台湾问题资料之二：郑成功与台湾

台湾，亚太地区的一颗诱人的明珠。17世纪初，荷兰殖民者以开埠通商为由侵入台湾；1642年荷兰人赶走西班牙人，台湾沦为荷兰的殖民地。荷兰殖民者派兵驻守军政中心台湾城(今台南市安平镇)和赤嵌城(今台南市内)，对台湾人民实行强制统治，疯狂掠夺各种物资。     

中国历代海防发展概览(续)

三、清朝海防建设与围绕边海防问题两种思想两条路线的斗争 郑成功收复台湾 从16世纪开始,西方殖民者相继渡海东来,从事资本主义原始积累的掠夺,亚洲出现了大批的殖民地。1557年,葡萄牙窃据我国澳门之后,狂妄地宣布台湾是澳门的附属地。17世纪初,荷兰取代葡萄牙、西班芽独霸远东海权的垄断地位,一跃而为海上殖民霸主。它的东方殖民侵略组织东印度公司,把侵略的魔爪伸向了中国。1603年租1622年,荷兰殖民者先后     

西藏军民两次抗英作战述评

西方殖民者对中国西藏的觊觎由来已久.早在明朝末年,就有西方传教士进入西藏地区,他们在进行传教活动的同时,收集了有关西藏地理、交通、民情等方面的大量资料,为西方殖民者后来的渗透和入侵提供了情报支持.17世纪至19世纪,南亚诸国逐步沦为英国的殖民地或控制范围.之后,英国便开始筹划以南亚为基地入侵西藏.     

《海国兵谈》——倡导日本近代海防的先声

18世纪中叶的扶桑之国日本,在经历了壬辰侵朝扩张战争失败后的一个多世纪里,一方面内政纷扰,国力日绌;另一方面,西方殖民者的势力随着其海上力量的发展不断向东亚地区扩展,船坚炮利的荷属东印度公司船只已开始穿过日本洞开的海     

信不信由你

为分赃而制定的西方国际法 1603年2月25日,荷属东印度公司捕获了一艘葡萄牙商船。当时,荷兰正在发动暴乱,以期争脱西班牙的统治,而葡萄牙仍是西班牙的属国。因此,这桩缴获原本是件很容易确定归属的事。但荷属东印度公司的股东成分有点复杂,有些是“和平主义者”,不想拿不干净的战争横财,也可能是不想招惹强大的西班牙,所以扬言要退股。     

荷据台湾时期的台江湾军事防御体系

荷属东印度公司弃澎湖占台湾后,为掌握对中国海上贸易的主动权、统治当地居民、抵御军事攻击,于台湾南部的台江湾内海沿岸地区构建了一套军事防御体系。这套军事防御体系主要由三部分组成:一是热兰遮城与普罗文蒂亚城两个主城堡,它们分别是荷兰殖民者在台湾的政治与商业据点,具有欧洲传统城防工事的功能与特征;二是围绕以上两个城堡构建的军事协防体系;三是整个台江湾海域的城海一体防御系统。台江湾军事防御体系是荷兰人占领台湾后构建的军事防御体系的核心,这一防御体系以城堡为核心,由城堡——协防工事——碉堡、炮台为层级关系的防御工事组成,形成城港一体、陆海防一体的军事化城堡建筑群。     

平时是学生,战时是军人 印度有支国民学兵团

印度国民学兵团是一个以在校大学生和中学生为重点对象、进行国防教育和军事训练的国家级组织,致力于为年轻人提供全面发展机会,培养责任感、奉献精神、自律意识和道德观,使其成为优秀的领导人才和有用的公民,找准人生各阶段的合适位置,在战时或国家危急时刻能毫不犹豫挺身而出,成为捍卫国家安全的第二支生力军。诞生于英国殖民统治时期印度国民学兵团前身是英国殖民者于1942年在印度成立的大学军官训练队。二战后期,大学军官训练队在支援英军抗击日本法西斯的战争中发挥了重要作用,实现了其建立的初衷。印度和巴基斯坦分治独立之后,鉴于当…     

军事目的与武德─—读《中华武德通史》

空军政治学院王联斌教授著《中华武德通史卜书,取材广泛,立论严谨,不仅依史对中华武德文化的发生与发展进行了梳理,廓清了其与政治制度变革和伦理文化发展的关系,而且从较深的层次上概括出了其个性特征。这项工作无疑是对中国史学和伦理学研究的重要贡献。中华民族历来是一个爱好和平的民族,中国人从来没有像西方人那样强烈的统治欲。正如英国著名哲学家罗素《巳·Russe师所说：“他们（指中国）统治别人的欲望明显要比白人弱得多。如果世界上有‘骄傲到不肯打仗’的民族,那么这个民族就是中国。中国人天生的态度就是宽容和友好,以…     

横戈大漠上昆仑

（一）1949年12月，二军进人南疆后，二军五师奉命接管阿克苏、和田防区。 和田位于世界著名的塔克拉玛干大沙漠西南，是古“丝绸之路”南路必经之地，它内连阿克苏、喀什地区，外与印度、巴基斯坦接壤。新中国成立前，由于封建地主阶级的压榨剥削和国民党反动派的黑暗统治，人民生活困苦万分，和田是天山以南最闭塞的穷乡僻壤。     

“偷天行动”——英军窃取苏联T-64坦克行动揭秘

如何能制止住铁流滚滚的苏联主战坦克?看看这张让西方人惊慌恐惧的苏联T-64坦克滚滚前进的照片吧。1981年苏联的T-64坦克优于任何一支西方武装力量所拥有的坦克。那一年的“五一”节,苏联举行阅兵仪式,殊不知一个英国情报军官却偷偷地溜进了一辆T-64坦克内部,拍下了里面的详情。这位情报官带回的结果极大地改变了冷战时期西方坦克设计与运用战术,让北大西洋联盟有能力造出了针对苏联王牌坦克的反装甲导弹。这次惊人的“偷天行动”最近由英国《间谍》杂志披露出来。小试身手先偷AK-47自动枪故事发生在东西方冷战的20世纪70年代。苏联人一鸣…     

ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT WITHIN A CONTESTED LAND: THE CASE OF KASHMIR

This paper considers the case of Kashmir to examine the relation between the people of the contested land (Indian-occupied Kashmir) and one of the nation states claiming it (India, in this case) in a game-theoretic framework. The motivation for this paper was whether it was possible to rationalize the lack of democratic space in Kashmir, relative to other states in India (especially since the founding fathers of the country had announced such democratic practices to be the guiding principles of the new nation) and at the same time, a highly rigid stance of the Indian Government on the Kashmir issue. An otherwise standard political economic model is used to capture how the way in which citizens determine their allegiance to one or the other nation state (India or Pakistan) can, in turn, affect the nation state's (India's) policies towards the contested land. I conclude that if the Indian Government perceives allegiance of the citizens to be determined primarily by partisan preferences of the citizens, not so much by their preferences for policies, then the government rationally concentrates on minimizing its disutility due to deviations from its ‘most-favorite' policy. This understanding rationalizes the policies of the Indian Government towards Kashmir. More importantly, it points towards areas that need consideration for any peace-making process to take-off.     

The Insurgency Environment in Northeast India

The northeast states of India have faced a series of insurgencies almost since independence. Most insurgent groups have been based on the competing demands of various ethnic groups, with conflicts not only between the insurgents and the government, but also between groups. The combination of anti-government and intercommunal violence shows little sign of ending. Although the Indian government has made progress in dealing with the largest groups, the continued existence of several dozen insurgent movements represents a significant security threat to internal stability in India.     

在英语课堂教学中培养学生的跨文化非语言交际能力

非语言交际传递了人们交际活动中的大部分信息，在人际交流中具有举足轻重的地位。本文通过四类非语言交际行为（即体态语、副语言、客体语和环境语）在英语课堂教学中出现的典型案例，阐释其所传递的跨文化信息，提出英语教师应当提高自己对英语文化环境下常见的非语言交际行为的把握，在课堂教学过程中，帮助学生在学习英语语言的同时，掌握英语文化环境下的非语言交际行为的准确含义，并以此加深对语言材料的理解，准确掌握有关文化背景，提高跨文化交际能力。     

试论英语地名在英语教与学中的重要性

地名蕴含着丰富的文化信息,是语言的文化词汇的一部分。地名几乎总是有理据的,所以它们记录了一部分民族文化。很多词典轻视地名,外语教学也常常忽视地名。本文论述名词、专有名词、地名、地名与普通词语之间的联系、英美两国的地名来源,说明地名在英语教与学中的重要性,以引起师生注意。     

Country Survey I–Military Spending in India 1

After a brief survey of the Indian economy, we survey the supply and demand of military expenditures in India over the last four decades. The causes of military expenditures appear to include regional rivalries and protracted conflicts, but it has proven difficult to delineate these with empirical models. The effects of military spending in India on economic growth appear to be benign, despite much speculation to the contrary. However, the opportunity costs of defence spending are shown to be considerable. We conclude with speculation about the role of debt and debt servicing in retarding future economic growth in India. We also speculate about the potential for the creation of a war economy in India.     

Indian and Chinese espionage

India and China both have powerful spy networks; completely different in their approaches to espionage; both effective against their perceived enemies. China focuses first on internal threats, on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then the US and Japan. India’s defense policy focuses on Pakistan and internal terrorist threats, and then on China. In reality, however, when it comes to spying on each other, both China and India suffer from incompetence and apathy – which endangers both their own security and regional stability. This article looks at how they spy on each other, and asks why and how they need to improve. The narrative also touches upon some of the individuals who are waging the spy war, from India’s wily spymaster Ajit Doval down to junior Chinese agents such as Wang Qing and Pema Tsering. The two countries are not friends. They have the largest territorial dispute in the world on their hands, covering an area the size of North Korea, and they have large armies facing each other along 4000 kilometers of frontier. But they also lay claim to the world’s two oldest and richest civilizations, with a rich history of exchange, and now with a combined population of 2.6 billion people and more than a quarter of the world’s economic output. If they cooperated, they could solve many of the world’s problems; but if they lurch into conflict, the potential consequences are terrifying to contemplate. Unfortunately, despite their geographical closeness, they do not know much about each other. They have few cultural interchanges, little diplomacy, few trade missions. They do not watch each other’s films, read each other’s books or listen to each other’s music. Chinese tourists would rather fly to New Zealand for their holidays than cross the border to India, and Indian students would rather study in Europe than China. China and India are neighbors that barely talk to each other. Most significantly, they do not spy on each competently. For countries that do not interact socially, defensive understanding is important for security – but China prefers the glamor of facing up to its Pacific and other maritime rivals such as the US and Japan. India, for its part, does talk a great deal about the China threat, but its resources and expertise are wrapped up in controlling its security threat from Pakistan and the Islamic world. When China and India do try to spy on each other, it is often without the benefit of a long-term focus or understanding. India has some very skilled operatives within the Research and Analysis Wing, but few that specialize in China. China has an enormous pool of resources spread across several government departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, and also has extensive facilities and manpower in the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (the JSD) and the new Strategic Support Force (the SSF). However, China’s intelligence services generally behave as if India is not worth spying on. Given that the two countries do not have the cultural or political machinery in place to understand each other, espionage and intelligence gathering is vital to ensure that miscalculations do not take place. This has been apparent over the last few years in stand-offs in the Himalaya, as well as top-level suspicions on each side about a variety of subjects including terrorism, covert operations in Sri Lanka and Burma, and the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs. Both countries do occasionally make efforts in espionage against each other, especially during sensitive periods such as the mountain stand-offs of 2014 and 2013 and during policy developments in nuclear warfare. In this article the author looks at actual spying incidents between the two countries, their methodologies, their staff, their technical capabilities, and how the act of spying, which is usually viewed as intrinsically adversarial, can be a force for good. The article relies on interviews with actual participants in intelligence from both countries as well as extensive use of contemporary online sources, and secondary analysis by both military and academic experts from China, India and NATO countries.     

英汉委婉语的语用共性与差异

委婉语（Euphemism）是人类语言使用过程中的一种普遍现象。英汉两种语言都有大量的委婉语，它们在使用领域、语用功能及特点方面具有颇多相同之处。但因为它们分别属于不同的语系，以不同文化背景和历史传统为生存基础，所以在其使用方面又有很大不同，折射出明显的文化痕迹，主要表现在宗教信仰、历史传统和社会价值观三个方面。     

Expansion of Chinese maritime power in the Indian Ocean: implications for India

This paper examines the ongoing expansion of China’s maritime power in the Indian Ocean region and analyses its potential impact on the extant balance of Sino-Indian maritime power in the region. It posits that the expanding Chinese maritime power in the Indian Ocean could seriously challenge India’s geostrategic advantage in the near future and that India can no longer take for granted its strategic location at the centre of the Indian Ocean nor the strength of its historical ties with the various regional states. It further argues that the current Indian maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean region, to be the “net security provider” for the entire region, is unsustainable and thus needs to be reviewed and rebuilt leveraging the geographic advantage enjoyed by India over China in the Indian Ocean.     

“多极”外交政策下的俄罗斯对印度军售现状分析与前景

俄印是传统友好国家,俄罗斯也是印度最大的武器和军事装备供应国。在俄奉行"多极"外交政策的背景下,同时印度作为世界最大的武器和军事装备进口国,其军火市场受到多方觊觎,俄对印军售也面临着严峻的挑战。俄专家认为,"俄中印"战略大三角的构想应做出调整,且"多极"外交政策无助于加强俄罗斯与印度关系。文章分析和预测了俄对印的军售现状和前景。俄印这两个传统与新兴大国间的军事技术乃至政治-军事合作,已经和继续对亚太地区乃至全球政治格局施加重大影响。     

The Fire Within: Naxalite Insurgency Violence in India

India is at a crossroads today. While it is fast emerging as a global power with a vibrant democratic polity, a robust economy and a nuclear-weapons capable military, the country is also witnessing a growing polarisation between the rich and poor and between urban and rural areas, a rise in communal tensions, large numbers of suicides by impoverished and indebted farmers and a spurt in terrorist activities and attacks by various disgruntled organisations and groups. Of these various challenges, as attested to by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself, the most dangerous threat to India's territorial integrity, prosperity and wellbeing has come from the Naxalite insurgency or ‘people's war’ that is manifest in large areas of eastern, central and southern India. But what factors account for the formation and persistence of Naxalite insurgency in India? What are the key objectives of the Naxalites and why is violence directed against the Indian State? And how has the Indian State (both central and state governments) responded to the Naxalite insurgency and with what effect? These are the main research questions that we attempt to answer in this paper. We put forward two broad arguments. First, the Naxalite insurgency in India is the latest manifestation of peasant struggles caused by grinding poverty, exploitation and inequality that have prevailed in rural areas for centuries. What sustains these struggles to this day is the fact that socio-economic conditions in rural areas have changed little and the policies followed by the post-independent Indian State have generally failed to mitigate rural problems. Second, the Naxalite insurgency has emerged as the most dangerous threat mainly due to the movement's spatial spread, growing support base in tribal and backward areas and enhanced fighting capabilities. The Indian State has viewed the movement as a ‘law and order’ problem and responded with force. But a ‘law and order’ approach to the Naxalite insurgency is unlikely to produce a lasting resolution of the problem, since it would not effectively redress deep-rooted grievances felt by a majority of India's rural poor for decades.