Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel–Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF

This article highlights a pattern of military adaptation and tactical problem-solving utilized by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) while engaged in protracted conflict with the Lebanese militant group Hizballah. It discusses the IDF’s recent attempts to institutionalize their historically intuitive process of ad-hoc learning by developing a formal tactical-level mechanism for ‘knowledge management’. The diffusion of this battlefield lesson-learning system that originated at lower-levels of the organization is examined, as well as its implementation and effectiveness during the 2006 Lebanon War. A nuanced analysis of IDF adaptation illustrates the dynamic interplay between both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes of military innovation.     

Book Reviews

Patrick Finney (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War. London: Arnold, 1997. Pp.xvi + 461, index. £15.99. ISBN 0–340–67640‐X.

Maria Emilia Paz, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the US as Allies in World War II. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Pp.xii + 264, 10 illus., biblio., index. $55 (cloth); $19.95 (paper). ISBN 0–271–01665–5 and 01666–3.

Norman J.W. Goda, Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa and the Path toward America. College Station, Texas A&;M University Press, 1998. Pp.xxvi + 307, 2 maps, biblio., index. $39.95. ISBN 0–89096–807–1.

Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp.xii + 525, biblio., index. £25; $34.95. ISBN 0–521–64044‐X.

Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. Pp.viii + 270, index. $35. ISBN 0–801403201–4.

Eric Arnett (ed.), Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban, SIPRI Research Report No.14. Oxford: Oxford University Press/Stockholm Int Peace Research Institute, 1998. Pp.viii + 98, index. £12.99. ISBN 0–19–8294115.

T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett and James J. Wirtz (eds.), The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and Emerging International Order. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1998. Pp.vi + 312, index. $47.50/£36. ISBN 0–472–10863–8.     

On the hierarchy of γ‐valid cuts in global optimization

Concavity Cuts play an important role in concave minimization. In Porembski, J Global Optim 15 ( 17 ), 371–404 we extended the concept underlying concavity cuts which led to the development of decomposition cuts. In numerical experiments with pure cutting plane algorithms for concave minimization, decomposition cuts have been shown to be superior to concavity cuts. However, three points remained open. First, how to derive decomposition cuts in the degenerate case. Second, how to ensure dominance of decomposition cuts over concavity cuts. Third, how to ensure the finite convergence of a pure cutting plane algorithm solely by decomposition cuts. These points will be addressed in this paper. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

The Kargil Conflict: Waging War in the Himalayas

In 1999 India and Pakistan engaged in a limited war in the Himalayan peaks of Kashmir. Pakistani irregulars occupied territory in the Indian-held district of Kargil. A campaign that lasted 74 days and cost each side more than 1,000 casualties concluded with India in control of the commanding heights around Kargil. The conflict exposed flaws in the Indian armed forces as well as enduring truths of combat in the high mountains. Political constraints combined with the unforgiving environment and a determined enemy to diminish India's military advantage. Transition from counterinsurgency to high-intensity combat in the Himalayas proved to be a daunting task. Early failure was only overcome through innovation and adaptation to the environment. Specialised forces, unconventional techniques and the focused application of overwhelming firepower ultimately secured victory.     

When the Going Gets Tough… Monitoring Missions and a Changing Conflict Environment in Sri Lanka, 2002–2008

This article analyzes how the conflict environment in which a civilian monitoring mission is deployed influences the monitors' assessment of the operation. It draws on unique empirical material from the experience of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), deployed to oversee a ceasefire agreement in Sri Lanka 2002–2008. With material from a survey and in-depth interviews, experiences of the monitors are analyzed and changes over time are traced in relation to the monitors' assessment of the mandate and organizational set-up of the mission. The study points to the difficulty of monitoring missions to address escalation during an ongoing peace process. Its function is dependent on the goodwill of the parties. In essence, monitoring missions have the potential to strengthen peace when there is momentum in favor of progress, but when relations between the parties turn sour and the conflict escalates a civilian monitoring mission basically loses its potential. During the final stages of the war, which saw a very large number of civilian casualties, the war-torn areas were closed to international observers. Moreover, international pressure for a short-term ceasefire to alleviate the humanitarian situation was dismissed by the Sri Lankan government, which also saw the backing of several important actors, not the least China.     

Challenges of measuring progress in Afghanistan using violence trends: the effects of aggregation,military operations,seasonality, weather,and other causal factors

Measuring nationwide progress of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan using violence trends is difficult due to several factors: aggregation of data to the national level may obfuscate disparate local trends; the observed seasonality in violence makes comparisons difficult and may obscure progress; and short-term spikes or troughs – attributable to weather, military operations and tempo, or holiday periods – heavily influence simple averaging schemes. Despite these challenges, proper understanding of violence statistics is critical to estimating the effectiveness of military forces added during a surge or redeployed as part of transition. This article explores methods for analyzing observed violence trends to identify causal factors, to provide a comparable baseline, and to inform assessments at appropriate levels of aggregation. One methodology for seasonal adjustment of violence data is discussed and shown to provide a logical baseline for examining trends. An ordinary least squares regression model is developed and implemented using time-series violence data.     

Optimal joint preventive maintenance and production policies

We study joint preventive maintenance (PM) and production policies for an unreliable production‐inventory system in which maintenance/repair times are non‐negligible and stochastic. A joint policy decides (a) whether or not to perform PM and (b) if PM is not performed, then how much to produce. We consider a discrete‐time system, formulating the problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) model. The focus of the work is on the structural properties of optimal joint policies, given the system state comprised of the system's age and the inventory level. Although our analysis indicates that the structure of optimal joint policies is very complex in general, we are able to characterize several properties regarding PM and production, including optimal production/maintenance actions under backlogging and high inventory levels, and conditions under which the PM portion of the joint policy has a control‐limit structure. In further special cases, such as when PM set‐up costs are negligible compared to PM times, we are able to establish some additional structural properties. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

Learning ‘Under Fire’: Israel’s improvised military adaptation to Hamas tunnel warfare

What organisational attributes enhance a military’s ability to effectively adapt on the battlefield? Upon the outbreak of war in July 2014 between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) encountered an expansive network of tunnels from which Hamas was launching large-scale assaults into Israel. This article illustrates that the IDF’s ability to successfully adapt ‘under fire’ to this battlefield surprise was facilitated by several important attributes related to its organisational learning capacity: a dynamic, action-oriented organisational culture, a flexible leadership and command style, specialised commando units which acted as ‘incubators’ for learning and innovation, and a formal system to institutionalise and disseminate lessons learned.     

Reassessing private military and security company (PMSC) ‘competition‘ in civil war: lessons from Sierra Leone

ABSTRACT

This paper challenges recent claims that competitive market dynamics incentivize Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) to fully commit to providing effective services, thereby reducing the duration of civil war. Our assessment of a most-likely case scenario for this argument – Sierra Leone – reveals four critical problems. First, there is rarely direct competition, even if numerous companies are present. Second, the presence of multiple PMSCs usually represents a collaboration among subsidiaries providing distinct services, often under the same corporate umbrella. Third, data aggregation obfuscates the overlap of PMSC presence, inflating the amount of perceived competition. Finally, we raise concerns regarding how quantitative analyses can conflate conflict intensity with conflict termination.     

The Persistent Deficit of Militia Officers in the Swiss Armed Forces: An Opportunity Cost Explanation

The Swiss Armed Forces are suffering from a structural deficit of militia officers despite good pay and a general supportive attitude in the population. Whereas, prior studies have focused on motivation to explain understaffing in armed forces, we offer an alternative approach based on opportunity cost. We model decision alternatives both within and outside a military organization, taking private sector employment as the reference point. We then monetize opportunity costs of leisure, fringe benefits, and private sector income not compensated. Our results suggest that in terms of opportunity cost, service as a militia officer is the least attractive option, an effect that we believe explains the persistent staff deficit. Implications of these findings for the literature and recruitment policy are discussed.