The Dark Side of Extended Deterrence: Thinking through the State Sponsorship of Terrorism

States employ extended deterrence to shield third parties from aggression. The concept is traditionally applied to interstate relations, collective security arrangements, and strategic considerations. The protective relationship that exists between a state sponsor of terrorism and its non-state militant proxy is rarely considered. This article will introduce and explore the sponsor–proxy relationship in the context of extended deterrence, and relate it to Iran’s support and sponsorship of political violence, militancy, and terrorism in Europe. The article reviews the rationale states have for sponsoring terrorism, and illustrates the promises and pitfalls associated with extending deterrence to non-state militants.     

Terrorism research: should we focus on the opponent or on our own people?

In terrorism research, three different sources of information and data exist: the terrorists and their environment; the incidents; and the population. This article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of research that is concerned with, or relies on, any of the mentioned sources. An in-depth understanding of the methodological issues that come with these sources is important to correctly interpret results from scientific studies. It is highlighted how the different scientific approaches add to a holistic view of terrorism as a phenomenon. Furthermore, the double-edged sword of information in the field of terrorism is discussed. From these deliberations, guidance concerning the future work of both scholars and decision-makers can be deducted.     

SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE BACKLASH EFFECT

This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile.     

The role and capabilities of major weapon systems transferred between 1950 and 2010: Empirical examinations of an arms transfer data set

Arms transfers provide exporters an avenue to provide security to other states while gaining economic benefits. Arms transfers provide importers an avenue to gain security without having to rely on alliances. Past research uses aggregate measures of the monetary or security value of major weapon system transfers without accounting for strategic differences in possible use in interstate and civil conflict. This article presents a data set on interstate transfers of major weapon systems between 1950 and 2010 building upon Stockholm Peach Research Institute’s Arms Trade Register with several improvements. First, it disaggregates land weapons and air weapons into categories reflecting their strategic capabilities. Second, model level characteristics (e.g. age, speed, and range) are drawn from Jane’s Defence sources. Additionally, the data set covers a larger range of time and states than previous data sets categorizing arms. To demonstrate the usefulness, this article first presents summary statistics of the data set and then replicates an earlier test to show that the effect of human rights and regime types on United States transfers differs across the categories of arms compared to alternative measures of arms transfers.     

A1 Qaeda and the radical Islamic challenge to western strategy

The September 11 global crisis prompted by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon raises major questions concerning the nature and trajectory of terrorism in the post-Cold War global order. Hitherto, terrorism has been largely debated by analysts at the level of nation states. Terrorist and insurgent movements have also been largely anchored in nationalist and ethnic power bases even when they have sought to mobilise a transnational ideological appeal on religious or class grounds. There have been a few exceptions to this pattern such as the alliance between the German Baader-Meinhof group and the Japanese Red Army Faction, but even such international alliances as this did not, until at least the 1980s, presage anything like a global terrorist network necessitating a global strategic response. This study examines terrorism and global strategic responses.     

Whatever Happens to Somalia…Ignoring it is No Longer an Option

The war against terrorism has brought Somalia, a country located in a key strategic region, back onto the radar of US and Western security concerns. Following a vicious civil war, a failed peace support operation and several attempts to start a peace process, lawless Somalia, a country without government, has gained the potential to be exploited as a terrorist base. Although this country in the Horn of Africa does not represent a direct and immediate threat to the US or its Western allies, its potential to destabilize the region is extremely high. This article offers an analysis of Somalia's potential to become a ground for terrorist activities and suggests a two-track approach. On the one hand, US foreign and security policy in Somalia needs to be more assertive; on the other, the only way to prevent Somalia from becoming a fertile ground for international terrorist groups is to help stabilize the country. In order to achieve this objective, it is crucial to adopt any initiative aimed at strengthening Somalia's civil society.     

The Political Economy of Legislation on Terrorism

^{1 1}This research was funded in part by a grant from the Lowe Institute of Political Economy. The corresponding author is S. Brock Blomerg. We thank Chris Blomberg and Brianna Loyosa for their excellent research assistance on the project. This paper presents an empirical analysis of what drives congressional legislation on terrorism during the period 1995 to 2010. We utilize and augment current methodology to compile and analyze data on sponsorship and cosponsorship of terrorism related data. Our results on the sources of legislation on terrorism are largely in line with past examinations of the importance of committee membership and leadership, party majority-ship, and other political factors. Further, we find that the most significant and robust drive for legislation on terrorism is the September 11^th attacks. And while the impact of 9/11 affected legislative productivity everywhere, we find that it most significantly affected states surrounding New York and Washington D.C. Our results indicate that the economy may be one factor motivating politicians to legislate on terrorism; however, these results are not robust.     

Economic Performance And Terrorist Activity In Latin America

We investigate the link between economic performance and terrorism for 18 Latin American countries from 1970 to 2007, taking into account the potentially complex nature of this link. Panel causality analysis findings indicate that during this period, terrorism had no causal effect on economic growth. By contrast, we find that growth reduced terrorism in the less developed but not in the higher developed Latin American economies. We argue that group-specific differences (linked to patterns of economic development) govern this causal heterogeneity. From a series of negative binomial regressions we gain additional support for our findings, while also identifying further determinants of terrorism.     

Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies

In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion,Denial, and Delegitimization in Counterterrorism

This article argues that deterrence theory can be applied to counterterrorism. Doing so requires broadening the traditional concept of deterrence by punishment, expanding deterrence by denial to include defense, mitigation, and strategic hindrance, and developing deterrence by delegitimization to influence the political, ideological, and religious rationales informing terrorist behavior. In practice, deterring terrorism requires tailoring threats against state and individual facilitators, diffusing the intended consequences of terrorism, and manipulating terrorist self–restraints. When these and other deterrent leverages are applied simultaneously against various actors and processes involved in terrorism, coercion can be achieved.     

新疆边境地区反恐情报保障问题研究

反恐情报保障是反恐行动的重要组成部分和决策依据。针对新疆边境地区情报力量建设较弱、情报保障手段单一、与有关部门缺乏有效的交流机制等问题，公安边防部门应采取加强情报力量建设、完善情报保障机制、充分利用各种情报手段和加强情报交流与合作等有效措施，不断提高反恐情报保障能力，掌握反恐怖斗争的主动权。     

面向新化学威胁形式的防护技术与装备

近年来,化学威胁的形式发生了变化,出现了类化学战、化学恐怖以及针对平民和环境的次生危害,给防化科研和防化工作提出了新的挑战。分析传统化学战与这三类新化学威胁形式的异同点发现,这些新威胁形式之间有着较多的共同点,而与传统化学战威胁形式则有较大差异。中国拥有为数众多的大型化工生产、储存设施,这些设施很可能成为袭击的目标,因此必须转变化学防护观念,尽快研究防化新技术、新装备,建立国家动员机制。     

TERRORISM AND DETERRENCE POLICY WITH TRANSNATIONAL SUPPORT 1

This study provides an explanation of terrorism by examining interactions between the terrorist group with a minority as a potential pool of recruits and the government supported by a majority. A hawkish deterrence policy makes it more risky for terrorists to launch attacks, but heightens the anti‐government feeling of the terrorist group. In addition, the payoff for the government depends not only on the payoff loss associated with the level of terrorism, but also on the political payoff from the action itself of adopting a hawk policy due to its politicians’ vested interests. We first show that whether the deterrence policy should be ‘hawk to ‘dove is closely dependent on the relationships among the risk associated with terrorism, the anti‐government feeling of the terrorist group, and the political payoff for the government. This study then introduces transnational support enhancing the capability of a terrorist group to intensify its activity and shows that the emergence of transnational support may cause the government to reform its deterrence policy from ‘dove’ toward ‘hawk,’ with terrorism intensified in the society.     

Spatial Distribution of Minority Communities and Terrorism: Domestic Concentration versus Transnational Dispersion

Qualitative studies of terrorist movements frequently highlight the importance of diaspora communities as important factors in producing and sustaining terrorist activity in countries. The underlying theoretical argument is that bifurcation of tight-knit minority communities between countries nurtures separatist or irredentist sentiments among affected community members, thus prompting terrorist activity, while minority community members in other countries might mobilize financial and political resources to support terrorist activity among their compatriots. In this study, we empirically test whether transnational dispersion, versus domestic concentration, of minority communities in countries produces higher incidents of terrorism. Conducting a series of negative binomial estimations on a reshaped database of around 170 countries from 1981 to 2006, derived from the Minorities at Risk database and the Global Terrorism Database, we determine that both transnational dispersion of kin minority communities and domestic concentration of minorities within countries increase terrorism and that transnational dispersion is a particularly robust predictor of terrorist attacks.     

Why a small probability of terror generates a large macroeconomic impact

The basic narrative of bargaining theory predicts that, all else equal, anarchy favors concessions to challengers who demonstrate the will and ability to escalate against defenders. For this reason, post-9/11 political science research explained terrorism as rational strategic behavior for non-state challengers to induce government compliance given their constraints. Over the past decade, however, empirical research has consistently found that neither escalating to terrorism nor with terrorism helps non-state actors to achieve their demands. In fact, escalating to terrorism or with terrorism increases the odds that target countries will dig in their political heels, depriving the non-state challengers of their given preferences. These empirical findings across disciplines, methodologies, as well as salient global events raise important research questions, with implications for counterterrorism strategy.     

An intervention analysis of terrorism: The spanish eta case

In this paper we evaluate what terrorism policies have worked best in handling the Spanish ETA terrorism using time series data from 1968 to 2000. We consider the political, deterrence and economic effects, and conclude that their influence on terrorism incidents is mixed. A parsimonious model shows that the behaviour of different terrorism incidents is distinct and the lagged effect is a primary concern. A policy to manage this case is devised.     

United States special operations forces and the war on terrorism

Those leading the war on terrorism have emphasized from the beginning that this war would be unlike other wars. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are military forces unlike other military forces. The implication is that SOF and the war on terrorism are thus made for each other. This contribution examines this assumption, the war on terrorism and SOF in greater detail.     

Growth and Fiscal Consequences of Terrorism in Nigeria

Abstract

In spite of government counter-terrorism expenditure and efforts, the incidence of terrorism in Nigeria appears to be rising. This paper examines the growth and fiscal consequences of terrorism in Nigeria by estimating the terrorism–macroeconomy relation using different measures of terror incidence. The results show that terrorism has an economically and statistically significant negative impact on growth; although this impact is considerably small and short-lived, manifesting only after a lag of about three years. Specifically, the cost of terrorism to Nigeria, in terms of lost GDP per annum, is estimated at 0.82%. Moreover, there is evidence that terrorism leads to the reallocation of economic activity away from private investment spending to government spending; that is, terrorism crowds out investment at a higher rate than its potential to crowd in government spending. Lastly, terrorism alters the composition of government expenditure – with the defence component of government expenditure rising vis-a-vis other expenditure items. The results are robust to allowing for dynamic interactions between terrorism and macroeconomic aggregates.     

Strategic terrorism: The framework and its fallacies

This article seeks to lay out a comprehensive framework by which those who utilize a campaign of strategic terrorism seek to attain their ends. It identifies a distinctive modus operandi: 1) disorientation: to alienate the authorities from their citizens, reducing the government to impotence in the eyes of the population; 2) target response: to induce a target to respond in a manner that is favorable to the insurgent cause; 3) gaining legitimacy: to exploit the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative political message. By elucidating the strategy of terrorism, the analysis also reveals its inherent limitations. Resting on the premise that a militarily more powerful adversary will in some way feel restrained from bringing the full force of its military superiority to bear, the strategy relies exclusively on the exploitation of the psychological effects of armed action, thereby rendering it vulnerable to those who are willing to view the resolution of clashes of interest principally in terms of the tangibles of military power.