飞兵万里救人质——以色列大机群跨洲奔袭反劫机行动纪实

最近,以色列以近乎恐怖主义手段暗杀了巴勒斯坦“人阵”总书记穆斯塔法,受到国际舆论强烈谴责。历史上,以色列曾经是一个深受恐怖主义伤害同时也敢于向恐怖主义宣战的国家。为此,我们推出一个以军当年反恐怖主义的著名战例,供读者了解以色列这个独特的国度。     

犹太家园的守护者——以色列国防军

以色列国防军始建于1948年,它为保卫国家参加了5次重大战争,是世界上身经百战的武装部队之一。以国防军目前的安全目标是:保卫以色列国的生存、领土完整和主权;威慑一切敌人和制止威胁日常生活所有形式的恐怖主义活动。它的主要任务包括:强化和平安排;同巴勒斯坦权力机构协调以确保约旦河西岸和加沙地带的总体安全;在以色列国土内及跨国界的打击恐怖主义的战争中奋勇当先,以及保持一种防止爆发战争的威慑能力。为确保上述目标的实现,以国防军采取了防御性的战略原则和进攻性的战术原则。鉴于以色列领土缺乏纵深,在必要时,以国防军必须采取主…     

备受争议的美国新战略

2003年是美国“先发制人”新国家安全战略出台后的第一年。这一年来,美国新战略可谓是备受煎熬。2002年9月20日出台的《美国国家安全战略报告》首次把“先发制人”战略正式纳入美国21世纪国家安全战略之中,强调美国将在威胁完全形成之前就采取行动,向恐怖分子和敌对国家发动主动进攻,消除威胁,确保美国绝对安全。这一新安全战略思想的出台是基于适应美国国家安全面临的新威胁,特别是为了应对国际恐怖主义组织,庇护恐怖主义国家和所谓“无赖国家”对美国构成的威胁     

倍受煎熬的美国新战略

2003年是美国“先发制人”新国家安全战略出台后的第一年。这一年来,美国新战略可谓是倍受煎熬。2002年9月20日出台的《美国国家安全战略报告》,首次把“先发制人”战略正式纳入美国21世纪国家安全战略之中,强调美国将在威胁完全形成之前就采取行动,向恐怖分子和敌对国家发动主动进攻,消除威胁,确保美国绝对安全。这一新安全战略思想的出台是基于适应美国国家安全面临的新威胁,特别是为了应对国际恐怖主义组织、庇护恐怖主义国家对美国构成的威胁提出的。可以说,美国从来没有像今天这样对其所面临的综合安全环境如此担忧。尽管不排除美国借…     

反恐怖斗争卫勤保障浅探

江泽民同志在党的十六大报告中指出:当今世界“传统安全威胁和非传统安全威胁的因素相互交织,恐怖主义危害上升”。“我们主张反对一切形式的恐怖主义。要加强国际合作,标本兼治,防范和打击恐怖活动,努力消除产生恐怖主义的     

阿富汗为三大组织合作提供契机

无论是西方国家还是东方国家,均面临源自阿富汗的相同威胁：那就是塔利班、“基地”恐怖主义．以及毒品生产和走私。因此,东西方合作既是不可避免的,也是十分重要的。     

世界新军事变革对国际反恐行动的负面影响及对策

首先,世界新军事变革发展的不平衡性造就和助长了世界军事霸权,刺激国际恐怖活动进一步滋长蔓延。随着军事霸权而来的是政治霸权、经济霸权和文化霸权,成为了国际恐怖主义的助推器。霸权主义的政治输出和干涉他国内政,造成了一些国家的政治动荡;对弱小国家的经济掠夺和不平等竞争,不断拉大世界的贫富差距;意识形态和文化的侵略,引发了错综复杂的宗教纷争和民族仇视,为恐怖主义的滋长和蔓延埋下了种子。延续多年、难有尽期的巴以民族仇杀,就是美国插手中东、偏袒以色列的恶果。     

后9·11时代的国外奥运会安保

肇始于1896年的现代奥运会是当今世界最高层次的体育盛会．其高扬的旗帜始终是团结、友好、和平。但是，恐怖主义及其他暴力活动的幽灵却时常游荡于奥运会的举办过程之中：1972年．在慕尼黑奥运会上．一个名为”黑色九月”的恐怖组织将以色列运动员胁迫为人质．造成11名以色列人、5名恐怖主义分子和1名德国警察死亡；     

网络恐怖主义对北京奥运安全的危害及其对策

近年来，网络恐怖主义对奥运安全的危害越来越引起国内和国际社会的广泛关注。当前，北京奥运会也面临着来自网络恐怖主义的威胁。为此，有必要通过转变观念、加强公安网监部门的作用、提高网络系统的安全性、加强国内立法和国际合作等方式来进一步增强北京奥运会防范网络恐怖主义威胁的能力。     

洛杉矶警察局反恐策略及对我国公安反恐工作的启示

洛杉矶警察局在9.11事件之后,不断积累预防和打击恐怖主义的经验,提高自身反恐能力,并在实际的预防打击恐怖主义斗争中做出了重要贡献。恐怖主义是全世界的敌人。针对中国的恐怖主义威胁现状,我国公安机关作为预防和打击恐怖主义的重要力量,要研究和借鉴他们好的经验,坚决打击国内恐怖主义的发展势头,以维护中国的安全稳定。     

PROTECTING CULTURAL MONUMENTS AGAINST TERRORISM

Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy to discourage terrorist attacks on iconic monuments is for a government to show a firm commitment to swift reconstruction. Using a simple game‐theoretic model, we demonstrate how a credible claim to rebuild any destroyed cultural monument discourages terrorist attacks by altering the terrorists' expectations and by increasing the government's reputation costs if they fail to rebuild.     

Military support and transnational terrorism

Analysing the relationship between the provision of military support and the probability of becoming the target of a terrorist attack, this paper contributes to the literature on the causes of transnational terrorism. We find that deployment of military troops of country X in country Y increases the probability of a terrorist attack on citizens of country X by a terrorist group located in country Y. Exporting weapons to country Y seems to increase the probability of being attacked by the terrorists of this country Y as well. Deploying materials, however, does not seem to significantly influence the probability of attack. Including lagged values for our military support variables ensures that the causality direction is from military support to terrorist attacks. Moreover, these results indicate that while the effect of military deployment on the probability of attack lasts for more than 1 year, the effect is rather short-lived.     

Military deployment and international terrorism: do location and mission type matter?

Extant literature documents a relationship between military deployment and the risk of an international terrorist attack against citizens of the deploying country. It appears that deployment significantly increases the possibility of terrorist actions in the home country. In particular, if country A decides to send troops to nation B, then citizens of the former country are more likely to fall victim of an attack carried out by a terrorist organisation originating from the latter country. Contributing to this line of literature, we further refine this relationship by distinguishing between regions where the troops are sent as well as by introducing differences between types of deployment. Our results indicate that missions to Asia and the Middle East are more dangerous than missions to other regions as reflected by the terrorist threat in the home country. Robustness tests do however show that the significance of the location variable Asia is predominantly attributed to the mission to Afghanistan. As for types of deployment, only ad hoc missions seem to increase the risk of an attack, whereas no significant results are found for other missions such as operations under UN and NATO flag. Leaving out the missions to Iraq and Afghanistan however also increases the danger resulting from missions by fixed coalitions. Our results find however no evidence that ‘wearing a blue helmet’ increases the probability of a terrorist attack at home.     

Defence industries adjusting to change 1

This paper analyses the impact of terrorist activity on international tourist flows. To this end, we have estimated a cross‐sectional gravity equation for tourism from the G‐7 countries to a sample of 134 destinations over the period 2001–2003. Within this framework, we evaluate the deviation from ‘normal’ tourist flows due to terrorist activity, which is considered as negative advertising for the affected country. The analysis suggests that both domestic victims and international attacks are relevant factors when foreign tourists make their choice. This result is robust under alternative specifications. Moreover, the impact of terrorism is more severe in developing countries.     

Terrorism in Nigeria

Using the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria as a point of departure, this paper examines the implications of the operations of terrorist groups on the security and stability of states in West Africa. It predominantly utilises secondary sources of data. Findings indicate that the membership and operations of this terrorist group are spreading across the sub-region. This spread is consequent upon Boko Haram's collaboration with other terrorist groups within West Africa and beyond. This constitutes threats to the security and stability of states in the sub-region. Thus, the paper recommends, among other things: a thorough understanding of the operational strategies of terrorist groups by states and those involved in security policymaking in the sub-region; and for agreements to be reached among Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member states and their governments for collaboration in various areas in order to curtail transnational crime and terrorism, and reduce socio-economic inequality that generates aggressive behaviours among the less privileged.     

Ethnic groups,political exclusion and domestic terrorism

This study examines whether the exclusion of ethnic groups from political power is an important contributing factor to domestic terrorism. To empirically test this question, we employ a negative binomial regression estimation on 130 countries during the period from 1981 to 2005. We find that countries in which certain ethnic populations are excluded from political power are significantly more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks and to suffer from terrorist casualties; furthermore, ethnic group political exclusion is a more consistent and substantive predictor of domestic terrorist activity than general political repression or economic discrimination.     

Other side of the Iranian coin: Iran’s counterterrorism apparatus

Iran’s support for terrorist groups is the subject of countless articles and monographs. Less emphasis is placed on Tehran’s efforts to fight terrorist groups targeting the Iranian state. Yet, modern domestic and foreign terrorist groups have targeted Iran for decades. As a result, the country has developed fairly sophisticated, albeit opaque, counterterrorism apparatus and mechanisms. This article sheds light on the Iranian counterterrorism apparatus and efforts since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, drawing on several years of fieldwork in Iran, interviews with current and former officials, and Persian sources.     

Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies

In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE BACKLASH EFFECT

This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile.