Characterization of the nucleolus for a class of n-person games

An inductive procedure is given for finding the nucleolus of an n-person game in which all coalitions with less than n-1 players are totally defeated. It is shown that, for such a game, one of three things may occur: (a) all players receive the same amount; (b) each player receives his quota, plus a certain constant (which may be positive, nerative, or zero); (c) the weakest player receives one half his quota, and the other players divide the remaining profit according to the nucleolus of a similar (n-1)-person game. It is also shown that the nucleolus of such a game yields directly the nucleolus of each derived game. An example is worked out in detail.     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

An algorithm for separable piecewise convex programming problems

We present a branch and bound algorithm to solve mathematical programming problems of the form: Find x =|(x₁,…x_n) to minimize Σ?_i0(x₁) subject to x?G, l≦x≦L and Σ?_i0(x₁)≦0, j=1,…,m. With l=(l₁,…,l_n) and L=(L₁,…,L_n), each ?_ij is assumed to be lower aemicontinuous and piecewise convex on the finite interval [l_i.L_i]. G is assumed to be a closed convex set. The algorithm solves a finite sequence of convex programming problems; these correspond to successive partitions of the set C={x|l ≦ x ≦L} on the bahis of the piecewise convexity of the problem functions ?_ij. Computational considerations are discussed, and an illustrative example is presented.     

On computing the expected discounted return in a markov chain

The discounted return associated with a finite state Markov chain X₁, X₂… is given by g(X₁)+ αg(X₂) + α²g(X₃) + …, where g(x) represents the immediate return from state x. Knowing the transition matrix of the chain, it is desired to compute the expected discounted return (present worth) given the initial state. This type of problem arises in inventory theory, dynamic programming, and elsewhere. Usually the solution is approximated by solving the system of linear equations characterizing the expected return. These equations can be solved by a variety of well-known methods. This paper describes yet another method, which is a slight modification of the classical iterative scheme. The method gives sequences of upper and lower bounds which converge mono-tonely to the solution. Hence, the method is relatively free of error control problems. Computational experiments were conducted which suggest that for problems with a large number of states, the method is quite efficient. The amount of computation required to obtain the solution increases much slower with an increase in the number of states, N, than with the conventional methods. In fact, computational time is more nearly proportional to N², than to N³.     

Characterizations of the exponential distribution by higher-order gap

Suppose X₁,X₂, ?,X_n is a random sample of size n from a continuous distribution function F(x) and let X_1,n, ≦ X_2,n ≦ ? ≦ X_n,n be the corresponding order statistics. We define the jth-order gap g_i,j as g_i,j = X_i+j,n ? X_i,n, 1 ≦ i < n, 1 ≦ j ≦ n ? i. In this article characterizations of the exponential distribution are given by considering the distributional properties of g_k,n-k, 1 ≦ k ≦ n.     

More on the search for an infiltrator

We have asymptotically solved a discrete search game on an array of n ordered cells with two players: infiltrator (hider) and searcher, when the probability of survival approaches 1. The infiltrator wishes to reach the last cell in finite time, and the searcher has to defend that cell. When the players occupy the same cell, the searcher captures the infiltrator with probability 1 ? z. The payoff to the hider is the probability that the hider reaches the last cell without getting captured. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 1–14, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1047     

A note on a stochastic production-maximizing transportation problem

A stochastic production-maximizing problem with transportation constraints is considered where the production rates, R_ij, of man i — job j combinations are random variables rather than constants. It is shown that for the family of Weibull distributions (of which the Exponential is a special case) with scale parameters λ_ij and shape parameter β, the plan that maximizes the expected rate of the entire line is obtained by solving a deterministic fixed charge transportation problem with no linear costs and with “set-up” cost matrix ‖λ_ij‖.     

On some stocxastic tactical antisubmarine games

Mathematical models of tactical problems in Hntisubmarine Warfare (ASW) are developed. Specifically, a game of pursuit between a hunter-killer force. player 1, and a possible submarine, player 2 is considered. The game consists of a sequence of moves and terminates when player 2 is tcaught or evades player 1. When the players move they observe the actual tactical configuration of the forces (state) and each player choosa-s a tactical plan from a finite collection. This joint choice of tactical plans determines an immediate payoff and a transition probability distribution over the states. Hence an expected payoff function is defined, Formally this game is a Terminating Stochastic Game (TSG). Shapley demonstrated the existence of a value and optimal strategies (solution), An iterative technique to approximate the solution to within desired accuracy is proposed. Each iteration of the technique is obtained by solving a set of linear programs. To introduce more realism into the game several variations of the TSG are also considered. One variation is a finite TSG and linear programming techniques are employed to find the solution.     

Algorithms for the minimax transportation problem

In this paper, we consider a variant of the classical transportation problem as well as of the bottleneck transportation problem, which we call the minimax transportation problem. The problem considered is to determine a feasible flow x_ij from a set of origins I to a set of destinations J for which max_(i,j)εIxJ{c_ijx_ij} is minimum. In this paper, we develop a parametric algorithm and a primal-dual algorithm to solve this problem. The parametric algorithm solves a transportation problem with parametric upper bounds and the primal-dual algorithm solves a sequence of related maximum flow problems. The primal-dual algorithm is shown to be polynomially bounded. Numerical investigations with both the algorithms are described in detail. The primal-dual algorithm is found to be computationally superior to the parametric algorithm and it can solve problems up to 1000 origins, 1000 destinations and 10,000 arcs in less than 1 minute on a DEC 10 computer system. The optimum solution of the minimax transportation problem may be noninteger. We also suggest a polynomial algorithm to convert this solution into an integer optimum solution.     

Estimating value in a uniform auction

Consider an auction in which increasing bids are made in sequence on an object whose value θ is known to each bidder. Suppose n bids are received, and the distribution of each bid is conditionally uniform. More specifically, suppose the first bid X₁ is uniformly distributed on [0, θ], and the i^th bid is uniformly distributed on [X_i?1, θ] for i = 2, …?, n. A scenario in which this auction model is appropriate is described. We assume that the value θ is un known to the statistician and must be esimated from the sample X₁, X₂, …?, X_n. The best linear unbiased estimate of θ is derived. The invariance of the estimation problem under scale transformations in noted, and the best invariant estimation problem under scale transformations is noted, and the best invariant estimate of θ under loss L(θ, a) = [(a/θ) ? 1]² is derived. It is shown that this best invariant estimate has uniformly smaller mean-squared error than the best linear unbiased estimate, and the ratio of the mean-squared errors is estimated from simulation experiments. A Bayesian formulation of the estimation problem is also considered, and a class of Bayes estimates is explicitly derived.     

Optimal betting strategies for favorable games

We examine the problem of a gambler interested in maximizing the expected value of a convex utility function of his fortune after n plays of a game. We allow any probability distribution to rule the outcome of each play, and this distribution may change from play to play according to a Markov process. We present results regarding the existence of an optimal policy and its structural dependence on the gambler's fortune. The well-known results of Bellman and Kalaba for exponential and logarithmic utility functions and coin-tossing games are generalized. We also examine the situation of general stale spaces and show that the same structural results hold.     

Transportation problems with some xij negative and transshipment problems

The general solution process of the Hitchcock transportation problem resulting from the application of the method of reduced matrices may give solutions with some negative x_ij values. This paper is devoted to a review of the reduced matrices method, an examination of suitable interpretation of sets of x_ij which include some negative values, and ways of interpreting these values in useful modifications of the Hitchcock problem. Such modifications include a) the reshipment problem, b) the overshipment problem, and c) the transshipment problem. Techniques are developed for determining and eliminating c_ij which are not optimal. These techniques and results are useful in solving the problems indicated above. The natural applicability of the simple and general method of reduced matrices is emphasized.     

The asymptotic distribution of order statistics

For each n., X₁(n), X₂(n), …, X_n(n) are IID, with common pdf f_n(x). y₁(n) < … < Y_n (n) are the ordered values of X₁ (n), …, X_n(n). K_n is a positive integer, with lim K_n = ∞. Under certain conditions on K_n and f_n (x), it was shown in an earlier paper that the joint distribution of a special set of K_n + 1 of the variables Y₁ (n), …, Y_n (n) can be assumed to be normal for all asymptotic probability calculations. In another paper, it was shown that if f_n (x) approaches the pdf which is uniform over (0, 1) at a certain rate as n increases, then the conditional distribution of the order statistics not in the special set can be assumed to be uniform for all asymptotic probability calculations. The present paper shows that even if f_n (x) does not approach the uniform distribution as n increases, the distribution of the order statistics contained between order statistics in the special set can be assumed to be the distribution of a quadratic function of uniform random variables, for all asymptotic probability calculations. Applications to statistical inference are given.     

New results on a Ruckle problem in discrete games of ambush

This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game in which player I chooses in integer interval [1, N] two integer intervals consisting of p and q points where p + q < N, and player II chooses an integer point in [1, N]. The payoff to player I equals 1 if the point chosen by player II is at least in one of the intervals chosen by player II and 0 otherwise. This paper complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, Lee, Garnaev, and Zoroa, Zoroa and Fernández‐Sáez. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 98–106, 2001     

Distribution of sample correlation coefficients

Let (Y, X_l,…, X_K) be a random vector distributed according to a multivariate normal distribution where X_l,…, X_K are considered as predictor variables and y is the predictand. Let r_i, and R_i denote the population and sample correlation coefficients, respectively, between Y and X_i. The population correlation coefficient r_i is a measure of the predictive power of X_i. The author has derived the joint distribution of R_l,…, R_K and its asymptotic property. The given result is useful in the problem of selecting the most important predictor variable corresponding to the largest absolute value of r_i.     

Maximizing the ratio of two convex functions over a convex set

The purpose of this article is to present an algorithm for globally maximizing the ratio of two convex functions f and g over a convex set X. To our knowledge, this is the first algorithm to be proposed for globally solving this problem. The algorithm uses a branch and bound search to guarantee that a global optimal solution is found. While it does not require the functions f and g to be differentiable, it does require that subgradients of g can be calculated efficiently. The main computational effort of the algorithm involves solving a sequence of subproblems that can be solved by convex programming methods. When X is polyhedral, these subproblems can be solved by linear programming procedures. Because of these properties, the algorithm offers a potentially attractive means for globally maximizing ratios of convex functions over convex sets. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

An attack-defense game with matrix strategies

This paper presents the results and the method of analysis for an attack-defense game involving allocation of resources. Each player is assumed to have several different types of resources to be divided in optimal fashion among a fixed set of targets. The payoff function of the game is convex. The “No Soft-Spot” principle of M. Dresher, and the concept of the generalized inverse of a matrix are used to determine optimal strategies for each player and the value of the game.     

A duel complicated by false targets and uncertainty as to opponent type

An attacker, being one of two types, initiates an attack at some time in the interval [-T, 0]. The a priori probabilities of each type are known. As time elapses the defender encounters false targets which occur according to a known Poisson process and which can be properly classified with known probability. The detection and classification probabilities for each type attacker are given. If the defender responds with a weapon at the time of attack, he survives with a probability which depends on the number of weapons in his possession and on attacker type. If he does not respond, his survival probability is smaller. These probabilities are known, as well as the current number of weapons in the defender's possession. They decrease as the number of weapons decreases. The payoff is the defender's survival probability. An iterative system of first-order differential equations is derived whose unique solution V₁(t),V₂(t),…,V_k(t) is shown to be the value of the game at time t, when the defender has 1, 2,…, k,… weapons, respectively. The optimal strategies are determined. Limiting results are obtained as t→-∞, while the ratio of the number of weapons to the expected number of false targets remaining is held constant.     

Confidence intervals for ranked means

Suppose that observations from populations π₁, …, π_k (k ≥ 1) are normally distributed with unknown means μ₁., μ_k, respectively, and a common known variance σ². Let μ_[1] μ … ≤ μ_[k] denote the ranked means. We take n independent observations from each population, denote the sample mean of the n observation from π₁ by X _i (i = 1, …, k), and define the ranked sample means X _[1] ≤ … ≤ X _[k]. The problem of confidence interval estimation of μ₍₁₎, …,μ_[k] is stated and related to previous work (Section 1). The following results are obtained (Section 2). For i = 1, …, k and any γ(0 < γ < 1) an upper confidence interval for μ_[i] with minimal probability of coverage γ is (? ∞, X _[i]+ h) with h = (σ/n^1/2) Φ^?1(γ^1/k-i+1), where Φ(·) is the standard normal cdf. A lower confidence interval for μ_[i] with minimal probability of coverage γ is (X _i[i] – g, + ∞) with g = (σ/n^1/2) Φ^?1(γ^1/i). For the upper confidence interval on μ_[i] the maximal probability of coverage is 1– [1 – γ^1/k-i+1]ⁱ, while for the lower confidence interval on μ_[i] the maximal probability of coverage is 1–[1– γ^1/i] ^k-i+¹. Thus the maximal overprotection can always be calculated. The overprotection is tabled for k = 2, 3. These results extend to certain translation parameter families. It is proven that, under a bounded completeness condition, a monotone upper confidence interval h(X ₁, …, X _k) for μ_[i] with probability of coverage γ(0 < γ < 1) for all μ = (μ_[1], …,μ_[k]), does not exist.     

A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000