火力运用对策空间模型

根据空 -地作战的特点 ,提出了软、硬火力单位的概念 ,根据模型提出了作战指数、生存指数 ,为双方的实力与“保卫目标”的安全度分析提供了数量依据 ;根据微分对策和战术原则提出了规范作战模式等概念 ,为构造火力运用、兵力数量需求等算法搭起一个框架。     

发动机冷却燃料做功潜力?分析

在高马赫数飞行下,用燃料冷却超燃冲压发动机壁面的冷却需求量大于发动机燃烧量。为了降低燃料的冷却量以及实现燃料冷却量和燃烧量的匹配,采用?分析法对超燃冲压发动机壁面燃料冷却工质进行做功潜力分析。发动机壁面冷却燃料的特性决定其热量?大小。根据发动机壁面温度分布、热流密度分布计算热量?,建立稳定流动燃料工质的?平衡方程。结果表明：在壁面最高温度为1200K时,传入壁面的热量为562.4kW,其中理论热量?为541.3kW;冷却燃料工质流量的增加,最大输出功减小;燃料工质出口温度增加,输出功减小,燃料工质出口压力增加,输出功基本不变。     

军事虚拟仓库组织结构的博弈分析

简要介绍了军事虚拟仓库及其组织结构形式．以及博弈论的相关知识。结合军事后勤系统的特点,采用完全信息静态博弈纳什均衡的方法分析了军事虚拟仓库的组织结构模式,在假设的合理的条件下模拟3种组织形式的博弈过程。通过各个模型的最终纳什均衡,指出了3种组织结构形式运作的结果和其积极因素、消极因素、噪声构成．结合我军现有的后勤保障体制,提出现行保障体制的合理与不合理的地方,并给出了改进方案,对优化全军后方仓库布局及管理和战备物资储备及应急保障有着重要意义,可以为总部决策提供咨询建议。     

Relaxed sequencing games have a nonempty core

We study sequencing situations with a fixed initial order and linear cost functions. Cost savings can be obtained by rearranging jobs. Next to finding an optimal order, an additional issue is formed by the division of these savings. Cooperative game theory studies this issue. A common assumption states that cooperation between players is restricted to groups that are connected according to the initial order. The value of disconnected groups is defined additively over their connected components. In this paper we allow players in disconnected coalitions to switch places as long as they do not hurt the players not in the coalition under consideration. The resulting games are called relaxed sequencing games. Although they have been studied before, no general results on stable profit divisions have been derived so far. In this paper we prove that relaxed sequencing games have a nonempty core, i.e., they all have stable profit divisions. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply 1 to comment 1

Kovenock and Roberson's [2011] comment provides initial work which has the potential, when suitably extended, to advance the research frontier. Kovenock and Roberson's paper consists of three sections. The first section is an interesting introduction. The second section, titled ‘Model and Main Result,’ provides no contribution beyond Hausken [2008a]. It consists of Equations (1)–(10) which are equivalent to equations developed by Hausken, and Equation (11) which is equivalent to the utility requirements u???0 and U???0 provided after Equation (17) in Hausken. The third section provides interesting ideas about mixed-strategy equilibria that can be extended in future research.     

The economic effects of international trade in armaments in the major western industrialized and developing countries†

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to assess the impact of exports and imports of armaments (based on 1980 data) on sectoral trade and employment and other economic variables in the major Western trading countries. If the United States were to place a unilateral embargo on its arms exports and imports, we calculate that it would experience a comparatively small amount of employment displacement in the aggregate and that most of this displacement would occur in the transport equipment and electric machinery sectors. If all the major Western countries were to place a multilateral embargo on their arms trade, the sectoral effects on the United States would be similarly small. But the sectoral effects in several other industrialized and developing countries measured as a percentage of sectoral employment, would be larger, indicating potential short‐run adjustment problems in labor markets in some cases.     

The effect of catastrophes on the strategic customer behavior in queueing systems

We consider the single server Markovian queue subject to Poisson generated catastrophes. Whenever a catastrophe occurs, all customers are forced to abandon the system, the server is rendered inoperative and an exponential repair time is set on. During the repair time new arrivals are allowed to join the system. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a natural linear reward‐cost structure with two types of rewards: A (usual) service reward for those customers that receive service and a (compensation) failure reward for those customers that are forced to abandon the system due to a catastrophe. We study the strategic behavior of the customers regarding balking and derive the corresponding (Nash) equilibrium strategies for the observable and unobservable cases. We show that both types of strategic behavior may be optimal: to avoid the crowd or to follow it. The crucial factor that determines the type of customer behavior is the relative value of the service reward to the failure compensation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

基于不完全信息演化博弈模型的网络舆情传播羊群行为

以网络舆情传播过程中大部分人对事实不了解为前提,在这部分群体内构建基于不完全信息环境的两人对称演化博弈模型。提出了两人对称博弈矩阵来决定个体策略的选择,建立了复制动态方程说明不同策略群体比例的演化方向,演化时引入个体的记忆长度,根据设定的交互规则更新各自的观点值及记忆列表。仿真分析模型表明,在此环境中很容易产生羊群行为,群体内的个体都选择盲从并且观点保持一致。此外,羊群行为的集聚产生受多种因素影响,主要与采取分析策略的交互利益、成本系数以及记忆长度有关。本文对科学分析引导网络舆情的传播有一定实际意义。     

利用径向力平衡飞行控制的航天器高精度轨道捕获方法

为实现对探测器轨道形状与高度的精准调整,提出一种径向力平衡飞行的航天器连续推力控制新方法。建立连续推力平衡飞行的动力学极坐标模型,并推导出特殊条件下的解析轨道解,进一步分析边值条件,给出连续推力的控制律。利用这一平衡飞行控制理论,构建轨道捕获的最优控制策略。考虑推力器的推力水平,通过一次或多次的控制过程,实现对轨道形状、轨道高度及轨道相位的综合调整。数值仿真表明:利用平衡飞行的轨道控制方法,配置微小推力器的空间引力波探测器可以实现高精度的轨道捕获;该方法具有控制过程可解析、计算量小、简便、实用等特点。     

Market entry strategy in the presence of market spillovers and efficiency differentiation

Firms form various alliances or use brand extensions to enter new markets in order to improve their operational efficiency and create a positive spillover. However, they do not always know the implications of these strategies for market entry and multimarket competition because the sale of products in one market can have negative spillover effects on product sales in other markets. We present an analytical framework to examine whether and how (i.e., by choosing alliance entry or independent entry) competing firms should enter a market in a situation where market spillovers occur when a firm enters a spillover-producing market to sell products that may increase or decrease the consumers' willingness to pay for products in the primary market. Our analysis shows that the operational efficiency (or quality differentiation ability) of firms in a spillover-producing market varies, and hence, the impact of market spillovers differs for firms. We identify the key factors, such as bargaining power, brand value difference in the primary market, and the extent of efficiencies and spillovers, that determine the firms benefitting from the different entry strategies. Specifically, we show that firms would be more willing to choose an alliance strategy to enter a spillover-producing market if the negative spillover is small and alliance efficiency is high. In contrast, if an alliance entry is not favored, the firms' relative operational efficiency is crucial for them to decide whether to enter the market independently under moderate spillover conditions. Finally, we show the implications of market entry strategies for managers.