评俄美《关于削减进攻性战略力量条约》

2002年5月24日,俄罗斯总统普京和美国总统布什在克里姆林宫签署了俄美《关于削减进攻性战略力量条约》和俄美《关于新战略关系联合宣言》等文件。其中尤以新条约令世人所关注。《关于削减进攻性战略力量条约》的内容俄美《关于削减进攻性战略力量条约》只有短短的5款。条约规定在2012年12月31日前,各方实战部署的战略核弹头总     

角逐已经开始——走向21世纪的美俄水下核对抗

90年代初期,美俄两国签订了《削减战略核武器条约》。从这个条约可以看出,尽管美俄两国在冷战结束后对海军战略进行了调整,大幅度地削减了各自的战略导弹核潜艇及攻击型核潜艇的数量,但是从根本上讲,美俄两国为了维护自己的切身利益,争夺21世纪的海洋,未来的水下核力量对抗,将会以新的方式和手段体现出来。可以断言,对     

莫斯科首脑会晤，俄美关系再度包装

2002年5月23日～26日,美国总统布什对俄罗斯进行了上任以来的首度访问,除了与俄罗斯总统普京签署了《削减进攻性战略武器条约》外,双方还发表了《美俄新关系联合宣言》、《美俄反恐声明》等一系列协议和声明。俄美关系又经历了一次大的调整,进入了新的发展阶段。 一路曲折,分合演绎 自冷战结束,俄罗斯便开始了融入西方的进程。十几年,俄美关系一路曲折走来。从90年代初一段短暂的“蜜月”到90年代中后期的“冷和平”直至今日美俄新的战略关系的建立。     

“20机制”真的亲如一家?

5月的欧洲-大西洋地区,政治风云变幻令人眼花缭乱:5月24日,俄罗斯与美国在莫斯科签署了削减进攻性战略力量条约,并发表了美俄新型战略关系的联合声明;5月28日,北约19国和俄罗斯领导人在罗马签署了建立北约-俄罗斯理事会的《罗马宣言》……一时间,“冷战彻底结束”,“美欧关     

俄美新战略关系评析

前不久，俄罗斯总统普京和来访的美国总统布什在克里姆林宫举行了会谈。会谈结束后双方签署了俄美关于削减进攻性战略核武器条约和俄美关于新型战略关系的联合宣言，以及关于中东问题、反恐合作等6项声明。这些文件的签署表明，俄美正在谋求建立新的战略平衡关系，这种关系对维系俄美之间的战略稳定具有积极意义，并将对两国关系的发展起到推动作用。俄美双方关于新型战略关系的联合宣言则宣称，俄美两国相互视为敌人和战略威胁的时代“已经结束”。     

以盾为剑——评美国在东欧部署反导系统

近一段时间，围绕美国在东欧部署反导系统一事，美、俄之间的对抗不断升级。俄总统普京严厉批评美国此举将把欧洲变成”火药桶”，并以频繁试射新型导弹、威胁要在欧盟“后院”部署核力量向美发出挑战。在双方多轮协商，包括2007年10月的“2＋2”战略安全会谈末取得进展的情况下，俄战略导弹部队司令索洛夫佐夫向美发出了退出《中导条约》的警告：而美国作为回应，则在次日进行了末段拦截俄制“飞毛腿”导弹的防御试验。     

20年前苏联专家亲手销毁美国导弹

最近,俄罗斯与美国的导弹"攻防战"高潮迭起。为了不让美国在东欧部署导弹防御系统,俄罗斯高级官员不断放风,暗示俄罗斯将退出苏美《中导条约》和《欧洲常规武器条约》,重新部署能覆盖西欧的中程导弹。有意思的是,俄舆论近来对《中导条约》也颇有微词,认为     

构建总体国家安全与推进军贸发展的关系

正近年来,在全球治理和全球化发展过程中出现了诸多不良现象,特别是自美国爆发金融危机以来,全球经济低迷,金融市场持续震荡,而围绕中美贸易战,严重影响着金融危机以来全球经济的复苏。作为当今世界第一大国的美国却在不断"退群",特别是在退出美俄《中导条约》后不久就试射了中程陆基弹道导     

俄罗斯真的违背《中导条约》了吗？

即便俄罗斯当前在国际事务上并不“按套路出牌”,但我认为俄罗斯还是不会做到公然违背《中导条约》。不管他们如何抱怨这一条约,俄罗斯人通常的做法是寻找条约的漏洞,而非公然违背。美国国务院上周发布报告称,“俄罗斯违背了《中导条约》所规定的义务”,但报告并没有明确俄罗斯违反《中导条约》的具体细节。     

“台风”过后 “北风”又起——世界最大的核潜艇将消失

俄罗斯杜马在今年4月14日批准俄美第二阶段削减战略武器条约后不到一周,俄罗斯联邦委员会又在4月19日,以绝对多数的表决结果,批准了该条约,使这一签署了7年(1993年1月俄美双方在莫斯科正式签署)之久的条约,终于生效。根据条约规定,俄美双方将在2003年之前,将各自的战略核弹头削减三分之二,即各保留3000到3500枚。在俄美第二阶段削减战略武器条约生效不     

Unblocking inertia: US-Russian nuclear arms control and missile defenses

The United States and Russia, in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine, seem to have ditched entirely the “reset” in their political relations. Despite this odor of Cold War redux, there remain the opportunities and necessities for renewed attention to strategic nuclear arms control as between the two governments. US and NATO missile defenses as planned for European deployment figure into this equation, although in somewhat unpredictable ways, given technological uncertainties in existing and foreseeable defenses, as well as the possibility of improved delivery systems for offensive conventional or nuclear weapons.     

Uncovering foreign military innovation

An analysis of US assessments of Germany's development of armored warfare illustrates the problems that intelligence agencies face as they attempt to understand military innovation. The covert nature of German Army's tank research in the years immediately following World War I limited the number of indicators of Berlin's interest in armored warfare. Similarly, the United States possessed at best a fragmentary picture of German experimentation with armor. By the outbreak of World War II, however, US military attaches had nonetheless developed an accurate understanding of German concepts of armored warfare. If the United States is to avoid strategic surprise in the future, it must cultivate intelligence sources and employ considerably different methods from those of the Cold War.     

America’s Prescient Dissenters: Senator J. William Fulbright and Dr. Andrew J. Bacevich’s Principled Dissent of US Policy in Vietnam and Iraq and their Enduring Perspectives

During the Cold War, the spread and fear of communism furnished the overarching ideological rationale for American foreign policy and for the deployment of United States military forces and resources. Subscribing to the domino theory and its potential impact on Southeast Asia, the Johnson Administration committed the United States to the Vietnam War. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, and the commencement of the Global War on Terrorism, Washington once again set a national agenda rooted in a simplistic analysis reminiscent of Vietnam and the domino theory. Ignorant of Iraq’s mammoth sectarian, historical, ethnic, and global strategic complexities, the Bush Administration launched Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The absence of critical analysis, contrarian viewpoints, and sound judgment characterized the US policy and strategy for both the Vietnam War and OIF, exhibiting the lack of moral courage that the national security enterprise seeks, but seldom attains. Faced with this challenge, this article draws attention to the ethical lessons we can learn from the dissent of William Fulbright and Andrew Bacevich.     

Geopolitics over Proliferation: the Origins of US Grand Strategy and Their Implications for the Spread of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

How much does the United States care about nonproliferation? Recent scholarship suggests that the fear of spreading nuclear weapons was central to the US grand strategy in the Cold War. In one important case, however, this argument does not hold. This article draws on theoretical debates and newly declassified archives to demonstrate the primacy of geopolitics over nonproliferation in Washington’s policy toward India and Pakistan. Despite their rhetoric, Democratic and Republican leaders consistently relegated nonproliferation to the backburner whenever it conflicted with other strategic goals. Moreover, they inadvertently encouraged proliferation in South Asia at three inter-connected levels: technology, security, and identity.     

GLOBALIZING REAGAN'S INF TREATY

When it was concluded more than a quarter century ago, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union was hailed as a disarmament watershed, eliminating entire classes of nuclear missiles from the arsenals of the arms-racing Cold War superpowers. Over the intervening decades, there have been repeated calls to convert this legacy treaty into a new international norm against nuclear and missile proliferation by broadening it into a global prohibition on ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Indeed, variations on this proposal have been knocking around for so long and with so little success that the entire concept has come to be dismissed by many knowledgeable insiders as something of a farce. Looking beyond its inauspicious pedigree, however, this viewpoint suggests that the time is opportune for Washington to give the idea a fresh look. Drawing on a detailed review of the history of “Global INF” and an analysis of the contemporary context, the author recommends that the Obama administration consider a simple declaratory approach that promises modest initial benefits, avoids previous and foreseeable pitfalls, and plausibly lays a solid foundation for achieving significant long-term progress.     

From one exceptionalism to another: France’s strategic relations with the United States and the United Kingdom in the post-Cold War era

ABSTRACT

The failed expedition of Suez in 1956 and France’s subsequent strategic ‘divorce’ from the United Kingdom and the United States lies at the heart of a policy paradigm that has dictated France’s defence posture from de Gaulle’s presidency to the end of the Cold War. Some crucial features of the Gaullist posture remain today enduring references for French presidents in the definition of France’s exceptionalism. While it is so, there have been significant changes since the 1990s when it comes to France’s strategic relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. This article demonstrates the extent and mechanisms of this rapprochement by analysing it through three dimensions of policy change: modes of action, institutional commitments and discourses. The article demonstrates the dimensions’ mutually reinforcing effects and argues that France’s exceptional posture has de facto been reversed.     

Inside the Iraqi State Records: Saddam Hussein, ‘Irangate’, and the United States

This article uses captured Iraqi state records to examine Saddam Hussein's reaction to US arms to sales to Iran during the Iran–Iraq War (the Iran/Contra scandal). These records show that ‘Irangate’ marked a decisive departure in Saddam's relations with the United States. Irangate reinforced Saddam's preexisting suspicions of US policy, convincing him that Washington was a strategic enemy that could not be trusted. Saddam concealed his anger to preserve a working relationship with the Reagan administration, but this episode nevertheless cemented his negative views of the United States and forged a legacy of hostility and mistrust that would inform his strategic calculus for years to come.     

The crisis of American military assistance: strategic dithering and Fabergé Egg armies

ABSTRACT

The United States has provided substantial amounts of military assistance and aid since the end of World War Two. During the Cold War, it proved vital in protecting numerous regimes from communist takeovers. Successful outcomes occurred when American leaders made large initial aid commitments, and the states had the capacity and political willpower to use it effectively. However, Vietnam was an example of how U.S. support lagged, as leaders in Saigon preferred political survival instead of creating regime legitimacy. Following 9/11, American security aid focused on making weak countries develop stronger security forces. Unfortunately, this created Fabergé egg militaries: expensive and easily broken by insurgents. This article suggests long-term strategic commitments need to be made alongside more resources for the American State Department and similar organizations to focus on the politics of state-building. Finally, this article suggests strategies, such as “whole-of-government” approaches, to improve long-term security and political institution building.     

‘Mad Dog?’ Samuel Huntington and the Vietnam War

Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington has frequently been considered a Vietnam War hawk. His observation that ‘forced-draft urbanization’ might help the United States win the war has come to define his engagement in contemporary strategic debates. This essay argues that both Huntington’s academic work and his private policy advice to the U.S. Government in fact urged a political settlement to the conflict. It argues that in spite of this, Huntington refused to break publicly with the U.S. policy because of his wider concern over what he saw as a crisis of authority in the U.S. foreign policy and governing institutions in the era.     

Expendable soldiers

Foreign Legions in the generic sense have evolved in ways that would surprise Beau Geste. Not only are more foreigners or recent immigrants enlisting in Western military forces, but also the post-Cold War era has seen the revival of warlord militias and Private Military Companies. Western militaries, in particular that of the United States, have also sought to increase their strategic reach through security assistance to regional military forces. While there have been some successes, security assistance has proven to have its limitations, not to mention unintended consequences for civil military relations, democracy promotion, and military efficiency.