The Deutch commission report: An overview

The threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is real and urgent. Combating this threat requires a new and comprehensive approach by the federal government. It requires sustained leadership at the top and an organizational structure that can set policies and objectives for combating proliferation; develop integrated, government‐wide plans to implement those policies and objectives, including plans for acquiring necessary technology; make appropriate decisions regarding how resources should be allocated to carry out those plans; and regularly evaluate the effectiveness of our policies, programs, and operations. There is no such comprehensive approach today.     

On parallel machine replacement problems with general replacement cost functions and stochastic deterioration

The parallel machine replacement problem consists of finding a minimum cost replacement policy for a finite population of economically interdependent machines. In this paper, we formulate a stochastic version of the problem and analyze the structure of optimal policies under general classes of replacement cost functions. We prove that for problems with arbitrary cost functions, there can be optimal policies where a machine is replaced only if all machines in worse states are replaced (Worse Cluster Replacement Rule). We then show that, for problems with replacement cost functions exhibiting nonincreasing marginal costs, there are optimal policies such that, in any stage, machines in the same state are either all kept or all replaced (No‐Splitting Rule). We also present an example that shows that economies of scale in replacement costs do not guarantee optimal policies that satisfy the No‐Splitting Rule. These results lead to the fundamental insight that replacement decisions are driven by marginal costs, and not by economies of scale as suggested in the literature. Finally, we describe how the optimal policy structure, i.e., the No‐Splitting and Worse Cluster Replacement Rules, can be used to reduce the computational effort required to obtain optimal replacement policies. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

A Foregone Conclusion? The United States,Britain and the Trident D5 Agreement

Existing studies of the United Kingdom’s purchase of Trident D5 missiles have simplified the Reagan administration’s sale. Using previously classified documentation, this article highlights the potential political and financial ramifications of a sale agreement that led to complex deliberations within the Thatcher government up until the final day of negotiations. The White House viewed the sale as a means to strengthen Western nuclear and conventional forces to counter the perceived Soviet threat. However, even within this conducive environment, US officials still drove a hard bargain with their British counterparts, in order to support US strategic interests. Indeed, the White House utilised the sale to influence British defence policy. In this way, the Trident agreement was not a foregone conclusion but rather a continuation of the friendly, but not preordained, nature of US–UK nuclear relations that has been renegotiated, according to the varying interests of both parties, throughout the partnership's existence.