从大国博弈视角解读与应对第三次抵消战略

在常规军力优势相对衰落、经费预算日益缩紧的背景下,美军为维持其军事霸权,提出了旨在实现兵力全球自由投送的第三次抵消战略(Third Offset Strategy)。通过梳理抵消战略的现实背景、历史沿革和战略目的,我们发现如果把第三次抵消战略简单视作美军的军事技术发展战略甚至军事战略,就会陷入片面而幼稚的认识误区。除了防范潜在的技术诱骗和技术突袭,更应该从大国博弈的战略视角出发,全面审视和应对第三次抵消战略对我国的挑战。美军实现国家利益的需求导向、自我变革的决心勇气和创新能力、科技兴军的先进理念和以军为主的军民融合成功经验值得借鉴。要以我为主参与制定未来战争的"游戏规则",做到"你打你的,我打我的";要深入研究美军作战体系和美国国家战略的薄弱环节,有针对性地"攻其所必救",从而化解重大安全挑战,争得新的战略机遇期。     

Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014

In 2013, France launched Operation ‘Serval’ to halt the southwards advance of Islamist insurgents in Mali. Using a Clausewitzian analytical framework, this article provides an assessment of France’s political and military aims in Mali and the degree to which they have been attained. Clear political goals, coordinated international diplomacy, an effective use of military force and blunders by the rebel forces turned ‘Serval’ into a short-term success. Strategically, however, the mission has proven unable to address the conflict’s underlying causes. Serval’s long-term effect is probably better measured by what it prevented than what it contributed.     

Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age

While the arrival of nuclear weapons coincided roughly with the development of short, medium, intermediate, and eventually intercontinental missiles, the contribution of missile technology to the deterrence equation is often lost. If nuclear weapons were eliminated, even new generation missiles with conventional payloads could struggle to render effective deterrence. But some of the physical and psychological effects commonly ascribed to nuclear weapons could still be in play. And in a world without nuclear weapons, thinking about the use and control of force from the nuclear age would also deserve renewed attention.     

The Weight of the Past(s): The Impact of the Bundeswehr’s Use of Historical Experience on Strategy-Making in Afghanistan

This article seeks to explain the basic dynamics of the development of the German military approach in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2010 by looking at the impact of the Bundeswehr’s established uses of historical experience. First, the German military approach in Afghanistan has slowly evolved from a peacebuilding and mediation mission towards a full-fledged combat deployment. Second, the Bundeswehr’s exclusive focus on the World War II experience has contributed to the emergence of the Balkans experience as a formative experience that shaped initial operational thinking in Afghanistan. Third, because a thorough debate on the historical foundation of counterinsurgency remained absent, the operational shift in 2009 was perceived as a return to ‘classical’ military tasks and thus led to an almost exclusive focus on training for combat.     

【邀请论文】特朗普政府太空防卫战略调整的动因、特点与影响

面对太空领域变化的安全环境和自身实力的相对衰弱,特朗普政府对美国的太空防卫战略进行了重大调整。相比奥巴马政府的太空防卫战略,特朗普政府明确将太空作为新型作战域,加快天军建设,并以中俄为主要对手,联合盟友构建军民一体、内外联动的太空防卫体系。本文认为,特朗普政府对于太空防卫战略的调整凸显了美国欲加快太空武器化、谋求外空绝对军事力量优势的霸权企图。但这无疑会加剧目前愈演愈烈的太空“安全困境”,将更多国家拉入“太空军备竞赛”的恶性循环中,对国际太空安全和全球战略稳定带来消极影响。展望拜登政府的太空防卫政策,其军事色彩会略微下降,但也将更重视技术积累和太空的开发利用。     

Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy,Policy, and Grand Strategy

Many scholars, strategists and pundits contend that the US is in decline. They argue that America's national capabilities are significantly eroding, and that with the rise of important regional powers, its primacy in world affairs is rapidly diminishing as well. Yet America continues to possess significant advantages in critical sectors such as economic size, technology, competitiveness, demography, force size, power projection, military technology, and in the societal capacity to innovate and adapt. This article argues that the nature of material problems has been overstated, and that the US should be able to withstand modest erosion in its relative strength for some time to come without losing its predominant status. Instead, where limits to American primacy do exist, they are as or more likely to be ideational as they are material. The problem inheres as much or more in elite and societal beliefs, policy choices, and political will, as in economic, technological or manpower limitations at home, or the rise of peer competitors abroad.     

The Hydrogen Bomb,Lewis L. Strauss and the Writing of Nuclear History

In January 1950 President Harry S. Truman announced that the United States would proceed with further work to determine the feasibility of a ‘Super’, or hydrogen, bomb. The events leading up to that decision – counter-pressures and advocacy from a number of quarters, including the divided Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the nuclear scientists, Congress and the Pentagon – is well known. Less attention has been given to how the story of the Super came to be told in official and popular publications. Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, rogue member of the AEC, later presidential adviser on atomic affairs and AEC chairman, was one of the most vigorous advocates of developing thermonuclear weapons. He was also a highly skilled player of bureaucratic politics. This article draws upon the Strauss archives to examine how he used his position and his contacts to shape the history of the H-bomb to his own political advantage.     

India's Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean – Securing the Waves?

India has increasingly high aspirations in the Indian Ocean, as enunciated by politicians, naval figures and the wider elite. These aspirations, its strategic discourse, are of pre-eminence and leadership. India's maritime strategy for such a self-confessed diplomatic, constabulary and benign role is primarily naval-focused; a sixfold strategy of increasing its naval spending, strengthening its infrastructure, increasing its naval capabilities, active maritime diplomacy, exercising in the Indian Ocean and keeping open the choke points. Through such strategy, and soft balancing with the United States, India hopes to secure its own position against a perceived growing Chinese challenge in the Indian Ocean.     

Deterring Insurgents: Culture,Adaptation and the Evolution of Israeli Counterinsurgency, 1987–2005

This article studies the Israeli ‘way of war’ in counterinsurgency in the period 1987–2005 by analysing the characteristic features of Israel's approach and its ability to adapt to the challenges posed by the Palestinian and Lebanese insurgencies. It first outlines the evolution of the Israeli counterinsurgency. It subsequently examines the Israeli approach through the lens of the country's strategic culture, illuminating its features, rationales and goals, and concludes by examining to what extent Israel managed to adapt to the challenges of fighting insurgents.     

Reconsidering a Naval Blockade of China: A Response to Mirski

Sean Mirski's assessment of a naval blockade is an important contribution to the debate over how the United States should respond to China's growing military power. Nevertheless, it has three limitations. First, although distant and close-in blockades could be employed in tandem, analyzing them separately helps to explain when they might be used and how they could influence escalation. Second, while conventional countervalue and counterforce options could also be employed together, this would depend on the degree to which they overlapped and the order in which they were implemented. Third, a blockade could lead to unanticipated prewar, intra-war, and postwar challenges.