C4ISR领域本体研究初探

如何实现C4ISR系统的跨越式发展,是当前的研究重点。本体论作为最新的知识工程化技术,信息系统建设是其研究、应用的重要领域。通过分析C4ISR系统特点及未来军事发展趋势,结合C4ISR系统建设的实际情况,阐述了军事领域开展本体研究的广阔前景,并探求建立C4ISR领域本体库,对本体库的作用及发展过程提出了初步设想,在C4ISR系统建设和本体应用两方面做出了有益的探索。     

次声波技术与心理战应用

次声波是一种频率变化范围在10?4 Hz～20 Hz之间的声波,它具有穿透力强、传输距离远以及不易被吸收的特点,以此制造的次声波武器伤人但不毁物。近年来,随着高新技术的不断发展,次声波武器在心理战领域得到了广泛应用。本文首先对次声波技术及次声波武器的概念进行了简要介绍;其次,研究了次声波的生物学效应,分析了次声波频率、声压强度以及作用时间与生物学效应的关系,发现三种次声波的作用参数与生物学效应之间的关系虽然错综复杂,但也有一定规律可循;最后,提出了次声波武器在心理战的三个潜在应用前景,即利用次声波穿透力强的特点发展对掩体人员作战的心理战装备、利用次声波的生物学效应发展反恐作战的心理战装备以及利用次声波的生理致伤机理发展心理战防护装备。     

Decision support model for effects estimation and proportionality assessment for targeting in cyber operations

Cyber operations are relatively a new phenomenon of the last two decades.During that period,they have increased in number,complexity,and agility,while their design and development have been processes well kept under secrecy.As a consequence,limited data(sets)regarding these incidents are available.Although various academic and practitioner public communities addressed some of the key points and dilemmas that surround cyber operations(such as attack,target identification and selection,and collateral damage),still methodologies and models are needed in order to plan,execute,and assess them in a responsibly and legally compliant way.Based on these facts,it is the aim of this article to propose a model that i))estimates and classifies the effects of cyber operations,and ii)assesses proportionality in order to support targeting decisions in cyber operations.In order to do that,a multi-layered fuzzy model was designed and implemented by analysing real and virtual realistic cyber operations combined with interviews and focus groups with technical-military experts.The proposed model was evaluated on two cyber operations use cases in a focus group with four technical-military experts.Both the design and the results of the evaluation are revealed in this article.     

Proportional use of force in asymmetric military operation

This paper studies a strategic conflict between a state and a non-state military organization. The non-state military organization decides whether to attack or not to attack the state, while the state decides on its counter-measure. If the state uses a high level of violence against the non-state organization, it may be accused by the international community of ‘non-proportional’ use of force, and both sides of the conflict take this possibility into account. The model predicts that it may be rational for the non-state organization to attack the state, even if as a reaction the state will militarily destroy this organization, due to a positive probability the state will be punished by the international community for non-proportional use of violence.     

MEASURING UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION AND INACTION IN THE 1990S

Although Africa is host to the vast majority (and the most deadly) of conflicts in the world, it would appear that there is a distinct lack of genuine interest in African affairs shown by the UN Security Council and its key members. This paper proposes a 10-level scale of response system to measure the seriousness of the Council in dealing with conflicts. By comparing the Council response with the size and severity of each individual conflict, the scale attempts to assess the Council performance in the fulfilment of its duty to restore international peace and security. The results show that Africa has been (and remains) marginalized in the Council work.     

The sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942–1974

This article had its genesis in a background study for the development of a new Australian Army counter-insurgency doctrine. Archival research showed that the Australian counter-insurgency doctrine employed in such post-1945 conflicts as Burma, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam originated in the jungle campaigns of the South West Pacific Area during World War II. The historical record also showed that the Army's counter-insurgency doctrine, as with its World War II-jungle warfare doctrine, was a pragmatic amalgam of Australian experience and British doctrine. The article traces this process through the development of a series of doctrine manuals. It also considers the contribution of key individuals to both counter-insurgency theory and practice. This distinctively Australian approach to the development of doctrine was responsible for producing a highly successful manual, The Division in Battle: Pamphlet No. 11, Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (DIB 11), which the Army used during its involvement in Vietnam.     

Trinitarian troubles: governmental,military, and societal explanations for post-1945 Western failures in asymmetric conflicts

It seems paradoxical that powerful Western states are at their most vulnerable when the disparity in military capabilities between them and their opponents is at its largest. Yet it is precisely in such ‘asymmetric conflicts’ that Western countries have failed to achieve their overall political objectives the most often. Focusing on the post-1945 world, this article will examine governmental, military, and societal reasons for Western failures in asymmetric conflicts. Politicians' lack of understanding regarding war's fundamental nature, militaries' tendency to dissociate operational goals from grand strategy objectives and citizens' moral aversion to warfare appear to be among the main obstacles to success.     

When Peacekeepers Fail Thousands are Going to Die. The ETO in Rwanda: a Story of Deception

This study develops the concepts of fourth generation operations and the associated principles. First, the concept of fourth generation operations is introduced and defined. Fourth generation operations are the evolution and extension of third and fourth generation warfare based on a change of tactics, technology, and combatants. These operations are currently ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the global war on terrorism. Based on the framework of US joint doctrine, the supporting principles of fourth generation operations are developed. This requires the introduction of the principle of Population Perception.     

Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the Rhodesian Front regime propaganda warfare strategy during Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. It uses the case of the Chilonga area of Chiredzi located in the south-east of Zimbabwe to demonstrate that propaganda warfare was introduced as a measure to counter guerrilla infiltration and civilian cooperation with them. Drawing on ideas of military anthropology vis-à-vis the importance of cultural awareness in counterinsurgency, the paper argues that the efforts of the Rhodesian Front regime to use propaganda were fruitless. This is because they mostly ignored the culture of the Shangani, local people. Despite that, there were other reasons for the failure of the Rhodesian Front’s propaganda strategy, including the lack of conformity between politics and military action.     

Bush path to self-destruction: Charles Taylor and the Revolutionary United Front

This article explains the demise of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebellion. It argues that the main cause of this fate was the group's relationship with its primary sponsor, Charles Taylor. The RUF's dependency on Taylor's patronage, coupled with the rebellion's weak organisational endowments harmed the group's prospects of success. Based on original research, the article shows how Taylor used the RUF as a strategic instrument for his own regional interests, which led to the group's unravelling. More broadly, the article speaks about proxy warfare in Africa and how the relationship between resource flows and rebellion are not always beneficial to rebels as one might expect.