“Government contracting options: A model and application“∗

This paper models and simulates a government‐contractor principal‐agent weapon system repair model. Insights are derived as to how government repair contracts should be constructed so as to induce optimal contractor behavior. The paper's general conclusion is that the best contracting approach combines a lump‐sum payment that does not vary with the number of units repaired, expensive item cost‐sharing, and a contractor‐provided availability guarantee. Provided there is intercontractor competition, this type of contract performs well even if the government is poorly informed about weapon system break patterns or repair costs.     

通用军械装备维修备件合同商保障方式研究

提出了备件合同商保障的概念,给出了备件合同商保障内容和维度,分析了备件合同商保障的特征,着重从备件的存储方式和供应方式两个方面进行了定性分析,为实施备件合同商保障奠定了理论基础．     

复杂装备军民融合维修保障效益评价研究

针对军民融合维修保障中缺少对合同商效益评价,无法为合同商选择、合同续签等工作提供科学依据的情况,提出基于项目后评价理论的合同商维修保障效益评价理念。在分析了军民融合维修保障项目后评价内容的基础上,以效益评价为例对复杂装备军民融合维修保障效益评价进行分析。建立了合同商保障的费用分析模型和装备可用度模型。最后,通过算例对该方法进行了演示验证。     

Quantification of contractor risk

This paper presents a quantitative index of the level of risk assumed by a contractor in various contract type situations. The definition includes expression of real world uncertainty and contractor's utility for money. Examples are given for the major contract types and special applications are discussed.     

业主延期条件下FIDIC施工合同条件调价公式研究

调价公式作为FIDIC合同中最重要的风险分配方式之一,通过对可调价要素价格指数或价格的调整,把合同中的隐性风险在业主和承包商之间的分配比例作了明确规定.从承包商的角度,并基于业主的原因造成工期延长的条件下,对调价公式中各个组成因子及其权重对调价结果的影响进行了研究,探索把调价公式同成本管理有机结合起来,以期达到降低成本...     

战时合同商保障风险评估研究

合同商保障风险的分析和评估,对于成功实施合同商保障具有非常重要的意义。首先对战时合同商保障过程中的可能遇到的风险问题进行了分析,建立战时合同商保障的风险评估模型,然后利用层次分析法得出模型中所需要的参数,最后进行了案例分析。     

基于效果的装备保障合同商选择方法

基于效果的合同商装备保障是将基于效果的维修理念应用于合同商装备保障领域提出的一种装备保障策略,更加关注装备的作战效能,同时对合同商提出了更高要求,因此,选择恰当的合同商对于实现预期结果显得更为重要。而合同商选择是一个多准则决策问题,很大程度上依赖于决策者和决策条件状态的不确定性和模糊性。构建了一个基于效果的合同商选择系统流程,并提出了基于相似度的模糊TOPSIS法,简化了计算流程,最后通过一个具体案例来验证该方法的有效性。     

基于博弈论的装备采购定价激励模型

不同的定价方式和定价参数的选择对于承包商会起到不同程度的激励作用。为提高装备采购效益,在承包商追求效用最大化假设的基础上,建立了装备采购完全信息动态博弈模型。对价格、成本、承包商努力程度和承包商效用之间的关系进行了研究,证明了成本分担和固定价格的定价方式能够有效激励承包商提高自身努力水平降低成本,并提出了2种定价方式的参数定量计算方法。     

基于性能的装备采购合同商选择研究

根据基于性能的装备采购目标,在考虑合同商满足军方提出的性能指标的基础上,从合同商的资质、生产技术能力、装备价格成本、装备保障性能、管理运营情况和双方协商沟通水平等方面建立了合同商选择评价指标体系,并运用层次变权综合决策方法进行综合评判。案例分析表明：该方法能充分反映决策者的意愿,使合同商的选择更好地满足基于性能的装备采购的需要。     

成本分担定价方式的装备采购博弈研究

承包商的努力程度直接决定了装备的制造成本。为有效激励承包商降低装备制造成本，提高装备采购效益，基于里昂惕夫劳资博弈模型建立了成本分担定价方式的装备采购博弈模型。并在承包商边际效用非线性和定价方式多变量的假设基础上，分别对价格、成本、承包商努力程度和承包商效用之间的关系进行了研究，对原模型进行了拓展，为定价方式中参数的确定提供了量化方法。     

Client‐contractor bargaining on net present value in project scheduling with limited resources

The client‐contractor bargaining problem addressed here is in the context of a multi‐mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows, which is formulated as a progress payments model. In this model, the contractor receives payments from the client at predetermined regular time intervals. The last payment is paid at the first predetermined payment point right after project completion. The second payment model considered in this paper is the one with payments at activity completions. The project is represented on an Activity‐on‐Node (AON) project network. Activity durations are assumed to be deterministic. The project duration is bounded from above by a deadline imposed by the client, which constitutes a hard constraint. The bargaining objective is to maximize the bargaining objective function comprised of the objectives of both the client and the contractor. The bargaining objective function is expected to reflect the two‐party nature of the problem environment and seeks a compromise between the client and the contractor. The bargaining power concept is introduced into the problem by the bargaining power weights used in the bargaining objective function. Simulated annealing algorithm and genetic algorithm approaches are proposed as solution procedures. The proposed solution methods are tested with respect to solution quality and solution times. Sensitivity analyses are conducted among different parameters used in the model, namely the profit margin, the discount rate, and the bargaining power weights. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Supply contracts in manufacturer‐retailer interactions with manufacturer‐quality and retailer effort‐induced demand

We consider a decentralized distribution channel where demand depends on the manufacturer‐chosen quality of the product and the selling effort chosen by the retailer. The cost of selling effort is private information for the retailer. We consider three different types of supply contracts in this article: price‐only contract where the manufacturer sets a wholesale price; fixed‐fee contract where manufacturer sells at marginal cost but charges a fixed (transfer) fee; and, general franchise contract where manufacturer sets a wholesale price and charges a fixed fee as well. The fixed‐fee and general franchise contracts are referred to as two‐part tariff contracts. For each contract type, we study different contract forms including individual, menu, and pooling contracts. In the analysis of the different types and forms of contracts, we show that the price only contract is dominated by the general franchise menu contract. However, the manufacturer may prefer to offer the fixed‐fee individual contract as compared to the general franchise contract when the retailer's reservation utility and degree of information asymmetry in costs are high. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

基于军民融合条件的装备性能维修保障合同执行情况

在军民融合背景下,部分新获得承制资格企业在首批装备制造或维修保障任务中时有违约问题发生。为解决该问题,提出了以基于性能的采办理论为基础的合同违约预测方法研究。以陆军通用武器装备维修保障承制单位为案例,运用SPSS软件进行数据整理和因子分析,构建合同履行预测评价模型。然后利用新入民营企业试生产实验数据在量产前建立费用和可用度模型,通过费效比最优的方式预测各新入企业的首批装备可用度及花费等关键指标,进行综合评估。结论表明该方法能够对装备合同履行情况和违约风险进行预判。     

Trade credit contract in the presence of retailer investment opportunity

This paper presents a model for designing a trade credit contract between a supplier and a retailer that would coordinate a supply chain in the presence of investment opportunity for the retailer. Specifically, we study a newsvendor model where the supplier offers a trade credit contract to the retailer who, by delaying the payment, can invest the accounts payable amount and earn returns. We find that when the channel partners have symmetric information about the retailer's investment return, a conditionally concessional trade credit (CTC) contract, which includes a wholesale price, an interest‐free period, and a minimum order requirement, can achieve channel coordination. We then extend the model to the information asymmetry setting in which the retailer's investment return is unobservable by the supplier. We show that, although the CTC contract cannot achieve the coordination in this setting, it can effectively improve channel efficiency as well as profitability for individual partners.     

多智能体的设备采购合同管理系统建模与设计

从现代设备采购合同管理的概念出发,首先介绍了设备采购合同管理所面临的新的挑战,然后提出了基于多智能体的设备采购合同管理系统模型。多智能体系统和设备采购合同管理系统都是非常复杂的。为了降低开发基于多智能体设备采购合同管理系统的难度,采用SWARM建模方法,分析和设计了一个简化的设备采购合同管理系统。     

基于身份验证技术的后勤保障审核系统

对身份验证的易仿造和易篡改提出了一种新的解决方案--采用数字水印技术来保证身份验证的完整性和不可否认性.阐述了一种采用非对称密码体制的数字水印应用策略,并以在某部队的具体应用为背景实现了一套对身份验证进行散列、数字签名,然后再通过数字水印技术将信息隐藏入验证系统的方案.该方案有效地确保了部队信息传输的保密性、交易者身份的确定性、数据交换的完整性以及发送信息的不可否认性,具有较好的实用价值.     

美军装备采办合同管理及其标准化

在我军武器装备建设逐渐"以计划为主要管理方式和手段"向"以合同为主要管理方式和手段"转变的背景下,装备采购合同管理的研究日趋深入。而装备采购合同"行政合同"的性质及合同标的物复杂性的特点,进一步凸显了标准化在保证装备采购合同规范性、降低不确定性、减少交易成本和提高工作效率中的重要作用。文章在对美军装备采办合同管理标准化特点与经验详细分析和提炼的基础上,对比我军装备采购合同管理体制及标准化现状,有针对性的提出了装备采购合同管理标准化建议,梳理了标准化重点,并为日后时机成熟时制定适用于装备采购合同管理的相关标准或指南,奠定了一定的研究基础。     

Supplier‐buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation

We consider the problem of designing a contract to maximize the supplier's profit in a one‐supplier–one‐buyer relationship for a short‐life‐cycle product. Demand for the finished product is stochastic and price‐sensitive, and only its probability distribution is known when the supply contract is written. When the supplier has complete information on the marginal cost of the buyer, we show that several simple contracts can induce the buyer to choose order quantity that attains the single firm profit maximizing solution, resulting in the maximum possible profit for the supplier. When the marginal cost of the buyer is private information, we show that it is no longer possible to achieve the single firm solution. In this case, the optimal order quantity is always smaller while the optimal sale price of the finished product is higher than the single firm solution. The supplier's profit is lowered while that of the buyer is improved. Moreover, a buyer who has a lower marginal cost will extract more profit from the supplier. Under the optimal contract, the supplier employs a cutoff level policy on the buyer's marginal cost to determine whether the buyer should be induced to sign the contract. We characterize the optimal cutoff level and show how it depends on the parameters of the problem. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 41–64, 2001     

Structural models of award fee contracts

This paper describes the construction of a mathematical model structure in a particular area of management. In addition it is intended as an illustration of how appropriate levels of mathematics can be utilized in management research when original formulations lack sufficient precision for conducting quantitative analyses. The specific area studied deals with the formulation and analysis of contract types. In particular the award fee type contract is treated. At present mathematical structure models for other contract types have received considerable attention, but award fee types have not been structured in mathematical terms. The paper provides a discussion of model formulation for award fee contracts, develops a detailed example of such a structure, and illustrates that model by numerical examples indicating the application of such models to the formulation and analysis of award fee contracts.     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008