Credibility over Courage: NATO's Mis-Intervention in Kosovo

NATO officials have cited various reasons for conducting their air campaign in Kosovo. Though not emphasised as much, the concern that NATO's credibility was at stake stood out as the most paramount on the basis of logical comparison. In fact, NATO intervened in Kosovo primarily to maintain its credibility as the Trans- Atlantic's only multilateral security mechanism because its continued existence depended on it. While NATO's search for its new role in the post-Cold War strategic environment has been fraught with several problems, the inclination towards collective security and crisis management has placed it in a position of proactive military obligation. Predictably, NATO's venture in the Balkans this time around has had various implications on its future prospects as an organisation.     

The Force Publique’s campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, 1892-1894

ABSTRACT

Between 1892 and 1894 the Force Publique of King Leopold II’s Congo Free State engaged in a series of little-known counter-insurgency operations against ivory and slave traders from Zanzibar, commonly referred to as Arabs. Without a particularly strong tradition of imperial service, this article argues that the predominantly Belgian officer corps borrowed and adapted methods used by more experienced colonial forces in the 19^th Century. Whether taken from existing literature or learned through experience, it reveals that the Force Publique’s counter-insurgency methods reflected many of the more recognisable aspects of traditional French and British approaches. It suggests that, despite the unique nature of each colonial campaign, basic principles could be adapted by whomsoever to overcome the military and political challenges of colonial conquest. The Force Publique’s campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, therefore, provide further evidence as to how some base theories could be universally applied.     

Countering Insurgent-terrorism: Why Nato Chose The Wrong Historical Foundation For Cimic

History teaches that counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns have never been won through purely military action. Defeating an opponent who avoids open battle, but who uses force to reach his goals, including terrorist action, requires a combination of police, administrative, economic and military measures. As a counterinsurgency campaign should pursue a comprehensive political objective, it requires high levels of civil–military cooperation. However, current NATO doctrine for Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) as it emerged from the 1990s is founded in conventional war-fighting and outdated peacekeeping doctrine. CIMIC's focus is on supporting military objectives rather than enabling the military to make a coherent contribution to political objectives. This makes CIMIC unfit for the Alliance's main operational challenges that have expanded from peace operations on the Balkans to countering insurgent terrorism in Afghanistan. When developing CIMIC, the Alliance obviously neglected the historical lessons from counterinsurgency campaigns.     

Defeating Balkan Insurgency: The Austro-Hungarian Army in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1878-82

The occupation and pacification of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austro-Hungarian forces between 1878 and 1882 constitutes a politico-military rarity: a major colonial-style campaign waged in Europe. Yet Vienna's 1878-82 operations in Bosnia - including a hard-fought, multi-corps invasion followed by a sustained counterinsurgency campaign to put down lingering resistance to Habsburg rule - remain little known even among scholars of the region and counterinsurgency experts. However, their strategic lessons are of import today, as Vienna's battlefield successes in Bosnia brought a degree of peace and stability to the region that it has rarely known in modern times. Moreover, Austro-Hungarian military leaders waged a victorious campaign in the field that strengthened political objectives, and provided a textbook example of how to vigorously wage a counterinsurgency campaign against religiously-inspired foes in harsh terrain without undermining the occupier's political legitimacy.     

The limits of covert action: SAS operations during ‘Confrontation’, 1964–66

This article evaluates the performance of the Special Air Service (SAS) during secret cross-border raids conducted as part of Britain’s undeclared war against Indonesia from 1963–1966. The analysis reviews the existing debate on the SAS’ performance during this campaign; it looks more closely at how military effectiveness might be defined; and it then examines, using the SAS’ own operations reports, the nature of their activities and their success or failure. This article concludes that critics of the SAS’ effectiveness during Confrontation are right; but for the wrong reasons. SAS operations did indeed have less effect than orthodox accounts would have it. But the reasons for this lay not in their misuse but in the exigencies of British strategy. This article demonstrates an enduring truth – no matter how ‘special’ a military force might be, tactical excellence cannot compensate reliably for problems in strategy.     

‘Getting COIN’ at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army

This article reassesses the extent to which the British Army has been able to adapt to the counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. While adopting Farrell's definition of bottom-up military adaptation, this article contends that the task force/brigade level of analysis adopted by Farrell and Farrell and Gordon has led them to overstate the degree to which innovation arising from processes of bottom-up adaptation has actually ensued. Drawing on lower level tactical unit interviews and other data, this article demonstrates how units have been unable or unwilling to execute non-kinetic population-centric operations due to their lack of understanding of the principles of counter-insurgency warfare.     

Currency Warfare and Just War: The Ethics of Targeting Currencies in War

ABSTRACT

Is Currency Warfare defined as, the use of monetary or military force directed against an enemy’s monetary power as part of a military campaign, a just way to fight a war? This article explores the ethics of waging currency warfare against the Just War Tradition’s principles of jus in bello (just conduct in war) and its criteria of discrimination and proportionality. The central argument is that currency warfare is inherently indiscriminate but may be proportionate when policy makers consider the nature of the threat confronted and the targeted currency's level of internationalization, that is, to what degree it is used in foreign transactions or used as a foreign currency reserve. I evaluate this argument against historical cases during the Second World War (1939–1945), the Gulf War (1990–1991), subsequent operations against Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s, and the ongoing campaign against ISIS.     

Through military lenses. Perception of security threats and jointness in the Italian Air Force

The article explores Italian Air Force (ITAF) officers’ perceptions of military transformation and of changes in the global security environment. While several studies have addressed the challenges faced by European armed forces in the last two decades, the methods used have been rather uniform, mostly relying on in-depth case studies through qualitative interviews and analysis of strategic documents and budgets. Using data from an original, and unique, survey conducted among ITAF captains (N = 286), this article focuses on servicemen’s attitudes towards the transformations of the global security environment and the changes occurring (and needed) within the Italian Air Force. After describing the “military view” on these topics, the article provides preliminary statistical evidence on the links between individual experiences, views, and change. The research aims to contribute to the broader debate on military transformation by adding a novel dimension of analysis and providing new insights on the micro-level aspects of learning.     

Stranglehold: The Context,Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China

The mounting challenge posed by China's military modernization has highlighted the need for the United States to analyze its ability to execute a naval blockade. A blockade strategy is viable, but it would be limited to a narrow context: the United States would have to be engaged in a protracted conflict over vital interests, and it would need the support of key regional powers. The United States would also need to implement a mix between a close and distant blockade in order to avoid imperiling the conflict's strategic context. If enacted, a blockade could exact a ruinous cost on the Chinese economy and state.     

‘Troops were then forced to fire’: British army crowd control in Palestine,November 1945

In November 1945, British army shooting during street riots and search operations in Palestine resulted in the death of 13 Jews and the injuring of dozens. The most costly in casualties caused by army fire during the whole Jewish insurgency, these incidents have nevertheless not received detailed attention in literature on the British army's counterinsurgency campaign in postwar Palestine. This article outlines British military use of firepower to control civilian crowds and the difficulties involved during these incidents, contributing to the debate on the army's principal of ‘minimum force’. It also highlights the serious problem of legitimizing opening of fire on unarmed protestors, epitomized in the army's fabricated account justifying shooting at a large crowd rushing a military cordon at Givat Hayim.     

The underlying causes of military outsourcing in the USA and UK: bridging the persistent gap between ends,ways and means since the beginning of the Cold War

This article reappraises the two most-studied country cases of military outsourcing: the USA and the UK. It argues that the contemporary wave of military contracting stretches back to the beginning of the cold war and not only to the demobilisation of armies in the 1990s or the neoliberal reforms introduced since the 1980s. It traces the political, technological and ideational developments that laid the groundwork for these reforms and practices since the early cold war and account for its endurance today. Importantly, it argues that a persistent gap between strategic objectives and resources, i.e. the challenge to reconcile ends and means, is an underlying driver of military contracting in both countries. Contemporary contracting is thus most closely tied to military support functions in support of wider foreign and defence political objectives. Security services in either state may not have been outsourced so swiftly, if at all, without decades of experience in outsourcing military logistics functions and the resultant vehicles, processes and familiarities with public-private partnerships. The article thus provides a wider and deeper understanding of the drivers of contractualisation, thereby improving our understanding of both its historical trajectory and the determinants of its present and potential futures.     

Air power in humanitarian intervention: Kosovo and Libya in comparative perspective

It would be hard to overstate the importance of air power in humanitarian intervention (HI) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Yet, the role of air power in HI and R2P has been understudied. This article seeks to remedy the lack of systematic investigation. It does so by developing a framework for assessing the effectiveness of air power during military operations in HI and R2P and applies it to NATO’s air campaigns in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force) and Libya (Operation Unified Protector). Upon examination NATO is revealed to have fared better in Libya than Kosovo in positively accomplishing its stated humanitarian objectives, minimizing collateral damage and reducing the costs for the interveners, all of which are aspects considered by the model. The relative effectiveness of Operations Unified Protector is generally attributed to geography, diplomacy and technology. It is argued that better ground support, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and burden sharing are needed to enhance the utility of air power in HI and R2P even further.     

Guerrilla warfare in Katanga: the Sanga rebellion of the 1890s and its suppression

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the origins and development of the Sanga insurgency of the 1890s with a view to demonstrating that, contrary to commonly held stereotypes, pre-colonial warfare was neither simple nor unchanging. Its tactics, it is argued here, repay the sort of close analysis commonly reserved for other typologies and theatres of war. The Yeke, against whose exploitative system of rule the Sanga and their allies rose up in 1891, survived the onslaught by entering into a strategic alliance with Lofoi, a newly established station of the Congo Free State, and its limited contingent of regular Force Publique troops. An in-depth examination of the joint Yeke-Force Publique counterinsurgency campaign leads to the conclusion that the novelty of the ‘small wars’ that accompanied the Scramble for Africa should not be overstated. In southern Katanga and, by implication, elsewhere, these confrontations were shaped by processes of mutual borrowing in which African military practices and even political aims were not necessarily subordinate to European ones.     

AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW

As an institution of state, the military in Lesotho was marred by controversy and steeped in intrigue from the start. For much of the post-colonial period the military was used as a politicised and partisan tool, which even seized power and governed in its own name. The current problem, as this brief history aims to demonstrate, is essentially two-pronged. It involves putting in place structures, mechanisms and philosophies designed to promote the military's acceptance of civil supremacy. The process should also include alterations to political society's perception of the military as a tool to be used in partisan games that almost always have calamitous outcomes. Lesotho's political development is classified in this article into four broad phases and the type of civil-military relations is assessed under each phase. The reasons for the military coup in 1986 are analysed, the emergence of a democratic order and the challenges facing this order are highlighted, and the reform measures that have thus far been instituted are evaluated. The essay concludes with a few projections into the future course of events.     

China's Military Procurement and Its Operational Implications: A Response to Yoram Evron

This article is a response to Evron's argument, offering readers another perspective to assess China's military modernization and war fighting capabilities, using the same framework and methodology. It examines three topics: China's national security and military strategy, the PLA's procurement decision-making process, and China's military support and mobilization system. It concludes that, China's military modernization is to fight and win local wars under the conditions of informatization, but if required the PLA can reliably supply large numbers of sophisticated weapons and spare parts, to wage a complex and prolonged conflict.     

战役优势参数及其应用研究

数学分析方法在军事行动计划中扮演着越来越显著的角色。对以兰彻斯特作战模型为基础的描述诸兵种合成作战的矩阵微分方程，以及由方程的控制矩阵和状态变量初值，在不解方程的情况下导出的战役优势参数进行了研究；以空战为例讨论了预测战役结局、辅助军事决策、优化兵力部署和规划火力分配等战役优势参数的主要应用；给出了对战役优势参数和数学模型的评价。     

The European community's recognition of new states in Yugoslavia: The strategic implications

The EC's recognition of new states in former Yugoslavia is considered by most analysts to have seriously aggravated the conflict in the region. This article challenges the conventional wisdom and argues that the strategic effects of recognition have been largely overstated. The prospect of recognition played no significant role in the Slovene determination to sustain their campaign for independence and therefore bears little responsibility for the first phase of the war. In Croatia, recognition ‐ together with the deployment of UN peacekeepers ‐ may even have had a mitigating effect. Only in Bosnia is there any correlation between recognition and an intensification of hostilities but it is doubtful whether non‐recognition would have prevented the eruption of violence since Bosnian Serb aspirations for an ethnically homogeneous state entity could not be realised without resort to war. The real relevance of recognition lies with the opportunities for more effective international action which it created. It was the failure to seize these opportunities, rather than the strategic effects of recognition, which better explains the tragic events that ensued.     

The Botswana Defence Force and the War against Poachers in Southern Africa

‘Semper aliquid novi Africa affert’ (out of Africa this is always something new) wrote the Roman scholar Pliny the Elder, and that has been all too true of catastrophe and misery in modern times. Yet despite Africa's problems, the continent also offers many examples of humankind's most commendable achievements. This is one such story. It is the account of the successful struggle by a small but well disciplined and well led African army to protect a vital national resource, a role performed with dedication and consistent success since 1987. The fight against poaching in Botswana is a peculiar form of low-intensity conflict that poses significant political, operational and technical challenges. This article identifies some of those challenges and notes how the Botswana Defence Force overcame them, providing an example that may profitably be emulated elsewhere. The article also calls attention to evolution of military roles and missions in reaction to the novel threats of post the Cold War world.     

Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia

In recent years, headline grabbing increases in the Indian defense budget have raised concerns that India’s on-going military modernization threatens to upset the delicate conventional military balance vis-à-vis Pakistan. Such an eventuality is taken as justification for Islamabad’s pursuit of tactical-nuclear weapons and other actions that have worrisome implications for strategic stability on the subcontinent. This article examines the prospects for Pakistan’s conventional deterrence in the near to medium term, and concludes that it is much better than the pessimists allege. A host of factors, including terrain, the favorable deployment of Pakistani forces, and a lack of strategic surprise in the most likely conflict scenarios, will mitigate whatever advantages India may be gaining through military modernization. Despite a growing technological edge in some areas, Indian policymakers cannot be confident that even a limited resort to military force would achieve a rapid result, which is an essential pre-condition for deterrence failure.     

Leadership at NATO: Secretary General Manfred Woerner and the Crisis in Bosnia

NATO's post-Cold War transformation, as well as the military alliance's decision to use force in Bosnia in 1994 and 1995, has been examined from multiple perspectives. Among an array of diplomatic, historical and political approaches, however, analysts have given little attention to the role played by NATO's top civilian leader in Brussels, the Secretary General. On the crisis in Bosnia, no research has been devoted to the leadership of Secretary General Manfred Woerner, who oversaw NATO as it moved toward aggressive military action in the Balkans. Using an approach that examines the Secretary General's leadership from three perspectives, this article provides the first assessment of Woerner's role in shaping alliance policy on Bosnia. The findings suggest that Woerner was a critical leader in influencing NATO decisions, which provides new explanations for NATO's conduct in the Balkans, and speaks to the broader literature on NATO's evolution after the Cold War.