More on the search for an infiltrator

We have asymptotically solved a discrete search game on an array of n ordered cells with two players: infiltrator (hider) and searcher, when the probability of survival approaches 1. The infiltrator wishes to reach the last cell in finite time, and the searcher has to defend that cell. When the players occupy the same cell, the searcher captures the infiltrator with probability 1 ? z. The payoff to the hider is the probability that the hider reaches the last cell without getting captured. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 1–14, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1047     

Country survey VI: Australia

Australia is a geographically large country, with the world's longest national coastline to defend, but a relatively small economy of some 17.5 million people. Since World War II, Australia has faced the dilemma of how to structure defence policy in the absence of an identifiable threat. Its policy of self‐reliance aims to permit Australia to conduct defensive operations in the event of low/medium level threats without depending immediately on its allies. This is to be achieved through the technological sophistication of defence equipment, a highly professional but small defence force and local industry support.

The burden of defence, measured as the share of defence outlay in GDP declined from about 3% in 1971–72 to about 2.3% in 1993–94. It has been the Government's policy to encourage the development of local defence‐related industry, in particular in areas such as: electronics/optics; communications and information technology; aerospace; shipbuilding and repair, munitions; and land vehicles. However, defence procurement has a small impact on the Australian economy as a whole.     

To free or not to free (ride): a comparative analysis of the NATO burden-sharing in the Czech Republic and Lithuania

ABSTRACT

The recent rise in the defence budgets among the NATO members reawakens the free-riding dilemma. This article provides an analysis of the defence spending of two new member states, the Czech Republic and Lithuania. Based on the free-riding theory, we explain why some of the new NATO members decide to increase their defence budgets (Lithuania), and others do not (Czech Republic). In contrast to the majority of works which focus either on the US as the biggest spender or on the “old” members of the Alliance, we explain under what circumstances some of the small European states who became new NATO members started to increase their defence budgets even though they do not have to, and the literature suggests that free-riding is easier. In the process, we identify three crucial factors that in?uence the decision-making process in this regard: the level of threat perception, economic situation, and the US pressure.     

A LONG‐RUN ANALYSIS OF DEFENCE SPENDING IN THE NATO COUNTRIES (1960–99)

This paper analyses the long‐run demand for defence output through a homogeneous treatment of 15 NATO member countries between 1960 and 1999. We carry out a progressive study of the interactions between either defence spending or defence burden and their main determinants: income, external threat and allied military spending. To that end, we use time‐series analysis with endogenously determined structural breaks. We further consider individual country functions related to one another through a common correlated effects method, in order to take into account explicitly the connections between members of an alliance.     

截击机作战起飞规划分析

根据截击机在优化的目标分配形式下拦截效果的概率模型,导出了截击机在拦截多攻击机机群时的最优目标分配形式,研究了机场飞机起飞架数与机场战术、技术参数、机场飞机的战术、技术参数以及与攻击机的进攻态势之间的关系,确定了多机场飞机对多攻击机机群进行最优目标分配时所应满足的量化关系,给出的模型可对作战决策过程提供理论依据     

A duel complicated by false targets and uncertainty as to opponent type

An attacker, being one of two types, initiates an attack at some time in the interval [-T, 0]. The a priori probabilities of each type are known. As time elapses the defender encounters false targets which occur according to a known Poisson process and which can be properly classified with known probability. The detection and classification probabilities for each type attacker are given. If the defender responds with a weapon at the time of attack, he survives with a probability which depends on the number of weapons in his possession and on attacker type. If he does not respond, his survival probability is smaller. These probabilities are known, as well as the current number of weapons in the defender's possession. They decrease as the number of weapons decreases. The payoff is the defender's survival probability. An iterative system of first-order differential equations is derived whose unique solution V₁(t),V₂(t),…,V_k(t) is shown to be the value of the game at time t, when the defender has 1, 2,…, k,… weapons, respectively. The optimal strategies are determined. Limiting results are obtained as t→-∞, while the ratio of the number of weapons to the expected number of false targets remaining is held constant.     

Pricing and inventory management during new product introduction when shortage creates hype

In this study, we analyze the joint pricing and inventory management during new product introduction when product shortage creates additional demand due to hype. We develop a two‐period model in which a firm launches its product at the beginning of the first period, before it observes sales in the two periods. The product is successful with an exogenous probability, or unsuccessful with the complementary probability. The hype in the second period is observed only when the product is successful. The firm learns the actual status of the product only after observing the first‐period demand. The firm must decide the stocking level and price of the product jointly at the beginning of each of the two periods. In this article, we derive some structural properties of the optimal prices and inventory levels, and show that (i) firms do not always exploit hype, (ii) firms do not always increase the price of a successful product in the second period, (iii) firms may price out an unsuccessful product in the first period if the success probability is above a threshold, and (iv) such a threshold probability is decreasing in the first‐period market potential of the successful product. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 304–320, 2015     

对防空部队自动化控制系统的电子压制(二)效能指标

电子压制是赢得现代战争的关键技术。首先分析电子压制的应用背景,建立地面防空系统的分析模型并给出攻击机突破地面防空系统过程中,电子压制对方自动化控制系统的效能评估指标。给出的模型和效能评估指标可对作战决策提供理论依据。     

The timing of contests

We develop a simple model to analyze the timing of contests. When the odds of winning a contest are exogenously given – we show that if either the players discount the future or if the total cost of contest is smaller in the future – there exist subgame perfect equilibria where both players settle, anticipating a contest in the future. With endogenous efforts, the aggregate efforts expanded in a contest are smaller if the contest occurs in the future when the relative effort productivities remain constant or diverge over time, thus creating scope for delay in contests. When the effort productivities converge over time, the total efforts may be greater under a future contest. As a consequence, players either settle over the two periods, or else they initiate a contest immediately.     

Optimal patrol to uncover threats in time when detection is imperfect

Consider a patrol problem, where a patroller traverses a graph through edges to detect potential attacks at nodes. An attack takes a random amount of time to complete. The patroller takes one time unit to move to and inspect an adjacent node, and will detect an ongoing attack with some probability. If an attack completes before it is detected, a cost is incurred. The attack time distribution, the cost due to a successful attack, and the detection probability all depend on the attack node. The patroller seeks a patrol policy that minimizes the expected cost incurred when, and if, an attack eventually happens. We consider two cases. A random attacker chooses where to attack according to predetermined probabilities, while a strategic attacker chooses where to attack to incur the maximal expected cost. In each case, computing the optimal solution, although possible, quickly becomes intractable for problems of practical sizes. Our main contribution is to develop efficient index policies—based on Lagrangian relaxation methodology, and also on approximate dynamic programming—which typically achieve within 1% of optimality with computation time orders of magnitude less than what is required to compute the optimal policy for problems of practical sizes. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 61: 557–576, 2014     

战术防空激光武器发展概况

空中攻击与防空作战在相互斗争中发展,随着空中威胁目标种类变化、性能提高,作为防空武器的一个重要的新型分支,防空激光武器在快速发展,将在近程防空与反导中起重要作用。综述了空中威胁变化对激光武器的需求,激光武器的分类、组成与特点,以及国外战术防空激光反导武器系统发展概况。     

直升机装备子母弹对坦克群作战的效能分析

分析了几个影响坦克威胁程度的主要因素,采用新的归一化效用函数法,对各目标的威胁程度进行评估,确定智能子母弹的攻击瞄准点.然后建立智能子母弹对目标攻击过程的数学模型及毁伤概率的计算模型,通过蒙特卡洛方法计算各目标命中的子弹数目.综合目标的特性进行多次仿真,得出了子母弹对整个坦克群目标的作战效能.最后模拟实现了整个攻击过程...     

Doing Away with “Legitimate Authority”

ABSTRACT

I argue in this article that traditional just war theory did allow private, indeed even individual war, and that arguments in support of a legitimate authority criterion, let alone in support of the “priority” of this criterion, fail. I further argue that what motivates the insistence on “legitimate authority” is the assumption that doing away with this criterion will lead to chaos and anarchy. I demonstrate that the reasoning, if any, underlying this assumption is philosophically confused. The fact of the matter is that wars need not necessarily be authorized by some higher authority (such as a king, president, or parliament) in order to be justified, and this moral fact does not need to lead to chaos and anarchy. Accordingly, the criterion of legitimate authority cannot be relied on to delegitimate individual war, private war, guerrilla war, or even terrorism. Finally, I consider some other defenses of authorization and demonstrate that the “authorization” these accounts defend is either not needed for justification or already provided by other just war criteria or, indeed, entirely fictitious.     

Globalisation in the defence industry: An exploration of the paradigm for us and European defence firms and the implications for being global players

This paper explores some of the key issues associated with the restructuring of the defence industry. A comparison is made between the US and the European Defence Industrial Bases in terms of the drivers for change and the paradigms within which change has taken place. Having shown that some very important differences exist, the paper then explores the approaches that have been adopted for industry consolidation and references them to the academic literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and strategic alliances (SAs). Given that most of the key defence players recognise the need to be global players, the paper presents an argument that the European firms’ experience of operating with a wide range of forms of corporate alliance will serve them in good stead for operating on a global defence scale. US firms, in contrast, have focused largely on M&A activity.     

Striking a deal on the F-35: multinational politics and US defence acquisition

Why does joint defence production of advanced weapons systems, which appears like a logical choice at first, become harder for both the primary production state and its allies to manage and justify as the acquisition process runs its course? To answer this question, we analyze the multinational politics of the F-35 JSF with a focus on how secondary states who have bought into the program are affected by domestic politics within the primary production state. We find that US congressional and bureaucratic politics, cuts to US defence spending, and a desire to retain tight control over the program has locked allies into a program with which they have little leverage. Potentially losing the ability to fight along side the US if they don’t follow through, coupled with inter-Alliance pressures, leaves secondary states who are involved with the F-35 program, vulnerable to the whims of US domestic politics.     

Aid versus sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds

We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator’s participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTERNAL DEBT,DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AND GNP REVISITED: THE CASE OF TURKEY

This paper contributes to the continuing debate on the economic effects of military expenditure by undertaking a case study of Greece. Within Europe Greece provides a particularly interesting object of study. It has the highest military burden in Europe and NATO, is the only European Union country situated in the unstable environment of the Balkans, faces a military threat from Turkey, and has a very weak economy. After some background analysis of the economy and military expenditure, the paper investigates the determinants of Greek military expenditure as well as whether the high military burden has played an important role in Greece's poor economic performance over the period 1960–1996. It estimates a Keynesian simultaneous equation model with a supply side, which allows the indirect effects of military expenditure to be captured explicitly. It concludes that the major determinants of Greek defence spending are not economic but strategic (the threat of war) and that the direct effect of defence spending on economic growth as well as the indirect effects through savings and trade balance are all significantly negative. On the basis of such strong results, the paper concludes that defence spending is harmful for the Greek economy.     

COUNTRY SURVEY XX: DEFENCE SPENDING AND PEACEKEEPING IN URUGUAY

Uruguay is a country with a very unusual profile, since it has just 3.4 million inhabitants but is among the top ten troop contributors to the UN PKO (Peace Keeping Operations) and is the first contributor per capita. In 2002 and 2003 it was the seventh troop contributor to the UN, and by the end of 2005 it was eighth in the UN ranking. Uruguay has never had any imminent external threat to its security after its independence in 1828, and it has had no internal threat since the end of the urban guerrillas’ actions in the 1970s. The country has no defence industry, and has always had an all‐volunteer military service, which presently involves almost 1% of the total population, and about 2% of the labour force. The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that, in the past decades, Uruguayan defence spending has been influenced mainly by internal factors, most of them of an economic nature. The high participation in PKO has not increased military expenditure and it has produced a positive impact on the country’s economy.     

Adaptive competitive decision in repeated play of a matrix game with uncertain entries

This study is concerned with a game model involving repeated play of a matrix game with unknown entries; it is a two-person, zero-sum, infinite game of perfect recall. The entries of the matrix ((pij)) are selected according to a joint probability distribution known by both players and this unknown matrix is played repeatedly. If the pure strategy pair (i, j) is employed on day k, k = 1, 2, …, the maximizing player receives a discounted income of β^{k - 1} X_ij, where β is a constant, 0 ≤ β ? 1, and X_ij assumes the value one with probability p_ij or the value zero with probability 1 - p_ij. After each trial, the players are informed of the triple (i, j, X_ij) and retain this knowledge. The payoff to the maximizing player is the expected total discounted income. It is shown that a solution exists, the value being characterized as the unique solution of a functional equation and optimal strategies consisting of locally optimal play in an auxiliary matrix determined by the past history. A definition of an ?-learning strategy pair is formulated and a theorem obtained exhibiting ?-optimal strategies which are ?-learning. The asymptotic behavior of the value is obtained as the discount tends to one.