装备采办中的讨价还价博弈模型

竞争性谈判是一种重要的武器装备采办方式,军方与承包商之间的谈判是一个重复博弈过程,双方谈判的本质是讨价还价。分析了轮流出价的讨价还价模型,对轮流出价博弈的子博弈精炼均衡进行了论述;在轮流出价模型的基础上建立了同时出价的讨价还价模型,并对2种模型的特点进行了分析;通过案例对2个模型的均衡结果进行了对比。分析结果显示：同时出价的讨价还价模型更能有效解决实际问题,更具有现实意义。     

Client‐contractor bargaining on net present value in project scheduling with limited resources

The client‐contractor bargaining problem addressed here is in the context of a multi‐mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows, which is formulated as a progress payments model. In this model, the contractor receives payments from the client at predetermined regular time intervals. The last payment is paid at the first predetermined payment point right after project completion. The second payment model considered in this paper is the one with payments at activity completions. The project is represented on an Activity‐on‐Node (AON) project network. Activity durations are assumed to be deterministic. The project duration is bounded from above by a deadline imposed by the client, which constitutes a hard constraint. The bargaining objective is to maximize the bargaining objective function comprised of the objectives of both the client and the contractor. The bargaining objective function is expected to reflect the two‐party nature of the problem environment and seeks a compromise between the client and the contractor. The bargaining power concept is introduced into the problem by the bargaining power weights used in the bargaining objective function. Simulated annealing algorithm and genetic algorithm approaches are proposed as solution procedures. The proposed solution methods are tested with respect to solution quality and solution times. Sensitivity analyses are conducted among different parameters used in the model, namely the profit margin, the discount rate, and the bargaining power weights. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Contracts and coordination: Supply chains with uncertain demand and supply

Considering a supply chain with a supplier subject to yield uncertainty selling to a retailer facing stochastic demand, we find that commonly studied classical coordination contracts fail to coordinate both the supplier's production and the retailer's procurement decisions and achieve efficient performance. First, we study the vendor managed inventory (VMI) partnership. We find that a consignment VMI partnership coupled with a production cost subsidy achieves perfect coordination and a win‐win outcome; it is simple to implement and arbitrarily allocates total channel profit. The production cost subsidy optimally chosen through Nash bargaining analysis depends on the bargaining power of the supplier and the retailer. Further, motivated by the practice that sometimes the retailer and the supplier can arrange a “late order,” we also analyze the behavior of an advance‐purchase discount (APD) contract. We find that an APD with a revenue sharing contract can efficiently coordinate the supply chain as well as achieve flexible profit allocation. Finally, we explore which coordination contract works better for the supplier vs. the retailer. It is interesting to observe that Nash bargaining solutions for the two coordination contracts are equivalent. We further provide recommendations on the applications of these contracts. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 305–319, 2016     

建立中国式辩诉交易制度的构想

美国的辩诉交易制度具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。有必要借鉴国外辩诉交易制度的合理因素,建立中国式的辩诉交易制度。建立中国式的辩诉交易制度,应对其适用条件、适用案件的范围及适用程序做出明确规定。     

军事联盟的形成机制与对策

国家间的对抗与合作是国际关系中的最常见的问题,通过引入博弈论中的讨价还价模型和差分方程,分析了联盟的形成机制,并对三国合作、三国竞争以及三国部分合作对抗的情况进行了比较,通过数值仿真对模型分析过程进行了验证,仿真结果表明,不同类型国家的策略选择对博弈结果影响很大,研究内容较好地揭示了国家间矛盾与利益的变化规律,为深入理解国际关系提供了参考。     

Interchange fee rate,merchant discount rate,and retail price in a credit card network: A game‐theoretic analysis

We consider two game‐theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an issuer's interchange fee rate, an acquirer's merchant discount rate, and a merchant's retail price in a credit card network. In the first setting, we investigate a two‐stage game problem in which the issuer and the acquirer first negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer then determine their merchant discount rate and retail price, respectively. In the second setting, motivated by the recent US bill “H.R. 2695,” we develop a three‐player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pricing decision. We derive both the Shapley value‐ and the nucleolus‐characterized, and globally‐optimal unique rates for the grand coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we find that the participation of the merchant in the negotiation process can result in the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand coalition in the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the credit card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with sufficiently low operation costs. We also show that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable and the U.S. bill “H.R. 2695” is thus more effective, if the degree of division of labor in the credit card network is higher as the merchant, acquirer, and issuer are more specialized in the retailing, acquiring, and issuing operations, respectively. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

不完全信息下军事威逼讨价还价博弈分析

在详细分析威慑与威逼区别的基础上,构建了不完全信息下军事威逼讨价还价博弈模型。按照最大期望效用准则,分析了不完全信息下军事威逼走向讨价还价阶段的条件,研究表明:运用鲁宾斯坦经典讨价还价唯一完美均衡解,得出以下结论:争夺目标自身的效用越大,战争带来的声誉得益效用越大,军事威逼走向讨价还价阶段的可能性越大;一旦进入讨价还价阶段,威逼者会接受挑战者提出的方案,冲突将不再发生。     

A sequential auction‐bargaining procurement model

One of the most important decisions that a firm faces in managing its supply chain is a procurement decision: selecting suitable suppliers among many potential competing sellers and reducing the purchase cost. While both auctions and bargaining have been extensively studied in the literature, the research that combines auctions and bargaining is limited. In this article, we consider a combined auction‐bargaining model in a setting where a single buyer procures an indivisible good from one of many competing sellers. The procurement model that we analyze is a sequential model consisting of the auction phase followed by the bargaining phase. In the auction phase, the sellers submit bids, and the seller with the lowest bid is selected as the winning bidder. In the bargaining phase, the buyer audits the cost of the winning seller and then negotiates with him to determine the final price. For this auction‐bargaining model, we find a symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy for the sellers in a closed form, which is simple to understand and closely related to the classical results in the auction and bargaining literature. We also show that the auction‐bargaining model generates at least as much profit to the buyer as the standard auction or sequential bargaining model. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Franchising cooperation through chance cross‐constrained games

This paper explores the role of franchising arrangements in the context of game theory. We assume a single franchisor and a single franchisee channel and address the impact of fixed lump‐sum fees, royalties, wholesale price, and retail price on the franchise contracts. We start with the chance cross‐constrained noncooperative situation where the franchisor, as the leader, first specifies his/her strategies. The franchisee, as the follower, then decides on his/her decision. We then relax the assumption of franchisee's inability to influence the franchisor's decisions and discuss cooperative situation between the franchisor and the franchisee. Nash's bargaining model is utilized to select the best Pareto‐efficient payment scheme for the franchisor and the franchisee to achieve their cooperation. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 669–685, 2000     

基于迭代Bargaining策略优化服务合成执行路径

服务质量(QoS)是优化服务合成执行路径的关键研究内容,当前绝大多数存在的方法很少注意到商业环境下服务商之间存在的隐性竞争压力可能会迫使服务商动态改变他们的QoS值以至于合成优化执行路径发生改变.针对此问题,提出一个基于迭代Bargaining策略的约束违背纠正方法.该方法使用本地最优化策略,在没有考虑用户QoS约束的情况下建立一条最优执行路径.对此路径,全局QoS计算模型和全局约束违背检查模型能找出所有发生的约束违背.一个迭代的Bargaining策略被递归作用于关键路径执行节点,使得更好服务提供商被选出替换原有执行节点,从而一个优化的执行路径能被重新建立以满足用户综合的QoS约束需求.