THE US NAVY AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

In the last decade, the nature of peacekeeping in Africa has changed somewhat, especially the manner in which peacekeeping missions are comprised, funded and driven. What one can observe is that there has been new thinking in the field of peacekeeping where this initiative is driven by states with particular interest in a particular issue(s). This thinking has led, to a certain extent, to the United Nations (UN) de-monopolising peacekeeping and ceding its ‘responsibility to protect’ to either lead states or regional organisations to deal with crises in respective backyards. In the first instance, ‘lead states’ have been empowered (financially and militarily) by peacekeeping powers to attend to crises in their respective regions to drive peacekeeping efforts. In the second instance, while financial and military support is not paramount, regional powers have had the blessing of the UN to deal with regional issues and crises in various parts of their respective regions. This situation evidently signifies the shifting nature of peacekeeping on the African continent. On assessing this scenario, the question that emerges in one's mind is where does this leave the UN? Does this mean that the UN and multilateralism is being sidelined in favour of unilateralism? Or does the UN still matter? What is the future of peacekeeping in Africa? These questions and the challenges posed by both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ approach to peacekeeping will be analysed in this article.     

Witchcraft and African development

Impressive investment and growth figures and commercial write-ups enthusing about ‘Africa rising up’, ‘the continent of the future’, and so on, obscure the poverty, illiteracy, poor health and other hardships afflicting the vast majority of African people. Why has massive so-called development and technical ‘aid’ not created the expected dynamic, autonomous economic progress? A blind eye is delicately being turned to the decisive role of people – more specifically, the cultural element. Notwithstanding good intentions, outsiders seeking to promote development assume that black Africans think and act like they only need more education, training and finance in order to ‘catch up’. Outsiders easily forget that since time immemorial, Africans have developed and cherished worldviews and cultures of their own. While these are by no means immutable and do adapt to changing needs and outside influences, Africans refuse to cast off overnight the heritage that makes them the people they are. This paper examines the impact of witchcraft as an integral feature of traditional culture on African existence, notably community life, religion, politics, the law, and economic practice. It stresses the significance of traditional society's powerful egalitarian impulses as well as its profound conviction that all things – goods, wealth, well-being and life force – are in a strictly limited supply that cannot be increased, but can only be redistributed by force or through magical manipulation. While modern life gradually weakens the influence of witchcraft beliefs – in Europe these flourished well into the 18th century – the exasperation associated with Africa's headlong urbanisation actually bolsters these beliefs.     

Prospects for creating a regional security structure in the Middle East

‘The Middle East talks the talk, but it doesn't walk the walk’, argues Heller when relating to attempts by parties in the region to create some kind of a cooperative security relationship. Concepts of regional security have simply been grafted onto traditional political-military doctrine, with the result that multilateralism has become just another vehicle for pursuing long-standing policy. He shows this with regard to the Middle East peace process as well as the Barcelona Process and attempts to forge a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. What should be done in order to promote the process? Heller's conclusion is that moving along the track of cognitive convergence while bypassing the sequencing problem by simultaneously pursuing both peace and security building will help mitigate some of the major problems in regional security.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Lost through non-translation: bringing Clausewitz's writings on ‘new wars’ back in

While Carl von Clausewitz has generally been respected as one of the most profound philosophers of war, his expertise has been regarded as somewhat limited if not even irrelevant to the so-called ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War world. Many scholars in international relations have claimed that ‘new wars’ are essentially ‘post-Clausewitzian’ and ‘post-trinitarian’ in nature, meaning that they are no longer fathomable through a Clausewitzian framework. However Clausewitz's earlier writings were nearly exclusively dedicated to guerrilla warfare, or what he called ‘small wars’. These writings have been largely overlooked by many analysts of contemporary conflicts. By drawing on his rare and untranslated writings, the article uncovers a critical part of Clausewitz's expertise in asymmetric warfare and shows that, far from being irrelevant in an age where interstate warfare is increasingly being replaced by conflicts between states and semi-/non-state actors, Clausewitz's philosophical writings actually shed new light into the particular interactive dynamics generated during wars waged under conditions of asymmetry.     

Europe's new subregionalism

From the Barents and the Baltic Sea in the north, through Central Europe and the Balkans, to the Black Sea in the south a range of new subregional groups and cooperation processes have emerged in Europe during the 1990s. Compared to NATO and the European Union, these new subregional groups have received little attention. Their ‘indirect approach’ to security, however, plays an important role in overcoming the legacy of the Cold War, reducing the risks of military conflict and addressing non‐military security challenges. As NATO and the EU expand eastwards, subregionalism is assuming growing importance as a means of avoiding new ‘dividing lines’ in Europe. After the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, subregionalism is also gaining importance as a means of building cooperation in South‐Eastern Europe. The challenge for the future is to give more substance and depth to Europe's new subregional cooperation frameworks.     

THE LAND IS THE ECONOMY

This article revisits Zimbabwe's land question from the vantage point of having been written five years after the ‘fast-track’ land redistribution programme was launched. Without belittling the accomplishments of land reform in the first 19 years of the country's independence, it is generally clear that the sweeping programme of 2000–2003, the most comprehensive of its kind, created a new paradigm. Clearly, the consequences will take many years to work themselves out through the country's political, economic and social fabric.

The article briefly defines what may be termed ‘old’ and ‘new’ versions of Zimbabwe's land question before outlining the salient aspects of the reform process itself. It then assesses the outcomes of the redistribution, the apparent lacuna between ‘land’ and ‘agrarian’ reform, and the debate that the reform process itself has kindled. Transforming land distribution into qualitative agrarian reform has proved an Achilles heel in the arguments put forward by the proponents of the fast-track programme. Finally, recommendations are provided as to what is necessary to secure land and agrarian reform in the short, medium and long term.     

The case for Azawad

Since Mali achieved independence from France, the marginalised Tuareg population of Mali has sought independence and the right to form their own nation, ‘Azawad’. These efforts have continuously been frustrated by the Tuaregs' neighbours, due to competing nationalist pride and interests in the mineral resources believed to lie under the northern Malian soil. Thus far, the Tuaregs of northern Mali have been largely neglected and denied both inclusive and effective governance by the various Malian governments from the southern Malian capital of Bamako. When negotiations have failed, Tuareg attempts to seize their own independence through violence have been brutally crushed by the Malian government. The Malian government will neither advance the interests of the Tuaregs nor allow them the freedom to pursue their own path in the world. The advent of the ‘Arab Spring’ in Libya provided another opportunity for the Tuaregs to pursue their dreams of an independent Azawad. Tuareg fighters returning from Libya carried with them both considerable combat experience and stockpiles of arms that they used to temporarily free their homeland. Unfortunately, the Tuaregs' whirlwind conquest of northern Mali was undone by the emergence of a new transnational threat in the Sahel. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) supplanted the previously victorious Tuaregs and attempted to turn Azawad into a Taliban-esque caliphate. French intervention defeated AQIM, but set the stage for a continuation of the cycle of violence and instability borne from the unwillingness of the international community to support the Tuaregs' legitimate right to self-determination.     

Shielding the ‘Hot Gates’: Submarine Warfare and Japanese Naval Strategy in the Cold War and Beyond (1976–2006)

The build-up of Japan's military apparatus in the 1990s and 2000s has been often regarded by security analysts as indicative of a departure from the country's Cold War strategic posture. Japan appears to be engaged in a process of militarisation that is eroding the foundations of its ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ policy. In the case of the archipelago's naval strategy, such assessments overlook the longstanding significance of a core feature of its defence policy, namely the surveillance of maritime crossroads delivering the wealth of the country. The paper reassesses the evolution of the Japanese strategy since the Cold War by examining the development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force's submarine force, one of the key components of the defensive shield for these crossroads. The paper argues that with the changes in the security environment of the 1990s, Japan already fielded a mature force with state-of-the-art submarines, and that the rise of a new naval competitor aiming at controlling key strategic points along Japan's sea lanes reconfirmed the critical importance of submarine operations to Japanese national security.     

Trinitarian troubles: governmental,military, and societal explanations for post-1945 Western failures in asymmetric conflicts

It seems paradoxical that powerful Western states are at their most vulnerable when the disparity in military capabilities between them and their opponents is at its largest. Yet it is precisely in such ‘asymmetric conflicts’ that Western countries have failed to achieve their overall political objectives the most often. Focusing on the post-1945 world, this article will examine governmental, military, and societal reasons for Western failures in asymmetric conflicts. Politicians' lack of understanding regarding war's fundamental nature, militaries' tendency to dissociate operational goals from grand strategy objectives and citizens' moral aversion to warfare appear to be among the main obstacles to success.     

The Taliban's ‘military courts’

The Taliban's ‘code of conduct’, which lists rules of discipline for the fighters, has been widely discussed, but do the Taliban try to implement it? This article discusses the structures that the Taliban have put in place for this purpose and their evolution over the years. It assesses that while the Taliban's ‘military justice’ system is still work in progress, the fact that it has attracted a significant investment in human resources bears witness to a serious intent of the leadership. However, the Taliban's concern with the behaviour of their fighting force is driven by their own political calculus, not by any sympathy for the international law of conflict.     

Making Jihad or Making Money? Understanding the Transformation of Dagestan’s Jamaats into Organised Crime Groups

While terrorist and insurgent groups have often combined anti-state subversion with ‘purely‘ criminal activities in order to obtain the financial means to wage their ideological struggle, little is known about the transformation of such groups into non-ideological organised crime groups (OCG) with close links to authorities. This holds particularly for jihadist groups that have on ideological grounds ruled out collaboration with their archenemies – ‘infidels’ and ‘apostates’. Using unique ethnographic data from Russia’s Dagestan, this article explores the causes and contexts of the gradual transformation of some of Dagestan’s jihadist units – jamaats – into organised crime groups collaborating with local authorities.     

Obligation to prevent (O2P): Proposal for enhanced community approach to genocide prevention in Africa

As empathetic as distant nations may feel about an ongoing or looming catastrophe in a particular region of Africa, they are too far removed from the horror to grasp its gravity and impact. Geographical proximity to the atrocity, and the likelihood of its spreading to their neighbourhoods, make the communities and neighbouring countries in the imploding region the best and most effective first responders to a crisis in their own backyard. A response from ‘communal’ or ‘regional’ groups is, therefore, the most practical measure for preventing human rights violations in Africa from descending into an actual genocide or an intractable genocidal condition. A community approach to preventing genocide and other human rights abuses should serve as the foundation for a new concept of ‘moral pan-Africanism’ on the African continent in the 21^st century. This article makes an argument for this genocide prevention model and new moral concept.     

Increased Chinese and American defence involvement in Africa

There is often a perception put forth of a fight for supremacy between China and the USA. This is often the case when discussing the continent of Africa. Both countries have recently increased their involvement in Africa for a variety of reasons. In 2011, China surpassed the USA as Africa's largest trading partner, with Africa predicted to be Beijing's largest trading partner by 2017. As expected, their bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation with strategic countries and organisations has matured and expanded along with it. Washington's own economic interests, al-Qa'ida and threats to maritime security are some of the crucial elements behind the US's presence on the continent. This article analyses both the USA and China's rising defence involvement in Africa. It compares and contrasts their similarities and differences, and argues that cooperation in certain areas can prove beneficial for all parties involved.     

UN-Consistent: A Comparison of Australia's Military Interventions in Somalia and Rwanda

This article seeks to compare Australia's involvement in two key 1990s peace missions: those to Somalia in 1992–93 and Rwanda in 1994–95. While there are many similarities between the two missions in terms of time, scale and theatre, the differences are more important. Both missions are usually recalled as failures despite the Australian troops having been extremely successful in their roles during both deployments. Moreover the experiences with intervention in Africa seem to have forever blighted Australian participation in peace missions on that continent.     

The ‘one-plus-four’ formula and transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In the aftermath of the signing of the ‘Accord Global et Inclusif’ (AGI) in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, not much was expected of President Thabo Mbeki's ‘imposed political monster’. In effect, after Mbeki came up with his ‘final plan’ providing for a transitional presidency made up of a president and four vice-presidents, many blamed ‘Mbeki's ignorance of Congolese political intricacies’. Mbeki's ‘one-plus-four’ formula was not only said to be unknown to the Congolese, but was also doomed to failure, given the nature of the stakeholders and the interests at stake in the DRC crisis. However, in view of the latest political developments in the DRC (a successful constitutional referendum as well as presidential, legislative and provincial elections, among others), we contend that, given the complexity of the Congolese conflict, Mbeki's design has emerged as a commendable contribution to the political solution of the Congolese crisis. Factors that have enabled such a transition mechanism to hold ought to be critically studied and eventually applied as a model for similar conflict situations in Africa and probably beyond.     

Is South Africa's 20 years of democracy in crisis? Examining the impact of unrest incidents in local protests in the post-apartheid South Africa

This article assesses South Africa's 20 years of democracy, which has frequently been bedevilled by local protests. This article is particularly interested in those unrest incidents that have been distinct for one reason or another. In South Africa, the surge in local unrest incidents is often linked to police behaviour, which has become increasingly militant and brutal when quelling protests. While the right to protest is constitutional, the damage caused during protest action can be immense owing to acts of violence. Protestors' resorting to violent protest action is often linked to increased frustrations as a result of the government's inability to live up to the expectations of marginalised and poor communities. While this article draws primarily on existing scholarly debates focusing on social protests, the primary objective is to examine the impact of unrest incidents on local protests in post-apartheid South Africa. The article further argues that ‘spaces’ for participation in local governance should be created so that citizens can become architects of development and their own future.     

THE AU PLAN ON TERRORISM

At a senior officials' meeting held in Algiers from 11–14 September 2002, the African Union proved ready and able to provide the political cohesion and sense of purpose needed for Africa to combat terrorism. While member states inevitably played to a global gallery in demonstrating their commitment to the ‘war on terrorism’, the practical counter-terrorist proposals adopted at the meeting substantially address Africa's security challenges. The resulting Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism focuses on state building and inter-governmental co-operation, to literally and figuratively close Africa's borders to terrorist activities. Implementing the plan will be a tough challenge for many African governments, especially to ensure that their counter-terrorist measures adhere to international and regional human rights accords.