Should we be using cost of capital in calculating holding costs of consumable inventory?

The DOD directs the usage of 10% of item cost as the cost of capital in the calculation of inventory holding costs. This 10% cost is not totally justified and a complete review must be accomplished to bring this factor to a meaningful and more useful value. The current logic supporting a 10% cost of capital results in a continuing perturbation which forces the Air Force to operate in a less than efficient mode when using the economic order quantity for consumable purchases.     

The orienteering problem

Orienteering is a sport in which start and end points are specified along with other locations. These other locations have associated scores. Competitors seek to visit, in a fixed amount of time, a subset of these locations on the way from the start point to the end point in order to maximize the total score. An effective center-of-gravity heuristic is presented that outperforms heuristics from the literature.     

The Joint Chiefs of Staff,the atom bomb,the American Military Mind and the end of the Second World War

ABSTRACT

The decision by the US government to drop the atomic bombs on Japan is one of the most heavily debated questions in history. This article examines one element of that debate, in many ways the most surprising. That was the different views of the top of the military hierarchy in the USA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS was on the whole more sceptical about using atomic weaponry than the USA’s civilian leadership, for ethical and strategic reasons. As such they were willing to consider very different ways of ending the war.     

Nobody wins the victory taboo in just war theory

ABSTRACT

This article examines how scholars of the just war tradition think about the ethical dilemmas that arise in the endgame phase of modern warfare. In particular, it focuses upon their reticence to engage the idiom of ‘victory’. Why, it asks, have scholars been so reluctant to talk about what it means to ‘win’ a just war? It contends that, while just war scholars may have good reason to be sceptical about ‘victory’, engaging it would grant them a more direct view of the critical potentialities, but also the limitations, of just war reasoning.     

Exact first and second order moments of order statistics from the truncated exponential distribution

Exact expressions for the first and second order moments of order statistics from the truncated exponential distribution, when the proportion 1–P of truncation is known in advance, are presented in this paper. Tables of expected values and variances-covariances are given for P = 0.5 (0.1) 0.9 and n = 1 (1) 10.     

The power of paired sample tests

The power of the component randomization test for the paired sample location test is compared to the power of the parametric test for paired comparisons using the sum of differences distribution. This analysis is presented in the form of operating characteristic curves for normal, exponential, uniform and absolute lambda observations over a range of small sample sizes.     

A two-echelon inventory model with purchases,dispositions, shipments,returns and transshipments

This paper presents a one-period two-echelon inventory model with one warehouse in the first echelon and n warehouses in the second echelon. At the beginning of the period the stock levels at all facilities are adjusted by purchasing or disposing of items at the first echelon, returning or shipping items between the echelons and transshipping items within the second echelon. During the period, demands (which may be negative) are placed on all warehouses in the second echelon and an attempt is made to satisfy shortages either by an expedited shipment from the first echelon to the second echelon or an expedited transshipment within the second echelon. The decision problem is to choose an initial stock level at the first echelon (by a purchase or a disposition) and an initial allocation so as to minimize the initial stock movement costs during the period plus inventory carrying costs and system shortage costs at the end of the period. It is shown that the objective function takes on one of four forms, depending on the relative magnitudes of the various shipping costs. All four forms of the objective function are derived and proven to be convex. Several applications of this general model are considered. We also consider multi-period extensions of the general model and an important special case is solved explicitly.     

Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons

India’s nuclear doctrine and posture has traditionally been shaped by minimum deterrence logic. This logic includes assumptions that possession of only a small retaliatory nuclear force generates sufficient deterrent effect against adversaries, and accordingly that development of limited nuclear warfighting concepts and platforms are unnecessary for national security. The recent emergence of Pakistan’s Nasr tactical nuclear missile platform has generated pressures on Indian minimum deterrence. This article analyzes Indian official and strategic elite responses to the Nasr challenge, including policy recommendations and attendant implications. It argues that India should continue to adhere to minimum deterrence, which serves as the most appropriate concept for Indian nuclear policy and best supports broader foreign and security policy objectives. However, the form through which Indian minimum deterrence is delivered must be rethought in light of this new stage of regional nuclear competition.     

A rent‐seeking model of international competition and alliances∗

This paper presents an alternative approach for analyzing international competition and alliances as rent‐seeking contests that are able to capture the impure public good nature of defense spending. Two‐country Cournot and Stackelberg games are considered and comparative static results derived. A three‐country model is investigated, and alliance behavior is explored in the context of this rent‐seeking model. The conjecture that an alliance may become less effective if the allies’ interests become more closely aligned is verified. Finally, the model is generalized, and a Nash‐Cournot equilibrium is computed.