基于多模射击的火力控制理论研究

为提高高炮武器系统拦截空中高度机动目标的能力,提出了多模射击的思想.多模射击是指火控系统根据战场态势,实时可靠地估计出目标在射弹飞行时间内若干个可能的机动形式预测结果.并据此控制高炮群同时向若干个可能的目标未来点进行射击.建立了多模射击毁歼概率计算公式.通过与传统的单模射击体制进行效能对比分析验证了多模射击体制的有效性.最后对基于多模射击的火力控制若干关键技术作了简要分析.     

建国六十年来国防法制理论研究的基本经验

建国六十年来，我国国防法制理论研究，始终坚持军地结合、基础先行、服务治军和理论创新，取得了令人瞩目的成就，积累了丰富的历史经验。     

加强防空导弹部队和歼击航空兵部署建议的 论证方法

兵力需求是作战筹划的重要内容之一，防空兵力需求的估算是防空作战指挥员和指挥机关平时进行战场建设，战时实施兵力集结与调动的基本依据。本文提出了一种加强防空兵力部署建议的论证方法，在不使用复杂的冲突空域仿真模型的情况下，使军事指挥机关能够高效地确定冲突双方兵力对比关系以及期望的作战行动效能；拟定在任何一个部队责任区内，防空导弹部队和歼击航空兵部署战斗编成的论证建议，供部队指挥员决策参考。     

国防生体育教学形式拓展探究

地方高校国防生的体育教学训练往往沿袭了普通大学生的体育教学形式，针对性不强，影响了国防生军事体育素质的提高。通过调查分析指出，国防生体育教学训练形式应从开展新生体能强化训练、军事体育竞赛等方面来进行拓展。     

基于经济绩效的国防工业市场最优集中度研究

以满足企业利润最大化和社会福利最大化双重效率标准的思想为基础，通过拟合我国国防支出需求函数和国防工业企业的成本函数，对我国国防工业市场最优集中度进行了理论研究，得出最优企业数量的一般表达式，并以我国航空工业上市公司为例，对其市场集中度展开了系统性估算。研究结果表明，我国国防工业产业的最优企业数量可以根据相关数据与拟合出的参数得到一个明确的数值，并且我国国防工业产业的最优市场集中度表现为适度集中，而在特殊情况下表现为完全集中。我国航空工业上市公司的最优企业数量为14家时，能够满足企业利润最大化与市场出清的双重标准，市场集中度达到最优。     

地缘政治危机与晚清政府边防政策的三次调整

摘要：鸦片战争后，中国边疆危机纷至沓来。晚清政府在不到30年的时间里，三次调整边防策略，相继形成了“郅治保邦”、“海防与塞防并重”和“保藩固圉”的边防政策，这在一定程度上遏制了帝国主义的兵锋战火。但又造成了“和”不能争主权、“战”不能取胜利的被动局面，加剧了清政府的民族危机、边防危机和统治危机。     

Bi‐objective missile rescheduling for a naval task group with dynamic disruptions

This paper considers the rescheduling of surface‐to‐air missiles (SAMs) for a naval task group (TG), where a set of SAMs have already been scheduled to intercept a set of anti‐ship missiles (ASMs). In missile defense, the initial engagement schedule is developed according to the initial state of the defensive and attacking units. However, unforeseen events may arise during the engagement, creating a dynamic environment to be handled, and making the initial schedule infeasible or inefficient. In this study, the initial engagement schedule of a TG is assumed to be disrupted by the occurrence of a destroyed ASM, the breakdown of a SAM system, or an incoming new target ASM. To produce an updated schedule, a new biobjective mathematical model is formulated that maximizes the no‐leaker probability value for the TG and minimizes the total deviation from the initial schedule. With the problem shown to be NP‐hard, some special cases are presented that can be solved in polynomial time. We solve small size problems by the augmented ? ‐ constraint method and propose heuristic procedures to generate a set of nondominated solutions for larger problems. The results are presented for different size problems and the total effectiveness of the model is evaluated.     

Private military contractors’ financial experiences and incentives

ABSTRACT

This article analyses findings from an original survey of 187 private military contractors on their incentives for working in the industry. Perceptions of contractors as “greedy, ruthless, and unscrupulous mercenaries” shape both public and military opinions of outsourcing and may impact U.S. military effectiveness, civil–military relations, and contractor identity. We find that contractors are motivated by a range of factors and that their financial experiences are not clearly more positive than that of state military troops. We recommend broad education of military and defense officials and the public in the U.S. and other relevant nations, regarding the true incentives of modern-day, Western contractors, in an effort to dispel misperceptions, increase effective utilisation of contractors, and beneficially shape PMC-military coordination. DoD may consider integrating such training into its current efforts to improve outsourcing, including its Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course, pre-deployment fora, and curricula of advanced military studies schools.     

一种通用型舰载防空硬武器火力优化算法?

针对当前武器优化分配算法缺少通用性，难以兼顾效率和时间的问题，提出了一种通用型舰载防空硬武器火力优化算法。该算法首先提取各舰载武器能够攻击的目标集合，然后对各武器的目标集合逐一进行时间分配，并计算对目标的毁伤概率，最终完成所有武器的分配。计算表明，该算法具有很好的通用性和实时性，可适用于较大规模舰载防空硬武器的火力优化分配问题。     

Solving partially observable agent‐intruder games with an application to border security problems

In this paper, we introduce partially observable agent‐intruder games (POAIGs). These games model dynamic search games on graphs between security forces (an agent) and an intruder given possible (border) entry points and high value assets that require protection. The agent faces situations with dynamically changing, partially observable information about the state of the intruder and vice versa. The agent may place sensors at selected locations, while the intruder may recruit partners to observe the agent's movement. We formulate the problem as a two‐person zero‐sum game, and develop efficient algorithms to compute each player's optimal strategy. The solution to the game will help the agent choose sensor locations and design patrol routes that can handle imperfect information. First, we prove the existence of ?‐optimal strategies for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we introduce a Bayesian approximation algorithm to identify these ?‐optimal strategies using belief functions that incorporate the imperfect information that becomes available during the game. For the solutions of large POAIGs with a finite time horizon, we use a solution method common to extensive form games, namely, the sequence form representation. To illustrate the POAIGs, we present several examples and numerical results.