《军械工程学院学报》2005年第17卷总目录

(括号内为:期号.页号)·兵器理论与技术·自润滑弹带挤进过程中渗出油量的对比计算………………………………………………刘俊红,许世蒙,傅苏黎,等(1.32)GPS弹道修正引信弹道环境信息的解算与数值仿真分析…………………………………………………徐建国,高敏(1.36)某型火炮复拨器拨动子应力分析及其修复研究…………………………………………………高永生,甘霖,陶凤和(1.39)GPS弹道修正引信机电安全系统与起爆控制技术研究………………………………………………高敏,徐建国,赵强(2.1)灰色模糊理论在弹药安全管理系统评价中的应用……………     

球齿轮传动的齿面接触分析和应力分析

球齿轮是一种新型的二维齿轮传动机构.在建立了球齿轮数学模型的基础上,得到了球齿轮传动的啮合模型,并进行了齿面接触特性分析,通过解非线性方程组,可得到接触点在齿面的位置.分析了球齿轮齿面的结构特征,针对球齿轮传动的接触形式表现为轮齿凸面与马鞍面之间的点接触,对啮合齿面的接触椭圆进行了分析计算,总结出了球齿轮在任一偏摆平面内啮合传动时接触椭圆的变化规律:在轮齿根部和顶部啮合时,接触椭圆较小,因而接触应力较大;而在轮齿中部啮合时,接触椭圆较大,所以接触应力较小.采用有限元的方法对球齿轮轮齿进行了弯曲应力和接触应力分析,分析结果进一步验证了接触椭圆变化规律的正确性.以上结论对进一步研究球齿轮的传动理论与实际应用具有重要的指导意义.     

多径条件下子阵级低角测高算法

针对多径条件下的测高问题,提出了一种子阵级处理新算法.采用均匀子阵划分形成三个子阵;在子阵级解析求出协方差矩阵的正交矢量,进而构造仰角谱,谱峰的位置即目标仰角;还可以估计出复反射系数.仿真分析给出了该方法的性能与SNR、目标仰角以及复反射系数的关系,某米波雷达实测数据检验了该方法的有效性,仰角测量误差达到阵列天线波束宽度的1/84.研究表明:该算法本身不依赖未知的复反射系数,并且信号处理维数低,运算量较低,可以应用在舰载雷达和米波三坐标雷达中.     

BP神经网络的布撒器末端修正

针对布撤器开舱点位置解算及子弹药减速伞延时解算所需时间长的问题,引入了BP神经网络算法,建立了子弹药的数学模型和BP神经网络解算模型,并进行了布撒器末端修正的仿真分析.仿真结果表明:运用BP神经网络算法计算的结果误差较小,并且大大缩短了在线解算的时间,进一步提升了布撤器的作战效能.     

一种稳健的自适应IIR陷波器复数级联算法

针对背景噪声中多个复正弦信号的提取问题,提出利用二阶陷波器复数算法的级联来实现,并给出了一种自适应级联算法.基于对软件复杂度和计算量的考虑,在这种算法的基础上又给出一种改进的二阶自适应陷波器级联的复数算法,大大降低了系统复杂度和计算量.仿真实验表明,两种陷波器级联算法均能很好地提取背景噪声中的复正弦信号,并准确估计复正弦信号的频率.     

信不信由你

开瓶器的前世军缘 17世纪的滑膛枪和子弹都不靠谱,子弹卡在枪膛里很常见,所以,当时有专门从枪管里拨子弹的螺旋状工具。一位在历史上没有留下姓名,但极有可能是个酒鬼的士兵意外发现,这种工具不仅能拨子弹,拔酒瓶木塞也很顺手。那个时代的“生活小窍门”同样流传甚广。据说很多士兵临到战场上子弹横飞时赫然发现,他们的拨弹螺旋器竟然被妻子留在了家里。因此之故,18世纪,英国出现了第一批专用开瓶器。     

适配子在生化分析中的应用进展

适配子具有亲和力高、特异性强、靶分子范围广、稳定性好、制备及修饰容易、可重复利用等优点,可以作为与抗体竞争的一类分子识别物质用于亲和PCR、生物传感器、适配子信标、色谱法、质谱法、毛细管电泳、流式细胞分析及荧光偏振等分析领域,显示出广阔的应用前景。     

磁致伸缩作动器的设计与性能分析

在分析超磁致伸缩材料特性的基础上设计了一种微位移作动器.通过有限元分析,对作动器的结构进行优化,得到均匀的偏置磁场和激励磁场;设计了预压力加载结构和强制冷却结构.对该作动器的动、静态性能进行了测试,结果表明:作动器基本上工作在线性区域内,其位移伸缩量大,低频动态性能较好,高频谐波分量影响较小,相位延迟较小,同时也证明了对作动器的磁场分析和结构优化是正确的.     

螺旋齿轮齿面接触应力理论计算

应用赫兹理论和齿轮啮合理论给出了螺旋齿轮齿面接触应力的计算方法和相关公式 .算例的计算结果表明螺旋齿轮齿面接触应力明显大于相近参数的圆柱斜齿轮 ,这是此类齿轮用于主传动时普遍出现齿面磨损的一个重要原因 ,因此在设计确定齿轮参数时必须校核接触应力 .     

基于多分辨分析的舰船噪声能量特征提取方法

以离散小波变换入手,利用小波分析的恒Q特性,提取了舰船噪声信号的子带能量分布特征。结果表明,由于各子带能量参数并不相互独立,基于离散小波变换的舰船噪声子带能量分布特征并不明显。因此,依据多分辨分析理论,对舰船辐射噪声信号进行了正交多分辨分解,并提取了舰船噪声子带能量分布特征。结果表明特征是显著的,该方法从整体上反映了舰船噪声信号能量分布特征。为了从细节上对噪声信号能量特征进行分析,提出了基于多分辨分析的子带能量密度特征提取方法。采用两类共8个噪声样本对噪声子带能量分布和能量密度特征提取方法进行检验,取得了比较理想的结果。     

便携式逻辑分析仪硬件平台设计

针对现有逻辑分析仪制造成本高、不便携带以及应用场合受限的问题,设计了一种基于FPGA+STM32的便携式逻辑分析平台。该平台硬件成本低、易携带等指标满足大多数测试要求。其设计核心主要包括主控芯片、被测信号采样、触发控制、数据锁存、高速存储、串口通信、TFT液晶显示等电路,其功能实现主要依靠FPGA的硬件设计和STM32的软件控制。该平台最大可实现32通道、存储深度64 K、分析速率400 MSa/s的测试要求。通过该平台可以实现被测信号的采集、缓存、分析、显示等功能。     

Contracts and coordination: Supply chains with uncertain demand and supply

Considering a supply chain with a supplier subject to yield uncertainty selling to a retailer facing stochastic demand, we find that commonly studied classical coordination contracts fail to coordinate both the supplier's production and the retailer's procurement decisions and achieve efficient performance. First, we study the vendor managed inventory (VMI) partnership. We find that a consignment VMI partnership coupled with a production cost subsidy achieves perfect coordination and a win‐win outcome; it is simple to implement and arbitrarily allocates total channel profit. The production cost subsidy optimally chosen through Nash bargaining analysis depends on the bargaining power of the supplier and the retailer. Further, motivated by the practice that sometimes the retailer and the supplier can arrange a “late order,” we also analyze the behavior of an advance‐purchase discount (APD) contract. We find that an APD with a revenue sharing contract can efficiently coordinate the supply chain as well as achieve flexible profit allocation. Finally, we explore which coordination contract works better for the supplier vs. the retailer. It is interesting to observe that Nash bargaining solutions for the two coordination contracts are equivalent. We further provide recommendations on the applications of these contracts. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 305–319, 2016     

Vertically restrictive pricing in supply chains with price‐dependent demand

We examine the behavior of a manufacturer and a retailer in a decentralized supply chain under price‐dependent, stochastic demand. We model a retail fixed markup (RFM) policy, which can arise as a form of vertically restrictive pricing in a supply chain, and we examine its effect on supply chain performance. We prove the existence of the optimal pricing and replenishment policies when demand has a linear additive form and the distribution of the uncertainty component has a nondecreasing failure rate. We numerically compare the relative performance of RFM to a price‐only contract and we find that RFM results in greater profit for the supply chain than the price‐only contract in a variety of scenarios. We find that RFM can lead to Pareto‐improving solutions where both the supplier and the retailer earn more profit than under a price‐only contract. Finally, we compare RFM to a buyback contract and explore the implications of allowing the fixed markup parameter to be endogenous to the model. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006.     

多智能体的设备采购合同管理系统建模与设计

从现代设备采购合同管理的概念出发,首先介绍了设备采购合同管理所面临的新的挑战,然后提出了基于多智能体的设备采购合同管理系统模型。多智能体系统和设备采购合同管理系统都是非常复杂的。为了降低开发基于多智能体设备采购合同管理系统的难度,采用SWARM建模方法,分析和设计了一个简化的设备采购合同管理系统。     

基于备件需求预测的两步法理论?

在对备件需求时间序列研究的基础上,结合指数平滑法和Croston法的特点,分析了指数平滑法与两步法的原理,通过对指数平滑法和两步法方差的研究,得到两步法是指数平滑法的一般形式的结论,为两步法的进一步研究提供一定的理论支撑。     

Supply contracts in manufacturer‐retailer interactions with manufacturer‐quality and retailer effort‐induced demand

We consider a decentralized distribution channel where demand depends on the manufacturer‐chosen quality of the product and the selling effort chosen by the retailer. The cost of selling effort is private information for the retailer. We consider three different types of supply contracts in this article: price‐only contract where the manufacturer sets a wholesale price; fixed‐fee contract where manufacturer sells at marginal cost but charges a fixed (transfer) fee; and, general franchise contract where manufacturer sets a wholesale price and charges a fixed fee as well. The fixed‐fee and general franchise contracts are referred to as two‐part tariff contracts. For each contract type, we study different contract forms including individual, menu, and pooling contracts. In the analysis of the different types and forms of contracts, we show that the price only contract is dominated by the general franchise menu contract. However, the manufacturer may prefer to offer the fixed‐fee individual contract as compared to the general franchise contract when the retailer's reservation utility and degree of information asymmetry in costs are high. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Supplier‐buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation

We consider the problem of designing a contract to maximize the supplier's profit in a one‐supplier–one‐buyer relationship for a short‐life‐cycle product. Demand for the finished product is stochastic and price‐sensitive, and only its probability distribution is known when the supply contract is written. When the supplier has complete information on the marginal cost of the buyer, we show that several simple contracts can induce the buyer to choose order quantity that attains the single firm profit maximizing solution, resulting in the maximum possible profit for the supplier. When the marginal cost of the buyer is private information, we show that it is no longer possible to achieve the single firm solution. In this case, the optimal order quantity is always smaller while the optimal sale price of the finished product is higher than the single firm solution. The supplier's profit is lowered while that of the buyer is improved. Moreover, a buyer who has a lower marginal cost will extract more profit from the supplier. Under the optimal contract, the supplier employs a cutoff level policy on the buyer's marginal cost to determine whether the buyer should be induced to sign the contract. We characterize the optimal cutoff level and show how it depends on the parameters of the problem. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 41–64, 2001     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

应用虚拟样机技术优化设计卡钳

分析了传统设计方法的弊端,介绍虚拟样机技术这一全新的设计方法.以应用动力学仿真软件ADAMS建造卡钳虚拟样机优化设计的实例,说明虚拟样机技术可以缩短开发周期、降低成本,提高设计质量和可靠性.     

Trade credit contract in the presence of retailer investment opportunity

This paper presents a model for designing a trade credit contract between a supplier and a retailer that would coordinate a supply chain in the presence of investment opportunity for the retailer. Specifically, we study a newsvendor model where the supplier offers a trade credit contract to the retailer who, by delaying the payment, can invest the accounts payable amount and earn returns. We find that when the channel partners have symmetric information about the retailer's investment return, a conditionally concessional trade credit (CTC) contract, which includes a wholesale price, an interest‐free period, and a minimum order requirement, can achieve channel coordination. We then extend the model to the information asymmetry setting in which the retailer's investment return is unobservable by the supplier. We show that, although the CTC contract cannot achieve the coordination in this setting, it can effectively improve channel efficiency as well as profitability for individual partners.