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1.
通过分析赛博空间概念内涵提出了一个赛博空间概念框架,以此为基础运用OODA环理论从本质上分析赛博空间战特性,按照作用方式不同将赛博空间战作战行动分为四大类,重点阐述了赛博空间战中针对信息运行空间的有效信息、节点单元和网络链路的三类典型攻击性作战行动,总结了赛博空间战作战行动以电磁频谱为媒介、以网络结构为依托、以信息控制为目标、与传统动能作战相辅相成的特征。  相似文献   

2.
首先阐述和分析了赛博空间和电子战的概念和特点,给出了电子战在赛博空间中的定位。然后探讨了电子战在赛博空间中的应用,给出了电子战在赛博空间中可能应用的几大方面。最后总结了赛博空间电子战面临的关键技术与挑战。  相似文献   

3.
司诺登对"棱镜"爆料在国际社会掀起波澜,也从一个角度反映出信息时代国家安全所呈现的新特点。事实上,各军事强国正竞相开展赛博领域的作战研究,大力推进相关武器装备体系的发展赛博空间是人类正在探索和逐步认识的领域,是信息社会发展的必然结果,已拓展成为与陆、海、空、天并列的战略疆域。应积极研究认识赛博问题,着力提高防范赛博安全威胁的能力;转变发展理念,高度重视赛博武器装备研发能力建设;集智联合攻关,全面加强  相似文献   

4.
根据赛博空间信息对抗的本质特征,结合体系作战特点,提出了一种基于服务概念的赛博空间概念,并将赛博安全分为赛博利用、赛博访问和赛博控制三类,分析赛博安全模型,给出未来影响赛博对抗装备发展的几种关键技术。  相似文献   

5.
唐朝京  刘培国 《国防科技》2011,32(4):18-20,69
电磁频谱安全是赛博空间安全的重要方面之一,文章从频谱的可用性与安全性两方面入手,分析了有限的频谱资源与无限的频谱需求之间的矛盾,以及电磁频谱使用易受有意、无意干扰和恶意攻击等电磁频谱安全问题。并提出了解决电磁频谱安全问题的相关建议。  相似文献   

6.
赛博空间作战对未来战争及战争仿真建模产生着深远、巨大的影响。针对在赛博空间和赛博空间作战基本认识上存在的争议,探讨了赛博空间的复合性、整体性等特点,以及赛博空间作战的战略威慑性、体系对抗性等特点。以战争仿真建模为视角,在研究赛博空间作战对未来战争及战争仿真建模突出影响的基础上,提出了赛博空间作战影响下战争仿真建模需关注战争复杂信息环境、大尺度战争体系、复杂自适应行为、战争体系脆弱性和赛博战争舆情信息传播仿真建模问题。  相似文献   

7.
战争源于理性的有限,而赛博空间重新定义了理性和智力的边界与空间,因此必须以变革的眼光重新审视赛博空间之后的国防与军事事务。不久的未来,一个国家的军事实力,在很大程度上可能不取决于其外在的实际军队如何,而是由其伴生内在的人工军队之规模和水平所决定的。  相似文献   

8.
分析了赛博空间及其体系特性,提出研究赛博空间作战效能评估需要重点关注对实体、体系仿真建模,对网络依赖等特殊行为建模,对体系整体能力的评估等几个问题。在体系视角下总结探讨了赛博空间作战效能评估的数学解析计算、基于历史数据和实验的统计评估、基于计算机仿真分析三种可行方法,提出了对赛博空间作战进行"对比式"效能评估的体系仿真试验方法,指出适用于赛博空间作战效能评估的指标体系是网状结构而非树状结构,复杂网络方法是能够有效解决这一问题的可行途径。  相似文献   

9.
当前,美国关于网络攻击的新闻不绝于耳。但是,美国一面对别国妄加指责,一面大张旗鼓组建世界上规模庞大、技术先进的赛博战部队,贼喊捉贼的伎俩运用得十分娴熟。赛博战相对于网络战而言,外延更广,涉及了空间系统、认证技术、人机一体建设等内容。美军除出台《2025赛博战构想》外,也通过各种手段网罗“赛博战士”,其中“赛博爱国者”大赛就是美国选拔和培养网军的冰山一角。  相似文献   

10.
本文立足我军网络电磁空间力量建设基础问题,从分析网络电磁空间概念内涵出发,首先指出其作为独立空间概念的重要性;接着展开分析了我军网电空间概念与美军赛博空间概念的联系与区别,指出两者在内涵侧重和作用方式上的差异,突出网电空间独有的融合域特征,力求为相关研究提供有益借鉴.  相似文献   

11.
The growth of the African Internet, and services related to the Internet, has been rapid over the last decade. Following this market expansion, a variety of service providers have started to provide access. A fast-growing market puts pressure on the providers to deliver services first and only then seek to secure the networks. Over time, industrialised nations have become more able to detect and trace cyber attacks against their networks. These tracking features are constantly developing and the precision in determining the origin of an attack is increasing. A state-sponsored cyber attacker, such as intelligence agencies and electronic warfare units, will seek to avoid detection, especially when the attacks are politically sensitive intelligence-gathering and intrusion forays into foreign states' networks. One way for the attacker to create a path that links the attacks and the originating country is by actions through a proxy. The less technologically mature developing nations offer an opportunity for cyber aggression due to their lower level of security under the quick expansion of the Internet-based market. Developing countries could be used as proxies, without their knowledge and consent, through the unauthorised usage of these countries' information systems in an attempt to attack a third country by a state-sponsored offensive cyber operation. If the purpose of the cyber attack is to destabilise a targeted society and the attack succeeds, the used proxies are likely to face consequences in their relations with foreign countries, even if the proxy was unaware of the covert activity.  相似文献   

12.
Given the advances made in conventional weapon capabilities, precision should by now be the accepted and expected norm in cyberspace as well. In this article I argue that developing precision cyber weapon systems, to be used during a lawful conflict, can be an important part of a responsible national security strategy to reduce the amount of violence and physical destruction in conflicts. I first describe a precision cyber weapon system in a military context. I then present three compelling rationales for the development of precision cyber weapon systems based on ethical, operational, and financial considerations. To support the position, I address several arguments that have been levied against their development. Thereafter I present several recommendations for a way ahead.  相似文献   

13.
Although Africa is host to the vast majority (and the most deadly) of conflicts in the world, it would appear that there is a distinct lack of genuine interest in African affairs shown by the UN Security Council and its key members. This paper proposes a 10-level scale of response system to measure the seriousness of the Council in dealing with conflicts. By comparing the Council response with the size and severity of each individual conflict, the scale attempts to assess the Council performance in the fulfilment of its duty to restore international peace and security. The results show that Africa has been (and remains) marginalized in the Council work.  相似文献   

14.
网络舆论战是一种新型作战样式。加强网络舆论战研究,既是信息化战争的时代要求,又是实现强军目标的客观需要,对于丰富具有我军特色的现代舆论战理论体系,推动我军政治工作的创新发展,具有十分重要意义。文章通过论述网络舆论战的地位作用和主要特点,对开展网络舆论战的基本战法进行了探讨。  相似文献   

15.
从舆论战和网络舆论战的概念和特点出发,阐述了心理学在网络舆论战中的重要作用。综合心理学理论和舆论传播理论分析了网络舆论形成的心理机制,得出了网络舆论是通过个体心理和群体心理两个阶段而形成的结论。根据这个结论,提出了网络舆论引导的具体策略。即在个体层面上,通过操纵信息来影响人的认知;在群体层面上,通过塑造引导者主体的可信性和喜爱性,以及网络技术手段来增强舆论引导的效果。最后,指出了网络舆论战的发展前景在于充分考虑受众的心理,有针对性地进行舆论引导。  相似文献   

16.
Cyber-weapons are software and software, at least intuitively, is non-physical. Several authors have noted that this potentially renders problematic the application of normative frameworks like UN Charter Article 2(4) to cyber-weapons. If Article 2(4) only proscribes the use of physical force, and if cyber-weapons are non-physical, then cyber-weapons fall outside the purview of Article 2(4). This article explores the physicality of software, examining Stuxnet in particular. First, I show that with a few relatively uncontroversial metaphysical claims we can secure the conclusion that Stuxnet is physical. In particular, there exist instances of Stuxnet that are both located in space and causally efficacious, and this is very strong evidence for their being physical. Second, I argue that the question of physicality is actually irrelevant for the moral evaluation of an attack like Stuxnet because of its undeniably physical effects. Finally, I argue that some features of Stuxnet should make us optimistic about the prospects for discrimination and proportionality in cyberwarfare.  相似文献   

17.
LIU Yangyue 《国防科技》2018,39(1):070-075
由于网络技术的军民两用特性,军民融合是提升网络空间安全能力的必然选择。而网络空间的竞争,归根结底是人才竞争。网络安全人才战略必须有效应对人才资源整体不足的现实困难,通过合理配置资源和创建创新机制安排,推进军民融合式的网络安全人才体系建设。美国高度重视人才在网络安全战略体系中的关键作用,通过宏观政策引导、创新交流机制、拓宽吸纳渠道等多种方式,为构建军民融合式的网络安全人才战略提供了经验借鉴。  相似文献   

18.
In the last decade, cyber conflict has become a main feature of international politics and a growing concern for strategic stability and collective security. Unfortunately, cyber conflict suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity about its impact on collective security and a lack of consensus among international actors on how to interpret it. This article proposes to understand cyber conflict as an evolving process driven by two factors: the way in which digital space is configured and the way in which tactical, organizational, strategic, and doctrinal characteristics related to cyber have been included in the field of national and international security. Both tend to encourage offensive behavior but also demonstrate features pointing to restraint.  相似文献   

19.
随着网络技术的发展,网络语言作为一种新的语言媒体和社会方言,越来越得到人们的重视。在不同的学术领域,专家对网络语言作出不同的诠释和研究。主要从构词、句法、非语言符号三个角度来分析经济原则在网络语言中的普遍使用,并从聊天室中收集、归纳、分析相关语料来证明经济原则的存在,及在网络空间中普遍使用的原因。对网络语言的深入研究,将更有助于人们了解语言在以高科技为背景条件下发展趋势。当网络语言冲击传统语言时,要树立正确的态度面对语言的发展。  相似文献   

20.
Australian defence strategy is disjointed and incomplete. Some would say that it is non-existent. Either way, this paper argues that Australia’s underwhelming approach to defence is the product of a crippling geographically focused strategic dichotomy, with the armed forces historically having been structured to venture afar as a small part of a large coalition force or, alternatively, to combat small regional threats across land, sea, and air. However, it is argued that Australia can no longer afford to drift between these two settings and must take measures to define a holistic “full spectrum defence” strategy and develop capability to fight effectively and independently across all domains of the twenty-first century-battlespace: land, sea, air, space, and the cyber realm.  相似文献   

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