Toward a determination of optimal multilevel sampling plans

Traditionally continuous sampling plans have been evaluated according to relatively few criteria. These typically include the OC curve (on which AQL systems are based), the ASN, and the AOQ curve. These characteristics are all calculated under the assumption that the process is “in control” so that mathematically they are derived as long-term averages. Thus, any two plans which (long term) spend the same proportion of time on each type of sampling inspection will be identical relative to these criteria. This is true whether sampling from lots or doing unit-by-unit inspection. The goal is to first establish desirable additional criteria and then to develop methods to determine which procedure (of those which satisfy the standard criteria) is optimal relative to the new criteria. To be considered will be measures of a plan's ability to detect a sudden drop in quality (such as ARL).     

Sequential and systematic sampling plans for the Markov‐dependent production process

Acceptance sampling plans are used to assess the quality of an ongoing production process, in addition to the lot acceptance. In this paper, we consider sampling inspection plans for monitoring the Markov‐dependent production process. We construct sequential plans that satisfy the usual probability requirements at acceptable quality level and rejectable quality level and, in addition, possess the minimum average sample number under semicurtailed inspection. As these plans result in large sample sizes, especially when the serial correlation is high, we suggest new plans called “systematic sampling plans.” The minimum average sample number systematic plans that satisfy the probability requirements are constructed. Our algorithm uses some simple recurrence relations to compute the required acceptance probabilities. The optimal systematic plans require much smaller sample sizes and acceptance numbers, compared to the sequential plans. However, they need larger production runs to make a decision. Tables for choosing appropriate sequential and systematic plans are provided. The problem of selecting the best systematic sampling plan is also addressed. The operating characteristic curves of some of the sequential and the systematic plans are compared, and are observed to be almost identical. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 451–467, 2001     

Risk preference,multiple attributes,and multiple criteria in bayesian acceptance sampling plans

Although there has been considerable research directed toward developing Bayesian acceptance sampling plans, little consideration has been given to incorporating a decision-maker's risk attitude or treating such problems in terms of multiple-type defects and multiple criteria. We review our own work which is focused on the above issues. A model incorporating risk preference is shown to yield substantial differences in the characteristics of an optimal sampling plan relative to a typical Bayesian linear cost (risk neutral) model. Bayesian models and optimization schemes for a variety of multiple-type defect plans are reviewed. A bicriterion acceptance model, employing average outgoing quality and average inspection cost is also formulated. Traditional versus interactive optimization procedures are compared empirically in terms of ease of use, satisfaction with solutions, and insight gained into the problem.     

The value of losing control: Competition in markets for complements

When selling complementary products, manufacturers can often benefit from considering the resulting cross‐market interdependencies. Although using independent retailers makes it difficult to internalize these positive externalities, the ensuing double marginalization can mitigate within‐market competition. We use standard game theoretic analysis to determine optimal distribution channel strategies (through independent retailers or integrated) for competing manufacturers who participate in markets for complements. Our results suggest that a firm's optimal channel choice is highly dependent on its competitive positioning. A firm with a competitive advantage in terms of product characteristics (customer preferences) or production capabilities (cost) might benefit from selling through company‐controlled stores, allowing coordinated pricing across the two markets, whereas a less competitive firm might be better off using independent channel intermediaries to mitigate price competition. We consider two scenarios depending on whether the two firms make their distribution channel decisions sequentially or simultaneously. Although firms are unlikely to make such decisions at exactly the same instant, the simultaneous model also serves as a proxy for the scenario where firms decide sequentially, but where they cannot observe each other's strategic channel choices. For the sequential case, we find that the sequence of entry can have tremendous impact on the two firms'profits; whereas in some cases, the first mover can achieve substantially higher profits, we find that when the two markets are of sufficiently different size and only loosely related, a firm with a competitive advantage might be better off as a follower. Interestingly, our results suggest that, when the markets are of rather similar size, both firms are better off if they enter the industry sequentially. In those cases, the first entrant has incentive to reveal its planned channel strategies, and the follower has incentive to seek out and consider this information. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

An analysis of the long range operating characteristics of the MIL-STD-105D sampling scheme and some suggested modifications

An integral part of the MIL–STD–105D scheme for sampling inspection by attributes is the transfer from normal inspection to reduced or tightened inspection when the historical record of inspected lots suggests unusually good or bad quality. The switching rules in MIL–STD–105D have been criticized, especially by Japanese manufacturers, as being too severe when what is defined as acceptable quality material is submitted. This paper examines the long range fraction of lots rejected for several MIL–STD–105D sampling plans by using the MIL–STD–105D switching rules, using a modification suggested by the Japanese Standards Association, and by using a second modification developed by the authors. The Japanese Standards Association switching rules are more complex than those in MIL–STD–105D. It is demonstrated that they lead to improved long–range properties for Normal–Tightened–Reduced schemes, but to poorer properties for Normal–Tightened schemes. A simplified set of switching rules is suggested, wherein the “limit numbers” in MIL–STD–105D are eliminated. In comparison to MIL–STD–105D, the simpler rules lead to a lower probability of rejection for good lots and a comparable probability of rejection for bad lots.     

Design of sequential sampling inspection plans with screening based on minimal lattice paths

In this article we propose new sequential sampling inspection plans with screening indexed by LTPD and AOQL, in which the alternative of accepting or rejecting a lot is decided by the results of sequential sampling plans, based on the minimal lattice paths. It is illustrated that the average total inspection can be economized by using both of the proposed sequential sampling inspection plans, with screening indexed by LTPD and AOQL, respectively. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks

The inspection game is a two-player noncooperative game that models a situation where an inspector verifies whether the inspectee complies with the rules (on the assumption that the inspectee has the tendency to violate at least one of the rules). The usual approach in the analysis of this game seeks to find an optimal strategic inspection scheme for each of the two players yielding favorable payoffs. Recently, there have been some developments in the study of such games that use a mathematical structure known as reaction network involving a set of molecular species and the existing reactions among these species. In this paper, we use a reaction network to analyze the inspection game giving an alternative way of modeling the social situation. The molecular species play the role of the players' decision moves and their resulting gain or loss, while the reactions are the encounters of the decisions of the players which, as expected, yield payoffs. We reexamine the dynamics of the inspection game through the lens of reaction network theory and consider various situations that call for more detailed analyses such as equal or unequal reaction rates and inspection leadership. Conditions concerning reaction rates, initial population of decision species, benefits, and costs are determined in order to identify strategies that yield better payoffs both for the inspector and inspectee. These results illustrate practical insights rooted from the formulated simple game models.     

Variables inspection for SPC‐quarantined production

When a control chart signals an out‐of‐control condition for a production process, it may be desirable to “quarantine” all units produced since the last in‐control SPC sample. This paper presents an efficient procedure for variables inspection of such “SPC quarantined” product. A Bayesian sequential inspection procedure is developed which determines whether the out of control production is of acceptable quality. By inspecting the units in reverse of the order in which they were produced, the procedure is also capable of detecting the point at which the process went out of control, thus eliminating the need to inspect units produced prior to the onset of the out of control condition. Numerical examples are presented, and the performance characteristics of the procedure are demonstrated using Monte Carlo simulation. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 159–171, 2001     

An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims

This paper deals with an inspection game of customs and a smuggler. The customs can take two options of assigning a patrol or not. The smuggler has two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take actions during a limited number of days. When both players do, there are some possibilities that the customs captures the smuggler and, simultaneously, the smuggler possibly makes a success of the smuggling. If the smuggler is captured or there remain no days for playing the game, the game ends. In this paper, we formulate the problem into a multi‐stage two‐person zero‐sum stochastic game and investigate some characteristics of the equilibrium solution, some of which are given in a closed form in a special case. There have been some studies so far on the inspection game. However, some consider the case that the smuggler has only one opportunity of smuggling or the perfect‐capture case that the customs can certainly arrest the smuggler on patrol, and others think of a recursive game without the probabilities of fulfilling the players' purposes. In this paper, we consider the inspection game taking account of the fulfillment probabilities of the players' aims. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

The optimum design of multivariate acceptance sampling plans

A model is developed which may be used to determine the expected total cost of quality control per inspection lot under acceptance sampling by variables where several characteristics are to be simultaneously controlled. Optimization of the model is accomplished through the application of a conventional search procedure. The sensitivity of the model and the optimum solution to the shape of the underlying probability distributions is discussed and associated analyses are presented through an example.     

Systems approach to the multistage manufacturing connected-unit situation

This paper investigates the relationships among incoming quality limit (AIQL), manufacturing quality level in each stage of production, and outgoing quality limit (AOQL), for a multistage manufacturing connected-unit situation from the systems cost-effectiveness point of view. An objective function is developed and the formulated problem is solved using discrete optimization technique. The study is restricted to the development of single sampling plans where inspection is by attribute. Lot size and sample size are fixed for incoming and outgoing inspection for each stage of manufacturing.     

A sequential attribute sampling inspection game for item facilities

The routine inspection of facilities storing large numbers of identical items is modeled as a two‐person, sequential game. Timely detection of illegal activity is parameterized in terms of a critical time to detection, and equilibria are derived which provide inspection strategies. Necessary conditions for deterrence of illegal behavior are discussed. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 496–505, 2001     

【专题】智能化导弹质量检测方法研究

导弹是由各种类型装备组成的综合性很强的复杂系统,智能技术的引入进一步丰富了智能导弹质量特性的内涵,对质量检测和控制提出了更高要求,需要开发与之相适应的检测方法。本文先给出了智能导弹的定义和内涵,分析了其智能特性,接着概述了智能化导弹的结构组成,分析了各智能部件的功能和结构组成,从智能化导弹结构组成及测试参数、智能化部件的嵌入式软件作用、零部件机械加工精度等方面提出了智能化导弹质量检测的需求,并在此基础上结合智能化制造等技术提出了在线检测、自动检测/测试、BIT自检、软件测评技术以及弹载遥测的智能化导弹质量检测途径和方法。     

A cost analysis of sampling inspection under Military Standard 105D

Military Standard 105D has been almost universally adopted by government and private consumers for the lot-by-lot sampling inspection of product which may be inspected on a dichotomoun basis The plan specifies, for each lot size, a random sample size and set of acceptance numbers (maximum allowable number of defectives in each sample). The acceptance numbers are based upon the binomial distribution and depend upon the quality required by the purchaser. Where several consecutive lots are submitted, a shift to less severe (“reduced”) inspection or more severe (“tightened”) inspection is specified when the ongoing quality is very high or low. Further experience permits a return to normal sampling from either of these states This paper examines the long range costs of such a sampling scheme. The three inspection types are considered as three distinct Markov chains, with periodic transitions from chain to chain. The expected sample size and the expected proportion of rejected product are determined as a function of the two parameters under control of the manufacturer, lot size and product quality. Some numerical examples are given which illustrate how to compute the overall cost of sampling inspection. Suggestions are made concerning the choice of parameters to minimize this cost.     

On the use of standard tables to obtain Dodge-Romig LTPD sampling inspection plans

Procedures are described which yield single and double sample Dodge-Romig [1] lot tolerance percent defective (LTPD) rectifying inspection plans. For the determination of such plans only a desk calculator and standard tables of the discrete probability distributions are required. Some advantages gained by using these procedures rather than the Dodge-Romig table include: (a) The Consumer's Risk is not limited to 0.10. (b) More choices of LTPD are available. (c) Smaller average total inspection is achieved by using a plan designed for specific “process average” and lot size rather than a compromise plan designed to cover intervals on these two parameters.     

The effect of nonnormality on variables sampling plans

Acceptance sampling plans based on variables have been in use for many years. Recently, there has been a renewal of interest in these plans, because of the relative efficiencies that they offer with respect to attributes sampling regarding sample size. Furthermore, in situations where acceptable quality levels are very small, and a high level of protection is desired, variables sampling is often much more efficient than attributes sampling. An important disadvantage of variables sampling is that the distribution of the parameter being inspected must be known. Most standard variables sampling plans assume that the distribution of this parameter is normal. This article examines the effect of the normality assumption in variables sampling. Methods to detect departures from normality are reviewed.     

Efficient distributions of arms‐control inspection effort

A rule that constrains decision‐makers is enforced by an inspector who is supplied with a fixed level of inspection resources—inspection personnel, equipment, or time. How should the inspector distribute its inspection resources over several independent inspectees? What minimum level of resources is required to deter all violations? Optimal enforcement problems occur in many contexts; the motivating application for this study is the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Using game‐theoretic models, the resource level adequate for deterrence is characterized in a two‐inspectee problem with inspections that are imperfect in the sense that violations can be missed. Detection functions, or probabilities of detecting a violation, are assumed to be increasing in inspection resources, permitting optimal allocations over inspectees to be described both in general and in special cases. When detection functions are convex, inspection effort should be concentrated on one inspectee chosen at random, but when they are concave it should be spread deterministicly over the inspectees. Our analysis provides guidance for the design of arms‐control verification operations, and implies that a priori constraints on the distribution of inspection effort can result in significant inefficiencies. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

异构混合存储的软硬件协同数据放置策略

分析比较当前大数据中心典型混合存储架构,针对其不能综合运用存储管理系统和存储设备优势的问题,提出软硬件协同的数据放置策略,同时考虑软件层混合存储管理系统和硬件层混合存储设备的特点,根据应用特性为数据选择合适的存储管理系统和设备。面向不同应用场景,提出运行前规划存储路径的静态放置模式和运行中规划存储路径的动态放置模式。基于存储管理系统和设备性能参数建模,采用仿真方法实现各数据放置策略,并运行实际应用中的三类负载进行实验测试,结果表明采用软硬件协同的数据放置策略相比只考虑存储管理系统和存储设备的数据放置策略,性能可以提高近30%。     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016