Schlieffen and the Avoidance of Tactics: A Reinvestigation

This article challenges the view that Schlieffen tried to evade the tactical conundrum of the modern battlefield by resorting to the operational level of war. On that view, the outflanking strategy of the Schlieffen Plan, with its supposed avoidance of frontal attack, betokened a failure to come to terms with the firepower revolution that had so enormously strengthened the tactical defensive. But Schlieffen did in fact engage directly with this problem by creating a mobile heavy artillery to improve the offensive tactical capability of the German army. Moreover, the Schlieffen Plan was not based exclusively on the outflanking principle. Schlieffen reckoned that the envelopment of Paris could succeed only in conjunction with a frontal assault on the whole line between Paris and Verdun, an immense tactical undertaking crucially supported by the mobile heavy artillery.     

From the Editors

For the first four years of the Algerian War British ministers and officials claimed that while supporting the French position in North Africa they did not support their policies. Successive Conservative governments sought to sustain France in North Africa because of the impact that long term insurgency in Algeria would have on Western defence by draining French human and material resources. They also feared that Western influence in North Africa could decline, opening the way for the spread of Communism, and that further humiliation for France, coming on the heels of Indochina, could lead to a ‘neutralist’ government in Paris, which would politically weeaken the Western alliance. Yet Britain's own foreign interests led it to wish to limit the spread of Arab nationalism and to avoid being tarred with the colonialist brush. The ambiguity of Britain's position led to shifting policies, which made the job of HM Ambassador in Paris, Gladwyn Jebb, particularly difficult.     

Book review

Jacques Fontanel, Les dépenses militaires et le désarmement, Editions Publisud, Paris, 1995, 136 pages.

Jean‐Paul Hébert ’Production d'armement — Mutilation du systéme français’, Paris 1995 La documentation française, 221 pages.     

The insurgency of the Vendée

The insurrection in the Vendée combined open warfare with the methods of petite guerre, ambushing French republican soldiers and cutting their supply lines to Paris. These tactics, when combined with the hatreds generated by a civil war, go far to explain to the cruelty of the conflict in the west and the depth of the hatreds it engendered. In republican eyes the use of guerrilla tactics was unjust and illegitimate, and they denounced their adversaries as common criminals and brigands, portraying them as backward, superstitious, even as subhuman, and in the process justified the savage repression they unleashed against them.     

椭圆状裂纹应力强度因子确定及抽油杆疲劳寿命预测

借助实验数据和公式逼近得到了带有椭圆状裂纹,承受拉-拉载荷的抽油杆的应力强度因子。将此应力强度因子代入Paris公式,即可预测抽油杆的剩余疲劳寿命。计算表明,当抽油杆上初始裂纹尺寸α_0<1.90mm时,预测疲劳寿命与实验值可较好地吻合。     

Book review

La Conversion économique du secteur militaire, J. FONTANEL, Economica, Paris, 1994, pp. 112. Paperback. ISBN 2–7178–2650–5.     

Insurgency and Genocide: La Vendée

The struggle between the peasant population of the Vendee and the revolutionary government in Paris during the 1790s was perhaps the first, and certainly one of the earliest, of the modern ideological insurgencies. The conflict demonstrates the fatal weaknesses of a purely popular guerrilla movement deprived of sustained outside assistance. It also brings to the surface some less‐familiar aspects of the French Revolutionary regime. Most notably, that regime, determined to eradicate rather than conciliate the Vendean peasantry, employed methods that foreshadowed the techniques of National Socialism.     

Book reviews

The Nuclear Question by Michael Mandelbaum. London: Cambridge University Press, 1979. ix + 277pp. £12.50.

Le Désir d'Europe: L'Introuvable Défense Commune by Andre Brigot and Dominique David. Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense national; Les Sept Epées, Cahier No. 16. Paris, 1980. 142pp. + bibl.; no index.     

1918 Revisited1

This article re-evaluates the origins of the armistice of November 1918, drawing on German, French and British primary sources and on insights from work by political scientists on war termination. It examines why the German government decided to request a ceasefire and why the US, Britain and France decided to grant one. At first sight these decisions appear paradoxical in the light of the military-political situation at the time. In accounting for them the article stresses (on the German side) the campaigning on the Western Front over the previous months and (among Germany's opponents) the diplomatic tensions between Washington, London and Paris. Between them these considerations caused an unexpected and temporary convergence of perceived interests in favour of ending the conflict.     

The Telefunken Affairand the internationalisation of the Algerian War, 1957–59

Between 1957 and 1959 the West German company Telefunken and the Bonn government became prime targets in the French army's campaign against the Front de Libération Nationale's (FLN) efforts to establish communications networks. To the French military, the prevention of sales of Telefunken equipment to the FLN or its allies constituted a matter of strategic importance. To the Germans, it was an act of economic protectionism that exposed France's continued misgivings of Germany. The problem exerted a considerable strain between Paris and Bonn, and even threatened to harm German-Arab relations. The Telefunken affair thus highlights the Algerian war's international ramifications. It further reveals the responsibility of the French military in the internationalisation of that war.     

Book reviews

The Political Economy of Defense, Ross A. L. (ed), Greenwood Press, 1991, New York. pp. ix, 229; ISBN 0–313–26462–7, Price $47.95

Economie Politique de la Defense, Jacques Aben, (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1992, 170 pages, 120 French Francs, ISBN: 2–254–92723‐X)     

Book reviews

The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States, Alex Mintz (ed), London and New York: Routledge, 1992, pp x, 334; ISBN 0–415–07595–5

Penser La Guerre, Penser L'Economie, Christian Schmidt, (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1991), 350p.

Military Production and Innovation in Spain, Jordi Molas‐Gallart, Chur (CH): Harwood Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. vii, 212; ISBN 3–7186–5280–3     

Indications and warning in Belgium: Brussels is not Delphi

The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium of 2015–2016 that occurred while these countries were in a heightened state of alert raise questions about indications and warning methodology as well as effectiveness of the blanket-protection deployment of security services assisted even by the military. Response and perhaps even more anticipation may require strategic rethinking in light of the predatory attacks that target the most vulnerable spots of the public space. This study looks at threat analysis in Belgium as conducted through her intelligence fusion centre Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA)?????? since its inception in 2006. With a special focus on what is known, at the time of writing, about the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, this study hopes to put into context how the system (mal)functions and will also consider the preventive measures that respond to the threat, and the international aspects which have implications far beyond Belgian borders. Therefore, a case is made for not just a Belgian homeland security framework, but one that fits into an EU-wide security concept.     

French foreign and security challenges after the Paris terrorist attacks

The Paris terrorist attacks in January and November 2015 have changed the relationship between French society and security. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the assumption that France is experiencing a new form of territorial war is explicit in the public debate. It has reinforced the strong conviction among the French politicians and diplomats that security requires close cooperation with the USA and a renouncement of the Gaullist paradigm of exceptionalism. This paper analyses why the terrorist attacks have been perceived in France as a form of territorial war. Second, it explains why terrorism contributes to a growing mistrust of the French public vis-à-vis the European Union. Finally, it shows the reasons but also the limits of French military activism outside Europe, in close connection with the US-led strategy.     

Intelligence reform and the transformation of the state: the end of a French exception

ABSTRACT

This article argues that the intelligence sector is a privileged vantage point to observe and analyse a transformation of the State in France, as this transformation deeply affects the heart of the executive power and the French intelligence and security apparatus. Traditionally, intelligence was not conceived in France as a functional tool in the hands of the decision-maker but was rather defined as a ‘regalian power’. Intelligence activities were derived from a very specific conception of the State, and especially the particular notion of ‘reason of State’ (raison d’État). The current intelligence reform prompts speculation as to whether it represents more than a ‘simple’ functional reorganisation or in fact could signify that intelligence is now recognised as a tool in the hands of a ‘État de droit’ (‘liberal state’). The idea of a French ‘exceptionalism’ is addressed through a theoretical approach of the way France redefines intelligence and surveillance in relation with a major evolution of the notion of ‘reason of State’ itself. Then the article illustrates the assumption of a ‘lost tradition’ of reason of State through an analysis of the current reform of the intelligence sector in France. This reform is based on processes of rationalisation, centralization, modernisation and normalisation of both intelligence activities and intelligence services in France. As a conclusion, the article addresses the reactions to the January and November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, and asks whether resilience towards terrorism requires to accelerate the pace of the transformation of the French intelligence sector.     

Daily life and motivation in war: The wehrmacht in the Soviet Union∗

Lucio Ceva, Le Forze armate. Turin: UTET, 1981, Pp. 641; L.48,000.

Bernd Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten: Die Waffen‐SS 1933–1945. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1982. Pp. 363; DM48.

Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, Les avertissements qui venaient de Berlin, 9 octobre 1939–10 mai 1940. Paris‐Gembloux: Editions Duculot, 1982. Pp. 398; Fr.90.

Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma. New York: Simon &; Schuster. Pp. 587; $22.50.

Nigel Hamilton, Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 1942–1944. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983. Pp.xxxi + 863; £12.95.

Bernard Burrows and Geoffrey Edwards, The Defence of Western Europe. London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982. Pp.155; £16.

Elmar Dinter and Paddy Griffith, Not Over by Christinas: NATO's Central Front in World War III. Chichester, Sussex: Antony Bird Publications, 1983. Pp.xiv + 178; £8.95.

David Capitanchik and Richard C. Eichenberg, Defence and Public Opinion. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp.ix + 98; £4.95.

Ian Clark, Limited Nuclear War. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982. Pp.266; £16.50.

Bhupendra Jasani (ed.), Outer Space ‐ A New Dimension of the Arms Race. London: Taylor and Francis, 1982. Pp. xviii + 423; £18.50.

William J. Taylor, Jr. and Steven A. Maaranen (eds.), The Future of Conflict in the 1980s. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982. Pp. xiii + 505.

Joseph S. Himes, Conflict and Conflict Management. Athens, GA; University of Georgia Press. 1980. Pp.333.

Richard Burt (ed.), Arms Control and Defense Postures in the 1980s. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press and London: Croom Helm, 1982. Pp.x + 230; £15.95.     

Book reviews

Die Faszination des Verrats: Eine Studie zur Dekadenz im Ost‐West Konflikt. By Thomas Noetzel. Hamburg, Junius (1989) DM48.

Les Nations Armées. By Maurice Faivre (Preface by Pierre Messmer), Paris FEDN/Economica (1988).

Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. By Bard E. O'Neill, Brassey's (US), Washington, DC (1990), $19.00.

LIC 2010: Special Operations and Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century. By Rod Paschall, Brassey's (US), Washington, DC, $24.00.

Air Power and Colonial Conflict: The Royal Air Force 1919–1939. By D. E. Omissi, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York (1990), ISBN 0–7190–2960–0. £35.00.

Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab‐Israeli Wars. By George W. Gawrych. Combat Studies Institute Research Survey No. 7, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1990. $8.00.

Arms Export Regulations. Edited by Ian Anthony. SIPRI/Oxford University Press, Oxford (1991), ISBN 0–19–829158–2, £25.00.     

Book reviews

Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny. By Joshua Muravchik, American Enterprise Institute (1991) ISSN 0–8447–3734–8. $12.95.

Generals in the Palacio. By Roderick Ai Camp. Oxford University Press, (1992), ISBN 0–19–507300–2, £45.

L'Armement en France. Genèse, Ampleur et Coût d'une Industrie By François Chesnais and Claude Serfati, Editions Nathan, Collection Economie/Sciences Sociales, Paris (1992), ISBN 2–09–190086–9.

The Têt Offensive. Intelligence Failure in War. By James Wirtz, Cornell University Press, New York (1991), ISBN 0–8014–2486–0. $38.50.

Restructuring of arms producton in Western Europe. Edited by Michael Brzoska and Peter Lock. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1992), ISBN 0–1982–9147–7. £25.00.

What is Proper Soldiering? A study of new perspectives for the future uses of the Armed Forces of the 1990s. By Michael Harbottle. The Centre for International Peacebuilding, Chipping Norton (1992), £3.50.

The Strategic Defence Initiative By Edward Reiss, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1992), ISBN 0–521–41097–5. £30.00.     

不确定多属性决策的单目标优化方法研究

运用神经网络的非线性映射和遗传算法的寻优特性,建立了不确定多属性决策的单目标优化模型。把属性值区间作为遗传算法染色体的搜索范围,用训练好的神经网络计算适应度。用不同的适应度函数来计算综合属性值区间数的下界和上界,然后对方案进行排序。算例结果表明,该方法是可行的。     

A drive to regime change through nonviolent economic warfare: The post-Mugabe era, 2017–2019

ABSTRACT

This article examines efforts made by the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance to bring about regime change through nonviolent economic warfare including its subsequent failure. The 30 July 2018 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe led to a victory by Emmerson Mnangagwa but it was disputed by Nelson Chamisa. Since August 2018, the political opposition led by Chamisa sought to make the country ungovernable by waging a nonviolent economic war nicknamed Kuzvidira jecha (pouring sand) against the Mnangagwa administration. This was punctuated by price hikes, fluctuation of the local currency, artificial food stuff price hikes and fuel shortages which caused serious challenges for most Zimbabweans. This was primarily intended to bring about regime change via public unrest against the Mnangagwa regime. On the contrary, the anticipated public uproar failed to foster regime change in Zimbabwe despite widespread adverse socio-economic effects. This led to the nonviolent participants resorting to violent tactics instead of adhering to nonviolence. Consequently, it was the failure to adhere to nonviolent principles by opposition advocates which forced the Mnangagwa regime to deploy its own instruments of violence in an effort to protect lives and property.