一体化试验技术在反坦克导弹全寿命周期中的应用研究

提出了一体化试验的设计方案和试验流程，并分析了一体化试验的技术关键：仿真可信性评估；半实物仿真；仿真试验数据与飞行试验数据的一体化处理。利用一体化试验技术对某型装甲步兵战车导弹射击试验中出现导弹逸出视场问题进行了研究。     

舰炮武器系统仿真试验可信性评估方法

在介绍舰炮武器系统半实物仿真原理及系统组成的基础上,深入探讨了仿真试验结果可信性问题、仿真模型校核、验证与确认(VVA)的层次、仿真模型评估方法;介绍了基于最大熵谱估计的可信性评估定量分析方法;给出了仿真试验静、动态数据的验证方法以及仿真结果静、动态精度的检验方法;最后,以某型舰炮武器系统定型试验雷达通道数据验证了以上所述方法的有效性,并展望了可信性分析方法的发展方向。     

防空导弹飞行试验的引战配合性能分析方法

提出了一种对防空导弹的引战配合性能进行量化评价的方法。利用飞行试验数据对导弹目标交会及战斗部杀伤目标过程进行了仿真。     

装备战场损伤试验布局设计仿真研究

装备战场损伤试验存在实施难度大,试验效率低的问题。为提高试验效能,采用AUTODYN,建立预制破片战斗部有限元仿真模型,模拟了战斗部爆炸及预制破片飞散的过程,仿真结果同实弹试验所采集数据基本吻合,验证了所用模拟方法的有效性。通过分析破片侵彻靶板的损伤规律,建立了球形破片撞击靶板损伤相图,结合破片飞散规律,建立了试验布局参考相图。研究结果表明:预制破片战斗部的爆炸及对装备的打击过程,能够通过数值仿真方式准确的进行模拟,从而大大减少试验费用;所建立的试验布局参考相图,能够为试验布局的设计和优化提供一定的参考。     

基于均匀实验设计的温压战斗部爆炸冲击波毁伤仿真研究

以温压战斗部爆炸冲击波对地下目标的毁伤为背景,设计毁伤仿真模拟的基本方案,在对影响冲击波毁伤因素合理分析的基础上,利用均匀试验设计方法设计以装药密度、空气温度、大气压强以及混凝土密度为影响因素的均匀试验方案,最后通过正态分布检验图和Bootstrap法等方法对毁伤参数的统计特性进行研究。结果表明,固定条件下温压战斗部爆炸冲击波对地下目标的毁伤中,毁伤参数值具有明显的正态分布特性,对后续结合现场试验数据确定毁伤参数真值和毁伤试验鉴定提供了一定的指导和借鉴作用。     

舰空导弹引战配合可视化仿真分析方法

提出了一种更加直观的舰空导弹引战配合分析方法,充分利用飞行试验数据和弹道仿真数据,通过引战配合数学仿真计算和可视化仿真,复现了弹目交会时战斗部破片杀伤目标的过程,并在某型舰空导弹飞行试验引战配合分析中得到了应用.     

单装战损评估仿真系统的设计与实现

首先介绍了系统模型的建立;接着阐述了系统功能、结构以及各子系统的设计与实现;继而介绍了系统实现所用到的关键技术和方法;最后利用该系统,进行了某杀爆战斗部对卡车毁伤的仿真试验,得出了汽车部件毁伤分布及毁伤等级等结果。仿真结果表明,该仿真结果与试验数据基本吻合。该系统可以为维修保障及器材供应计划的制定提供参考依据。     

某型火箭弹对巡航导弹毁伤概率仿真分析

通过对巡航导弹目标特性分析,论述了目标易损性和毁伤机理(包括破片战斗部对目标的击穿概率模型)。利用破片初速及存速计算模型,分析了战斗部爆破后破片速度衰减规律,并做了模拟仿真,为火箭弹战斗部设计及毁伤效能评估提供了理论依据。最后根据射弹散布规律及毁伤原理建立了毁伤模型,并以某型火箭弹为例,对毁伤概率模型进行了仿真分析。仿真结果表明:该方法为火箭弹战斗部设计和提高对巡航导弹毁伤概率提供了参考。     

活性破片飞散特性及毁伤效应研究

为了掌握活性破片的空间飞散特性及毁伤效能,采用数值仿真与试验相结合的方法研究了某预制活性破片战斗部在爆炸作用下的飞散特性,得到了活性破片的空间分布和初始速度分布参数的有关数据,分析了活性破片对靶板的毁伤规律.结果表明:活性破片战斗部在起爆300 μs后,70％的活性破片速度分布在1 500～2 000 m/s;50％的...     

谱分析方法在仿真结果分析中的运用

文中给出了谱估计的分析，并将它直接应用于仿真系统输出量的特性分析。对于仿真的可信性问题，讨论了相容性检验方法，特别是小子样现场试验下，仿真与现场试验之间的一致性问题。     

Putin – the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Remembering and forgetting Mirambo: Histories of war in modern Africa

ABSTRACT

While the study of organised violence is considered essential to understanding the history of the West, and accordingly imbued with various layers of meaning and remembrance, war is widely regarded as inimical to the modern nation in Africa and stable development more broadly. Using examples drawn from primarily from East Africa, this paper considers the ways in which warfare in the deeper (‘precolonial’) past has been framed and envisioned in recent decades, in particular by governments whose own roots lie in revolutionary armed struggle and who began life as guerrilla movements. While in some cases particular elements of the deeper past were indeed mobilised in pursuit of contemporary political goals, in many other scenarios histories of precolonial violence were beheld as problematic and unworthy of remembrance. This paper highlights the paradox and ambiguity which has attended the memory of key aspects of Africa’s deeper past.     

The UK,interrogation and Iraq, 2003–2008

The UK’s interrogation operations during the conflict in Iraq (2003–2008) are often portrayed by the media as involving significant amounts of mistreatment. This article demonstrates that these practices are not necessarily representative of the UK’s interrogation operations across this conflict. In doing so it contributes to the limited literature on the practice of interrogation and on the UK’s combat operations in Iraq. The UK’s interrogation capability, and therefore its intelligence-gathering capability, is shown to have rested primarily with the military’s Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT). The JFIT suffered from limitations to the number, training and experience of its interrogators and interpreters. It is argued that maintaining a permanent, higher level of preparedness for interrogation by the British armed forces is desirable.     

SIM—LISP:一个通信网络管理专家系统外壳的设计与实现

本文介绍了笔者为开发名为OONMES的网络管理专家系统所实现的一个简单专家系统工具SIM-LISP。SIM-LISP是一个用C/C++语言来实现的模拟LISP语言的可调用函数集,它短小精巧,速度快,可以完成针对网管专家系统的事实或规则知识的表示、匹配、合一和推理等基本操作,并有与知识对象的连接功能,是网管专家系统内核实现的支撑环境。     

Al Qaida on the US invasion of Afghanistan in their own words

This article consists of selected translations from captured interviews and dairies of Al Qaida members. The time period covered is from mid-2001 to early 2002 and concerns their operations in Afghanistan. The material clearly conveys a range of emotion, from confident to despondent, as well as efforts to contest the US actions. The first several pages give the reader context and some possible “lessons learned,” but the story(ies) are best told by the Al Qaida members themselves. All names are pseudonyms.     

Does Intent equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The prospect of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is often referred to as the foremost danger to American national security. This danger has become more realistic because of al-Qaeda's expanding global network and the expressed willingness to kill thousands of civilians. In the past four years, numerous media reports have documented the group's ongoing quest for WMD capabilities; many reports have detailed al-Qaeda members’ attempts to manufacture or obtain certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to use in WMD against targets in the West and the Middle East. Yet the question remains: Does al-Qaeda's current WMD capability match its actual intent? While most studies of the group have focused on its explicit desire for WMD, allegations of CBRN acquisition, and the killing potential of specific CBRN agents, few open-source studies have closely examined the evolution of al-Qaeda's consideration of WMD and, most notably, the merit of actual CBRN production instructions as depicted and disseminated in the group's own literature and manuals. The following report will examine the history of al-Qaeda's interest in CBRN agents, the evolution of the network's attitude toward these weapons, and the internal debate within the organization concerning acquisition and use of WMD. More so, the following research will assess the validity of actual CBRN production instructions and capabilities as displayed and disseminated in al-Qaeda's own literature and websites.     

Late Medieval Lance Use: Mounted Combat and Martial Arts in Western Europe from the 14th to the 16th Century

Despite the lance’s status and the amount of attention the couched lance has received in historiography, study of its martial art has been neglected. The various lance types and techniques used by western European cavalry have only recently begun to receive scholarly attention. Additionally, Medieval European lance use has too often been studied in isolation, without an adequate understanding of the idiosyncratic and asymmetrical dynamics of mounted combat. Although the charge with the couched lance was a valid tactic, it was only one of many. Light and heavy lances were used in one hand or two to trip, block, unhorse, and wrestle. These techniques were governed by the harsh laws of distance, speed, impact, iron, and asymmetry. By utilizing the surviving Fechtbücher and several Peninsular and Near Eastern sources, a brief foray into the diverse techniques of lance use and their purposes has been attempted here.     

物理学中的辩证自然观——控制、信息、系统与辩证自然观

和谐律、守恒律、方向律是自然辩证法中自然观的三大规律,它们贯穿、融合并体现于各具体学科的研究领域中。本文主要以自然辨证规律在控制与系统科学中的体现为依托,系统阐述物理学中控制系统理论与信息理论及其应用中自然观三大规律的具体表现。     

The practice and theory of British counterinsurgency: the histories of the atrocities at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938–1939

This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.