The Gravity of Arms

The aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of international arms transfers in a gravity model framework. By distinguishing between the decision to export arms (extensive margin) and the value of the arms exported (intensive margin), while also considering its interdependence, is what differentiates this paper from previous research. A theoretically justified gravity model of trade augmented with political and security motives is estimated using a two-stage panel data approach for 104 exporting countries over the period from 1950 to 2007. In addition to the usual gravity variables related to the economic mass of the trading countries and the trade cost factors, the model is extended with political and security factors. The level of democracy in both trading partners, political differences between trading partners and voting similarity with the United States in the UN General Assembly of the countries engaged in trade are the main political factors, whereas the existence of conflicts, military pacts, and embargoes are taken as security motives. The key result indicates that both political and security motives are an important determinant of an arms trade, but their effects on the extensive margin of exports (the decision to order a transfer) differs from their effect on the intensive margin (average value of exports). Moreover, the relative importance of the factors under study has changed since 1989. In the post-cold war period, countries that are less democratic are more likely to export arms, military pacts are less relevant and embargoes play a role.     

非法移民对边境安全稳定的影响分析

边境安全作为国家安全或者国土安全的重要方面，越来越多地受到各种非传统安全因素的威胁和挑战，其中，非法移民问题就是一个不可忽视的因素。非法移民的界定涵盖了“偷运移民”和“贩运人口”两种犯罪形式，并分别从结构性维度和战略性维度分析了非法移民对输出国（或地区）、输入国（或地区）和途经国（或地区）边境安全稳定的影响。     

Budget allocation under uncertainty and the costs of war and insecurity

This study presents a framework and models for the analysis of government budget allocation into defense and civilian expenditures in situations of uncertainty about the incidence of war. The models display the intricate relationships between security levels, subjective probabilities of the occurrence of war, and potential war damages. We show that poor countries tend to perceive greater probabilities of war than their richer rivals, and that the psychological burden of insecurity is larger when the country’s wealth is larger and when its preference for security is higher. We apply our models to the Israeli–Syrian arms race and show that the higher rate of growth of Israel’s gross domestic product relative to that of Syria is expected to lead to an increase in Syria’s perception of the likelihood of war and to a decrease in Israel’s perception of such a likelihood. We also show that if Syria’s regime becomes ideologically more extreme, the monetary cost of maintaining Israel’s security at the level that it enjoyed prior to the change will be very high, whereas the monetary cost of maintaining Israel’s welfare will be moderate.     

The Finger on the Button

Taiwan's international status is such that the country's ability to trade and to supply certain goods and technologies remains its primary means of practicing diplomacy and asserting international influence. U.S. pressure to conform to international nonproliferation standards has made the issue of export controls a troubling one for Taiwan. Limiting Taiwan's economic relations affects its ability to sustain itself economically and to maintain productive relations with other nations. On the other hand, as a recipient of U.S. high-technology transfers and security assurances, Taiwan cannot ignore the directives of the United States. The article focuses on this dilemma and how a shift in power to the Democratic Progressive Party is affecting Taiwan's choice between placing limitations on its global economic power or risking being cut off from U.S. technology and losing U.S. security assurances. In order to address this challenge properly, Taiwan will need to reassess its fundamental economic and security interests.     

DETERMINING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

This paper models the determination of the defence industrial base – the number of different military systems a country decides to maintain. High R&D costs means that few countries can afford to produce major weapons systems and the producers also import systems. Non‐producers rely on imports and we assume their demand is driven by regional arms races. Military capability is determined by the number of systems and the quantity and quality of each. We examine how the defence industrial base is influenced by military expenditures, R&D costs, export controls, the nature of regional arms races and a variety of other factors.     

Increased Chinese and American defence involvement in Africa

There is often a perception put forth of a fight for supremacy between China and the USA. This is often the case when discussing the continent of Africa. Both countries have recently increased their involvement in Africa for a variety of reasons. In 2011, China surpassed the USA as Africa's largest trading partner, with Africa predicted to be Beijing's largest trading partner by 2017. As expected, their bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation with strategic countries and organisations has matured and expanded along with it. Washington's own economic interests, al-Qa'ida and threats to maritime security are some of the crucial elements behind the US's presence on the continent. This article analyses both the USA and China's rising defence involvement in Africa. It compares and contrasts their similarities and differences, and argues that cooperation in certain areas can prove beneficial for all parties involved.     

THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR ENERGY EXPANSION

Nuclear energy is an integral part of China's energy strategy and will increasingly contribute to China's total energy supply. China has more than twenty civilian facilities, including power reactors, mines, and enrichment plants, to support its nuclear power program. As China operates more nuclear plants, more nuclear materials will be produced and stockpiled, and more nuclear facilities will be spread around the country. To ensure that this expanded network of nuclear facilities does not increase the risk that nuclear materials will be diverted or become the target of attack, China will need to develop more reliable domestic nuclear security strategies. China is also poised to become a major exporter of nuclear energy technology. China has committed to keeping nuclear technologies out of the hands of dangerous states and/or sub-state organizations, but in order to fulfill its nonproliferation obligations as well as its treaty-based commitment to share nuclear technologies, China will need to strengthen nuclear export controls and practices. This report examines and evaluates security measures at Chinese civilian nuclear power plants and suggests ways to improve them. It also reviews current export control policies and systems, identifies likely challenges to the expanding nuclear sector, and proposes possible solutions.     

US–Latin America’s security: moving through an inflection point?

Recent elections in Latin America, such as those of Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Horacio Cartes in Paraguay, and the impeachment process of Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, point to a new direction in Latin American politics and away from the “hard left;” they also point to a new momentum in the security relationship between the US and Latin American countries. Former US President Obama’s 2016 trip to Cuba and Argentina was a clear demonstration of this new security paradigm and also a clear indication that there is a new momentum brewing in the US towards a rethinking and reshaping of security strategies and mindsets. This article will explore the multidimensional security relationship between the US and Latin American countries in light of recent changes in the US’ posture toward the region.     

STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS IN TAIWAN

Because it is a producer and supplier of high-tech dual-use goods as well as a major transit point for WMD-related and military items, Taiwan represents an important case study of national export control systems. Taiwan is not an official member of the major multilateral export control regimes, yet it remains committed to nonproliferation goals. The article explores the strategic trade controls of Taiwan within the context of its nonproliferation policies and commitments. The author discusses the strong and weak aspects of Taiwan's strategic trade controls by looking in detail at key components of the country's export-import control system: legal basis, licensing system, enforcement and compliance mechanism, government-industry outreach, and adherence to nonproliferation treaties and multilateral export control regimes.     

SOCIAL PREFERENCES FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE AND POLICE ENFORCEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE

We study the determinants of social preferences for national defence and for police and law enforcement. For this task, we estimate a bivariate ordered probit model for a set of European countries (France, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) in 2006. Determinants of spending decisions for defence and police are found to be linked but are of significantly different magnitudes. Besides, measures against terrorist threats are positively linked to police and defence spending increases, while the subjective perception of fiscal pressure has no influence. Finally, no significant differences are found between Northern and Southern Europe.     

浅谈警卫人员应具备的心理品质

警卫人员良好的心理品质是圆满完成警卫任务至关重要的因素。一个优秀的警卫人员，必须具有警卫兴趣浓厚、性格特征良好、情绪控制适度、意志力坚强、感知敏锐、记忆力强、思维敏捷、注意力集中、动作反应迅速、空间定位能力好等良好的心理品质。     

EXPORT CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Export controls and international safeguards are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of export controls and international safeguards rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.     

THE ROLLBACK OF LIBYA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

In 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi agreed to eliminate his country's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and long-range Scud missiles under strict verification by U.S. and British experts and international inspectors. This article examines the negotiation and implementation of Libya's WMD rollback, with a primary focus on its chemical weapons program, and draws some lessons for the future. Although the Libyan case was unique in many ways, some aspects have relevance for other countries, including the critical role played by multilateral nonproliferation organizations, the utility of economic sanctions and export controls, the importance of a flexible U.S. disarmament funding mechanism, the value of rotating technical assistance teams in and out of the country that is disarming, and the desirability of remaining politically engaged with a former proliferator after rollback is complete.     

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons: how safe is safe enough? Transparency versus opacity

Due to expanding and increasing religious extremism and terrorism coupled with political instability in Pakistan, most western observers believe that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not secure and could be taken over by terrorists. This would have adverse implications for the region and for global peace, especially for the security of USA and Europe. This article argues that this perception is based on a flawed understanding and knowledge of how Pakistan's command and control setup has evolved and operates. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are as safe as any other state's nuclear weapons. Pakistan has also been active in supporting and participating in global efforts to improve nuclear safety and security. Over the years, Pakistan has been quite open in sharing information regarding how it is improving its command and control system with western governments as well as scholars. This article argues that the steps Pakistan has taken to secure its nuclear weapons are adequate and that Pakistan would continue to further strengthen these measures; however, it is the expanding religious extremism, terrorism and anti-Americanism in the country which make the international perception of Pakistan extremely negative and then seep into the perception of Pakistan's nuclear weapons safety and security.     

中国警卫工作在社会视角中的误区

中国警卫工作始终披着神秘面纱，面纱遮盖住警卫工作诸多秘密，也造成社会视角中对中国警卫工作认知的扭曲；社会生活中群众对警卫工作的扭曲认识，严重影响了警卫部队建设和警卫工作的开展。分析社会对警卫工作产生扭曲认识的原因，对警卫概念、发展史、基本机构和作用等方面加以介绍，还中国警卫工作一个真实面目。     

Stopping Suicide Attacks: Optimal Strategies and Unintended Consequences

We study the behavior of defense spending in Switzerland over 1975–2001. Our main interest is in determining how neutrality in international affairs (non‐membership in military alliances) affects defense spending. We find that neutrality is associated with a perception of lower levels of external threat; hence it confers economic benefits in the form of a smaller defense burden. However, neutrality does not fully insulate a country from variations in the level of external threat in the global system as perceived by members of military alliances. Swiss defense spending has tracked very closely the spending trends – but at a lower average level – of the United States and other NATO countries. To the extent that post‐Cold War threats, such as international terrorism, materialize primarily in the context of existing security alliances, Swiss military spending patterns observed in 1975–2001 are likely to remain the same in the future.     

National restrictions in multinational military operations: A conceptual framework

Recent scholarship in security studies has started to explore the causes and consequences of various forms of national restrictions in multinational military operations (MMOs). This article makes a conceptual contribution to this literature by developing a theoretical framework of national restrictions in MMOs that distinguishes between structural, procedural, and operational restrictions. I argue that these types of restrictions are governed by different causal mechanisms. Structural restrictions are relatively stable over time and effect deployment decisions irrespective of other factors. Procedural restrictions, on the other hand, can constitute veto points against deployment only in combination with distinct political preferences. Finally, operational restrictions directly affect the rules of engagement of troop contributing countries. The article illustrates the three types of restrictions and their interaction with empirical examples from a range of countries and sketches their impact on MMO deployment decisions and mandates.     

Defense spending and economic growth across the Taiwan straits: a threshold regression model

This paper employs both linear and non‐linear models to investigate the relationship between national defense spending and economic growth for Taiwan and China. Using data from 1953–2000 on defense spending, GDP, import, export and capital, we find that China's defense spending leads that of Taiwan. There exists the phenomenon of an arms race between both countries when official Chinese data are used. On the one hand, feedback relations prevail between economic growth and defense spending growth in Taiwan. On the other hand, China's national defense is found to lead economic growth.     

The Kennedy Administration,US Foreign Internal Security Assistance and the Challenge of ‘Subterranean War’, 1961–63

US foreign internal security assistance, that is, support to ‘Free World’ governments threatened by subversion, terrorism, and insurgency, formed a central part of the Kennedy administration's strategy for defeating ‘wars of national liberation’. As part of the administration's counterinsurgency policy, support to police and paramilitary forces abroad was intended to improve the ability of friendly governments to identify and root our perceived threats to the states. Under the tenets of modernization theory embraced by administration officials, strong internal security forces were expected to contribute to nation-building by protecting the fragile development process underway in the developing world. However, in attempting to export the American police model, policymakers failed to consider whether US notions about internal security were appropriate for fractious and unstable regions of the world.     

South Africa's arsenal of terrorism legislation

After only ten years in existence, the African Union (AU) has already made its mark on the landscape of peace and security in Africa. This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the AU's leading collaborative interstate security policy, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa. It examines four countries – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya – and how engaging with the APSA through early warning systems can contribute to developing the elements necessary for sustainable peace, namely regional stability, conflict management, and good governance.