Conditional commitments: Why states use caveats to reserve their efforts in military coalition operations

Why do states make substantial military contributions to coalition operations, while at the same time apply reservations, or caveats, to how the coalition can use the military contributions? Caveats rose to prominence in defense and policy circles with NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan. In the scholarly security literature, the term remains a buzzword for all types of reserved efforts by states in coalition warfare, but there are few theoretical accounts addressing caveats. This article contributes to the knowledge gap on caveats through a comparative case study of Denmark’s, the Netherlands’, and Norway’s contributions to NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011. It demonstrates that caveats can occur through three different causal pathways: compromises from domestic bargaining, handling of alliance commitments, and implementation and civil–military relations. Insights into the complexity that causes caveats are highly relevant for both political and military decision-makers that are trying to coordinate states’ effort in coalition operations.     

Using strategic culture to understand participation in expeditionary operations: Australia,Poland, and the coalition against the Islamic State

This article investigates how strategic culture influenced the decision-making of Australia and Poland regarding the global coalition against the Islamic State. In the coalition, Australia has followed its tradition of active participation in United States-led operations, while Poland has embarked on a more cautious line, thereby breaking with its previous policy of active participation. The article examines how Australian and Polish responses to the coalition were shaped by five cultural elements: dominant threat perception, core task of the armed forces, strategic partners, experiences of participating in coalitions of the willing, and approach to the international legality of expeditionary operations. It finds that Australia and Poland differed on all five elements but that the major differences are found in dominant threat perception and core task of the armed forces.     

Less than Meets the Eye

Observers of United States (US) interventions have almost universally characterized the 1994 Haiti intervention as multilateral, a model for how international cooperation can achieve common security goals. A closer analysis of the intervention reveals that the planning and execution of the intervention were almost entirely unilateral and therefore cost the US few if any of the theoretical costs of coalition warfare, including interoperability and policy compromise. Mapped onto the unilateral strategy and operation of the intervention, however, was a multilateral diplomatic effort that secured United Nations Security Council authorization and provided a cover for an intervention that the US had already planned and intended to execute with or without that authorization. That the US sought a multilateral cover for an intervention that it could easily accomplish unilaterally shows the importance of two factors: A domestic audience that opposed unilateral peacekeeping but would accept using US resources as part of a broader multilateral operation, and a local population that would be more responsive to a multilateral coalition than a use of force that was perceived to be unilateral. The Haiti intervention shows that the determinants of success in operations other than war are as much political as military. When the US already has overwhelming military superiority vis-à-vis its adversary, building military coalitions becomes as much about enlisting political support as aggregating material capability.     

Schlock and Blah: Counter-insurgency Realities in a Rapid Dominance Era

This article examines the concept of ‘shock and awe’ in US military thought. It argues that the term derives from two main sources in defense thinking: rapidity in operations and overwhelming military superiority and is reflected in the concept of ‘full spectrum dominance’. However, the concept is not well attuned to fighting net-based counter insurgency war in a terrain such as Iraq which depends upon both intelligence gathering and adaptive military organizations. The article concludes that US military thinking should be more attuned to the effects of military force especially on political processes and the capacity of insurgents to mobilize popular support.     

Ideology,ballots, and alliances: Canadian participation in multinational military operations

The decision to employ force abroad is often a contentious political decision, where partisanship plays a crucial role. Prior to military intervention, political parties usually make their ideologically distinctive preferences clear and seek to implement them once in power. What remains unclear, however, is how ideology affects the decision to use military force. This article contends that alliance and electoral calculations constrain the ability of political parties to implement their ideological preferences with regards to the use of force. It examines a “most likely” case for the partisan theory of military intervention, namely Canada’s refusal to take part in the invasion of Iraq and its decision to commit forces to the war against the Islamic State. It finds that only in combination with alliance and electoral calculations does executive ideology offer valuable insights into Canada’s military support to U.S.-led coalition operations, which contributes to our understanding of allied decision-making.     

The human consequences of foreign military intervention

The empirical international conflict literature has given much recent attention to interstate armed force’s impact on human well-being. While empirical research has advanced our understanding of the phenomenon considerably, we argue that one conclusion that many studies have reached is preliminary. Some recent research contends that only full-scale war, and not force short of war, has a discernable impact on human welfare or physical quality of life (PQOL). We develop theory on one type of force short of war, large-scale foreign military intervention (FMI), and its potential effects on PQOL. Using interrupted time series and panel corrected standard error methodologies, we find that from 1960 to 2005 large-scale FMI had a statistically and substantively significant impact on the PQOL of populations in 106 developing countries. The specific effect that this type of armed force has depended in large part on the regime type of the target country.     

Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political undercurrents and the burden of community spirit

This article considers why the British Army of today holds to the conviction that its peace support operations be conducted with an emphasis on the concept of minimum force. Evidence is presented here to show that the origins of this concept lie in two particular historical determinants: first, the moral parameters set by a religious sentiment refined through interaction with Victorian sensibilities; and, second, the pragmatic necessities of imperial policing. This article goes on to indicate how both these factors shaped – and, most significantly, why they continue to shape – a particularly British approach to the question of low-intensity conflict and, in particular, to the question of the use of military technology in such conflict.     

The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012

This article – based on interviews with Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders and the lessons-learned database of the Norwegian Armed Forces – argues that what appear to be an inability or unwillingness to learn and adapt in war may have other explanations. The ambiguity of experiences makes lessons contested, contradictory, and fluid interpretations of confusing events. Consequently, they do not provide unequivocal guidance for adaptation. Even when lessons learned are fairly clear and agreed upon, adaptation does not automatically follow, as force autonomy may be quite limited, at least for small states in coalition operations conducted in partnership with indigenous forces.     

Buying Peace? Civil War Peace Duration and Private Military & Security Companies

Do Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) impact peace duration after civil war? I argue that the role these organisations play in a conflict can impact post-conflict stability. Specifically, I suggest that variance in services provided by PMSCs can influence rebels’ calculations about relative capabilities. These calculations then contribute to the probability for civil war recurrence. Building on the bargaining framework, with a focus on information and commitment problems, this article demonstrates that PMSCs participating in armed combat operations can jeopardise the stability of peace following civil war. Three case narratives (Angola, Sierra Leone and Croatia) are used to probe the theoretical argument and results are illustrative – PMSCs serving as force multipliers contribute to an increase in the probability for conflict recurrence.     

A gentle occupation: unravelling the Dutch approach in Iraq, 2003–2005

This article examines the so-called ‘Dutch approach’ to conducting stabilisation operations. The term is mostly used in relation to the mission carried out by the Netherlands armed forces in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province from 2006 to 2010, but actually originates in the Iraqi province of Al Muthanna. Here, a 1350-strong battle group operated from July 2003 until March 2005 as part of the US-led coalition, after which the Dutch forces left Iraq relatively unscathed and self-confident of their ability in dealing with this type of conflict. On the basis of archival research and interviews, the authors unravel the ‘Dutch approach’ in southern Iraq by tracing its roots and by examining the Dutch operation in the context of the American and British experiences. They argue that despite predominantly effective tactical reflexes and an overall adequately broad interpretation by battle group commanders of a too narrowly defined political mandate, stability in Al Muthanna was conditions-driven rather than the result of a unique and effective approach. The term ‘Dutch approach’ turned out to be a convenient fabrication which, after the relatively successful mission in Al Muthanna, became increasingly politicised in the run-up to a dangerous new operation in southern Afghanistan.     

Regaining Strategy: Small Powers,Strategic Culture,and Escalation in Afghanistan

Abstract

In Western operations in Afghanistan, small European powers escalate in different ways. While Denmark and the Netherlands have contributed to Western escalation through integration with British and US forces, Norway and Sweden have done so by creating a division of labour allowing US and British combat forces to concentrate their efforts in the south. These variations in strategic behaviour suggest that the strategic choice of small powers is more diversified than usually assumed. We argue that strategic culture can explain the variation in strategic behaviour of the small allies in Afghanistan. In particular, Dutch and Danish internationalism have reconciled the use of force in the national and international domains, while in Sweden and Norway there is still a sharp distinction between national interest and humanitarianism.     

Interchange fee rate,merchant discount rate,and retail price in a credit card network: A game‐theoretic analysis

We consider two game‐theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an issuer's interchange fee rate, an acquirer's merchant discount rate, and a merchant's retail price in a credit card network. In the first setting, we investigate a two‐stage game problem in which the issuer and the acquirer first negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer then determine their merchant discount rate and retail price, respectively. In the second setting, motivated by the recent US bill “H.R. 2695,” we develop a three‐player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pricing decision. We derive both the Shapley value‐ and the nucleolus‐characterized, and globally‐optimal unique rates for the grand coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we find that the participation of the merchant in the negotiation process can result in the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand coalition in the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the credit card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with sufficiently low operation costs. We also show that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable and the U.S. bill “H.R. 2695” is thus more effective, if the degree of division of labor in the credit card network is higher as the merchant, acquirer, and issuer are more specialized in the retailing, acquiring, and issuing operations, respectively. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

城镇化对察布查尔县锡伯族语言发展的影响研究

随着经济发展和社会进步,城镇化也带来了一系列的问题,城镇化进程中的语言问题应当引起高度重视。本文在城镇化背景下,选取新疆察布查尔锡伯自治县的3个城镇区域为样本(爱新舍里镇、察布查尔镇、种羊场),调查城镇化给不同区域的锡伯族人的语言使用所带来的影响。通过数据分析,我们认为城镇化将扩大国家通用语的使用范围,增加国家通用语和锡伯语语言接触的深度,将进一步改变锡伯族的语言观念,城镇化的发展将增加锡伯族语言转用人群。最后提出城镇化与察布查尔县锡伯族语言和谐发展的对策,解决语言生活中的实际问题。     

Conceptualizing the War in Afghanistan: Perceptions from the Front, 2001–2006

Analytical focus on military operations in Iraq continue to overshadow analysis of the war in Afghanistan as it enters its sixth year. It is now possible to discern several clearly-delineated periods of coalition counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. What is the nature of the war and how has it evolved? Has there been success so far in Afghanistan?     

The socialization of military power: security cooperation and doctrine development through multinational military exercises

Multinational Military Exercises (MMEs) are often viewed by states as opportunities to increase interoperability, improve cooperation, and solve common security problems. We argue that in addition to this, MMEs work as tools to shape the shared beliefs of coalition partners surrounding threat. Specifically, MMEs allow multinational forces to identify best practices, consolidate beliefs, and codify behavior through doctrine, typically by means of some institutional process. We examine our argument on MMEs through an analysis of various multinational and coalition partner efforts to identify security threats and cooperate through the development of common doctrine at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. Our analysis suggests that the use of MMEs for doctrine development does help to socialize states in terms of identifying common threats and subsequently sharing a process by which to address them.     

Coordination as showcasing: the establishment of Norway’s Afghanistan Forum

In complex operations such as the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where multiple government ministries are involved in putting together a state’s contributions, the use of national-level coordination bodies has become more widespread. Research has taken for granted that the rationale behind these bodies reflects their declared aim – enhanced coordination as a means to improve mission effectiveness. However, they appear to have had modest effect on coordination. That notwithstanding, they seem to remain popular. This prompts us to ask why such bodies are actually established. This article – based on in-depth interviews and archival records – critically explores the establishment of Norway’s ad hoc, inter-ministerial, political-level Afghanistan Forum. Distinguishing between a structural-instrumental, a cultural-institutional and an environmental perspective from organizational theory to structure the analysis, this article shows that the declared purpose of the forum, inter-ministerial coordination, proved less important than showcasing coordination efforts and keeping the coalition together. In addition, national traditions in handling coordination challenges in the central government apparatus and powerful international reforms helped bring the forum about. This has implications for research on the rationale and effectiveness of these bodies, and also for understanding their policy relevance.     

Bringing Military Conduct out of the Shadow of Law: Towards a Holistic Understanding of Rules of Engagement

In this article, I outline a holistic approach to the military concept of “Rules of Engagement” (ROE), which complements the legal aspects of ROE with considerations of operational and political requirements for the use of military force. Drawing upon two illustrative cases from the US military experience with the use of ROE, I demonstrate that ROE for any particular military operation should be formulated to balance optimally, if not harmonize fully, the legal, operational and political concerns related to the use of force. In this task, political decision-makers and military practitioners alike are confronted with unavoidable and real-life dilemmas. How these dilemmas are handled has significant implications for how legal requirements concerning accountability and concerns for civilian lives in military combat can be preserved through ROE.     

More allies,weaker missions? How junior partners contribute to multinational military operations

There is a growing consensus that multinational military operations are often less effective than the theoretical sum of their constitutive parts. Multiple chains of command, restriction on intelligence sharing, and capability aggregation problems can reduce fighting power. However, partners may be necessary to provide legitimacy to an intervention. As such, most studies assume that the state leading a coalition (usually the United States) has to accept a degree of operational ineffectiveness in order to gain political benefits from the participation of junior partners to a multinational military operation. However, such analysis puts all junior partners under the same category, without taking into account the differentiated contributions of those junior partners based on their relative military power and international status. This article explores variation between the junior partners’ contributions and their impact on coalition political and military dynamics. It teases out the implications of adopting a fine-grained analysis of junior partners.     

The Rise of Special Operations Forces: Generalized Specialization,Boundary Spanning and Military Autonomy

The special operations forces (SOF) of the industrial democracies have suddenly and rapidly grown in numbers and resources during the past decades. Most explanations for this growth focus on factors external to the armed forces. We argue that the enlargement of SOF is also the result of internal organizational dynamics. First, we compare SOF to other units and military appendages that have grown over the past 30 years in order to delineate what is unique to their development and the special adaptive potential they bring to the armed forces: generalized specialization, boundary spanning roles, and enlargement of military autonomy. Second, we analyze the actions of internal military entrepreneurs and their organizational mentors to show how they use this adaptive potential to “sell” the use of SOF to key policy-makers and decision-makers.