Mailed Fists and Velvet Gloves: The Relevance of Smart Power to Singapore’s Evolving Defence and Foreign Policy

Abstract

This paper critically assesses the conceptual utility of smart power to Singapore’s evolving defence and foreign policy and behaviour. First, as a political concept adopted by the United States for its post-Afghanistan strategy, smart power does not travel easily. With qualifications, however, the notion is relevant to Singapore’s policy pragmatism and its emphasis on deterrence and diplomacy. Second, Singapore’s willingness to employ its military assets in disaster relief and peacekeeping arguably hews most closely to smart power’s mix of hard and soft approaches. Third, Singapore’s contributions to global governance, albeit limited, imply a rethinking among its leaders on the place of values in its policy.     

The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Smart Power Quandary in Southeast Asia

Abstract

China has a strong interest in pursuing a smart power strategy towards Southeast Asia and has worked laboriously to engage with regional countries economically, socially, and politically. But China has been only partially successful in achieving its goals in the region. This paper argues that China’s security policy towards Southeast Asia significantly contradicts many other objectives that Beijing wishes to accomplish. Given the deep-seated, narrowly-defined national interests of the Chinese military in the South China Sea disputes, it is likely that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to pose the main obstacle to the effective implementation of a Chinese smart strategy in Southeast Asia.     

Feeding the Lion: China and defence development in African states

ABSTRACT

In analysing trends in Chinese defence engagement and their impact on defence development in African states, it is important to consider both China's changing policy priorities and its capabilities for the provision of defence support. China's international ambitions and its economic development contribute to its emergence as a key supporter of defence capability development in Africa, occupying a crucial niche as a provider of support, particularly arms transfers, appropriate to evolving local requirements. The economic and politico-military imperatives driving China's engagement of Africa, which stem from its economic reforms and re-emergence as a great power, are facilitating defence modernisation by accelerating the introduction of modern arms in substantial quantities. The commercial importance of arms exports and the growing importance of strategic ties strongly situate China to help sustain processes of defence capability development in African states over the long term.     

The Serbian defence institution: the need for clear policy guidance to improve the Serbian defence planning,management, and command processes

ABSTRACT

The uncritical layering of western liberal defence governance norms and concepts on top of existing legacy concepts has impeded achieving coherent military capabilities and capacities when Serbia’s political and military leadership tried to reform the defence system using Western benchmarking principles and Western countries’ best practices. The process of this change has been more valuable than its actual output, as defined by increased capabilities. Such outcomes should be reflective of policy guidance, and can be thought of as closing the trinity loop of a defence planning system: plans, money and execution. This article addresses two key functional areas of the Serbian defence institution. First, it assesses the current state of defence planning to discern its strengths and weaknesses to ascertain if plans are tied to financial decision-making. Second, a full examination of current Serbian defence management is conducted to discern whether weaknesses exist that distract from producing operational capabilities. Both areas are analyzed thoroughly and some solutions for change are proposed. Also, the article analyzes the appearance of two negative phenomena in the planning process – economization and managerialism.     

United States defence contractors and the future of military operations

ABSTRACT

The United States’ global strategic outlook has shifted markedly since the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the United States’ strategic posture shifts, the nature of military operations is simultaneously changing rapidly. Many analysts predict that cyber-operations, autonomous weapons systems, artificial intelligence, and clandestine special forces operations will be central features in future conflicts. Although often overlooked by scholars and policy analysts, defence contractors are integral to the development and implementation of these emerging categories of warfare. This inquiry examines the evolving nature of the American defence industry and the roles corporations play in current theatres of conflict. Surprisingly, rather than becoming less reliant on defence contractors after their much-maligned performance in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, American military and intelligence agencies have become more dependent on the private sector as technology becomes increasingly central to warfare.     

Defence industry in Iran – between needs and real capabilities

ABSTRACT

The paper’s goal is to analyses the potential of the Iranian defence industry, including both research-and-development and production capabilities. It is argued that, despite official statements about the great power and sophistication of the Iranian defence industry, in reality its capabilities are very limited and cannot meet the operational needs of the Iranian armed forces. At the same time, it is argued that many official releases, which are abundantly available in the Iranian press and often unthinkingly repeated by the Western media, do not present the real and value of military products, but are rather a tool for deception and propaganda.     

Country survey XVI the defence sector in the economy of a declining superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001

The Soviet Union was able to develop a large military-industrial complex and become the world's second superpower despite deficiencies in its centrally planned economy because defence was given high priority status and special planning, rationing and administrative mechanisms were used to attain national security objectives. However, in the period 1976-85 the effectiveness of priority protection diminished and defence institutions experienced more of the problems typical of the shortage economic system. The heavy defence burden also created growing difficulties for the civilian economy. The attempts by the Gorbachev government to reform the defence sector and improve defence-economic relationships during perestroika (1985-91) uniformly failed. For most of the transition period, the Russian military-industrial complex has been adversely affected by its low priority status, cuts in defence spending, instability of the hybrid politico-economic system, and negative growth of the economy. The armed forces and defence industry have been reduced in size and their outputs of military services and equipment have fallen to low levels. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces still have over one million troops, significant stocks of sophisticated conventional weapons, and a large nuclear arsenal. The government of President Putin has raised the priority of the defence sector, increased real defence spending, and adopted ambitious plans to revive Russian military power. It is likely, though, that tight resource constraints will hamper efforts to reform the armed forces and to upgrade weapons. By 2010 Russia will be an important, but not dominant, military power in Eurasia.     

Chinese views of the nuclear endgame in North Korea

ABSTRACT

This article examines Chinese views of North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program during the Donald J. Trump administration. It shows that China has portrayed itself as a responsible country that promotes regional stability, unlike the United States, which has engaged in military brinkmanship with North Korea. Some Chinese foreign-policy experts have asserted that Beijing should back Pyongyang in the event of war because of their shared history of humiliation by great powers, while others have favored working with other regional partners. Another theme in Chinese discourse about North Korea is that Pyongyang is an impetuous, ungrateful regime that impedes Beijing’s ability to attain its core interests of regional stability, economic development, and heightened global influence. This negative assessment of North Korea drove Beijing’s endorsement of stricter UN sanctions in 2017. While Beijing has punished Pyongyang for its wayward policies, China responded favorably to North Korea’s decision in April 2018 to stop nuclear tests and partake in international dialogue. Beijing seeks to help Pyongyang gradually disarm and develop its economy within a Chinese-led East Asian order. The article concludes by explaining how Beijing’s recent, more positive view of Pyongyang is likely to affect its support for American efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program.     

The Czech defence and security industry: taking the pulse to an ailing man

ABSTRACT

The paper summarises the evolution of the iron triangle of the mutual relationships amongst the ministry of defence, defence industry, and the political elite in the post-communist Czech Republic in 1990-2020. The essay stresses the oddness of this relationship. On the one hand, the government is bound by a partnership to the Defence and Security Industry Association of the Czech Republic (DSIA), a lobbying group of more than 100 organisations that conduct business in defence and security sector in Czechia. Yet, since its creation in 2000, this assemblage of industries within DSIA's market position is falling, in fact. Neither political parties in power, nor the governments have been able to support national defence industry through the small military. Just a few DSIA national members are able to compete internationally with their cutting-edge products. Others have evolved into middlemen trading intime-expired Czechoslovak equipment retired from the Czech Armed Forces.     

From one exceptionalism to another: France’s strategic relations with the United States and the United Kingdom in the post-Cold War era

ABSTRACT

The failed expedition of Suez in 1956 and France’s subsequent strategic ‘divorce’ from the United Kingdom and the United States lies at the heart of a policy paradigm that has dictated France’s defence posture from de Gaulle’s presidency to the end of the Cold War. Some crucial features of the Gaullist posture remain today enduring references for French presidents in the definition of France’s exceptionalism. While it is so, there have been significant changes since the 1990s when it comes to France’s strategic relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. This article demonstrates the extent and mechanisms of this rapprochement by analysing it through three dimensions of policy change: modes of action, institutional commitments and discourses. The article demonstrates the dimensions’ mutually reinforcing effects and argues that France’s exceptional posture has de facto been reversed.     

The future of European defence policy: An economic perspective

European defence policy has been dominated by politics. This paper shows how economic principles can be used to derive guidelines for the formulation of European defence policy. The inefficiencies of the EU's existing defence arrangements are identified. It is shown that there is scope for efficiency improvements in the EU's Armed Forces and its defence industries.     

Demobilisation,disarmament and reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The numbers game

Abstract

The creation of the Africa Command (AFRICOM) has reflected the growth in the strategic importance of Africa in US foreign policy since the end of the 1990s. One of the objectives of this new geographical military command is to forge closer links between foreign, security and development policies. However, this approach met with a number of difficulties associated with the challenge of ‘inter-agency cooperation’ among rather disparate actors from foreign affairs, defence and development. In addition, the establishment of AFRICOM has met with fierce criticism in the US and elsewhere – especially in Africa – culminating in the charge that the US foreign and development policies in Africa are being militarised. Although AFRICOM has a number of interesting features, this paper shows that it has reacted to these criticisms by realigning itself more closely with the traditional model of a military command, at the expense of the innovative interagency elements.     

Country survey military expenditure in Cyprus

Cyprus, a small island state, gained independence from British colonial rule in 1960. For more that half its history as an independent state Cyprus has been under occupation following the 1974 Turkish invasion. Despite the fact that it has faced war, invasion and occupation, Cyprus has allocated a comparatively small proportion of its national income to defence. The average defence burden—military expenditure as a share of GDP—during 1964–98 was around 2.5%. However, as a result of a substantial shift in defence policy during the past decade or so, the defence burden during the 1990s has increased, averaging about 4% of GDP as Cyprus decided to implement an extensive military modernization program aiming to present a more credible military deterrence vis‐a‐vis Turkey. Empirical estimations of a demand function for Cypriot military expenditure suggest that it is positively affected by alliance spillins and external military threat.     

France and its allies: A comparative study of defence spending trends since 1985*

Within the EU France devotes to defence the largest financial and human resources although it is not the richest country, nor has it the largest population or labour force. The cost of nuclear weapons accounts for only a small fraction of this abnormally high French defence effort. If France had restructured its military capabilities at the same rate as its principal Allies during the 1985–1994 period, then French defence outlays would be about 20% less than at present. The fundamental reasons for France's excess defence outlay comprise virtual total dependence on French sources for equipment, produced in very small numbers; a military presence outside of Europe; and too many personnel. These deficiencies, and the consequent absence hitherto of a “peace dividend”, indicate a failure to identify the country's real strategic requirements, and a lack of will to reorganise efficiently French defence. The recently announced reform towards an all‐professional force is unlikely to achieve the potential and desirable improvement in cost‐effectiveness.     

Country survey VI: Australia

Australia is a geographically large country, with the world's longest national coastline to defend, but a relatively small economy of some 17.5 million people. Since World War II, Australia has faced the dilemma of how to structure defence policy in the absence of an identifiable threat. Its policy of self‐reliance aims to permit Australia to conduct defensive operations in the event of low/medium level threats without depending immediately on its allies. This is to be achieved through the technological sophistication of defence equipment, a highly professional but small defence force and local industry support.

The burden of defence, measured as the share of defence outlay in GDP declined from about 3% in 1971–72 to about 2.3% in 1993–94. It has been the Government's policy to encourage the development of local defence‐related industry, in particular in areas such as: electronics/optics; communications and information technology; aerospace; shipbuilding and repair, munitions; and land vehicles. However, defence procurement has a small impact on the Australian economy as a whole.     

Saudi Arabia's defence offset programmes: Progress,policy and performance

This paper discusses the performance of Saudi Arabia's defence offset programmes. The Kingdom is involved in some of the World's biggest defence offset agreements and a review of the problems it has faced and the policies it has introduced provides a useful insight into that part of the international defence market where trade and development meet.

The paper reviews the origins and development of Saudi Arabia's major defence offset programmes. Saudi policies towards defence offsets are outlined before assessing the practical impact of the programmes themselves. The author concludes that Saudi Arabia's offset projects have had only a minor impact on the Kingdom's economy to date and makes a number of policy recommendations which are designed to enhance the utility of the programmes in the Kingdom's drive to enhance and diversify the technological base of its economy.     

Modelling international conflict under conditions of state level economic and political uncertainty

Formal models of international conflict have tended to concentrate on change across the security dimension, assuming that the state level economic and political dimensions are constant. However, the conclusion of the Cold War suggests that over the long run these dimensions are not constant; indeed, the development of economic power, state level limits on defence expenditures, structural impediments to economic change, and several other ‘constants’ clearly do have an endogenous role in international conflict. This paper suggests one strategy for their inclusion as a causal factor in conflict modelling.     

Allocating the U.S. Department of Defense Budget: Revisiting the ‘Incremental/Fair Share Model’

Abstract

This article examines the ‘incremental/fair share model’ that was proposed by Alex Mintz in 1988 concerning the budget allocation of the U.S. Department of Defense. Although Mintz was unable to confirm the correctness of his model, this study demonstrated it to be statistically significant. In the statistical analyses, I used the two-stage least squares method and Durbin’s h-test to better scrutinize the model’s adequacy. Few previous studies have addressed the allocation of the U.S. defence budget; consequently, the incremental/fair-share model should constitute a starting point for further research on the U.S. defence budget allocation.