中东地区的秘密战争

1948年,以色列出现在世界政治版图上,这在很大程度上得益于苏联的外交支持。苏联是第一个承认以色列的国家,并与之建立了外交关系。斯大林和克里姆林宫领导层,计划将以色列纳入自己在中东的战略势力范围,并使之成为社会主义阵营的又一成员。在巴勒斯坦犹太人反对英国托管期间,在1948年5月14日正式开始的第一次阿以战争期间,根据苏联领导人的命令,一批批现代化武器从捷克斯洛伐克输入到以色列。     

神出鬼没的“中东飞虎”——以色列反恐怖部队

由于政治和历史的原因,以色列国家在中东地区树敌颇多,导致其爆发战争屡见不鲜,仅仅大型中东战争就打了5次之多,其中小规模战争更是频繁不断,迄今其有“中东的超级大国”和“世界上最小的超级大国”之称。可以这样说,这个“荣誉”是以色列国家用枪杆子打出来的。尤其是以色列在对待巴勒斯坦解放运动这一问题上的强硬态度,招致许多阿拉伯国家的强烈不满,以阿多次     

以色列国防科技工业管理体制和运行机制

以色列在武器装备建设上的发展令世人瞩目。 因以色列的国情与所面对的地缘政治关系，其国防科技工业管理体系和运行机制可以说是独一无二的。     

兵戈相向——五次中东战争始末

中东战争,一般是指第二次世界大战后,阿拉伯国家同以色列之间进行的五次规模较大的战争。因发生在中东巴勒斯坦及其周围地区,故名。又称阿以战争。这五次战争的共同特点是,都有大国插手的背景。     

雄踞一隅的以色列海军

以色列陆地三面与阿拉伯国家为邻, 另一面临海,沿地中海东岸有较长的海岸线和多个港口,那是以色列与欧美国家联系的主要门户。海洋也是以色列的生命线。以色列政府一直重视海洋国土的防卫问题。以色列开国总理本·古里安说：“如果我们无法控制周边的海域,以色列就将成为一座孤立无援的城市。如同我们必须化沙漠为绿洲一样,我们也必须征服海洋。”     

历史观演变对档案观的影响

文章从历史与档案的关系入手,分析我国历史观的发展演变,阐明了历史观演进对于档案观以及档案工作的深远影响。     

雄踞一隅的以色列海军

以色列陆地三面与阿拉伯国家为邻,另一面临海,沿地中海东岸有较长的海岸线和多个港口,那是以色列与欧美国家联系的主要门户。海洋也是以色列的生命线,以色列政府一直重视海洋国土的防卫问题。以色列开国总理本·古里安曾说:“如果我们无法控制周边的海域,以色列就将成为一座孤立无援的城市。如同我们必须化沙漠为绿洲一样,我们也必须征服海洋。”海上利器:“海豚”充当守卫神潜艇是海军重要武备,但以色列海军潜艇战力的发展并不快。在上世纪80年代,以色列海军装备的还是几艘役龄很长的维克斯540型柴电潜艇。它们性能落伍,无力承担以色列海军封锁东地中海海域、     

Israel 四伏的危机锻造了世界王牌空军——浅析以色列空军为什么能够强大？

在世界地图上，以色列东临叙利亚、约旦，西绕地中海，南连埃及、北比黎巴嫩，中间是因一而二的巴勒斯坦地区，至今仍然战火纷飞。不管领土争端的结果如何，以色列总是处在战争力量的中心，既使是被挤压的中心，甚至是生发战争的中心。作者个人认为，自然界力的关系总是同步产生作用力与     

以色列与俄罗斯：有趣且微妙的关系

以色列将保持与美国与欧盟的关系,但它也将持续发展与俄罗斯的关系,不论哪一个后苏联国家将成为国务院下一个“民主化”战略的试验场。莫斯科任一层级都知道这一点,特别是以色列选择不参与联合国为美国版乌克兰决议而举行的投票,这凸显以色列在该议题上的中立立场。     

巴以冲突探源之三：犹太人定居点问题

巴以争端中同样棘手的问题之一是犹太人定居问题。犹太人定居点的存在已有100多年的历史,而现在所说的定居点主要是指以色列在其公认边界外建立的定居点。本文的定居点仅限于探讨以色列在加沙地带、约旦河西岸(含东耶路撒冷)建立的定居点。     

India and Israel: emerging partnership

The absence of formal diplomatic relations between India and Israel from India's hesitant recognition of Israel in 1950 and the establishment of full relations in January 1992, was the result of a complex interplay between two sets of tensions. The first involved the Arab–Israeli dispute, and India's sympathies with a post-colonial Arab world and with the Non-Aligned Movement; the second involved accommodating Muslim opinion within India. Normalization has proceeded more strongly as the growth of Hindu nationalism has weakened Muslim leverage on Indian foreign policy.     

‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’sStrategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict

‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along its borders. The Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges.     

浅析公共关系理念在公安边防工作中的应用

从公共关系学角度提炼出公共关系理念，通过研究公共关系理念在公安边防工作中的价值，探究公安边防部队内部和外部存在的公共关系，将公共关系理念的原理及方法引入边防工作，进而提出处理方法，达到树立公安边防部队良好形象，推动边防事业发展的目的。     

From control to parasitism

This article sets out to investigate the current paradoxical roles of border control agencies in order to contribute to the theoretical debate on border porosity and related security issues in West Africa. The colonial demarcation of African borders accounts for their porous nature initially, as borderland populations challenged the unjust scission of their cultural, economic, geographical and geopolitical spaces. However, new forms of porosity also evolved over time, masterminded by new actors. Drawing on the Ghana–Togo border case, and through interviews, observation and documentary analysis, this article argues that border control agencies are partly responsible for the current border porosity and attendant security problems as their jurisdiction has shifted to a multi-layered border parasitism. The article is not, however, an attack on border law enforcement agencies; rather it attempts to explore their roles in shielding the region, already exposed to terrorism and piracy, from further security threats.     

How long until midnight? Intelligence-policy relations and the United States response to the Israeli nuclear program, 1959–1985

Why did the United States fail to stop Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons? Existing research argues that patrons such as the U.S. should have an easy time halting proliferation by militarily and economically vulnerable clients. Nevertheless, Israel acquired nuclear weapons with relatively little American opposition. Utilizing extensive primary source research, we argue that problematic intelligence-policy relations hindered U.S. efforts to arrest Israeli proliferation as (1) policymakers often gave mixed guidance to the intelligence community, resulting in (2) limited information on Israeli efforts that reinforced policy ambiguity. The results carry implications for understanding the dynamics of nuclear proliferation and intelligence-policy relations.     

Iraq's role in the 1973 Arab‐Israeli War

The events of the 1973 Arab‐Israeli War serve as an early indicator of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's willingness to use military power to address foreign policy concerns. In that war, Iraq intervened on the Syrian front with an armored division, other supporting units, and over 100 aircraft. This intervention, which occurred despite severe political and military difficulties, was larger than any previous Iraqi contribution to the anti‐Israeli struggle. Baghdad later asserted that Iraqi forces had saved Damascus from possible Israeli occupation, and these claims have been widely repeated by a variety of authors of different nationalities with various degrees of agreement or skepticism. Nevertheless, Iraqi claims to have saved Damascus from Israeli capture are false since the Israelis did not view the seizure of the city as important to their strategy for victory. Rather, the Iraqi presence on the Golan Heights was useful to the Arab war effort as one of many factors helping to delay the Israeli advance and prevent some important Syrian targets from being placed within artillery range of the Israeli force. Iraqi military shortcomings were well highlighted in this conflict, and many were repeated in the early stages of the war with Iran.     

公安边防部队遂行边境封控任务探究

边境封控行动事关国家安全和社会稳定大局,已成为新的历史条件下公安边防部队重要的职能和任务。分析公安边防部队边境封控行动的主要任务,探讨边境封控行动的特点和原则,提出公安边防部队边境封控行动的主要方法。     

Budgetary savings from conscription and burden sharing in NATO

We study the spatial and temporal determinants of terrorism risk in Israel, using a geocoded database of Israeli terrorist attacks from 1949 to 2004. In selecting targets, terrorists seem to respond rationally to costs and benefits: they are more likely to hit targets more accessible from their own homebases and international borders, closer to symbolic centers of government administration, and in more heavily Jewish areas. We also examine the waiting time between attacks experienced by localities. Long periods without an attack signal lower risk for most localities, but higher risk for important areas such as regional or national capitals.     

Israel’s relations with the Gulf states: Toward the emergence of a tacit security regime?

By drawing on the literature about security regimes, this article posits the idea that a particular type of regime, which can be termed a “tacit security regime” (TSR), has begun to emerge between Israel, on the one hand, and several Gulf Arab states, on the other. It is a regime which, unlike liberal institutional variants that attempt to privilege the promotion of collective norms, remains configured around perceptions of threats to be countered and strategic interests to be realized. By examining the development, scope, and scale of this nascent TSR, this article explores the extent to which Israel, mindful of Washington, DC’s regional retrenchment, sees the emergence of such a regime as redefining the political and strategic contours of Israel’s relations with much of the Middle East.     

Who Really Dictates What an Existential Threat Is? The Israeli Experience

National security conception or securitization theory frames threats and conceptualizes the responses towards them. But in many cases, and especially in the Israeli context, there is a tendency to blur the nature and essence of different threats; security threats become strategic threats and then existential threats. In the Israeli context, because the broad concept of security is perceived, in most cases, as equivalent to military security, the meaning of the strategic threat will be framed, mostly, militarily, derived from military thought.

The article examines the nature of existential threats in the Israeli context and seeks to find the implications of securitization theory in this regard by analyzing the unique role of the military establishment and the influence of the military thought on strategic thought in Israel. The article also deals with the centrality of ‘military wisdom’ in the Israeli ethos and the sense of insecurity embedded in the Israeli narrative that leads to an ‘intellectual symbiosis’ between the political and the military echelons and finds this phenomenon as one of the major explanations for the influence of the military establishment on defining the nature of security threats as well as on the crucial decision to launch wars.