气象条件对武器效能动态评估与微分对策的影响分析

针对气象条件对作战双方武器效能的动态影响问题,基于微分对策思想,构建了包含气象影响因子的作战双方武器对抗的兰彻斯特模型,讨论了不同气象条件对双方武器效能的动态影响。结果表明:气象条件对双方武器效能都有损耗,但由于损耗程度不同,整个战局的态势将向损耗程度较小的一方倾斜;武器效能的固有差距是主要的,但一定的战场大气环境条件可以缩小此差距。     

Collective action and the common enemy effect

How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).     

A multi‐objective model for bank ATM networks

In this paper we present an application of the core solution concepts for multi‐objective games to a bank ATM network model. In these games, the worth of a coalition is given by a subset of vectors of the k‐dimensional space rather than by a scalar. The paper investigates how an ATM network model based on multi‐objective cooperative game theory could be used as an alternative way of setting interchange fees paid by the customer's bank to the one that owns the ATM. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

基于微分对策理论的信息战模型

基于兰彻斯特作战理论,提出了一个新的微分对策模型来研究在交战双方均有信息战系统协助作战的条件下的最优火力分配策略。又运用微分对策理论对该模型进行分析和求解,并对所得到的结论作出符合战术意义的解释。     

灰色数列预测应用分析

对灰色理论与统计分析在装备经济管理工作中的实用性分别以模型机理、模型数据处理复杂性和模型结果精度三方面进行了比较分析,着重指出在某些情况下灰色模型具有小样本而精度高的特点,并列举了实例加以说明．     

两人多冲突环境下的双矩阵对策集结模型

针对用多个双矩阵对策来描述的两人多冲突环境,首先基于局中人所受到的约束条件,构造局中人面向多冲突环境的可行策略串集合;其次以所有局中人的可行策略串集合建立新的结局空间,构造局中人在新结局空间上的支付函数,进而建立两人多冲突环境下的对策综合集结模型;最后给出了一个军事例子,该算例说明了模型的实用性.     

Inventory control under substitutable demand: A stochastic game application

Substitutable product inventory problem is analyzed using the concepts of stochastic game theory. It is assumed that there are two substitutable products that are sold by different retailers and the demand for each product is random. Game theoretic nature of this problem is the result of substitution between products. Since retailers compete for the substitutable demand, ordering decision of each retailer depends on the ordering decision of the other retailer. Under the discounted payoff criterion, this problem is formulated as a two‐person nonzero‐sum stochastic game. In the case of linear ordering cost, it is shown that there exists a Nash equilibrium characterized by a pair of stationary base stock strategies for the infinite horizon problem. This is the unique Nash equilibrium within the class of stationary base stock strategies. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 359–375, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10018     

基于模糊多目标对策的雷达反干扰策略优化

考虑到单部雷达反干扰效能评估指标多样化、模糊且存在不同权重的情况,在对策论基础上提出了一种雷达反干扰策略优化模型,并在考虑局中人偏好情况下,设计了一种模糊多目标对策最优混合策略求解算法,为找出较优化的雷达反干扰策略以及为战场决策提供参考。     

Game theoretic analysis of maximum cooperative purchasing situations

This article introduces maximum cooperative purchasing (MCP)‐situations, a new class of cooperative purchasing situations. Next, an explicit alternative mathematical characterization of the nucleolus of cooperative games is provided. The allocation of possible cost savings in MCP‐situations, in which the unit price depends on the largest order quantity within a group of players, is analyzed by defining corresponding cooperative MCP‐games. We show that a decreasing unit price is a sufficient condition for a nonempty core: there is a set of marginal vectors that belong to the core. The nucleolus of an MCP‐game can be derived in polynomial time from one of these marginal vectors. To show this result, we use the new mathematical characterization for the nucleolus for cooperative games. Using the decomposition of an MCP‐game into unanimity games, we find an explicit expression for the Shapley value. Finally, the behavior of the solution concepts is compared numerically. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 607–624, 2013     

Export controls,market structure and international coordination

We look at the different ways of aggregating the exports of dual use products to give the security perception of exporter countries and their consistency with the relevant export control regimes. Also, we analyze different models of export controls highlighting the role of the perception of security, market structure and competition between exporting firms in determining the existence of multiple equilibria and therefore, the need for coordination between countries in setting export controls.