The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis: conceptual breakthrough or anti-imperialist phantom?

The creation of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) is a sign of Africa's willingness to take its destiny into its own hands. Presented as a reaction to the slowness of the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), it is also a response to some of the ASF's conceptual weaknesses. This decision reflects a wish to establish an instrument better equipped to deal with the challenges Africa is facing. Departing from the (sub)regional logic of the ASF results from a desire to take into account the transnational nature of threats, while its enlarged mandate is meant to offer Africa the capacity to intervene in all kinds of conflicts, including by undertaking peace enforcement activities. But the obstacles on the road towards the actual creation and mobilisation of this capacity should not be underestimated. These include material difficulties, but also political tensions, between ‘small’ and ‘big’ states as well as between the African Union and subregional organisations. The risk then is high that the ACIRC, whose announcement came as a reaction to France's intervention in Mali, ends up joining the ranks of the many ‘anti-imperialist’ phantoms haunting the history of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU). Confronted by events considered ‘neocolonial’ initiatives, African actors have indeed traditionally reacted by launching grand projects that never got off the ground. However, by actually establishing this new instrument, they may also demonstrate that times have definitively changed.     

THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

The African Union is preparing for its enhanced role in the maintenance of peace and security by establishing a Peace and Security Council that is tasked with identifying threats and breaches of the peace. To this end, the AU has recommended the development of a common security policy and, by 2010, the establishment of an African Standby Force capable of rapid deployment to keep, or enforce, the peace. The ASF would comprise of standby brigades in each of the five regions, and incorporate a police and civilian expert capacity. G8 leaders have pledged support for the AU proposal through funding, training, and enhanced co-ordination of activities. For its part, the AU will need to undertake a realistic assessment of member capabilities, to clearly articulate its needs, and to set realistic and achievable goals. The latest plan for establishing a rapidly deployable African peacekeeping force will require something that similar proposals have lacked: the political will to fund and implement a long list of recommendations. Success will ultimately be judged by the AU's future responses to situations of armed conflict. Even if such responses are largely symbolic in the short term, a sufficient display of political will among African leaders could inspire the confidence needed to galvanise international support.     

Witchcraft and African development

Impressive investment and growth figures and commercial write-ups enthusing about ‘Africa rising up’, ‘the continent of the future’, and so on, obscure the poverty, illiteracy, poor health and other hardships afflicting the vast majority of African people. Why has massive so-called development and technical ‘aid’ not created the expected dynamic, autonomous economic progress? A blind eye is delicately being turned to the decisive role of people – more specifically, the cultural element. Notwithstanding good intentions, outsiders seeking to promote development assume that black Africans think and act like they only need more education, training and finance in order to ‘catch up’. Outsiders easily forget that since time immemorial, Africans have developed and cherished worldviews and cultures of their own. While these are by no means immutable and do adapt to changing needs and outside influences, Africans refuse to cast off overnight the heritage that makes them the people they are. This paper examines the impact of witchcraft as an integral feature of traditional culture on African existence, notably community life, religion, politics, the law, and economic practice. It stresses the significance of traditional society's powerful egalitarian impulses as well as its profound conviction that all things – goods, wealth, well-being and life force – are in a strictly limited supply that cannot be increased, but can only be redistributed by force or through magical manipulation. While modern life gradually weakens the influence of witchcraft beliefs – in Europe these flourished well into the 18th century – the exasperation associated with Africa's headlong urbanisation actually bolsters these beliefs.     

The African Standby Force: The African Union’s tool for the maintenance of peace and security

Declared operationally ready in 2016, the African Standby Force (ASF) has not been deployed in its originally designed form. This is not for the lack of opportunities but rather a demonstration of the power of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) – Africa’s sub-regional security structures – over matters of peace and security. Experience gathered from its short existence suggests that the ASF may never be deployed in its current form. It may instead evolve into a robust framework, adaptable mainly by the RECs/RMs, for addressing varied security challenges. Four things are critical to enhancing the utility of the ASF: the political willingness of the RECs/RMs, the strategic interest of the member states, predictable and sustainable financing, and clarity on the role of the African Capability for Immediate Response to Crisis, the temporary battlegroup that was created to provide the African Union with a rapid response capability, pending the ASF’s operationalization.     

THE AU PLAN ON TERRORISM

At a senior officials' meeting held in Algiers from 11–14 September 2002, the African Union proved ready and able to provide the political cohesion and sense of purpose needed for Africa to combat terrorism. While member states inevitably played to a global gallery in demonstrating their commitment to the ‘war on terrorism’, the practical counter-terrorist proposals adopted at the meeting substantially address Africa's security challenges. The resulting Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism focuses on state building and inter-governmental co-operation, to literally and figuratively close Africa's borders to terrorist activities. Implementing the plan will be a tough challenge for many African governments, especially to ensure that their counter-terrorist measures adhere to international and regional human rights accords.     

The right place at the right time,or the right person in the right place?

South Africa's military has, since the First World War, been an oft-used and effective tool in the conduct of South African foreign policy, but this role has not always translated into power for Defence Department principals in its formulation. South African Defence Ministers for most of the country's history have played a minor role in the making of foreign policy; despite a change in this dynamic between approximately 1975–1990, the post-apartheid era has once again seen a diminishment of Defence's power in this arena. This article examines why Defence Ministers have generally been such weak players, with an eye toward disaggregating whether this was a product of interpersonal relationships with Cabinet and – most importantly – the Head of State, or whether this influence (or lack thereof) was more a function of South Africa's international standing. While determining who has influence on this process is difficult given the primacy of the national leader in making foreign policy and a lack of insider accounts by participants in the process, this article relies upon several interviews with participants and knowledgeable observers that help illuminate the process and Defence's role in it.     

Securitising humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa: A critical review of South Africa's new defence policy

The South African Defence Review 2014 is the country's new defence policy. The Review, which is expected to steer South African defence policymaking for the next few decades, discusses in detail the role of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in peace missions in Africa and proposes the direct involvement of the country's soldiers in both military and civilian tasks, from peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction and development. This paper contains a critical review of the Review with regard to South Africa's envisaged contribution to regional and continental peace and stability. It is argued that humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction should not be securitised and that the SANDF should only be tasked with peacekeeping and the establishment of stability and security in fragile in-conflict and post-conflict settings. The humanitarian work should be left to humanitarian and aid agencies, while reconstruction and development should be left to organisations such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development, continental and international development organisations, and local actors.     

SOUTH AFRICA'S ANTI-TERROR LAW

This article argues that whereas the waves of democratization which enveloped the continent in the early 1990s following the collapse of Eastern European one-party socialism genera ted expectations of a ‘new dawn’ for ‘good governance’ and sustainable human development on the continent, one wave after another appears to have suffered serious setbacks. Indeed, a decade later, some of the most articulate pro-democracy leaders, who came into office on the crest of the democratic waves of the 1990s have sought to manipulate their countries' constitutions in order to perpetuate their presidential tenure. Such undemocratic behaviour will only fuel speculation in the industrialized world that the New Partnership for Africa's Development is just another decorative blue-print drawn up by beleaguered African despots in order to obtain new resource inflows at a time the international community under the hegemonic leadership of the Uni ted States will be wholly preoccupied with rebuilding post-Saddam Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian roadmap.     

The Botswana Defence Force and the War against Poachers in Southern Africa

‘Semper aliquid novi Africa affert’ (out of Africa this is always something new) wrote the Roman scholar Pliny the Elder, and that has been all too true of catastrophe and misery in modern times. Yet despite Africa's problems, the continent also offers many examples of humankind's most commendable achievements. This is one such story. It is the account of the successful struggle by a small but well disciplined and well led African army to protect a vital national resource, a role performed with dedication and consistent success since 1987. The fight against poaching in Botswana is a peculiar form of low-intensity conflict that poses significant political, operational and technical challenges. This article identifies some of those challenges and notes how the Botswana Defence Force overcame them, providing an example that may profitably be emulated elsewhere. The article also calls attention to evolution of military roles and missions in reaction to the novel threats of post the Cold War world.     

THE PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT

Founded on the basis of the 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community that came into force in May 1994, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was inaugurated in Addis Ababa on 18 March 2004. The inauguration followed the ratification by a majority of the 53 African Union (AU) member states of the PAP Protocol that had come into force on 14 December 2003.

While it is suggested that the PAP will oversee the AU Executive once the continental parliament has been given legislative power in its second term, the debate on the role that the PAP should play continues to rage. This article enters the debate by giving an overview of the workings of the PAP and makes some concrete proposals on ways in which the continental parliament can contribute to the continent. The article underlines the need for the PAP to develop or seek the capacity to conduct or commission research on pertinent issues for further recommendation to the assembly. It proposes that the continental parliament should send observer missions to countries holding elections on the continent so that it may contribute to the entrenchment of democracy on the continent.

The article also identifies some of the challenges that lie ahead of the continental body, including funding as well as the challenge of maximising the participation of ordinary Africans.     

The next step in Somalia: exploiting victory,post-Mogadishu

From 2006 to 2011, al-Qaeda's East African proxy, al-Shabaab, served as the de facto ruling party of Somalia despite the efforts of the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG). During these five years, a violent struggle between al-Shabaab and the peacekeeping force of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) resulted in thousands of dead civilians, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and a strategic environment inhospitable to reconciliation, recovery or development. By 2012, AMISOM was able to break the deadlock and force al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and Kismayo. In order to continue the momentum, the African Union and other partner nations must support the TFG in neutralising al-Shabaab throughout Somalia and providing good governance to its constituents. Al-Shabaab's revenue streams must be shut down and its offensive capability must be degraded while the strategic environment is shaped to ensure that conditions conducive to a revival do not exist. Failure to do so will likely see Somalia continuing to produce Islamist extremists and pirates to menace international maritime traffic in the western Indian Ocean, destabilise East Africa and adversely impact millions.     

Building A New Luftwaffe: The United States Air Force and Bundeswehr Planning for Rearmament, 1950–60

Rearming Germany was a long and complicated process. It was especially difficult to create a new German air force. The army generals who dominated the Bundeswehr cadre did not even want an air force but rather a small arm air corps. Moreover, Adenauer's defense staff failed to adequately budget or plan for a new air force. As rearmament began, US Air Force leaders, working closely with the small Luftwaffe staff in West Germany's shadow Defense Ministry, basically took charge of the process to ensure that the Germans built a new Luftwaffe on the American model – a large, multipurpose force organized as an independent service and fully integrated into NATO. The first Bundesluftwaffe commanders allied themselves to the Americans, often in opposition to their army comrades, to overcome the political problems caused by Adenauer's poor defense planning and create a modern air force on American lines.     

The South African Denuclearization Exemplar

ABSTRACT

South Africa's nuclear disarmament is a unique historical case, notable in part for the dramatic shift from deception to cooperation. The unprecedented transparency it demonstrated in order to convince the international community of the veracity of their disarmament is heralded as an exemplar for verifiable denuclearization. Less known is how this case affords insights into how a nuclear weapon program can be clandestinely hidden by the ambiguity provided by an otherwise completely legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy program. Using a variety of open sources, including newly declassified internal South African and US government reports, it can be shown that South Africa employed a variety of deceptive tactics before it disarmed, and even for nearly two years after becoming a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This article reviews that information to derive instructive lessons on the lengths that a nuclear proliferant state might go to conceal its true capabilities and intentions, and to thwart international discovery of the existence and full extent of an existing—or, in this case, a former—nuclear weapon program.     

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Intervention which violates state sovereignty is often justified by its humanitarian goals. In Africa, the debate goes beyond humanitarian objectives and considers intervention when collapsed state authority threatens regional security. Poorly planned interventions can do more harm than good while also weakening the norm of non-intervention in international relations. The brutal and often degrading history of colonization and neo-colonialism still influences African thinking on intervention. Africa's relative geopolitical weakness has compelled it to rely strongly on the international rules. African state's view on intervention should be rethought in the light of failed states, the spill-over of conflicts, threats to the democratic process and an abject failure to act in the face of hummanitarian catastrophe. Military intervention should be an exceptional action of last resort but it will remain an option while states are unwilling or unable to protect their own populations. The objective should be prevention through good governance and the democratic process.     

South Sudan and the pitfalls of power

For the people of South Sudan, the promise of independence is saddled with challenges similar to those witnessed by post-independence Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Then, the euphoria was short lived as several African countries lapsed into a state of authoritarianism, corruption and instability. The question is, what went wrong and can South Sudan learn from Africa's past? This update observes that there are differences in context between South Sudan and post-independence Africa, but maintains that South Sudan faces similar dangers: independence could easily turn into disenchantment and come to haunt the leaders of Africa's newest state should they fail to take concrete measures to transform institutions to be accountable, inclusive and responsive to people's needs.     

Combating Islamist radicalisation in South Africa

Is radical Islamism spreading in South Africa? The answer has to be an emphatic ‘yes’. When discussing issues of radicalisation in Africa, commentators often examine the case of Somalia's al-Shabaab or al-Qaeda's North African franchise, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Very little attention is paid to radicalisation amongst South Africa's Muslim population. Yet, there is growing evidence that South Africa has come to play an important role in global jihadi networks, from the provision of safehouses and identity documents to the movement of funds and the existence of paramilitary camps for local and foreign jihadis. This paper aims to briefly examine radicalisation and its attendant sources in the country, as well as seeking ways to combat it utilising lessons learned from other countries. ‘Institutional socialisation’ by means of the sources of radicalisation, as well as the concept of what could be termed ‘the democratisation of jihad’ are discussed. The author also proposes ways to combat radicalisation in South Africa utilising lessons learned from other countries, concluding that issues of radicalisation and deradicalisation have to be dealt with on the part of both government and the South African Muslim community.     

BENCHMARKS AND INDICATORS TOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

In addition to the South African King Report, there has been a rapid growth in the development of African thinking on corporate governance. In a period in which the private sector is accepted as the motor for growth, good corporate governance is an essential lever for development and social justice. As the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) recognises, the link with economic and political governance criteria is critical. New thinking is to attack on the supply side of corruption (company bribes) by complementary anti-corruption measures by the state. The recent initiative of the African Union (AU) to develop an AU Convention on Combating Corruption addresses the importance of declaring public officials' assets, and also breaks ground by targeting unfair and unethical practices in the private sector.     

A blunted spear: the failure of the African National Congress/South African Communist Party revolutionary war strategy 1961–1990

Following a classic Maoist revolutionary war strategy, with both Guevarian and Giapist elements, the African National Congress (ANC) attempted to overthrow, through revolutionary violence, the apartheid government of South Africa. This struggle, which began in 1961 and was eventually suspended in mid-1990, witnessed the general failure of the ANC strategy: for all intents and purposes – and despite all claims to the contrary – the ANC and its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (‘Spear of the Nation’) failed to overthrow of the South African state by force, the purpose for which it was intended. The strongest indication of this was that the ANC was never able to establish (Phase One of revolutionary war) effective internal underground structures of any duration within South Africa. This much was clear when the ANC was unbanned in 1990, but was recognised long before: in October 1986, the ANC stated that ‘despite all our efforts, we have not come anywhere near the achievement of the objectives we set for ourselves’. The ANC's ‘use’ of the UDF structures inside South Africa, in this sense, was not the same thing as establishing effective internal ANC/MK structures in the way that they intended. The ANC/South African Communist Parry (SACP) also underestimated continuously the ability of the government to react strongly and viciously to the ‘Revolutionary Onslaught’: at least part of the blame for this underestimation lay with the promotion of the armed struggle over all other activities. In eidle, the ANC/SACP were unable to reach back effectively into the country to lead a revolution. In the end, the apartheid regime was defeated not by guerrilla action or by revolutionary overthrow, but through the mass action of millions of South Africans.     

Neo-conservation

Africa's wildlife is in danger. The last couple of years have been disastrous for the African elephant as poaching for ivory reached record numbers. Rhinos have been hit hard with several sub-species becoming extinct. The current anti-poaching and anti-trafficking operations lack the sophistication and determination that is found abundantly within criminal organisations immersed in this illicit trade. Terrorism, rebellious elements and corrupt officials all benefit from the destruction of Africa's eco-system and the inaction or lack of efficient action thereof by law enforcement officials. This commentary suggests new courses of action using methods from the fields of counter-terrorism and special operations.     

FOOD AID

Abstract

This paper seeks to critically appraise Africa's position within the United Nations Security Council from the inception of the UN in 1945 until the end of 2010, spanning the entire history of the world body. A few factors make such an appraisal a useful exercise. These include the ongoing debates about the reform of the Council in particular and the UN as a whole, and the growing interest that many African students and observers of and actors in international relations seem to have developed in recent years in the working of the world body. In this appraisal, emphasis will be placed on the origin and rationale behind the establishment of the Security Council as well as the use of the veto power by its permanent members, with a special reference to Africa.