The origins of the cancellation of Canada's Avro CF-105 arrow fighter program: A failure of strategy

The story of the demise of Canada's remarkable CF-105 Arrow jet-fighter interceptor has been told and retold by numerous Canadian writers. As told by most, it is a tragic tale. Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, in an act as unforgivable as it was incomprehensible, not only destroyed a highly promising all-Canadian state-of-the-art aircraft but ruined all hopes of Canada ever being an important player in the North American defense industry. This article offers a contrasting interpretation — locating the problems leading to the aircraft's cancellation further back in history, and in particular in serious and determinative failures in strategic thinking and analysis by senior Canadian military officials at the time of the Arrow program's birth in 1953.     

Perspectives for the development of key industrial capabilities for Canada’s defence sector

With the Canada First Defence Strategy, Canada has put forth a major opportunity to reconcile national security imperatives and industrial policy. The Jenkins Report (2013) set out to examine ways to use that procurement effort to foster key industrial capabilities (KICs) that would put the Canadian defence industry at an advantage both nationally and internationally. The Canadian defence industry should then develop highly focused capabilities with a view to moving up global value chains. As such, KICs that hold the best potential should be selected. They should be sustained through a range of strategies that are however contingent on the elimination of policy gaps. This leads to a balancing act between the need to control intellectual property assets versus accessing them in a world where national boundaries are eroded. Canada’s industry should target opportunities outside North America while continuing to focus on better integration with the North American industry.     

The UK defence electronics industry: adjusting to change

The electronics industry provides components and capabilities that are critical to modern defence requirements. It is anticipated that the effectiveness of both weapons systems and the command and control network that supports military operations will become increasingly dependent upon the electronics sub‐systems they employ in the future. With the ascendancy of ‘network centric warfare’, it seems certain that defence electronics will continue to grow in importance in the future, enabling far‐reaching advances in military capability and efficiency. Yet little is known about the structure, conduct, performance and competitiveness of the UK defence electronics sector as it prepares to meet the challenges ahead. This paper reports the findings of a study commissioned in 2002 by Intellect, the UK defence electronics trade association, and supported by the Department of Trade and Industry. The UK defence electronics industry is found to be a high technology, R&D‐intensive and decreasing cost industry, which is competitive in world defence markets. The UK industry faces major competitive threats in the future from established US and European firms and from potential new entrants from China, India, Israel, Singapore, South Korea and Turkey. The future competitiveness of the UK defence electronics industry will depend on maintaining both technical advantage and open access to the large US market.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTERNAL DEBT,DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AND GNP REVISITED: THE CASE OF TURKEY

This paper contributes to the continuing debate on the economic effects of military expenditure by undertaking a case study of Greece. Within Europe Greece provides a particularly interesting object of study. It has the highest military burden in Europe and NATO, is the only European Union country situated in the unstable environment of the Balkans, faces a military threat from Turkey, and has a very weak economy. After some background analysis of the economy and military expenditure, the paper investigates the determinants of Greek military expenditure as well as whether the high military burden has played an important role in Greece's poor economic performance over the period 1960–1996. It estimates a Keynesian simultaneous equation model with a supply side, which allows the indirect effects of military expenditure to be captured explicitly. It concludes that the major determinants of Greek defence spending are not economic but strategic (the threat of war) and that the direct effect of defence spending on economic growth as well as the indirect effects through savings and trade balance are all significantly negative. On the basis of such strong results, the paper concludes that defence spending is harmful for the Greek economy.     

Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic?

In contrast with a widespread perception of Russia as an expansionist power in the Arctic, this article argues that Moscow does not seek military superiority in the region. Rather, Moscow's military strategies in the Arctic pursue three major goals: first, to demonstrate and ascertain Russia's sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region; second, to protect its economic interests in the High North; and third, to demonstrate that Russia retains its great power status and still has world-class military capabilities. The Russian military modernization programs are quite modest and aim at upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capabilities or provoking a regional arms race. The Russian ambitions in the Arctic may be high, but they are not necessarily implying the intentions and proper capabilities to confront other regional players by military means. On the contrary, Moscow opts for soft rather than hard power strategy in the Arctic.     

France and its allies: A comparative study of defence spending trends since 1985*

Within the EU France devotes to defence the largest financial and human resources although it is not the richest country, nor has it the largest population or labour force. The cost of nuclear weapons accounts for only a small fraction of this abnormally high French defence effort. If France had restructured its military capabilities at the same rate as its principal Allies during the 1985–1994 period, then French defence outlays would be about 20% less than at present. The fundamental reasons for France's excess defence outlay comprise virtual total dependence on French sources for equipment, produced in very small numbers; a military presence outside of Europe; and too many personnel. These deficiencies, and the consequent absence hitherto of a “peace dividend”, indicate a failure to identify the country's real strategic requirements, and a lack of will to reorganise efficiently French defence. The recently announced reform towards an all‐professional force is unlikely to achieve the potential and desirable improvement in cost‐effectiveness.     

NATO's Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences and the War in Afghanistan

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has since the turn of the new century experienced a double transformation gap: between global and regionally oriented allies and between allies emulating new military practices defined by the United States and allies resisting radical change. This article takes stock of these gaps in light of a decade's worth of collective and national adjustments and in light of counter-insurgency lessons provided by Afghanistan. It argues first of all that the latter transatlantic gap is receding in importance because the United States has adjusted its transformation approach and because some European allies have significantly invested in technological, doctrinal, and organizational reform. The other transformation gap is deepening, however, pitching battle-hardened and expeditionary allies against allies focused on regional tasks of stabilization and deterrence. There is a definite potential for broad transformation, our survey of officers' opinion shows, but NATO's official approach to transformation, being broad and vague, provides neither political nor military guidance. If NATO is to move forward and bridge the gap, it must clarify the lessons of Afghanistan and embed them in its new Strategic Concept.     

South Africa's threat environment: a guide for the National Planning Commission

Abstract

The mandate of South Africa's recently appointed National Planning Commission includes addressing ‘defence and security matters’. This article seeks to outline the central elements of the threat environment facing South Africa in the foreseeable future. It is argued that South Africa faces no meaningful existential threat from conventional military forces but that its security forces will need to be prepared to address possible raids and attacks by conventional military forces both on home soil and on vital interests beyond the nation's borders. Other threats highlighted include the threats posed by potential insurgencies, by terrorism, and by crime, social unrest and banditry. Also addressed is the danger of so-called hybrid threats, in which two or more of the single threat types outlined here are combined. Finally, the article challenges the National Planning Commission to rethink South Africa's policy on peace operations in the light of the need to ensure the safety and security of the nation's citizenry.     

Explaining US and British performance in complex expeditionary operations: The civil-military dimension

A nation's structure and culture of civil-military relations are important and largely overlooked factors in explaining the performance of armed forces involved in complex expeditionary operations. The US model of ‘Huntingtonian’, divided civil-military structures and poor interagency cooperation, makes the US military less suited for complex expeditionary operations. British civil-military relations involve a Defence Ministry that conscientiously integrates military and civilian personnel, as well as extensive interagency cooperation and coordination. This ‘Janowitzean’, integrated form of civil-military relations makes the British military more likely to provide for the planning and implementation of comprehensive campaigns that employ and coordinate all instruments of power available to the state, as well as troops in the field displaying the flexibility and cultural and political understanding that are necessary in complex expeditionary operations.     

Japan as a Seapower: Strategy,Doctrine, and Capabilities under Three Defence Reviews, 1995–2010

Abstract

This article draws upon previously unavailable document materials to question views pointing to a degree of stagnation in Japanese maritime thinking. It similarly reviews claims about trends to compensate the decline of national military power with the build-up of projection capabilities. The article’s main argument is that Japanese seapower is not declining. The Japanese Navy is evolving to combine enhanced capabilities to retain sea control in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea with extended operational reach and flexibility, including an expeditionary component to meet alliance and diplomatic commitments in East Asia and beyond its confines.     

Country survey: Angola

This paper is a survey of Angola’s defence sector and policy from 1992, the year the civil war ended, to 2012. Angola achieved its independence upon the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) defeating National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Since then, fuelled by its rich natural resources, the country has grown steadily. The MPLA military forces were a central factor behind independence and maintain their central role to this day. Moreover, Angola’s support for African peace with monitoring military missions is a clear indication that the country aims to intervene in African security and military issues, with its military capabilities funded by oil revenues.     

Country survey XII: South Africa

This article examines the relationship between defence expenditure and economic performance in South Africa, both prior to and after that country's first fully democratic election in 1994. Prior to 1994 defence expenditure decisions were largely dominated by non‐economic factors; since then defence spending has declined in reaction to, inter alia, the need to address a number of socio‐economic inequities.

After 1975 in particular, military industrialisation in South Africa placed a disproportionately high burden on the country's industrial resources and natural economic and technical capabilities. However, although this suggests that the opportunity cost of domestic arms production has been fairly high, the country's poor economic and development performance since the mid‐1970s is a function of underlying structural deficiencies and institutional constraints rather than the consequence of inordinately high defence spending levels.     

Iron Cannot Fight 1 – The Role of Technology in Current Russian Military Theory

Contemporary Russian military theory is dominated by three schools of thought: the ‘traditionalists’, the ‘modernists’ and the ‘revolutionaries’. On the role of technology in future warfare, the traditionalists argue for both high tech and massive forces at the same time. The modernists are ready to trade manpower for technology, whereas the revolutionaries give technology full priority. Both the traditionalists and the modernists believe Russia, because of the country's technological lag and limited resources, should respond asymmetrically to the Western technology challenge. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, maintain that Russia must respond in kind. If not, the country will no longer be able to defend its sovereignty. The currently ongoing radical reform of the Russian military is a partial victory for the modernists, but which model or mix of models that will dominate in the future is first of all dependent on the Russian military's purchasing power and the state of the domestic defence industry.     

Country survey XVII: New zealand's defence policy

New Zealand's current defence strategy, first expressed in NZ Government (1991), is one of "self-reliance in partnership". We outline the country's defence policy in historical context, examine its current defence expenditure and capabilities, and document the genesis of recent major changes in security policy. We pay particular attention to the role of explicit economic analysis and advice in the formation of these policy changes.     

North Korea's ‘first’ nuclear diplomacy, 1993–94

North Korea's nuclear diplomacy in 1993–94 was its first long, complex, and sophisticated military–diplomatic compaign, in which it sought to obtain both displomatic and economic benefits. Although North Korea could not achieve all of its goals, its endeavour was quite successful overall. North Korea's nuclear development, deterrent capabilities, the limits of the international nuclear regime, and the lack of transparency in the North Korean system played important roles in this.     

The Serbian defence institution: the need for clear policy guidance to improve the Serbian defence planning,management, and command processes

ABSTRACT

The uncritical layering of western liberal defence governance norms and concepts on top of existing legacy concepts has impeded achieving coherent military capabilities and capacities when Serbia’s political and military leadership tried to reform the defence system using Western benchmarking principles and Western countries’ best practices. The process of this change has been more valuable than its actual output, as defined by increased capabilities. Such outcomes should be reflective of policy guidance, and can be thought of as closing the trinity loop of a defence planning system: plans, money and execution. This article addresses two key functional areas of the Serbian defence institution. First, it assesses the current state of defence planning to discern its strengths and weaknesses to ascertain if plans are tied to financial decision-making. Second, a full examination of current Serbian defence management is conducted to discern whether weaknesses exist that distract from producing operational capabilities. Both areas are analyzed thoroughly and some solutions for change are proposed. Also, the article analyzes the appearance of two negative phenomena in the planning process – economization and managerialism.     

Constraining missile defence†

Assessing missile defence through the prism of offence–defence theory requires primarily an examination of legal and structural constraints on future development. New weapons technology is frequently cited as having the most critical impact on the offence–defence balance. Yet, the method for assessing the introduction of a new weapons technology tends to neglect projected maturity and instead focus excessively on the initial rudimentary capabilities. It is argued here that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) missile defence is set to incrementally become more advanced in terms of quality, quantity and mobility, which is supported by a strategy that is increasingly favouring offence. As the system gradually enhances the offensive advantage vis-à-vis Russia, NATO categorically rejects any legal or structural constraints on future deployments.     

Are the Baltic States and NATO on the right path in deterring Russia in the Baltic?

ABSTRACT

The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia.     

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: TRENDS IN COST AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR UK AEROSPACE

This paper, intended to stimulate debate, suggests that we are at a turning point in the history of the UK military aerospace industry. It argues that there is urgent need for a fresh vision as to how the UK military aerospace industry can both prosper and make its maximum contribution to the defence of Britain. Further, the resulting plans and policies must emphasise the robustness of defence capabilities in a future in which the only thing we can be certain is that it will be very different from the present – especially whenever defence most matters.     

The Demand for Turkish Defence Expenditure

Although a number of studies concerning Turkish defence-growth relation have been published in recent years, little attention is given the demand for Turkish defence expenditure. This is an important issue for understanding which variables contribute to the determination of the demand for military expenditure. However, it is difficult to develop a general theory or a standard empirical approach for the determination of the demand military expenditure. This study models and estimates the demand for Turkish defence expenditure for the period 1951-1998 using autoregressive distributed lag approach to cointegration (ARDL) following the methodology outlined in Pesaran and Shin (1999). This procedure can be applied regardless of the stationary properties of the variables in the sample and allows for inferences on long-run estimates, which is not possible under alternative cointegration procedures. The findings suggest that Turkish defence spending is determined by NATO's defence spending, Greece's defence spending and some security considerations.