青年民兵应树立正确的义利观

当前,大力发展的社会主义市场经济,使人们的价值取向发生了明显而深刻的变化,面对价值取向多元化的考验,作为一名民兵树立什么样的义利观,对于我们进行正确的价值判断,掌握恰当的行为准则关系极大。 所谓“义”,在我国古代,主要指道德规范,即道义。随着时代的发展,“义”的含义越来越宽泛。今天我们所说的“义”,主要是指调整人与人之间关系的行为规范。通常包涵     

在军民融合中加快推进战略资源统筹

党的十八大对国防和军队现代化建设提出了新的要求,在军民融合中加快推进战略资源统筹,是国防和军队建设又好又快发展的一个重要突破口.要确立“坚持以国家核心安全需求为导向”的军事价值、“走出一条投入较少效益较高的路子”的经济价值以及“调整职能理顺关系优化机制设置”的管理价值等三个方面的价值取向.面对“市场”与“战场”在共同参与国家资源的分割、目标最大化取向以及资源配置遵循的规则差异对加快推进军民融合式发展构成的挑战,要以战略规划为战略着眼点、以体制机制为根本着力点,以法规建设为现实切入点加快推进军民融合式战略资源统筹.     

现代军人价值观的矛盾

军人价值观面临的主要矛盾（一）社会利益观念的功利性和军人奉献的无私性的矛盾。市场经济机制是利益驱动机制。通过经济的发展,给人们带来了实惠,调动了人们的积极性。社会价值取向日益“务实”,在“利”和“义”的天平上,“利”的砝码不断加重。社会成员已不像以往那样重视社会理想信念和精神价值,而是更加重视现实的物质利益。讲实惠、重功利,已成为人们的普遍价值取向。军人作为社会中的特殊群体,其宗旨是全心全意为人民服务,强调的是自我牺牲和无私奉献。两种截然不同的价值取向不可避免地造成了军人价值观的矛盾。（二）地方…     

军费概念辨析

军费是国家为了满足安全需要用于军事活动的资源价值,是国家安全保障能力在经济方面的价值反映。军费概念应是两个方面的统一:一方面,军费作为一个军事经济范畴,体现了一种客观军事经济过程,即国家为了满足其安全需要而配置部分资源价值于军事活动的活动过程;另一方面,军费运行过程中必然地、不以人的意志为转移地形成一定的军事经济关系。凡是具有这一概念所反映的本质属性的事物都是军费。     

知识是价值取向的重要尺度

知识是价值取向的重要尺度赵言舟赵磊知识通常为人的价值取向提供重要依据,它影响甚至决定着一个人对客观事物和外部环境的价值认识、价值判断和价值选择的方式、方法,对人生价值观的确立具有比较特殊的“尺度”作用。知识是确定理想价值的一种“尺度”。在人生价值中,...     

从市场价值视角看职业出版家的“七种武器”

新闻出版改革发展伴随着中国改革开放30年的步伐不断深入，出版产业提出了“五大”战略，“培养优秀职业出版家”就是其中一大战略，可见职业出版家在中国新闻出版改革发展中的重要战略地位。本文从新时期市场对“价值”的新取向来分析“职业”出版家所应掌握的“七种武器”，结合现实，提出“职业”出版家才是出版社“价值”创造核心，应当成为“五大战略”亟待首先建设的。     

兵团精神：新中国屯垦戍边核心价值观

以“热爱祖国、无私奉献、艰苦创业、开拓进取”为主要内涵的兵团精神,既是兵团过去克服艰难险阻、经受多种考验的价值取向和价值评价,也是兵团今后更好地履行历史使命的价值取向和价值评价,是对新中国屯垦戍边长期起主导作用的核心价值观。     

读后感神圣的使命

为了及时赶到点验现场,个体户民兵刘长会不惜花钱“打的”,这种崇高的国防观念,委实可嘉! 刘长会“打的”赶来参加民兵点验,是因为他心中装着国防,装着自己的神圣使命。在市场经济条件下,人们的价值取向、效益观念等许多方面都在发生着变化。为追逐金钱、名利、地位,一些人的国防观念变得日益淡薄。在自身利益和国家利益发生冲突时,唯恐个人利益受到损害而置     

坚持用科学发展观指导军队院校创新发展

坚持用科学发展观指导军队院校创新发展,一要全面把握“以人为本”的科学内涵,搞清楚为谁发展和靠谁发展的问题;二要深刻理解“和谐发展”的本质要求,既把握重点又统筹兼顾;三要认清“可持续发展”的意义,坚持改革创新和内涵式发展;四要始终坚持“又好又快”价值取向,在“有效果”的前提下追求高效率。     

编制营区规划应注意的几个问题

营区规划是营区建设的发展方向和目标，也是管区建设、改造、管理的依据。而营区规划的编制更是一项复杂的工作，是营房建设与管理的一件大事，是节约营区建设投资关键环节。为了扎扎实实地做好这项工作，笔者深入部队进行了多次调查研究，在分析和总结调研成果的基础上，提出了编制营房规划应注意的三个方面的问题，即：应树立“四个意识”，处理好“三个关系”与克服“两种思想”，并分别作了较为详细的阐述。     

Nuclear ‐ and missile‐related trade and developments for selected countries,November 1996‐February 1997

The material in this overview is drawn from selected abstracts that appear in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ nuclear and missile databases. Transactions of nuclear and missile technologies, parts, and materials are listed according to the recipient country. Other developments are listed according to the country where the event or development took place. The new, streamlined format of this section indicates a decision by the Monitoring Proliferation Threats Project to focus on only key information in the overview and to offer more in‐depth analysis in the “Reports” section of the journal.     

New terrorist threat to India's internal security: the danger from Pakistan's “Karachi Project”

The spectacular commando-style terrorist strike on Mumbai in November 2008 exposed India's lax internal security structure. As nearly all the security apparatus broke down during the long spell of attacks, massive public outrage flared up across the country calling for a firmer government response. Shockingly, India has done little to prevent a recurrence and a new security threat faces the country every single day not merely before but even after the Mumbai attacks. In contrast, Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence and the Lashkar-e-Taiba have successfully evaded pressures from both India and the international community and continue their terror campaign against India under the “Karachi Project” with the explicit intention to unsettle South Asia. Classified documents indicated that India is at the forefront of a cataclysmic “nuclear terrorism” threat from a “combination of Pakistan-based terrorists and homegrown radicals.” This article analyses the danger posed by the Indo-Pak radical groups targeting India and India's lack of preparedness to the new security threat from the “Karachi Project.”     

UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S ANTISATELLITE TEST

In discussing China's January 2007 hit-to-kill intercept of the Chinese weather satellite FengYun-1C, most American analysts sought the “message” for the United States—either by asserting that China's test was a deliberate step toward a comprehensive counterspace capability to offset U.S. conventional military superiority or an attempt to force the United States to the negotiating table on “the prevention of an arms race in outer space.” Chinese officials, after a long silence, eventually claimed the test was an “experiment” that was “not targeted at any country.” We traveled to China several times in 2007 and had a series of conversations with Chinese individuals knowledgeable about the history of this particular antisatellite program and with access to information about the decision-making process prior to and after the final test. These discussions were off the record, not for attribution, given the sensitivity of the subject. They reflected the views of some of the key institutions involved in the test from the State, the Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army, and aerospace experts involved in debris calculations. The information conveyed to us suggests that American commentators tend to place much greater importance on the United States as a driver in China's decision to develop the technology and conduct the test than do the Chinese.     

“simple-approximate” battle-outcome-prediction conditions for variable-coefficient lanchester-type equations of modern warfare

This article considers combat between two homogeneous forces modeled by variable- coefficient Lanchester-type equations of modern warfare and develops new “simple-approximate” battle-outcome-prediction conditions for military engagements terminated by two different types of prescribed conditions being met (fixed-force-level-breakpoint battles and fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battles). These battle-outcome-prediction conditions are sufficient (but not necessary) to determine the outcome of battle without having to explicitly compute the force-level trajectories, and they are characterized by their simplicity, requiring no advanced mathematical knowledge or tabulations of “special functions” for their application. Integrability properties of the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients figure prominently in their results, and involved in their development is a generalization of Lanchester's famous square law to variable-coefficient Lanchester-type combat and several other novel mathematical developments for the analysis of ordinary differential equations. Examples are given, with the attack of a mobile force against a static defensive position (both sides armed with weapons whose firepower is range dependent) being examined in detail.     

U.S. SPACE WEAPONS

Under the administration of President George W. Bush, Pentagon rhetoric has increasingly articulated a more robust vision of space as a future battlefield. This analysis details some of the ongoing spending for research and development programs identified in current U.S. Air Force, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and Defense Advanced Research and Planning Agency (DARPA) planning and budget documents related to “space control” and “space force projection.” This analysis finds that current support for “space superiority” and “space control” systems remains largely rhetorical—with little actual budgetary support. Unclassified technology development programs included in the six-year Future Years Defense Plan are a decade or more away from deployment. Programs related to offensive counterspace, space-based missile defense interceptors, and space-based strike total slightly less than $300 million in FY 2006 funding. We conclude significantly higher expenditures in research and development would be required to develop and deploy killer micro satellites, space-based missile defense interceptors, and military space planes.     

Violence in context: Mapping the strategies and operational art of irregular warfare

The malaise that the United States, and the West, have experienced in recent campaigns stems in large part from unclear thinking about war, its political essence, and the strategies needed to join the two. Instead, analysis and response are predicated on entrenched theoretical concepts with limited practical utility. The inadequacy of understanding has spawned new, and not so new, terms to capture unanticipated trends, starting with the re-discovery of “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” and leading to discussion of “hybrid threats” and “gray-zone” operations. New terminology can help, but the change must go deeper. Challenging analytical orthodoxy, this article sets out a unifying approach for the study of political violence, or more accurately: violent politics. It provides a conceptual foundation that helps to make sense of recent shifts in warfare. In effect, it offers sorely needed theoretical insights into the nature of strategy and guides the process of responding to nontraditional threats.     

Toward a multi-stage information conversion model of the research and development process

Research and development activities in a business firm or government laboratory are portrayed as a multi-stage information generation and conversion process. A “basic research” phase generates opportunities, in the form of findings in a set of scientific disciplines, which are available for subsequent exploitation. It is assumed that increments to information in a subject area are stochastic, proportional to the amount of knowledge which already exists in the area, and have values which are randomly distributed. An “exploratory development” phase is viewed as a process of selecting a subset of alternative research opportunities, improving each opportunity in the direction of its applications, estimating the value of the improved opportunity and using these estimates to choose the exploratory development results to be implemented in engineering development. The “engineering development” phase makes the value of exploratory results realizable without changing value or risk. Engineering development costs are assumed to increase as value increases. If exploratory development is not successful, additional costs in engineering development must be incurred to bring the design up to a minimum desirable level. The model is intended as a step toward formulating and analyzing problems in management planning and control of the several interrelated stages of the research and development process.     

How viable is international arms control for military artificial intelligence? Three lessons from nuclear weapons

Many observers anticipate “arms races” between states seeking to deploy artificial intelligence (AI) in diverse military applications, some of which raise concerns on ethical and legal grounds, or from the perspective of strategic stability or accident risk. How viable are arms control regimes for military AI? This article draws a parallel with the experience in controlling nuclear weapons, to examine the opportunities and pitfalls of efforts to prevent, channel, or contain the militarization of AI. It applies three analytical lenses to argue that (1) norm institutionalization can counter or slow proliferation; (2) organized “epistemic communities” of experts can effectively catalyze arms control; (3) many military AI applications will remain susceptible to “normal accidents,” such that assurances of “meaningful human control” are largely inadequate. I conclude that while there are key differences, understanding these lessons remains essential to those seeking to pursue or study the next chapter in global arms control.     

Uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimates of operational readiness and reliability in a two-state system

This paper obtains the uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimates of two indices of performance of a system which alternates between two states “up” or “down” in accordance with a Markov process. The two indices are (1) operational readiness, which measures the probability that the system will be up when needed; and (2) operational reliability, which measures the probability that the system will be up during the entire time of need. For the purpose of obtaining these estimates, two types of observations are considered: (a) those which reveal only the state of system at isolated time-points, and (b) those which continuously record the duration of the “up” and “down” times of the system.     

“Effing” the military: a political misunderstanding of management

The use of commercial business management techniques is widespread in all government departments, including the Ministry of Defence. This article examines the use of popular management techniques in the Armed Forces and argues that their application is misplaced. It looks at what the “effs” – “efficiency” and “effectiveness” – mean in the business world and to the Armed Forces. It compares the definitions both in business and the Armed Forces and finds that there are few, if any, situations where the same measurements can be applied. Whilst many management techniques are suited for business, the function of the Armed Forces and its output cannot be measured in the same way, complicated by the different metrics of “efficiency” in peace and in war. This difference may not be clearly understood by some politicians, or indeed by some senior military personnel. Using examples from some of the most popular management techniques such as “Lean” and “Agile” it is possible to see that their use might actually diminish the capabilities of the Armed Forces when it comes to performing their principal role – the use of force to achieve political objectives.