A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000     

Discrete search allocation game with false contacts

This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

A search game taking account of attributes of searching resources

This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game (SAG), in which a searcher and a target participate as players. The searcher distributes his searching resources in a search space to detect the target. The effect of resources lasts a certain period of time and extends to some areas at a distance from the resources' dropped points. On the other hand, the target moves around in the search space to evade the searcher. In the history of search games, there has been little research covering the durability and reachability of searching resources. This article proposes two linear programming formulations to solve the SAG with durable and reachable resources, and at the same time provide an optimal strategy of distributing searching resources for the searcher and an optimal moving strategy for the target. Using examples, we will analyze the influences of two attributes of resources on optimal strategies. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2008     

Rendezvous search on labeled networks

Two players are independently placed on a commonly labelled network X. They cannot see each other but wish to meet in least expected time. We consider continuous and discrete versions, in which they may move at unit speed or between adjacent distinct nodes, respectively. There are two versions of the problem (asymmetric or symmetric), depending on whether or not we allow the players to use different strategies. After obtaining some optimality conditions for general networks, we specialize to the interval and circle networks. In the first setting, we extend the work of J. V. Howard; in the second we prove a conjecture concerning the optimal symmetric strategy. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 256–274, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10011     

A search game on a cyclic graph

There is a finite cyclic graph. The hider chooses one of all nodes except the specified one, and he hides an (immobile) object there. At the beginning the seeker is at the specified node. After the seeker chooses an ordering of the nodes except the specified one, he examines each nodes in that order until he finds the object, traveling along edges. It costs an amount when he moves from a node to an adjacent one and also when he checks a node. While the hider wishes to maximize the sum of the traveling costs and the examination costs which are required to find the object, the seeker wishes to minimize it. The problem is modeled as a two‐person zero‐sum game. We solve the game when unit costs (traveling cost + examination cost) have geometrical relations depending on nodes. Then we give properties of optimal strategies of both players. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

An infiltration game with time dependent payoff

The problem of assigning patrol boats, subject to resource constraints, to capture or delay an infiltrator with perishable contraband attempting escape across a long, narrow strait is formulated as a two-sided time sequential game. Optimal mixed strategies are derived for the situation of one patrol boat against one smuggler. Procedures for obtaining numerical solutions for R > 1 patrol boats are discussed.     

Adaptive competitive decision in repeated play of a matrix game with uncertain entries

This study is concerned with a game model involving repeated play of a matrix game with unknown entries; it is a two-person, zero-sum, infinite game of perfect recall. The entries of the matrix ((pij)) are selected according to a joint probability distribution known by both players and this unknown matrix is played repeatedly. If the pure strategy pair (i, j) is employed on day k, k = 1, 2, …, the maximizing player receives a discounted income of β^{k - 1} X_ij, where β is a constant, 0 ≤ β ? 1, and X_ij assumes the value one with probability p_ij or the value zero with probability 1 - p_ij. After each trial, the players are informed of the triple (i, j, X_ij) and retain this knowledge. The payoff to the maximizing player is the expected total discounted income. It is shown that a solution exists, the value being characterized as the unique solution of a functional equation and optimal strategies consisting of locally optimal play in an auxiliary matrix determined by the past history. A definition of an ?-learning strategy pair is formulated and a theorem obtained exhibiting ?-optimal strategies which are ?-learning. The asymptotic behavior of the value is obtained as the discount tends to one.     

Estimating the probability that a simulated system will be the best

Consider a stochastic simulation experiment consisting of v independent vector replications consisting of an observation from each of k independent systems. Typical system comparisons are based on mean (long‐run) performance. However, the probability that a system will actually be the best is sometimes more relevant, and can provide a very different perspective than the systems' means. Empirically, we select one system as the best performer (i.e., it wins) on each replication. Each system has an unknown constant probability of winning on any replication and the numbers of wins for the individual systems follow a multinomial distribution. Procedures exist for selecting the system with the largest probability of being the best. This paper addresses the companion problem of estimating the probability that each system will be the best. The maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) of the multinomial cell probabilities for a set of v vector replications across k systems are well known. We use these same v vector replications to form v^k unique vectors (termed pseudo‐replications) that contain one observation from each system and develop estimators based on AVC (All Vector Comparisons). In other words, we compare every observation from each system with every combination of observations from the remaining systems and note the best performer in each pseudo‐replication. AVC provides lower variance estimators of the probability that each system will be the best than the MLEs. We also derive confidence intervals for the AVC point estimators, present a portion of an extensive empirical evaluation and provide a realistic example. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 341–358, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10019     

The search for an intelligent evader: Strategies for searcher and evader in the two-region problem

This paper considers the search for an evader concealed in one of two regions, each of which is characterized by its detection probability. The single-sided problem, in which the searcher is told the probability of the evader being located in a particular region, has been examined previously. We shall be concerned with the double-sided problem in which the evader chooses this probability secretly, although he may not subsequently move: his optimal strategy consists of that probability distribution which maximizes the expected time to detection, while the searcher's optimal strategy is the sequence of searches which limits the evader to this expected time. It transpires for this problem that optimal strategies for both searcher and evader may generally be obtained to a surprisingly good degree of approximation by using the optimal strategies for the closely related (but far more easily solved) problem in which the evader is completely free to move between searches.     

Characterization of the nucleolus for a class of n-person games

An inductive procedure is given for finding the nucleolus of an n-person game in which all coalitions with less than n-1 players are totally defeated. It is shown that, for such a game, one of three things may occur: (a) all players receive the same amount; (b) each player receives his quota, plus a certain constant (which may be positive, nerative, or zero); (c) the weakest player receives one half his quota, and the other players divide the remaining profit according to the nucleolus of a similar (n-1)-person game. It is also shown that the nucleolus of such a game yields directly the nucleolus of each derived game. An example is worked out in detail.     

A dual criteria sequencing problem with earliness and tardiness penalties

We consider the problem of sequencing n jobs on a single machine, with each job having a processing time and a common due date. The common due date is assumed to be so large that all jobs can complete by the due date. It is known that there is an O(n log n)‐time algorithm for finding a schedule with minimum total earliness and tardiness. In this article, we consider finding a schedule with dual criteria. The primary goal is to minimize the total earliness and tardiness. The secondary goals are to minimize: (1) the maximum earliness and tardiness; (2) the sum of the maximum of the squares of earliness and tardiness; (3) the sum of the squares of earliness and tardiness. For the first two criteria, we show that the problems are NP‐hard and we give a fully polynomial time approximation scheme for both of them. For the last two criteria, we show that the ratio of the worst schedule versus the best schedule is no more than . © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 422–431, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10020     

搜索路径给定时的搜索对策问题及其应用

搜索路径给定时的最优搜索方案问题,也可以理解为是关于搜索者和目标的二人对策问题,主要讨论了当搜索路径给定时的单个搜索者和单个目标的搜索对策问题。首先根据问题的特点,利用动态规划和迭代的方法,确定关于目标逃逸路径混合策略的最优分区,证明该分区是多面体凸集;针对目标不同逃逸路径的分区,求出搜索者的最大期望收益,再将问题转化为二人有限零和对策,计算出搜索者的支付矩阵,确定最优搜索策略。最后结合海军护航行动,对我舰载直升机搜索小型海盗船进行分析和计算,说明搜索路径给定时的最优搜索对策对于双方的资源分配和提高搜索效率具有一定的应用价值。     

The solution to an open problem for a caching game

In a caching game introduced by Alpern et al. (Alpern et al., Lecture notes in computer science (2010) 220–233) a Hider who can dig to a total fixed depth normalized to 1 buries a fixed number of objects among n discrete locations. A Searcher who can dig to a total depth of h searches the locations with the aim of finding all of the hidden objects. If he does so, he wins, otherwise the Hider wins. This zero‐sum game is complicated to analyze even for small values of its parameters, and for the case of 2 hidden objects has been completely solved only when the game is played in up to 3 locations. For some values of h the solution of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations is known, but the solution in the remaining cases was an open question recently highlighted by Fokkink et al. (Fokkink et al., Search theory: A game theoretic perspective (2014) 85–104). Here we solve the remaining cases of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations. We also give some more general results for the game, in particular using a geometrical argument to show that when there are 2 objects hidden in n locations and n→∞, the value of the game is asymptotically equal to h/n for h≥n/2. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 23–31, 2016     

Two‐stage component test plans for testing the reliability of a series system

A system reliability is often evaluated by individual tests of components that constitute the system. These component test plans have advantages over complete system based tests in terms of time and cost. In this paper, we consider the series system with n components, where the lifetime of the i‐th component follows exponential distribution with parameter λ_i. Assuming test costs for the components are different, we develop an efficient algorithm to design a two‐stage component test plan that satisfies the usual probability requirements on the system reliability and in addition minimizes the maximum expected cost. For the case of prior information in the form of upper bounds on λ_i's, we use the genetic algorithm to solve the associated optimization problems which are otherwise difficult to solve using mathematical programming techniques. The two‐stage component test plans are cost effective compared to single‐stage plans developed by Rajgopal and Mazumdar. We demonstrate through several numerical examples that our approach has the potential to reduce the overall testing costs significantly. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 95–116, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1051     

不完全信息下军事威逼讨价还价博弈分析

在详细分析威慑与威逼区别的基础上,构建了不完全信息下军事威逼讨价还价博弈模型。按照最大期望效用准则,分析了不完全信息下军事威逼走向讨价还价阶段的条件,研究表明:运用鲁宾斯坦经典讨价还价唯一完美均衡解,得出以下结论:争夺目标自身的效用越大,战争带来的声誉得益效用越大,军事威逼走向讨价还价阶段的可能性越大;一旦进入讨价还价阶段,威逼者会接受挑战者提出的方案,冲突将不再发生。     

New results on a Ruckle problem in discrete games of ambush

This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game in which player I chooses in integer interval [1, N] two integer intervals consisting of p and q points where p + q < N, and player II chooses an integer point in [1, N]. The payoff to player I equals 1 if the point chosen by player II is at least in one of the intervals chosen by player II and 0 otherwise. This paper complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, Lee, Garnaev, and Zoroa, Zoroa and Fernández‐Sáez. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 98–106, 2001     

Confidence intervals for ranked means

Suppose that observations from populations π₁, …, π_k (k ≥ 1) are normally distributed with unknown means μ₁., μ_k, respectively, and a common known variance σ². Let μ_[1] μ … ≤ μ_[k] denote the ranked means. We take n independent observations from each population, denote the sample mean of the n observation from π₁ by X _i (i = 1, …, k), and define the ranked sample means X _[1] ≤ … ≤ X _[k]. The problem of confidence interval estimation of μ₍₁₎, …,μ_[k] is stated and related to previous work (Section 1). The following results are obtained (Section 2). For i = 1, …, k and any γ(0 < γ < 1) an upper confidence interval for μ_[i] with minimal probability of coverage γ is (? ∞, X _[i]+ h) with h = (σ/n^1/2) Φ^?1(γ^1/k-i+1), where Φ(·) is the standard normal cdf. A lower confidence interval for μ_[i] with minimal probability of coverage γ is (X _i[i] – g, + ∞) with g = (σ/n^1/2) Φ^?1(γ^1/i). For the upper confidence interval on μ_[i] the maximal probability of coverage is 1– [1 – γ^1/k-i+1]ⁱ, while for the lower confidence interval on μ_[i] the maximal probability of coverage is 1–[1– γ^1/i] ^k-i+¹. Thus the maximal overprotection can always be calculated. The overprotection is tabled for k = 2, 3. These results extend to certain translation parameter families. It is proven that, under a bounded completeness condition, a monotone upper confidence interval h(X ₁, …, X _k) for μ_[i] with probability of coverage γ(0 < γ < 1) for all μ = (μ_[1], …,μ_[k]), does not exist.     

A new importance sampling Monte Carlo method for a flow network reliability problem

The exact evaluation of the probability that the maximum st‐flow is greater than or equal to a fixed demand in a stochastic flow network is an NP‐hard problem. This limitation leads one to consider Monte Carlo alternatives. In this paper, we propose a new importance sampling Monte Carlo method. It is based on a recursive use of the state space decomposition methodology of Doulliez and Jamoulle during the simulation process. We show theoretically that the resulting estimator belongs to the variance‐reduction family and we give an upper bound on its variance. As shown by experimental tests, the new sampling principle offers, in many cases, substantial speedups with respect to a previous importance sampling based on the same decomposition procedure and its best performances are obtained when highly reliable networks are analyzed. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 204–228, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10004