customers and a willingness to work openly and closely with them. It will be agile in its ability to bring together diverse technologies, to package them as a system and to deliver them either as hardware or as a service. Such suppliers will also need to innovate and to adapt at least as rapidly as the threats that they seek to counter.