When to commit in a serial supply chain with forecast updating

Negotiations between an end product manufacturer and a parts supplier often revolve around two main issues: the supplier's price and the length of time the manufacturer is contractually held to its order quantity, commonly termed the “commitment time frame.” Because actual demand is unknown, the specification of the commitment time frame determines how the demand risk is shared among the members of the supply chain. Casual observation indicates that most manufacturers prefer to delay commitments as long as possible while suppliers prefer early commitments. In this paper, we investigate whether these goals are always in the firm's best interest. In particular, we find that the manufacturer may sometimes be better off with a contract that requires an early commitment to its order quantity, before the supplier commits resources and the supplier may sometimes be better off with a delayed commitment. We also find that the preferred commitment time frame depends upon which member of the supply chain has the power to set their exchange price. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

Dynamic pricing in a trade-in program with replacement and new customers

Trade-in programs have been widely adopted to enhance repeat purchase from replacement customers. Considering that a market consists of replacement and new segments, we study the joint and dynamic decisions on the selling price of new product (hereafter, “selling price”) and the trade-in price involved in the program. By adopting a vertical product differentiation choice model, we investigate two scenarios in this paper. In the base model, the manufacturer has sufficiently large production capacity to fulfill the customer demand. We characterize the structural properties of the joint pricing decisions and compare them with the optimal pricing policy under regular selling. We further propose a semi-dynamic trade-in program, under which the new product is sold at a fixed price and the trade-in price can be adjusted dynamically. Numerical experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the dynamic and semi-dynamic trade-in programs. In an extended model, we consider the scenario in which the manufacturer stocks a batch of new products in the beginning of the selling horizon and the inventory cannot be replenished. Following a revenue management framework, we characterize the structural properties with respect to time period and inventory level of new products.     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

The value of information sharing in a two‐stage supply chain with production capacity constraints

We consider a simple two‐stage supply chain with a single retailer facing i.i.d. demand and a single manufacturer with finite production capacity. We analyze the value of information sharing between the retailer and the manufacturer over a finite time horizon. In our model, the manufacturer receives demand information from the retailer even during time periods in which the retailer does not order. To analyze the impact of information sharing, we consider the following three strategies: (1) the retailer does not share demand information with the manufacturer; (2) the retailer does share demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses the optimal policy to schedule production; (3) the retailer shares demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses a greedy policy to schedule production. These strategies allow us to study the impact of information sharing on the manufacturer as a function of the production capacity, and the frequency and timing in which demand information is shared. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

Competing with channel partners: Supply chain conflict when retailers introduce store brands

Private‐label products are of increasing importance in many retail categories. While national‐brand products are designed by the manufacturer and sold by the retailer, the positioning of store‐brand products is under the complete control of the retailer. We consider a scenario where products differ on a performance quality dimension and we analyze how retailer–manufacturer interactions in product positioning are affected by the introduction of a private‐label product. Specifically, we consider a national‐brand manufacturer who determines the quality of its product as well the product's wholesale price charged to the retailer. Given the national‐brand quality and wholesale price, the retailer then decides the quality level of its store brand and sets the retail prices for both products. We find that a manufacturer can derive substantial benefits from considering a retailer's store‐brand introduction when determining the national brand's quality and wholesale price. If the retailer has a significant cost disadvantage in producing high‐quality products, the manufacturer does not need to adjust the quality of the national‐brand product, but he should offer a wholesale price discount to ensure its distribution through the retailer. If the retailer is competitive in providing products of high‐quality, the manufacturer should reduce this wholesale price discount and increase the national‐brand quality to mitigate competition. Interestingly, we find the retailer has incentive to announce a store‐brand introduction to induce the manufacturer's consideration of these plans in determining the national‐brand product quality and wholesale price. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Vertically restrictive pricing in supply chains with price‐dependent demand

We examine the behavior of a manufacturer and a retailer in a decentralized supply chain under price‐dependent, stochastic demand. We model a retail fixed markup (RFM) policy, which can arise as a form of vertically restrictive pricing in a supply chain, and we examine its effect on supply chain performance. We prove the existence of the optimal pricing and replenishment policies when demand has a linear additive form and the distribution of the uncertainty component has a nondecreasing failure rate. We numerically compare the relative performance of RFM to a price‐only contract and we find that RFM results in greater profit for the supply chain than the price‐only contract in a variety of scenarios. We find that RFM can lead to Pareto‐improving solutions where both the supplier and the retailer earn more profit than under a price‐only contract. Finally, we compare RFM to a buyback contract and explore the implications of allowing the fixed markup parameter to be endogenous to the model. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006.     

成本分担定价方式的装备采购博弈研究

承包商的努力程度直接决定了装备的制造成本。为有效激励承包商降低装备制造成本，提高装备采购效益，基于里昂惕夫劳资博弈模型建立了成本分担定价方式的装备采购博弈模型。并在承包商边际效用非线性和定价方式多变量的假设基础上，分别对价格、成本、承包商努力程度和承包商效用之间的关系进行了研究，对原模型进行了拓展，为定价方式中参数的确定提供了量化方法。     

Spatial pricing and product allocation in online retailing

Spatial pricing means a retailer price discriminates its customers based on their geographic locations. In this article, we study how an online retailer should jointly allocate multiple products and facilitate spatial price discrimination to maximize profits. When deciding between a centralized product allocation ((i.e., different products are allocated to the same fulfillment center) and decentralized product allocation (ie, different products are allocated to different fulfillment centers), the retailer faces the tradeoff between shipment pooling (ie, shipping multiple products in one package), and demand localization (ie, stocking products to satisfy local demand) based on its understanding of customers' product valuations. In our basic model, we consider two widely used spatial pricing policies: free on board (FOB) pricing that charges each customer the exact amount of shipping cost, and uniform delivered (UD) pricing that provides free shipping. We propose a stylized model and find that centralized product allocation is preferred when demand localization effect is relatively low or shipment pooling benefit is relatively high under both spatial pricing policies. Moreover, centralized product allocation is more preferred under the FOB pricing which encourages the purchase of virtual bundles of multiple products. Furthermore, we respectively extend the UD and FOB pricing policies to flat rate shipping (ie, the firm charges a constant shipping fee for each purchase), and linear rate shipping (ie, the firm sets the shipping fee as a fixed proportion of firm's actual fulfillment costs). While similar observations from the basic model still hold, we find the firm can improve its profit by sharing the fulfillment cost with its customers via the flat rate or linear rate shipping fee structure.     

Impacts of sequential acquisition,market competition mode,and confidentiality on information flow

We investigate information flow in a setting in which 2 retailers order from a supplier and sell to a market with uncertain demand. Each retailer has access to a signal. The retailers can disclose signals to each other (horizontal information sharing), while the supplier can solicit signals by offering retailers differential payments as incentives for signal disclosure (vertical information acquisition). In the base setting, market competition is in quantity, and a retailer can fully infer the signal that the other retailer discloses to the supplier. We show that the supplier prefers to sequentialize the procedure for information acquisition. Moreover, vertical information acquisition by the supplier is a strategic complement to horizontal information sharing between the retailers to establish information flow. In the equilibrium, the retailers have no incentive to exchange signals, but system wide information transparency can be realized through a combination of information acquisition and inference. We further study the signaling effect, whereby the supplier utilizes wholesale pricing as an instrument to affect the retailers' inference of the shared signals, and price competition to explore their impacts on the supplier's preference for sequential acquisition and the sustainability of information flow.     

Lateral capacity exchange and its impact on capacity investment decisions

We study the problem of capacity exchange between two firms in anticipation of the mismatch between demand and capacity, and its impact on firm's capacity investment decisions. For given capacity investment levels of the two firms, we demonstrate how capacity price may be determined and how much capacity should be exchanged when either manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader in the capacity exchange game. By benchmarking against the centralized system, we show that a side payment may be used to coordinate the capacity exchange decisions. We then study the firms' capacity investment decisions using a biform game framework in which capacity investment decisions are made individually and exchange decisions are made as in a centralized system. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium capacity investment levels and study the impact of firms' share of the capacity exchange surplus on their capacity investment levels.© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Stability of information‐sharing alliances in a three‐level supply chain

In their recent article, Leng and Parlar (L&P) (2009) analyze information‐sharing alliances in a three‐level supply chain (consisting of a manufacturer, a distributor, and a retailer) that faces a nonstationary end demand. Supply chain members can share demand information, which reduces information distortion and thus decreases their inventory holding and shortage costs. We expand the results from L&P by considering dynamic (farsighted) stability concepts. We use two different allocation rules and show that under some reasonable assumptions there should always be some information sharing in this supply chain. We also identify conditions under which the retailer in a stable outcome shares his demand information with the distributor, with the manufacturer, or with both remaining supply chain members. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Managing components for assemble‐to‐order products with lead‐time‐dependent pricing: The full‐shipment model

We study a component inventory planning problem in an assemble‐to‐order environment faced by many contract manufacturers in which both quick delivery and efficient management of component inventory are crucial for the manufacturers to achieve profitability in a highly competitive market. Extending a recent study in a similar problem setting by the same authors, we analyze an optimization model for determining the optimal component stocking decision for a contract manufacturer facing an uncertain future demand, where product price depends on the delivery times. In contrast to our earlier work, this paper considers the situation where the contract manufacturer needs to deliver the full order quantity in one single shipment. This delivery requirement is appropriate for many industries, such as the garment and toy industries, where the economies of scale in transportation is essential. We develop efficient solution procedures for solving this optimization problem. We use our model results to illustrate how the different model parameters affect the optimal solution. We also compare the results under this full‐shipment model with those from our earlier work that allows for multiple partial shipments. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Supply chain coordination with shelf‐space and retail price dependent demand and heterogeneous retailers

We consider supply chain coordination in which a manufacturer supplies some product to multiple heterogeneous retailers and wishes to coordinate the supply chain via wholesale price and holding cost subsidy. The retail price is either exogenous or endogenous. The market demand is described by the market share attraction model based on all retailers'shelf‐spaces and retail prices. We obtain optimal solutions for the centralized supply chain, where the optimal retail pricing is a modified version of the well‐known cost plus pricing strategy. We further get feasible contracts for the manufacturer to coordinate the hybrid and decentralized supply chains. The manufacturer can allocate the total profit free to himself and the retail market via the wholesale price when the retail price is exogenous, but otherwise he cannot. Finally, we point out that different characteristics of the retail market are due to different powers of the manufacturer, and the more power the manufacturer has, the simpler the contract to coordinate the chain will be. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

On the effectiveness of returns policies in the price‐dependent newsvendor model

We study in this paper the price‐dependent (PD) newsvendor model in which a manufacturer sells a product to an independent retailer facing uncertain demand and the retail price is endogenously determined by the retailer. We prove that for a zero salvage value and some expected demand functions, in equilibrium, the manufacturer may elect not to introduce buybacks. On the other hand, if buybacks are introduced in equilibrium, their introduction has an insignificant effect on channel efficiency improvement, but, by contrast, may significantly shift profits from the retailer to the manufacturer. We further demonstrate that the introduction of buybacks increases the wholesale price, retail price, and inventory level, as compared to the wholesale price‐only contract, and that the corresponding vertically integrated firm offers the lowest retail price and highest inventory level. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

The effects of customer rebates and retailer incentives on a manufacturer's profits and sales

In some industries such as automotive, production costs are largely fixed and therefore maximizing revenue is the main objective. Manufacturers use promotions directed to the end customers and/or retailers in their distribution channels to increase sales and market share. We study a game theoretical model to examine the impact of “retailer incentive” and “customer rebate” promotions on the manufacturer's pricing and the retailer's ordering/sales decisions. The main tradeoff is that customer rebates are given to every customer, while the use of retailer incentives is controlled by the retailer. We consider several models with different demand characteristics and information asymmetry between the manufacturer and a price discriminating retailer, and we determine which promotion would benefit the manufacturer under which market conditions. When demand is deterministic, we find that retailer incentives increase the manufacturer's profits (and sales) while customer rebates do not unless they lead to market expansion. When the uncertainty in demand (“market potential”) is high, a customer rebate can be more profitable than the retailer incentive for the manufacturer. With numerical examples, we provide additional insights on the profit gains by the right choice of promotion.© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Supply contracts in manufacturer‐retailer interactions with manufacturer‐quality and retailer effort‐induced demand

We consider a decentralized distribution channel where demand depends on the manufacturer‐chosen quality of the product and the selling effort chosen by the retailer. The cost of selling effort is private information for the retailer. We consider three different types of supply contracts in this article: price‐only contract where the manufacturer sets a wholesale price; fixed‐fee contract where manufacturer sells at marginal cost but charges a fixed (transfer) fee; and, general franchise contract where manufacturer sets a wholesale price and charges a fixed fee as well. The fixed‐fee and general franchise contracts are referred to as two‐part tariff contracts. For each contract type, we study different contract forms including individual, menu, and pooling contracts. In the analysis of the different types and forms of contracts, we show that the price only contract is dominated by the general franchise menu contract. However, the manufacturer may prefer to offer the fixed‐fee individual contract as compared to the general franchise contract when the retailer's reservation utility and degree of information asymmetry in costs are high. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

基于感知信息共享的C2网络特征分析

指挥控制（C2，Commandand Control）关系网络连接数的增加会增强指控节点之间的信息共享，但也会增加节点信息处理和交换负荷，如果达到一定程度，则会造成节点本身的“信息过载”从而影响C2网络性能。对此，通过研究C2网络在两种不同处理方式下的共享感知信息平均提交时间，用网络节点响应时间的均方差表征一个C2网络的共享态势感知时间的一致性，最后对两种不同结构C2网络特征参数的计算，说明了网络连接增加会导致信息提交时间的延长，但一致性会增强。     

Stochastic production capacity: A bane or a boon for quick response supply chains?

The quick response (QR) system that can cope with demand volatility by shortening lead time has been well studied in the literature. Much of the existing literature assumes implicitly or explicitly that the manufacturers under QR can always meet the demand because the production capacity is always sufficient. However, when the order comes with a short lead time under QR, availability of the manufacturer's production capacity is not guaranteed. This motivates us to explore QR in supply chains with stochastic production capacity. Specifically, we study QR in a two-echelon supply chain with Bayesian demand information updating. We consider the situation where the manufacturer's production capacity under QR is uncertain. We first explore how stochastic production capacity affects supply chain decisions and QR implementation. We then incorporate the manufacturer's ability to expand capacity into the model. We explore how the manufacturer determines the optimal capacity expansion decision, and the value of such an ability to the supply chain and its agents. Finally, we extend the model to the two-stage two-ordering case and derive the optimal ordering policy by dynamic programming. We compare the single-ordering and two-ordering cases to generate additional managerial insights about how ordering flexibility affects QR when production capacity is stochastic. We also explore the transparent supply chain and find that our main results still hold.     

Coordination of pricing and inventory control across products

We consider the joint pricing and inventory‐control problem for a retailer who orders, stocks, and sells two products. Cross‐price effects exist between the two products, which means that the demand of each product depends on the prices of both products. We derive the optimal pricing and inventory‐control policy and show that this policy differs from the base‐stock list‐price policy, which is optimal for the one‐product problem. We find that the retailer can significantly improve profits by managing the two products jointly as opposed to independently, especially when the cross‐price demand elasticity is high. We also find that the retailer can considerably improve profits by using dynamic pricing as opposed to static pricing, especially when the demand is nonstationary. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Economic and environmental impacts of vertical and horizontal competition and integration

We explore the economic and environmental impacts of market structures (competition or integration at vertical and horizontal levels). We consider a bilateral duopoly consisting of two manufacturers and two retailers in which each manufacturer offers a wholesale price contract to the respective retailer. The manufacturers decide on wholesale prices and abatement efforts concerning pollution emissions related to manufacturing processes, whereas the retailers compete in quantities in the consumer market. To understand the comprehensive effects of market structures on economic competitiveness and environmental sustainability, we examine a measure of eco‐friendly social welfare, which is the ratio of social welfare and environmental pollution. Interestingly, we find that the market structures that have been believed to be more efficient are less efficient from a broader perspective: (1) double marginalization can generate higher eco‐friendly social welfare, and (2) horizontal competition between firms can result in lower eco‐friendly social welfare. Although vertical integration and horizontal competition yield greater social welfare by facilitating more production activities, these market structures often fail to induce sufficient abatement efforts to balance the polluting effect of the large volume, resulting in more significant environmental degradation. We also show that, despite the pollution‐curbing effect, higher emission penalties can result in less eco‐friendly social welfare. They can even curtail the abatement efforts of firms under particular circumstances. When products become more substitutable, the eco‐friendly social welfare can decrease depending upon the market structure.