THE NEPAD AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

The idea of establishing a permanent Pan-African army has for long caught the imagination of Africans as a potential solution to many of their continent's manifold security problems. This feature tracks the quest for a Pan-African military force through the past five decades covering the feeble attempts of Africa's freedom fighters to join forces, the repeated failure to establish an African High Command (AHC) in the early years of decolonisation, the subsequent inability of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Defence Commission to agree on a common defence structure, and the various fruitless initiatives of the international community to set up a Pan-African peacekeeping force in the 1990s. On the basis of this retrospective journey, the article argues that the African Union's current initiative to establish an African Standby Force (ASF) based on five regionally administered standby brigades should be seen in the tradition of this long quest and not as a groundbreaking new conceptual development, as argued by some. It further contends that even though the ASF is conceptually closer to the Standby Arrangement of the United Nations (UNSAS) than to a Pan-African army as envisioned by leading Pan-Africanists such as Kwame Nkrumah, it nonetheless marks a substantial development in Africa's continental self-emancipation which should be greeted and supported by Africans and the international community alike.     

REFLECTIONS ON THE INTEGRATION OF THE MILITARY IN SOUTH AFRICA

This paper explores the contribution of the African Union (AU) to human security promotion in Africa. It contends that human security concerns informed the formation of the AU. Through the efforts of the AU Commission, the African ruling elite and policy-makers have become aware of human security doctrines. Human security ideas have been integrated into AU binding agreements, declarations, decisions and policies. The commission is now in the difficult, yet most important, phase of trying to persuade significant numbers of the African ruling elite and civil society to accept human security as a guiding principle and the desirable norm. Through the African Citizens' Directorate (CIDO), the commission is using indigenous African civil society groups to institutionalise human security doctrines in Africa. The commission faces serious challenges in its efforts to make human security the only security norm. While member states of the AU that have never been comfortable with the introduction of human security doctrines into the continental integration project are tacitly undermining the CIDO's ability to work with civil society groups to institutionalise the doctrines in Africa, the leaders who enthusiastically supported the integration of human security doctrines into the documents and work of the AU have seemed in recent times to be less resolute in their support of AU Commission's human security work.     

BENCHMARKS AND INDICATORS TOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

In addition to the South African King Report, there has been a rapid growth in the development of African thinking on corporate governance. In a period in which the private sector is accepted as the motor for growth, good corporate governance is an essential lever for development and social justice. As the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) recognises, the link with economic and political governance criteria is critical. New thinking is to attack on the supply side of corruption (company bribes) by complementary anti-corruption measures by the state. The recent initiative of the African Union (AU) to develop an AU Convention on Combating Corruption addresses the importance of declaring public officials' assets, and also breaks ground by targeting unfair and unethical practices in the private sector.     

AMENDMENT TO THE AFRICAN UNION'S RIGHT TO INTERVENE

Heads of State and Government passed the first amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union within seven months of the launch of the organization. This article provides a legal analysis of the broadening of Article 4(h) of the Act, the right of intervention, to prevent a “serious threat to legitimate order”. It argues that this clause is inconsistent with the other grounds for intervention, which aim to protect African peoples from grave violations of human rights when their governments are unable or unwilling to do so. The amendment, by contrast, aims to uphold state security, rather than human security. The context in which this and other amendments were adapted from proposals by Libya in Durban 2002 is considered in terms of political implications for the African Union.     

THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

The African Union is preparing for its enhanced role in the maintenance of peace and security by establishing a Peace and Security Council that is tasked with identifying threats and breaches of the peace. To this end, the AU has recommended the development of a common security policy and, by 2010, the establishment of an African Standby Force capable of rapid deployment to keep, or enforce, the peace. The ASF would comprise of standby brigades in each of the five regions, and incorporate a police and civilian expert capacity. G8 leaders have pledged support for the AU proposal through funding, training, and enhanced co-ordination of activities. For its part, the AU will need to undertake a realistic assessment of member capabilities, to clearly articulate its needs, and to set realistic and achievable goals. The latest plan for establishing a rapidly deployable African peacekeeping force will require something that similar proposals have lacked: the political will to fund and implement a long list of recommendations. Success will ultimately be judged by the AU's future responses to situations of armed conflict. Even if such responses are largely symbolic in the short term, a sufficient display of political will among African leaders could inspire the confidence needed to galvanise international support.     

AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANISATION' PEACE OPERATIONS

This paper reviews recent developments among African regional organisations in undertaking peacekeeping operations, as well as in preparing for future missions. It focuses on those that have been the most active: the Organisation of African Unity/African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community. The paper goes on to briefly describe and analyse the activities of the French, UK, and US capacity-building programmes designed to develop African peacekeeping capacities. The author then identifies some specific concerns and recommends actions to help meet today's challenges. The paper concludes with a short analysis of African organisations' capacities and proclivities to provide a peacekeeping force for Sudan.     

THE AU PLAN ON TERRORISM

At a senior officials' meeting held in Algiers from 11–14 September 2002, the African Union proved ready and able to provide the political cohesion and sense of purpose needed for Africa to combat terrorism. While member states inevitably played to a global gallery in demonstrating their commitment to the ‘war on terrorism’, the practical counter-terrorist proposals adopted at the meeting substantially address Africa's security challenges. The resulting Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism focuses on state building and inter-governmental co-operation, to literally and figuratively close Africa's borders to terrorist activities. Implementing the plan will be a tough challenge for many African governments, especially to ensure that their counter-terrorist measures adhere to international and regional human rights accords.     

Repression Substitution: Shifting Human Rights Violations in Response to UN Naming and Shaming

Does the United Nations naming and shaming of specific violations of human rights decrease government repression? In this article, we argue that international shaming of specific human rights violations can weaken the target government, bringing new challenges and making the government cessation of repression less feasible. When international naming and shaming campaigns target specific repressive tactics, they increase the costs of some – but not all – means of repression. Using original data on naming and shaming by the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), we show that the shaming of one physical integrity violation is jointly associated with decreases in that violation and increases in other violations of human rights.     

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Intervention which violates state sovereignty is often justified by its humanitarian goals. In Africa, the debate goes beyond humanitarian objectives and considers intervention when collapsed state authority threatens regional security. Poorly planned interventions can do more harm than good while also weakening the norm of non-intervention in international relations. The brutal and often degrading history of colonization and neo-colonialism still influences African thinking on intervention. Africa's relative geopolitical weakness has compelled it to rely strongly on the international rules. African state's view on intervention should be rethought in the light of failed states, the spill-over of conflicts, threats to the democratic process and an abject failure to act in the face of hummanitarian catastrophe. Military intervention should be an exceptional action of last resort but it will remain an option while states are unwilling or unable to protect their own populations. The objective should be prevention through good governance and the democratic process.     

MONEY IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLITICS

“Lack of money is the root of all evil”

George Bernard Shaw

In a environment where party financing, private funding in particular, is generally a laissez-faire business, as in most Southern African countries, there is the real risk that interest groups and wealthy individuals will buy influence in political parties and in so doing erode public confidence in the political system. Because they are neither open to public scrutiny nor subject to any legislative restraints, huge private donations can, and often do, come with strings attached. This lack of transparency and openness, as well as mechanisms to prevent it, provides ample ground for influence peddling, where those who pay the piper call the tune. Left unchecked, this party funding scenario will continue to be a serious indictment of the region's democratisation projects, crippling democracy and stunting economic development. This article consid     

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

The UN relies on regional organisations to carry out peacekeeping activities and has very good reasons for doing so: resource constraints and relevant political influence. In Africa, however, the UN Security Council seems unwilling to take decisive action when faced with complex emergencies and leaves the burden to the OAU which has its own problems. The UN charter does allow regional organisations to take enforcement action even without prior armed attack. The OAU charter converges with that of the UN in ways that should make cooperation easier than it has been. Despite the rhetoric, the UN Security Council has undertaken very little visible action in Africa when it is most needed. A lack of significant African representation in the Council is perhaps a cause. The Council will improve its global authority if it undertakes reforms that reduce the power of the US and the UK over its decisions.     

The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis: conceptual breakthrough or anti-imperialist phantom?

The creation of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) is a sign of Africa's willingness to take its destiny into its own hands. Presented as a reaction to the slowness of the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), it is also a response to some of the ASF's conceptual weaknesses. This decision reflects a wish to establish an instrument better equipped to deal with the challenges Africa is facing. Departing from the (sub)regional logic of the ASF results from a desire to take into account the transnational nature of threats, while its enlarged mandate is meant to offer Africa the capacity to intervene in all kinds of conflicts, including by undertaking peace enforcement activities. But the obstacles on the road towards the actual creation and mobilisation of this capacity should not be underestimated. These include material difficulties, but also political tensions, between ‘small’ and ‘big’ states as well as between the African Union and subregional organisations. The risk then is high that the ACIRC, whose announcement came as a reaction to France's intervention in Mali, ends up joining the ranks of the many ‘anti-imperialist’ phantoms haunting the history of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU). Confronted by events considered ‘neocolonial’ initiatives, African actors have indeed traditionally reacted by launching grand projects that never got off the ground. However, by actually establishing this new instrument, they may also demonstrate that times have definitively changed.     

South Africa's threat environment: a guide for the National Planning Commission

Abstract

The mandate of South Africa's recently appointed National Planning Commission includes addressing ‘defence and security matters’. This article seeks to outline the central elements of the threat environment facing South Africa in the foreseeable future. It is argued that South Africa faces no meaningful existential threat from conventional military forces but that its security forces will need to be prepared to address possible raids and attacks by conventional military forces both on home soil and on vital interests beyond the nation's borders. Other threats highlighted include the threats posed by potential insurgencies, by terrorism, and by crime, social unrest and banditry. Also addressed is the danger of so-called hybrid threats, in which two or more of the single threat types outlined here are combined. Finally, the article challenges the National Planning Commission to rethink South Africa's policy on peace operations in the light of the need to ensure the safety and security of the nation's citizenry.     

RIGHTS,ROOT CAUSES AND RECRUITMENT

Children are defined by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child as people under the age of 18. Youth, although commonly used to describe the age group between 15–25, is not a term recognized in legislation designed to protect children. It has, however, become a concept employed by regimes and rebels alike to mobilize Africa's young population for political and military ends. African youth are caught in the chasm between childhood and the unattainable social, political and economic status that would define them as adults. Deprived of educational opportunities and livelihoods, youth are actively mobilized by politicians and armed groups alike, who recognize that their alliance is valuable and their enmity dangerous. The militarization of disaffected young people, of which the problem of child soldiers is only a small part, originates with the idea that youth constitute “potential”: a commodity that can and has been plundered alongside natural resources and public funds to serve the agendas of warfare.     

FROM RIGHTS TO RESPONSIBILITIES

This article aims to explore possible avenues that the international community can use in order to justify forcible intervention in sovereign states in cases where gross and systematic violations of the human rights of the he population take place, but where the legal authority for such intervention is not forthcoming from the Uni ted Nations Security Council. Two possible justifications are identified: the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which despite being controversial, enjoys a measure of acceptance due to the practice of states in this regard, and the notion of an international responsibility to protect vulnerable populations and individuals. The latter option, despite a vague and uncertain legal basis, offers several advantages: it focuses on the suffering of human beings and not on the rights of states, it enumerates clear and definable thresholds for intervention by the international community and acknowledges that intervention is only one step in the process of achieving peace, to be preceded by preventive action and followed by post-conflict reconstruction. It is submit ted that elements of the notion of an international “responsibility to protect” are to be found in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and especially the Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. Furthermore, the principles underlying this notion, as developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty may serve as guidelines in decisions by the Assembly to authorise interventions in AU members.     

THE RIGHT INTERVENTION

Sovereignty has often been used to protect leaders at the expense of citizens. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) allows for intervention without the consent of the target state in a way that the OAU system of complete consensus never did. Ensuring that intervention is effective is as important as the decision of when and why to intervene. Sanctions, criminal prosecutions and military interventions are the broad options available to the AU. To be effective, though, the AU will need to agree on how intervention will be authorised and on mechanisms for its implementation. While the AU may have limited resources, not all action is costly. If African leaders speak out against human rights violations whenever they occur and combine this with a small, well-trained regional force, the benefits will far outweigh the costs.     

Institutional parameters that condition farmer–herder conflicts in Tivland of Benue State,Nigeria

ABSTRACT

This conceptual review examines institutional parameters that underpin farmer–herder conflicts in Tivland of Benue State, Nigeria. Anchored on the theory of New Institutionalism, it argues that tensions and conflicts between Tiv-farmers and the Fulani-herdsmen is occasioned largely by the disarticulation of the traditional institutional norms/rules of interaction by formal political institutions expressed in land use laws, West African sub-regional protocol, human rights provision of the Nigerian constitution and the Benue State law on anti-grazing. In these contrasting institutional forms, the formal political institution is prioritised by the state while farmers and herders are divided about the institutional basis of their coexistence. Farmers who host the herdsmen demonstrate preference for traditional norms of land ownership and control while the herdsmen incline towards new political/legal instruments which they interpret, purports to give them access to grazing lands and hence an alibi for rejecting institutions that contradict their claim to access spaces for pastoralism. Thus, persisting claims to the exercise of rights to freedom of movement and access to grazing land as opposed to claims to traditional rights of ownership and control of ancestral lands explain the origin and continuity of the farmer–herder conflicts in Benue state, Nigeria.     

PEACEFUL CHANGE AND THE RISE OF SUDAN'S DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT

Negotiations to end Sudan's devastating civil war have repeatedly faltered, but among other developments, the re-emergence of civil society in both the north and south provides greater impetus for peace, as well as greater prospects for democracy and respect for human rights. Particularly important, but thus far relatively unnoticed, is the rise of a southern-led civil society movement in the north. Although Sudan's complex history and demographics provide an explanation for much of the conflict, in fact the conflict is essentially political, while it is this very complexity that could provide a basis for the resolution of the conflict. Some intriguing parallels with South Africa's recent experience underscore the role of civil society, and point to some options for the future.     

THE CREATION OF THE ICC

The implications for African states of the recently created International Criminal Court should be carefully considered. There are far-reaching limitations placed on the ICC's jurisdictional scheme, both temporally as well as by the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction in the form of territoriality and nationality. The Court's powers may also be constrained out of deference to the grant of an internationally acceptable amnesty, and national courts may be constrained to recognise immunities from prosecution for high-ranking officials. These limitations need to be properly understood so that the ICC can be effectively utilised by African States to declare and act upon their commitment to the principle of individual criminal liability for those responsible for the most serious crimes.     

AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW

As an institution of state, the military in Lesotho was marred by controversy and steeped in intrigue from the start. For much of the post-colonial period the military was used as a politicised and partisan tool, which even seized power and governed in its own name. The current problem, as this brief history aims to demonstrate, is essentially two-pronged. It involves putting in place structures, mechanisms and philosophies designed to promote the military's acceptance of civil supremacy. The process should also include alterations to political society's perception of the military as a tool to be used in partisan games that almost always have calamitous outcomes. Lesotho's political development is classified in this article into four broad phases and the type of civil-military relations is assessed under each phase. The reasons for the military coup in 1986 are analysed, the emergence of a democratic order and the challenges facing this order are highlighted, and the reform measures that have thus far been instituted are evaluated. The essay concludes with a few projections into the future course of events.