排序方式: 共有41条查询结果,搜索用时 140 毫秒
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十六大明确了新的分配原则即“生产要素按贡献参与分配原则”,这是我国收入分配理论和政策方面的革命性突破。弄清楚这一原则的确切含义、实施原因、分配形式、实现途径以及它与按劳分配之间的关系,对充分调动社会各方面的积极性,优化资源配置,切实保障广大群众的切身利益有着十分重大的意义。 相似文献
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介绍图像处理技术在桨叶表面应力分布测试试验中的应用情况 ,对实际使用中的图像处理技术进行了较详细的分析讨论 .经过处理后的桨叶试验图像 ,不仅增加了图像的清晰程度 ,而且从中可获得半定量以至定量的参数 ,以帮助对桨叶表面应力分布进行分析 相似文献
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零知识证明是密码学关注的问题之一。在可判定条件下,运用代数学中群的共轭性质进行零知识证明,其实例就是数学中关于寻找共轭子的困难性问题。 相似文献
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The 22 September 1979 Vela Incident: Radionuclide and Hydroacoustic Evidence for a Nuclear Explosion
This article offers a new analysis of radionuclide and hydroacoustic data to support a low-yield nuclear weapon test as a plausible explanation for the still contentious 22 September 1979 Vela Incident, in which U.S. satellite Vela 6911 detected an optical signal characteristic of an atmospheric nuclear explosion over the Southern Indian or Atlantic Ocean. Based on documents not previously widely available, as well as recently declassified papers and letters, this article concludes that iodine-131 found in the thyroids of some Australian sheep would be consistent with them having grazed in the path of a potential radioactive fallout plume from a 22 September low-yield nuclear test in the Southern Indian Ocean. Further, several declassified letters and reports which describe aspects of still classified hydroacoustic reports and data favor the test scenario. The radionuclide and hydroacoustic data taken together with the analysis of the double-flash optical signal picked up by Vela 6911 that was described in a companion 2017 article (“The 22 September 1979 Vela Incident: The Detected Double-Flash”) can be traced back to sources with similar spatial and temporal origins and serve as a strong indicator for a nuclear explosion being responsible for the 22 September 1979 Vela Incident. 相似文献
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通过研究椭圆曲线群,给出基于其上的2个零知识证明方案,这2个方案均使得甲方向乙方宣称自己拥有某种信息,并通过互动证明使其确信具有该信息,但同时还未泄漏该信息。 相似文献
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Stephan De Spiegeleire Karlijn Jans Mischa Sibbel Khrystyna Holynska Deborah Lassche 《Defense & Security Analysis》2019,35(1):59-81
Most countries put significant amounts of time and effort in writing and issuing high-level policy documents. These are supposed to guide subsequent national defence efforts. But do they? And how do countries even try to ensure that they do? This paper reports on a benchmarking effort of how a few “best of breed” small- to medium-sized defence organisations (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) deal with these issues. We find that most countries fail to link goals to resources and pay limited attention to specific and rigorous ex-ante or post-hoc evaluation, even when compared to their own national government-wide provisions. We do, however, observe a (modest) trend towards putting more specific goals and metrics in these documents that can be – and in a few rare cases were – tracked. The paper identifies 42 concrete policy “nuggets” – both “do’s and don’ts” – that should be of interest to most defence policy planning/analysis communities. It ends with two recommendations that are in line with recent broader (non-defence) scholarship on the policy formulation-policy implementation gap: to put more rigorous emphasis on implementation (especially on achieving desired policy effects), but to do so increasingly in more experiential (“design”) ways, rather than in industrial-age bureaucratic ones (“PPBS”-systems). 相似文献